

Borromean (De)Knot in Jorge Luis Borges's “Funes, the Memorious”

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Abstract In Lacanian theory, the Borromean knot is formed by the three linked rings of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real such that each ring controls and blocks the other two from drifting apart. Later, Lacan introduces the Sinthome as the fourth ring for subject analysis. This paper concentrates on a condition in which the rings fall apart. Terms of the orders (RSI), together with the Sinthome, are discussed exemplifying Borges's “Funes, the Memorious,” seeing it a literary representation of the Borromean de-knot. The article also considers itself with a discussion about postmodernism as a social and cultural condition for the Borromean knot unmade, unfolded, and unwrapped.

Key words Lacan; Borges; Borromean knot; the Imaginary; the Symbolic; the Real; the Sinthome; subject

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Introduction

Jorge Luis Borges is considered, first and foremost, in relation to Magical Realism and postmodernism. Fantasy, mystery, and philosophical contemplation are inseparable elements of his fiction. His works blur the lines between reality and fantasy, text and literary work, writer and reader, literature and philosophy. He has

novel ideas on imagination, fictionality, truth, reality, translation, and criticism. His works delve into issues that have never been under the direct focus of literature. Most of them take the issues of time, labyrinth, infinitude, possible worlds, etc. as their subject matter and not only give them a literary sense but also develop them further. His fictions both enter these issues into the domain of literature and represent the capacity of literature to go beyond limits of their former fields of study. Thus, these approaches in his works give his writing a special style and character: philosophical in dealing with different worlds; fantastic in referring to dreams and imagination; mysterious when concerning with mirrors and labyrinths; and blended in taking into account distinctive genres and issues. His *Ficciones* (1944) which includes some of his notable and anthologized fictions such as "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," "The Library of Babel," etc. represent above-mentioned characteristics in his literary works.

This study focuses on "Funes, the Memorios." It is the tale of Ireneo Funes who becomes capable of remembering every image, word, memory, or better to say, everything after he falls from a horse and injures his head. This study is a Lacanian analysis of 'Borromean knot' in the story. The idea has always been that Borges posits his stories on philosophical theories. In this article, the argument is not whether Borges posits "Funes, the Memorios" on Lacan's philosophy and Psychoanalysis, but rather to analyze the story in regard to Lacanian theory. It has two objectives: firstly to study orders (the imaginary, the symbolic, and the Real) introduced by Jacques Lacan and their interlocked relationship in his theory 'Borromean knot'; and secondly, to cast light on the idea that the postmodern is a condition when the interrelation between orders is undone. Thus, this study is mapped firstly by introducing Lacanian psychoanalysis and reviewing Lacan's concepts of the Imaginary order, the Symbolic order, the Real, and the Borromean knot. Later, the article seeks to examine Borges's fiction "Funes, the Memorios" following structure of subject in terms of the three orders. And lastly, it attempts to explore the postmodern as a condition when the knots come undone.

The Three Orders and the Sinthome

Lacanian reasoning and ideology flourished in mid-twentieth century to cover vast areas of study as a critical theory. Scholars often categorize the Lacanian non-traditional psychoanalysis theory as generally consisting of three phases of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. The Imaginary order, as a pre-verbal stage, is the "world of images," the "world of perception" (Tyson 27). As the title speaks for itself, the Imaginary order provides the child with an illusory sense

of supervision and master power as a result of an unbreakable bond with his/her mother; “a union of mutual satisfaction” (ibid), or what Lacan labels as the desire for mother. The importance of the Imaginary stages lies in two interesting factors, the first of which focuses on the way the child’s senses, although highly illusive, do emerge as independent of Lingual supports, and later points to the child’s experience, as his/her very first and initial version of a social experience. Next comes the Verbal stage, which concerns itself with Lacanian Symbolic and Real orders. Symbolic order can be regarded as a socio-culturally pre-structured world of intended symbolism, in which the child’s primary experiences of break from the previous illusive world of images occur through “the experience of loss” (Tyson 28). Interestingly enough, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, the “use of language in general, in fact implies a loss, a lack, because I wouldn’t need words as stand-ins for things if I still felt that I was an inseparable part of those things” (ibid 29), since one needs words to reflect up on concepts. It worth noting that language primarily suggests a sense of separation to the child through the subject of “I,” as an independent entity and not united with anyone else which then tends to intensify its domain by associating and attributing socio-cultural codes of gender, nationality, religion, etc. In line with his notion of Repression, Lacan proposes his famous theory of language acquisition, through assimilating it with the unconscious in construction process. He asserts that both notions operate under the service of the primary lost object. Lacan also, benefits from the symbolic and metaphorical nature of language as a proof to reflect up on the notion of absence or the loss. In a broader scope, Symbolic order functions as the phase which “dominates human culture” (Tyson 31), by having indulged the social values and ideological systems, to which an individual’s emersion happens. And finally the third and the last phase is the Real order. As another sub-category of the Verbal stage, the Real order lives as a highly complex concept. The Real is what exists beyond our comprehension, hence, fluctuating our previous sense of environmental mastery and supervision. The Real is the “uninterpretable dimension of existence; it is existence without the filters and buffers of our signifying, or meaning-making system” (ibid). In other words, the Real is the pure sense of an individual’s experience, independent of socio-cultural boundaries or the man-made system of meaning making and definable logic.

Following Lacan’s model of developmental psychic, he showed opulent interest in the discussion of the three interrelated phases of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. He proposed a three-dimensional model of the spheres in which each phase is drew as a ring. However, the rings represent rims, or holes in

a “body,” around which desire flows. Lacan’s idea here is that the psyche is itself a “body” or space whose boundaries are defined by its rims. The figure that these rims form, the navel of Lacan’s psyche, is known technically as a Borromean knot” (Wertheim 1). Wertheim also refers to the psychoanalytical definition of the Lacanian Borromean Knot as:

[K]nots are objects composed of a single “closed curve in space that does not intersect itself anywhere.” Objects like the Borromean which are composed of more than one interlinked element are thus not technically knots but rather, they are “links.” However, the longevity of the Borromean figure’s designation as a knot means that it is interchangeably known as the Borromean knot, the Borromean link, and even the Borromean rings . . . We may also add a fourth ring to the configuration, to derive a figure known as the Borromean lock. (Wertheim 2)

Hypothesized after Lacan’s encounter with James Joyce, the existence of the fourth ring seemed inevitable to Lacan, however, it is paradoxically interesting to mention that the fourth link added as lock, rather than an interrelated link. Lacan calls the fourth link the Sinthome, to further define it as the complex which must be unlocked and resolved in order for a human psyche to operate based on its normal psychological bases. As a surrealist, he believed in psychoanalysis, mostly as a practice of “philosophy and the arts, and later to mathematics” (Homer 6), rather than a medical practice. In this way, analysis for Lacan is “the operation of this unlocking — the separation of the Sinthome from the body of the psychic link” (Wertheim 4).

Borromean (De)Knot in “Funes, the Memorious”

In his later seminars, Lacan uses the Borromean knot to picture and clarify the interconnections between the three orders of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Each ring represents one of the three orders such that they are interjoined and tied, while each has its specific and exclusive elements, property, and condition at the same time. The Borromean knot is a union of three rings in such a way that a single ring intersects and interferes in the domain of other rings. They are structured in a way that each ring holds the other two from falling apart. The structure of the Borromean knot is such that by undoing or unchaining of any one ring will release all the others. The Borromean knot is developed and explained in different seminars by Lacan and is provided by distinctive theoretical points of

view. However, as Luke Thurston maintains, “a certain structure is seen to repeat itself: in the knot, three terms are bound together by a fourth, which is at once a part of the knot and paradoxically beyond it” (“Ineluctable Nodalities” 140). This fourth knot or ring is the Sinthome that holds other three knots together. As the three orders of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary constitute the structure of subject, the Sinthome prevents the subject from drifting apart by separation of/from each order. Thus, the Sinthome’s function is beyond meaning. The idea is that each order in the development of subject may become disrupted or unbalanced (as each knot is in continuous threat to be undone) and the Sinthome here functions as safety knot that keeps knots together.

Lacan does not mention anything about a condition where the fourth ring or knot is undone and unchained or he does not prospect explicitly what may happen under this condition. Nevertheless, it is not a far-fetched possibility and can be demonstrated and justified through his ideas on subject and the three orders. The possibility of such a condition is expressed in “Funes, the Memorious” by Jorge Luis Borges. In the story, everything starts with falling from a horse and head injury. Falling from a horse is important as far as it is the event that all consequences should be seen through. Falling from the horse is parallel to falling of the Sinthome apart from other knots. The idea is that there may be events or conditions in which the ring that holds human subjectivity in proper order and appropriate condition becomes unchained. By drifting the Sinthome’s apart, there is the condition of Borromean de-knot in which the three orders of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary fall apart. Borges in “Funes, the Memorious” demonstrates Borromean de-knot and the state of subject for in the three orders after getting undone from each other.

The Sinthome designates lack, trouble, gap, departure, inconsistency, digression, inhibition, and restriction. They are permanent on experiences of subject that are connected in one way or another with the three orders. They are necessities of existence and life of subject. The Sinthome holds the orders in knot through these experiences. Thus, with the unchaining of the Sinthome, every lack, departure, deviation, and constraint is removed. After the incident in “Funes, the Memorious”, Funes is free of these experiences. He is able to remember everything in detail and he is not in restrictions of forgetting. He is competent in system-making and he has no boundary in language. He is encircled with information in a way that he is surrounded with everything that influences perception and understanding. His life is consummated, indiscrete, inseparate, and connected in a way that seems he is in union with the Other. The main fact in his problematic

subjectivity is that he feels no impossibility, incompleteness, or inconsistency (Solano-Suarez in *The Later Lacan* 99-103). These features are an integral part of a subject who is in perpetual endeavor to reach the Other. The Sinthome is identical with lack in a way that it is involved in a never-ending process of replacement and substitution in order to fulfill lack. As far as there is lack which is part of the three orders of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, the Sinthome is unavoidable, and in so doing there is no subject without the Sinthome (Soler in *Cambridge companion* 90). In the story, Funes is a person who does not feel any lack either in his memories or in his relationship with language. The idea is that the Sinthome always replaces lack with something else which is followed by jouissance. The Sinthome is the knot of bringing satisfaction although it is partial and temporary. This is the reason Funes is in continuous suffering. As he does not have any lack in his perceptions and understanding, he cannot replace something for it in order to feel jouissance. He is in pain as he stays in dark smokes and is not able to sleep, to focus, to generalize. Another point is that jouissance has different conditions that are related to three orders of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary. As Soler in "The Paradoxes of the Symptom in Psychoanalysis" adds:

If the symptom designates whatever participates in jouissance, it may or may not be in conformity with the norms of discourse; jouissance has more than one modality. We have to distinguish along with the jouissance of the pure letter (something symbolic transformed into something real) and the jouissance of meaning (a mixture between symbolic and imaginary elements), that which is neither of the letter nor of meaning. A jouissance that remains alien to any form of symbolization, that in no way reaches the unconscious but may haunt the imaginary form of the body, is what we may call the Real. There are thus not just one but three modes of jouissance, which leads to another question: are they linked or not? In fact, the Borromeian knot provides an answer. (93)

In fact, the Borromeian knot gives answer to Funes' problem in a way that this condition does not provide him with normal and regular subjectivity. He is not able to experience any kind or modality of jouissance relevant to the three orders. Funes has problems with letters, meaning, and symbolizing due to the fact that the Sinthome linking the orders together is separated.

The Sinthome gives means to subject to create identity. Funes is not able to define a self-identity after falling from horseback due to the fact that he becomes

all other. He comes to be mere reflection and projection in a way that he is not able to individuate himself. He is a state that everything flows into him, fill him up, and make an image into him without the possibility of conception. He is suffering from mass of thoughts, senses, and perceptions that burden on him. In a normal way, these burdens are circulating in mind but in him, they occupy a space and make property. In so doing, he is encumbered with non-essential inputs. The mass of thought and senses inflame him and he gradually feels losing self-unity. In other words, where the procedure should be from inputs to deciphering to meaning, and there to making identity, in Funes it is interrupted because of the Sinthome separated. Thus, there cannot be subject or self in Funes and his mind and body become just a storage and burden of images and senses.

The RSI in Borromean De(knot) in “Funes, the Memorious”

Now the question is what happens to the orders of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary when the Sinthome is drifted away? It is obvious that with separation of the Sinthome that knots together the three orders, the other knots relevant to orders will become disconnected. There, each order works independently that in one way or another influences the subject, as Funes reveals “that before that rainy afternoon when the blue-grey horse threw him, he had been what all” subjects “are: blind, deaf, addlebrained, absent-minded” (Borges 72). In this condition, the released orders function in retrospect and irregular as Borges represents about Funes in the story.

It is possible to say that Lacanian Real is the most remote imagination of the human being to attain what is inaccessible. There can be some attempts and some achievements in fulfilling it, but the Real is untaken and cannot be occupied. Funes enlists some of these prodigious accomplishments regarding memory “recorded in the *Naturalis historia*: Cyrus, king of the Persians, who could call every soldier in his armies by name; Mithridates Eupator, who administered the law in the twenty-two languages of his empire; Simonides, inventor of the science of mnemonics; Metrodorus, who practiced the art of faithfully repeating what he had heard only once” (72). Even these memories are not that much amazing to Funes. With history and time passing, it seems the reality demands something to go beyond limits of time and place for the reason that the Real is somewhere beyond limitations (of time, place, etc.). With the assumption of the Real knot separated from other knots, the argument is not that the subject can have access to the Real. In this case, the subject becomes the target of more limitations of the reality, although seemingly Funes is limitless in memory and perception. Little by little, Funes is prisoned in

details, forms, images, shapes, numbers, signs, and ciphers. It is implied in Lacan's ideas that the Real functions a gradual development and progress for the reality. With its absence, subject of the reality becomes confused, perplexed, purposeless, and useless. Where the Real is "an absolute fullness, a pure plenum devoid of the negatives of absences, antagonism, gaps, lacks, splits" (Web: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) with Funes' own statements "I alone have more memories than all mankind has probably had since the world has been the world." And: "My dreams are like you people's waking hours." And again, toward dawn: "My memory, sir, is like a garbage heap."

It can be concluded that he is in pseudo-Real or stimulated-Real in a way that it seems there is no absence, hole, break, discontinuity, deficiency. This condition brings about "indefatigable" reality for him which is "a multiform, instantaneous and almost intolerably precise world" (73). In Lacan's idea, the Real is resistant to recognition, experience, and perception that urges and pressures the subject to attain unknown and impossible. It drives the subject to think and achieve with effort. However in the case of losing the Real knot and its replacement with stimulated-real, the subject feels superiority and dominance and stops him from development as it is the similar in Funes who With no effort, he had learned English, French, Portuguese and Latin. I suspect, however, that he was not very capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions. In the teeming world of Funes, there were only details, almost immediate in their presence. In other words, one of the main implications regarding the order of Real is competency and capacity of forgetting. The Real of Lacan is a state forgotten; it is inaccessible due to the fact that it is forgotten. The balance between memory (part of the process in the Imaginary order) and forgetting is the necessity of a proper subjectivity. Funes suffers from disproportion between memory and forgetting which can be projected to disproportion between the Imaginary and the Real (Bell 123-9). The proper subjectivity and mentality is guaranteed with proper relationship between the Imaginary and the Real and their interconnection in the Borromean knot as Soler sates "The disease of "mentality" is another conceptual innovation generated from the Borromean knot; it designates an emancipation of the Imaginary unburdened of the Real" (95).

The Symbolic is the order related to language and speech. One of Lacan's main contributions to psychoanalysis is probably his idea on the state of language and unconscious. He believes "*the unconscious is language*, meaning that language is that which makes up the unconscious" (Fink 8). In the story, "when he [Funes] fell, he became unconscious," it seems his unconscious state is not momentary

because of accident, yet becomes permanent due to the fact that “when he came to, the present was almost intolerable in its richness and sharpness” (72). Thus, Funes is all in unconscious. Unconscious is characterized by repression. No repression is seen in Funes’ new state after falling from horse. He is never conscious to himself and surrounding; the boundary which is upon the subject by dependence of the orders to each other through the Sinthome. Another reason for saying that Funes is in his ultimate unconscious is that “The unconscious cannot forget, composed of “letters” working, as they do, in an autonomous, automatic way; it preserves in the present what has affected it in the past, eternally holding onto each and every element, remaining forever marked by all of them” (Fink 20). Funes’ attempt to define his memories by ciphers indicates the same function unconscious does in working through past and letters. When it is said that Funes is a subject in his unconscious, the implication is not that normal subjects are separated from their unconscious. But what is meant is that unconscious is not present to normal subjects all the time as it is for Funes. Funes is incapable of forgetting and detaching from unconscious. In other words, Lacan believes in human being as a split subject between conscious and unconscious. Yet, Funes is the total subject of unconscious. What Funes’ plan and accomplishment, in regard to language, tells reader that Funes’ ability of language is paralyzed as:

Locke, in the seventeenth century, postulated (and rejected) an impossible language in which each individual thing, each stone, each bird and each branch, would have its own name; Funes once projected an analogous language, but discarded it because it seemed too general to him, too ambiguous. (74)

The Symbolic is an order signifying the importance and function of language to the human subject. Language is prefigured in absence as a system in chain of signifying in which every signifier refers to another signifier. But Funes makes a system of language where every signifier is independent and autonomic, and the chain of signifying is abandoned. Another important fact about the Symbolic order is that it emphasizes on lack as the main element in language in a way no signifier has a lasting existence since it is the subject of other which is the object of perpetual change. Where human being is subject to lack with language (or any other system of symbolization) through his delivery to habits, practices, rules, laws, connections, norms, orders, and structures, Funes is resistant as he makes a specific kind of enumeration and a language which is as private as possible. His lack is

fulfilled through signifiers that he creates; they are signifiers that signify everything to him and nothing to collective order. He attempts to be resistant to lack by the way of causing clash to systems of signification. In this way, language loses its collective and conventional feature and is expanded to particulars resulting from many images and perceptions. So, with a private language, communication fails due to the fact that there are many signifiers unfamiliar to others. This is the way with a nominalist, as Stewart mentions:

the most real things are the particulars which he [Funes] perceives with his sensory apparatus and which he stores in his memory. The fundamental characteristic of knowledge according to nominalism is, of course, particularity since it is concrete particular images or representations which are given in perception and memory. (78)

The Imaginary order is even more crucial for subjectivity as it is the order that binds the Symbolic and the Real to each other due to the fact that it is the register that shapes reality for a subject in a way that Libbrecht says "one thing is certain: without the imaginary there can be no human reality as such" (*Lacanian Terms* 91); a reality based on the mistakes of the Symbolic and the Real to one another. In other words, mistakes bring about misrecognitions and miscognitions (they are typified as distorted and transivised) that configure reality for subject. Regarding nonexistence of mistake in Funes because of fault and dysfunction in his orders of the Symbolic and the Real, the question is what happens to his reality? Simply, his knowledge of reality becomes paranoiac due to fact that there is no consistency of image for him. Funes is trapped in inconsistency of images such as "the forms of southern clouds," "mottled streaks on a book," "outlines of the foam raised by an oar," "in dreams," "a circle drawn on a blackboard, a right triangle, a lozenge," "changing fire and its innumerable ashes," "many faces of a dead man" (72-3) that frames before his eyes quickly and nonstop.

The Imaginary is accompanied by the premise of the unitary image, legacy of mirror stage, prepare for real mastery in the subject. Thus, the real mastery becomes an everlasting illusion in subject that anticipates recognition and access to that totality. This illusion is replaced by objects of other in real and is signified through signifiers through language. In other words, the effect of the Imaginary order is the possibility of reaching and having the original image. Funes feels having the experience of the original image and total unity. He recognizes of his self as unified and integrated. Thereby, it can be concluded that Funes is in the

state of an infant before the experience of mirror stage. He is not able to obviously separate his I from other. It is the reason his state seems like an ideal state. Funes is not able to distinguish himself from the world, to recognize the lines of his body from other forms in surrounding, to see the self separate from other things.

This process of retrospect (of course mentally and imaginatively, not biologically) in the orders to the mirror stage of Funes can be justified as a reduction of subjectivity to mere I. His I “is a (false) unity consisting of” image “in which various (ideal) images are overlaid and amalgamated” (Chiesa 16) such that Funes confuses them with himself. The shortcut from Funes’ life and his memory can be abridged to Roudinesco’s article on the mirror stage “The Mirror Stage: An Obliterated Archive,” where he is able to remember everything. This experience is not just limited to imaginary story narrated by Borges. There have been many reports from near-death experiences from different people in different spots of the world in which they see frames of their life and memories that passed before their eyes. Or in religious ideas, there is an understanding and insight that people are asleep or in dream but wake up upon death. Funes’ near-death experience (falling from horse) and at last death are literary reading of Borges to these reports and insights. But Funes’ story is an example for falling in Borromean knot at an individual level. Can falling in Borromean knot be a collective condition?

Borromean (De)Knot and Postmodern Condition

Samuel Beckett’s writings resist to world making which is fundamentally linguistic. His writings reduce human being and his relations to bareness where there cannot be a stable system for identification that language is one of them. His characters are not able to detach themselves from the burden of self in order to enter into the realm of society. Therefore, they become estrange to history, time, and space as what happens and they sense is just existence of Now. Robert Coover, a postmodern author, blurs the boundaries of image, fiction, and real with proposing alternative narratives in order to represent the gap between events and their interpretations which is significant to identity and identification. Coover, in other words, depicts unrepresentability. His fictions are like language games played on real and fictional characters that they find themselves in disordered and disorganized world. William H. Gass concerns in his novels with the relationships of language, body, and mind. His fiction *Emma Enters a Sentence of Elizabeth Bishop’s* is about a girl who hates her body and becomes the object of language in a way that she leaves her self and becomes an absolute alterity; or better to say an utter signifier. Most of the postmodern literary works concerning traumatic effects of events such as war and

colonialism also prefigures experience of Borromean de-knot. Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse-Five* represents the traumatic effect of war on memory and consequent time cracks. The linguistic and spacial problems embedded to Friday's identity are the direct effect of colonialism that Coetzee points in his novel *Foe*. The hyperreality of the worlds of images and language calls to mind Borromean de-knot in Paul Auster's *The New York Trilogy* as these worlds seem to be loosed and separated from each other. What is significant to these postmodern works is the presence of events that result in Borromean de-knot in which time and identity shatter.

From the viewpoints of theoreticians on postmodern condition, it is possible to say that it is a condition in which Borromean knot is fallen, and it vehemently influences and dominates human subjects. Terms of unmaking, unwrapping, unfolding, and unrepresentability entailed with terms such as decentering, dissemination, destabilizing, and deconstructing can justify de-knot in postmodern condition. Unrepresentability is one of the main features of postmodern condition that undermines every attempt for representation, modes of following, and mimesis. The subject is trapped in manifold plays and interplays which promise attainment of the Real which are in fact pseudo-Reals. It takes place by the fact that the signifier is released from its commitment to signified which has been the principle of representation. Postmodern condition "extends the reign of the signifier into culture in general and poses a more radical 'loss' of the signified; it casts doubt on the function and ability of language to organize and control meanings in socio-cultural domain; it recasts the role of the social mass as held within the reason of ideology; and it emphasizes consumption, seeing it as a play which constantly eludes the rational explanation of theory" (*Postmodern Literary Theory* 260). Subsequently, the assumption that there is the Real preceding to signification and resisting to symbolization is abandoned, and the world is filled with many simulated-Reals that substitute the Real. For this, "first the referent (the world outside the text) disappears. Then the signified and we are left in a world of radically 'empty' signifiers. No meaning. No classes. No History. Just a ceaseless procession of simulacra" (Hebdige 164).

Ways of world making, which in Lacanian point of view is prefigured in language, is not possible anymore. In other words, postmodern condition with Borromean de-knot is against prefigurativism, against forms, models, and modes that influence and prolong human relations, practices, hypothesis, intentions, decisions, and actions. In so doing, all conventions, customs, usages, laws, orders, authorities, and rules are abandoned and delegitimized. In other words, it is a

condition in which there is resistance to codes of ciphering and frameworks that have been defined as modes of classification and categories through which the acts of naming, theorizing, including, and excluding are played. As a result, there cannot be a stable system.

It can be said with Borromean de-knot, the inner space of the subject becomes a whole, unbroken and undivided, while the outer space of subject is characterized as fragmented, partial, and plural. Subject, thus, is in generalized immanence dominated by unconscious. He is not able to detach himself from what is within his self to go beyond. In other words, self becomes a whole with no divisions, partitions, distinctions, hierarchies, and classes. The boundaries and lines between self and things disappear and the subject sees himself part of an image which is in appearance unified but made up of many other images. Where the subject is supposed to create a relationship between his I and the world, he is absorbed in the identificatory process of dissolving into images and things. “Thus the ‘I’ is nothing more than a fictive entity, an optical illusion, a hologram hanging in the air, created at the flickering point where the lazer beams of memory and desire intersect. The subject simply ceases...this is the Postmodern Condition” and this is “the ‘death of subject’” (Hebdige 164).

This condition is the realm with autonomy of images. The reality is not available through signifiers (this phase is not reachable at all) but the images constitutes a reality which is two-dimensional and flat. The dimension of symbolization is not feasible because detachment and separation from the world of image is not possible. Thus “no larger unities are possible beyond the single image, the isolated statement, the individual body, the individual ‘trend’” (Hebdige 264). Because of the fact that the distinction between I and other is not possible, the subjects in this condition are all others as Sardar believes “everything is a mirror-image of the other” (*Postmodernism and the Other* 4). The others are by no means the memory of what Lacan calls unconscious. In other words, in this condition, the only language-oid is the language of particulars derived from images which undermines communication, the main function of language.

In Lacanian theory, the assumption is that history comes forth with the subject’s registry to the Symbolic with language and speech. As this process is impaired or becomes impaired with Borromean de-knot in postmodern condition, the subject is unfamiliar with time and space. So in terms of Hebdige, the subject is in the “Renewal of the Now” (159). The past is the memories combined by chance with no value for sequence and synchrony. Myers believes, relying on Lacanian theory, that “it is only with the disappearance of the subject, in the object, that the

subject can emerge at all, just as it is only with the disappearance of history, in the present, that history too can finally emerge" (95). However and interestingly, with Borromean de-knot, the object disappears in the subject, time and space into the body where finally the subject is filled with memories, images, and objects.

Notes

1. The Other refers to two additional types of otherness corresponding to the registers of the Symbolic and the Real. The first type of Other is Lacan's "big Other" *qua* symbolic order, namely, the overarching "objective spirit" of trans-individual socio-linguistic structures configuring the fields of inter-subjective interactions. Relatedly, the Symbolic big Other also can refer to (often fantasmatic/fictional) ideas of anonymous authoritative power and/or knowledge (whether that of God, Nature, History, Society, State, Party, Science, or the analyst as the "subject supposed to know" [sujetsupposé savoir] as per Lacan's distinctive account of analytic transference). But, as already becomes evident in Lacan's first few annual seminars of the early 1950s, there also is a Real dimension to Otherness. This particular incarnation of the Real, about which Lacan goes into greatest detail when addressing both love and psychosis, is the provocative, perturbing enigma of the Other as an unknowable "x," an unfathomable abyss of withdrawn-yet-proximate alterity." (qtd. from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lacan.>)
2. In Lacanian term, *jouissance* is a pleasure followed by pain "As such, it refers to a fulfillment that is necessarily merely temporary, and that must therefore always be sought anew" (Wolfreys 59).
3. Libbrecht states in *Lacanian Terms* that "the imaginary is the only 'consistency' man has" (91) that Lacan points to in his later seminars.

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