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Comparative Literature Studies

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Global Comparative Literature: An Introduction

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There is general agreement that the modern discipline of Comparative Literature was founded in the United States after World War Two and that its most prominent early practitioners were political exiles who were comfortable in reading and often writing in two or more European languages as well as engaging the English literature of their host nation. The second generation of Comparative Literature scholars tried to follow in their footsteps, especially so far as the emphasis on languages was concerned, but they also tried to break away from the heavy emphasis on the classics of European literature which had been a feature of the work of the first generation. As that second generation now trains its successors, the world is a very different place both in terms of the literature studied and the approaches that are used to study it. National economies, while they have a local importance, are now part of a global flow of capital, raw materials and finished goods. In literary studies in English, postcolonial studies opened the way for the margins to write back to the center. In the global literary world, the margins have become part of the center. This year at Purdue University for the first time in its history, students from Indiana are a minority in terms of total numbers enrolled, the new majority coming from other parts of the United States and from overseas. These global flows are reflected in the way Comparative Literature is practiced here, and this module of essays by faculty and graduate students in Comparative Literature and English, though neither comprehensive nor paradigmatic, is a glimpse into how some of this research from a global perspective is being carried out.

The opening essay by Charles Ross begins by acknowledging the changes that a global literary imagination implies although the essay itself can be seen as operating within the parameters of traditional comparative Literature scholarship. The same can be said of the essay by Russell Keck on Charles Dickens which follows. They remind us that whatever innovations there are in terms of subject matters and interpretive approaches, there is always room for scholarship that the founding practitioners of

Comparative Literature would have recognized by those who comfortable in working in multiple languages and literary periods. The essays by Natalia Oliviera on Clarice Lispector and Carolina de Jesus and on Xu Jinglei's film *Go Lala Go!* by Jinua Li, are examples of the global approach to Comparative literature referred to above, in which the study of literature and film is fully internationalized. Dana Roder's essay on Hilary Mantel's *Wolf Hall* takes us back to sixteenth-century England as seen from a twenty-first century perspective. The concluding two essays address each in its own way the changing nature of "literature" in the contemporary world. Bryan Nakawaki considers one aspect of the new digital reality by investigating the nature of a text when it is marketed as an audio-book and arguing that this presentation too is to be considered a performance. And the final essay by Sharon Solwitz studies how a conventional print author attempts to achieve a fusion between the linear presentation of a literary text and the visual and aural realities of the contemporary world which are sometimes seen as a threat to the culture of print.

This then is the face of Global Comparative Literature. And since English is now truly a global language, English is the language most widely chosen the research in this area, although this does not have to be, as there are flourishing traditions of Comparative Literature, conferences, journals, blogs, in any number of national languages. Finally the "comparative" part of Comparative Literature is not just confined to traditional print media, but also embraces the modern information producing technologies which are part of our contemporary experience.

Revenge and the Perfect Woman in Dante and Dumas' *The Count of Monte Cristo*, with Notes on Mo Yan and World Literature

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Abstract Alexandre Dumas' *The Count of Monte Christo* reveals the influences of adventure tales from Ariosto to the *Arabian Nights*. Although far too long to assign in an undergraduate World Literature survey, it deserves recognition for its influence, much as the work of Mo Yan will always be considered pivotal not for its literary excellence but for its representations of a difficult periods in history. This article looks at the universal themes of vengeance and the ideal women in Dumas's wide-ranging but erudite yarn, which, for example, characterizes the king of France as an effete enemy of the people by having him annotate an edition of Horace's poems, but also, in its entirety, establishes the great cultural watershed of Paris, France, in the 1840s, during the ferment leading up to the revolution of 1848 that so influenced Marx and hence so much of the world, including China.

Keywords world literature; Lukács; *Paradiso*; *Candide*; *Ben Hur*; *Les Miserables*; *Arabian Nights*.

At Purdue University the theory of comparative literature takes its most concrete form in the two-semester world literature survey. The theory that determines reading selections is often related to the explanations editors of anthologies give for the inclusions and exclusions. These critical approaches rarely include open appeals to stylistic excellence or religious instruction. Rather, today's criteria tend to include cultural coverage, common reactions to worldwide developments, and "resonances across time and space" (Longman xix-xxi). The Norton anthology searches for works that encompass a "global reach" and can be presented "as part of shared heritage of generations of readers in many countries, and as part of a network of cultural and literary relationships whose scope is still being discovered" (Norton 2002: xv).

Although one may think the Norton editors mean stylistic excellence when they

look for works of “consummate artistry”, the context explains that they really mean a work’s “ability to express complex signifying structures” (Norton 2002: xv), a weighty phrase that the third edition drops in favor of a new emphasis on travel and geography (Norton 2012: xix). In practice the new theories subtly add to the battle of the books from the old to the new, feeding the natural inclination of graduate students to focus on contemporary literature. The short story “Old Gun” by Mo Yan, now included in *The Norton Anthology of World Literature* (3rd ed., in six volumes) is part of the inexorable lure of the new, in large part because Mo Yan’s work reaffirms so many older themes.

An informal survey of a dozen second-semester World Literature syllabi (from colleges in Indiana for which Purdue offers equivalency) finds that traditional faculty are more likely to end the course with the Modernists (e.g., Joyce, Eliot, Lawrence, Woolf), *The Wide Sargasso Sea*, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, or a selection of American Black literature.

By contrast younger teaching assistants tend to stress more recent contemporary authors, and sometimes reach the mid-twentieth century with as much as three weeks left in the course. This makes for interesting variety, of course, as in Dr. Laverne Nishihara’s section of English L214 (Spring 2008) at Indiana University East in Richmond, IN, which left the Norton anthology at volume D and ended the course independently with Sofya Kovalevskaya’s “Nihilist Girl” (chapters 5-8), written in Russian and published in 1892 before becoming a volume published by the Modern Language Association in 2001. Slaney Ross’s section of ENGL/CMPL 267, taught at Purdue in the spring of 2013, retained both broad historical coverage and a good dose of the contemporary by ending with Mo Yan’s “The Old Gun,” which appears in the third edition of the *Norton Anthology of World Literature*. She put the work in conversation with Aphra Behn’s *Ooronoko* in order to argue for the theme of politically motivated suicide (These sample syllabi were included in a review of course equivalents conducted by Purdue’s College of Liberal Arts.)

In the spring semester of 2013 I asked my graduate students to choose a literary work not normally found in anthologies and defend its inclusion, drawing on criteria found in various anthologies, including those for older Western Literature surveys, more recent world literature anthologies, and a consideration of what is meant by global literature. I did my best to convince them not to choose a contemporary author, but with only mixed results. The students argued for the inclusion of an important but overlooked work by Cicero, for offering of Shakespeare’s *Antony and Cleopatra* instead of *Hamlet*, for a portion from the Iceland *Edda*, and a representative story about the Holy Grail, and some poetry by Michaelangelo, in defense of the often maligned notion there was something special about the individual in the Renaissance.

But the Turkish student argued for the inclusion of Ayla Kutlu's novel *Kadin Destani* (*Woman's Epic*) a modern Turkish version of *Gilgamesh* from a woman's point of view. An Egyptian student made a case for including *Incendies* by Wajdi Mouawad, a Lebanese-Québécois playwright, while a woman of Syrian nationality whose family lives in Saudi Arabia believed students or world literature should benefit from the exploration of desert life and Sufi mysticism in Ibrahim Al-Koni's *Gold Dust*. A Chinese student supported the case for varying the selection of the already-anthologized Eileen Chang (Zhang Ailing, 张爱玲, 1920-1995).

I chose Alexandre Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo* (1844) for my own offering, despite the thousand pages that make it impossible to actually assign in a world literature survey, except as extra reading. In part I chose it just as an exercise in argument for a rather hopeless position, but in part to rethink Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (1856), which despite its length is often included in survey courses. I also chose it because years ago my mother gave me the novel in two volumes. I never read them, but according to Italo Calvino, one definition of a classic is a book one can read for profit even after missing it in one's youth (Calvino 4).

A final reason is that by the standard of global reach, *The Count of Monte Cristo* positively screams for inclusion in courses on world literature. As I learned well after beginning this project, its Wikipedia page (which gets its facts from the introduction to a 2004 edition) tells us that "*Monte Cristo* is said to have been at its first appearance in 1844, and for some time subsequently, the most popular book in Europe. Perhaps no novel within a given number of years had so many readers and penetrated into so many different countries" (Dumas 2004: xxv). This popularity has extended into modern times as well. The book was "translated into virtually all modern languages and has never been out of print in most of them. There have been at least twenty-nine motion pictures based on it," including one in Tamil, the culture whose selections have proved most intractable to teaching at Purdue. There have been "several television series, and many movies [have] worked the name 'Monte Cristo' into their titles" (Dumas 2004: 601). The title *Monte Cristo* lives on in a "famous gold mine, a line of luxury Cuban cigars, a sandwich, and any number of bars and casinos — it even lurks in the name of the street-corner hustle three-card monte (Dumas 2004: xxiv). In *A Long Day's Journey Into Night*, Eugene O'Neill gives as a cause of his father's drunkenness and its effects on his family, that his father, the popular actor James O'Neill, during the course of the nineteenth century, played the part of the Count of Monte Cristo over six thousand times, for it turns out that Dumas turned his novel into a series of three highly successful stage plays.

In addition to writing an international best seller, Dumas himself is a post-colonialist's dream. His African features are no accident. Although his grandfather

was a French marquis, his grandmother was a slave on a Haitian plantation, and their son Thomas Dumas inherited the status of both, at least until the marquis brought him to Paris in 1776, where, since there was no slavery, Thomas Dumas was free. There he received an education. During the 1790s he became a general in the French army for his efforts in opening the passes through the Alps that allowed Napoleon into Italy. By age thirty-one he became the highest-ranking person of color in any Continental or American army before Colin Powell. His career is the subject of the 2013 Pulitzer Prize winner for biography (Reiss, *The Black Count*).

Unfortunately for Dumas' mixed-race father, the French Revolution was unable to hold back the interests of French slave traders. Despite the efforts of abolitionists, when The Constituent Assembly debated the slave trade in March 1790, the defenders of commerce prevailed, and even "secured the passage of a decree which included the alarming phrase: 'Whosoever works to excite risings against the colonists [slave holders] will be declared an enemy of the people'" (Thomas 522, citing memoirs by Honoré Riquetti, count of Mirabeau). In 1802, the year Alexandre Dumas was born, slavery was reintroduced and all black officers expelled from the French armies. Thomas Dumas suffered from the decree and died two years later. Alexander's mother, the daughter of an innkeeper, nonetheless gave her boy an education. By the 1820s he had become a successful playwright. In 1844 he serially published *The Three Musketeers*, whose theme "one for all and all for one" is diametrically opposed to the portrait of the Count of Monte Cristo, which followed the same year, for the Count is a vengeful and calculating, if highly educated man of the world.

The Count of Monte Cristo always knows the right architects, can speak all languages, and hold his own in any society, whether cosmopolitan Paris, the Islamic Middle East, North Africa, among the bandits of Italy, or in papal Rome. He knows opera, plays, and painters. His collection of marbles, as his statues are called, is impeccable, and at the pistol range he can turn any numbered playing card into a ten. It is perhaps a fraught question for cultural studies how given Dumas's background, he could let his hero own several slaves and constantly give orders that he expects to be obeyed to the minute and without the slightest variance. But in fact the work exposes the contradiction between the world of honor and Christian providentialism that undergirded the world slave trade.

Although not obvious in the novel itself, Dumas' social commentary, like that of Mo Yan, is pointed enough for those who know how to look. It illustrates with unparalleled success, in fact, Georg' Lukács' thesis in *The Historical Novel* (1937), that the swift economic and cultural changes in France between 1814 and 1844 — the period in which *The Count of Monte Cristo* is set — precluded the full development of an the idea of social progress that it would fall to Hegel, not Dumas, to articulate

(Lukács 28). Lukács dates the classical form of the historical novel from the French Revolution, the revolutionary wars and the rise and fall of Napoleon, whose mass armies of citizens came home from Russian, Germany, Italy, and Egypt with for the first time a realization of broader horizons and that they were a part of history too, “to see in history something which deeply affects their daily lives and immediately concerns them. There is no point in dealing here with the social transformations of France itself,” Lukács goes on, somewhat ingenuously. “It is quite obvious the extent to which the economic and cultural life of the entire national was disrupted by the huge, rapidly successive changes of the period” (24) — “obvious,” Lukács leaves unsaid, because the changes of precisely this time period, from 1814 to 1844, provide the historical background for *The Count of Monte Cristo*. The Count’s skillful revenge plot, which he ultimately curtails, is in fact based on his recognition of the role and limitations of Capital: “The inhumanity of Capitalism, the chaos of competition, the destruction of the small by the big, the debasement of culture by the transformation of all things into commodities — all this is contrasted in a manner generally reactionary in tendency, with the social idyll of the Middle Ages, seen as a period of peaceful co-operation among all classes, an age of the organic growth of culture” (26).

It was because of this “falsely idyllic picture” rather than a commitment to “human progress” (27) that Dumas could not come to terms with Louis Napoleon, and his increasingly reactionary regime. Although Dumas’ novel weaves in and out of history, it fails to articulate “an ideological defense of human progress” such as Hegel devised (28), that would “preserve the achievements of the French Revolution as the imperishable basis of future human development” (29). In this sense, the novel remains a book for boys. The Count does not fully comprehend, even if he glimpses, the limits of his worldview.

The reactionary character of the novel is captured in the character of the Count, which Dumas crafted to illustrate the contradictory search for vengeance and the perfect woman. This paradox is the thesis of a simple comparison paper I wrote for my seminar in order to illustrate a theme that might be assigned in an undergraduate survey course that takes comparative literature seriously. Given the availability of information on the Internet, I find that comparisons should be random, so that students cannot find them pre-written somewhere on line. As an example, I made a random choice, for comparison with Dumas, and came up with the ninth canto of Dante’s *Paradiso*.

As generations of teachers know, the work of Dante provides plenty of scope for comparison with almost anything. It also represents an important way station in the older conception of Western literature that runs from the Bible and Virgil to T. S. Eliot’s *The Wasteland*. The religious development of Western literature is itself a topic

often sacrificed, in our era, to differing conceptions of cultural studies, which do not take fully seriously the intellectual depth of Western thought.

Such oversight is a shame, since in an older anthology, three or four pages suffices to introduce students — and fairly naïve students such as myself — to the simple outlines of Christian imagery. At the level of iconology, one wants to know that St. Mark is represented in art by a lion, the Holy Spirit by a dove, and that Christ is the Lamb of God or the Word, which is how the gospel of John refers to him (Gould 390-393). Dante is too creative to be such a guide himself, but by randomly choosing a canto of a classic like *The Divine Comedy*, one can show how Dante, or any major author, can help one find things in Dumas we might not otherwise notice. Writing is a process of discovery, as we need to remind administrators, not just a way to put together a vita.

Dante's *Paradiso* itself is little read or assigned, compared to the great vignettes of evildoers in Dante's *Inferno*. Yet the theme of love gives us a glimmer of hope that something can be made of this ignored portion of Dante's text. By the time we reach canto nine — in composing part of this hypothetical comparison paper — Dante has ascended to the lunar sphere. There he meets Piccarda, whose inconstancy contrasts with the changing moon. He also meets a steadier woman, appropriately named Constance, who gives him his first instruction on the degrees of splendor that structure the *Paradiso*, for Dante's task in writing the *Paradiso* was to make everyone blessed yet find ways to distinguish degrees of blessedness without diminishing the souls found there. His solution lay in describing shades of light and brightness, such as pearls on a white forehead, a series of images that culminates in the Threefold Light of the Trinity, the disappearance of Beatrice, and the final white mystic rose of belief.

In Dante's cosmology, Venus is the second stop from the moon, coming after Mercury. Here the emperor Justinian lectures Dante on the righteous role of Rome in establishing the Roman Church, despite Rome's less praiseworthy pursuit of honor and fame. At this point Beatrice, who has taken over the role of Dante's guide from Virgil and Statius, explains how Christ's death can be regarded as God's act of vengeance against mankind.

Dante feels so close to *The Count of Monte Cristo* at this point that I am positively trembling. For the Count spends most of his time seeking vengeance — not exactly an unknown desire in the rather under-religious world of Mo Yan — once he finds his way out of the dungeon where he rots for many years, as Jean Valjean will do, perhaps more famously, in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* (1862), a novel which also had a long afterlife in cinema and on Broadway.

In Dumas's novel, the Count of the "Mountain of Christ," if I may be so bold in paraphrasing, is resurrected (so to speak) and finds not only the light of day but

a fortune in jewels, which had been hidden on the island of Monte Cristo centuries earlier as the result of some Dantean struggle among the prelates and potentates of the Roman curia. His imprisonment is in fact the result of allegations that he favored the Emperor Napoleon, in the period between Elba and Waterloo, the post-French Revolutionary period that for Lukács begins our modern conceptions of History, when the average soldier, fresh from campaigns across Europe and the near-East, for the first time understand that he himself is not confined locally but is part of a larger world picture. Politics thus makes Dumas's hero's time in a dungeon comparable to the exile of Dante from Florence.

Dante was not immune to grand conceptions of history, such as Lukács expresses in his *précis* of Marxist-Leninist theory, for both exile and imprisonment are related indirectly to Holy Roman Emperor, whom Dante hoped would unite Italy, but who never did. He lacked Napoleon's military genius, but then, so did Napoleon in the end. Both Dante's poem and Dumas' novel, in the spirit of the French Revolution, call out for systems of government that will control local abuses.

Such local cruelty is one reason that Dante's *Divine Comedy* often reads like a series of personal vendettas, especially in the *Inferno*, where it seems Dante inserts almost everyone he hated in his lifetime. The Count of Monte Cristo's vendettas are even more central. Much of the book describes the way he tracks down the two men who framed him, one of whom married his fiancé, the beautiful Mercédès. Given the role of personal animosity in both works — and again, one feels the central conception of Mo Yan's various moral protagonists who so often personally face the sheer brutality of peasants, bureaucrats, the generally unenlightened — it hardly seems surprising that the name of the Count, before he becomes the Count, is Edmund Dantès.

As informed readers, we know that Italy's Dante has made some terrible error that requires him to make his voyage through hell and purgatory before he can reach paradise. No wonder that the Count of Monte Cristo, formerly Edmund Dantès, is similarly warned about the immorality of vengeance early in the book by a certain *abbé* — a religious man whom he met in his dungeon and who provided both his extraordinary education and the clues to the whereabouts of the jewels that make up his extraordinary fortune:

“I regret having helped you in your investigation and said what I did to you,” he remarked.

“Why is that?” Dantès asked.

“Because I have insinuated a feeling into your heart that was not previously there: the desire for revenge.”

Dantès smiled and said: “Let us change the subject.”

(Dumas 2003:168, ch.17)

Dantès does not smile ironically in the French original of this passage, making him colder, more mysterious, not the happy jack of all trades he seems in English:

-- Je suis fâché de vous avoir aidé dans vos recherches et de vous avoir dit ce que je vous ai dit, fit-il.

-- Pourquoi cela? demanda Dantès.

-- Parce que je vous ai infiltré dans le coeur un sentiment qui n’y était point: la vengeance.” dit-il.

“Parlons d’autre chose”, dit-il.

(Dumas *Le comte*: 209)

Setting aside the morality of vengeance, as Edmond wishes and as the novel does for hundreds of pages, we can say that the redemptive property of love, needed by both vengeful men, connects Dante and Dumas. For it turns out, despite the randomness of my selection, that canto nine of the *Paradiso* lets us see deeply into sexual side of a love that is otherwise almost entirely spiritual with regard to both Dante’s Beatrice and the Count’s beautiful — as she is constantly called — Mercédès. And we may even extend the comparison to Mo Yan, despite the overt absence of religion in his novels, for many of Mo Yan’s male protagonists, such as Ding Gou’er in *The Republica of Wine*, are constantly groping women — for what? Sex? The truth?

Most of Dante’s canto is taken up by two narrators, Cunizza da Romano and Folco of Marseilles, whose combination of violent politics and sexuality is remarkably close to that of the repeatedly beating lovers Gao Ma and Jinju suffer in Mo Yan’s novel *The Garlic Ballads* (1988), which catches the restless mood of China just before Tianamen Square (1989). Dante’s Cunizza is the sister of one of the most horrible Italian despots of all time, the infamous Ezzolino da Romano, tyrant of Padua, whom even Boiardo remembers two centuries later for having burned alive 11,000 Paduans in a single day (*Orlando* 2.25.48). The immediate point of her presence is to exemplify a discourse in the poem on heredity, where we are told that the natural disposition of a person can trump even the influences of the planets. Thus Cunizza need not be blood-thirsty just because her brother is. Dante’s point, much overlooked, has immediate relevance to any society recovering from the trauma of tyranny, including post-Terror France or post-revolutionary China.

Cunizza was a real woman historically, and something of a scandal for commentators, for she was married at least four times and had at least two major

love affairs, and the question arose, how could Dante put such a tainted woman into Paradise? In the translation of Dorothy Sayers (whose commentary and sense of scandal I'm following here), she is said to speak "from her deep heart, as one delighted to give generously" (*Paradiso* 9.23-24)? We might note that Allen Mandelbaum's translation of the same passages loses the double entendre, if there really is one, when he translates *ben far giova* as "rejoiced in kindness": In his version the Cunizza Dante sees is a light who "out of that depth from which it sang before / continued as if it rejoiced in kindness" ("del suo profondo, ond'ella pria cantava / sequette come a cui di ben far giova"). Good people exist in every society, however troubled. But Cunizza admits that she is in the sphere of Venus for a reason and knows that there are vulgar minds (*Paradiso* 9.36) who might blame her, although she pardons herself.

What connects Cunizza to the beautiful Mercédès is that by the time Edmund Dantès tracks her down in Paris, twenty-one years have passed and she has married one of the men the Count intends to kill. The woman on a pedestal in Dumas's novel is also now the mother of the twenty-one-year-old son of his worst enemy, a boy whom the Count befriends, almost irreligiously, in order to work his revenge, for revenge by definition is never the true answer to the trauma of violence

The post-revolutionary world to which this boy gives the Count entry was Parisian society, and Paris was most important cultural center in the world in 1830-1848, providing another set of arguments for including Dumas in a World Literature course. Lukács believed that France lost her way as a leader in the fight for progressive social policies, instead reverting to a kind of reactionary admiration for an idyllic middle ages. Dumas himself was disappointed in the policies of Louis Napoleon. But there is another, cultural sense in which Paris was the capital of the world, and that is as a confluence of classical texts and education that explains the many literary and musical references in Dumas' work. Dante, Descartes, Corneille, Racine, Molière, Meyerbeer, seventeenth-century romances, Rossini, Beaumarchais, Victor Hugo and others are called on when needed. His daring constantly compares the Count to Byron's Manfred as a man who loses his social standing but then makes up for his loss; plus, the scenes in Epidaurus with Ali Pascha recall Byron's death fighting for Greek independence. Early in the novel Dumas shows King Louis XVI annotating an edition of Horace to prepare a new one, as a way to metonymically represent his aloofness to social changes despite his erudition. The Mercedes plot might be traced to Diego de Montemayor's *Diana*, in which a shepherdess abhors Sylvanus, but when her Sirenus leaves for a year, she marries Delius and puts Sylvanus in oblivion. There are further classical references to Sappho, Lucullus, Virgil, and to Cornelius Nepos, while the murder of a woman to preserve her honor from rape by the *banditi*

of Rome is right out of Livy's *De urbe condita* or any number of Italian Renaissance tragedies, such as Pietro Aretino's *Horatia* (1553). Perhaps due to the great success of Shakespeare in Paris following tours by English acting companies in 1827 (Haines), Dumas refers several times to *Macbeth*, especially the banquet scene where Banquo's ghost appears, and to *Hamlet*, including Claudius's advice on the death of fathers. Such insertions buttress the feeling that despite its wild adventure, *The Count of Monte Cristo* touches perennial human concerns, including violence and forgiveness.

Several references to Voltaire's *Candide* suggest that beneath the novel's surface adventures and romance, there is also a layer of social satire or at least social awareness. Dumas, who visited Rome, describes papal intrigue at length when the Count appears in Rome to befriend Albert, Mercédès son, in order to plot his way to Paris, and much of this intrigue recalls chapter eleven of *Candide*, where the fiancé of the daughter of the pope is poisoned drinking a cup of chocolate before being kidnapped by pirates from Salé on her way to Gaeta. One of the more troubling characters for a modern reading is the Count's mute, black servant Ali, at least before we realize his type is Cacambo, who appears in chapter thirteen of *Candide*, "a valet of the type one often finds in the provinces of Spain and in the colonies," something of a halfbreed, and impossibly fond of his master. The romance element is further strengthened by the Count's suddenly becoming a master marksman, just when his skill with dueling pistols is needed to defend himself against Albert. Similarly *Candide* in chapter sixteen, having learned to shoot when in the Bulgar army, suddenly turns out to be a perfect marksman during the episode when the two monkeys chase a naked woman. Finally, the sudden, fairy-tale richness of the Count finds its counterpart in the sheep filled with jewels that *Candide* finds in El Dorado in chapter eighteen. There is even a reference to Pangloss, *Candide*'s tutor (Dumas 2003:217, ch. 22).

Among the many literary works Dumas cites from Horace to Shakespeare, perhaps the major one is *The Thousand and One Arabian Nights*. Although this work is probably more French than Arabian, given that much of it is based on the extension of Persian culture into northern India — and given its lack of currency in middle eastern countries, despite episodes in Baghdad and Damascus — it fits the world of the Count of Monte Cristo, for Edmund Dantès lays claim to a cosmopolitan lifestyle, including experiences in North Africa and the Middle East — exactly the kind of wide experience of the world that led Lukács to say that it was the citizen armies of France, the masses of returning soldiers who had been as far as Russian, Egypt, and the Levant, that first gave the common man a conception of his place in history, that he was not confined by local custom but led a life connect to larger processes (such as the new role of what Marx called Capital).

The Count is a sailor and was to have been a sea captain before he is unjustly

imprisoned, and so he adopts the name of Sinbad the Sailor as he goes about rewarding his friends and punishing his enemies for their betrayal of him in his home town of Marseilles. Is it an accident that Edmund Dantès is originally from Marseilles, and that the second speaker of Dante's canto, named Folco, is also from Marseilles? Perhaps, but Folco derives from the Italian word *folcire*, to sustain, to prop up, and in the canto he props up the reputations of Cunizza and another calumniated woman, Rahab the harlot, who helped Joshua take Jericho. One hopes, throughout one's long reading of Dumas's novel, that the Count will come around and similarly prop up the besmirched reputation of Mercédès, despite the revulsion the Count feels when he learns that she waited only eighteen months for him, while he was imprisoned, before marrying his rival.

Bruno Bettelheim's psychoanalytic analysis of fairy tales, *The Uses of Enchantment*, tells us that Sinbad the Sailor represents the "old bad man within" Sinbad the poor porter who goes by the same name (Bettelheim 84). Due to this dark side of the Count's character, it is therefore appropriate that, although one expects for over a thousand pages that Edmond Dantès and the once-beautiful Mercédès will unite in the end, one cannot help feeling reunion may be unlikely, and might be unsuitable, for vengeance is a nasty business. The cold, commanding Count seems not to learn this lesson for most of the novel, despite the warnings of the Abbé Faria, his fellow prisoner who helps the otherwise bewildered Count identify his enemies. Edmond has a good memory and is a practical man, he says, but he does not have philosophy. "Philosophy cannot be taught. Philosophy is the union of all acquired knowledge and the genius that applies it: philosophy is the shining cloud upon which Christ set His foot to go up into heaven" (169). Missing his point, at least for about nine hundred pages, Edmund answers, "Come then. ... What will you teach me first? I am eager to begin, I am athirst for knowledge" (169).

Unlike Dante's, the Count's vision of knowledge does not coincide with the perfect woman. Dante may see Beatrice, but she is, after all, dead when he meets her in heaven, and Dante himself in real life never returned to Florence from exile, where his real wife remained without him. As he wrote the poem in which he sought his spiritual health and beatitude in Beatrice, he knew how steep the steps are of another man's house, and how salt his bread. (In his *Vita Nuova*, Dante calls Beatrice the "gloriosa donna della mia mente" [the glorious woman of my mind] and the "donna della salute," because she gave him a greeting or salutation that restored his health ["salute"]. The steep steps and salt bread can be found in *Paradiso* 17.55-60.) One expects the Count to suffer too, and he does when the horrible but nonetheless innocent son of one of his victims is killed, but he never returns to Mercédès.

The reasons are given late in the story in a metonymic scene that both determines

Mercédès future relationship to the Count and symbolizes it. This happens when she shows the Count her grey hair. For stylistic excellence the speech in which Mercédès steps off the pedestal of the perfect woman must be set against Flaubert's description of the droplets of sweat on the voluptuous Emma Bovary that Vladimir Nabokov so admired and imitated when describing Lolita (Butler; Nabokov 134). Adulterous Emma is first seen perspiring at home on her farm, before she marries bourgeois Charles Bovary, because she is a peasant at heart, and many argue that Lolita is like a mounted butterfly (Butler). Mercédès role is mercifully to remove her aging self from the Count's life:

See ... (she completely removed her veil) "See: misfortune has turned my hair grey and my eyes have shed so many tears that there are dark rings round them; and my forehead is furrowed. But you, Edmond, you are still young, still handsome and still proud. You did have faith, you had strength, you trusted in God, and God sustained you. I was a coward, I denied Him, so God abandoned me; and here I am!"

Mercédès burst into tears, her heart breaking under the weight of memory. Monte Cristo took her hand and kissed it respectfully, but she herself felt that the kiss was passionless, as if his lips were pressing the marble hand of the statue of some saint.

(Dumas, 2003: 1191, ch. 113)

Voyez... (elle découvrit tout à fait son visage), voyez, le malheur a fait mes cheveux gris; mes yeux ont tant versé de larmes, qu'ils sont cerclés de veines violettes; mon front se ride. Vous, au contraire, Edmond, vous êtes toujours jeune, toujours beau, toujours fier. C'est que vous avez eu la foi, vous; c'est que vous avez eu la force; c'est que vous vous êtes reposé en Dieu, et que Dieu vous a soutenu. Moi, j'ai été lâche, moi, j'ai renié, Dieu m'a abandonnée, et me voilà.

Mercédès fondit en larmes; le coeur de la femme se brisait au choc des souvenirs.

Monte-Cristo prit sa main e la baisa respectueusement; mais elle sentit elle-même que ce baiser était sans ardeur, comme celui que le comte eût déposé sur la main de marbre de la statue d'une sainte. (Dumas, *Le comte* 2: 702)

Twelve years later, Flaubert gave his own version of such a scene, when Emma Bovary's appeals for money and receives only a cold response from Rodolphe, her first lover:

"Dear Madame, I do not have them." He did not lie. ... "You do not have

them!” she repeated several times. “You do not have them! I ought to have spared myself this last shame. You never loved me. You are no better than others” (trans. Nabokov, *Lectures* 169).

Enfin il dit d'un air très calme:

“He ne les ai pas, chère madame.”

Il ne mentait point. . . . “Tu ne les as pas!”

Elle répéta plusieurs fois:

“Tu ne les as pas! . . . J'aurais dû m'épargner cette dernière honte. Tu ne m'as jamais aimée! tu ne vaux pas mieux que les autres!” (Flaubert 575-76; 3rd part, ch. 8)

Flaubert did not believe Mercédès's voluntary withdrawal from competition for the Count's affections; instead, he sent Mme. Bovary hurtling toward bankruptcy and ruin. Mercédès, to the contrary, is solvent thanks to the Count, and lives.

Instead of reuniting with Mercédès to atone for his excess of vengeance, the cold Count tries to warm his own heart by saving the life of two characters, one by means of an elaborately staged mock death, using a sleeping potion, and the other by an even more elaborate suicide scene like the central episode of the original *Mash* movie, complete with hookahs and candles and caves. The sleeping beauty who awakens is named Valentine, who is said to seem like an angel of mercy when she appears to her fiancée. He had wanted to kill himself, thinking she was dead, until she appears in all her

miraculous beauty. Pale and sweetly smiling, she seemed like an angel of mercy casting out the angel of vengeance”

(Dumas, 2003: 1239; ch. 117)

“merveilleuse beauté.

Pâle et doucement souriante, elle semblait l'ange de la miséricord conjurant l'ange des vengeances.

(Dumas, *Le comte* 2: 764; ch. 118)

Mercy thus prevails, but Mercédès does not, for the Count, rather than return to her and her graying hair, runs off with his beautiful young ward named Haydée, who is about sixteen and technically a slave he has purchased in Constantinople. It is an ending appropriate for Dumas, who is said to have had over forty mistresses, and who knew that in the real world of France in 1848, religion itself could be used on either side of the slave question, as it had for centuries. Is this why throughout the novel the Count can pursue vengeance and still believe that he is an agent of Providence? In

Dumas' novel, the final swarm of angelic appearances, resurrections, moral doubts, and providential opportunities bewilders the Count, thus allowing him to maintain his stature as a hero of romance, the literary form that uses magic to reconcile the contradictions of the real world. In the end the Count and Haydée miraculously sail from the shores of the island of Monte Cristo, disappearing from sight in an ending as mystical and entirely satisfying as Frodo's sailing from the Gray Havens at the end of Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings*.

Flaubert or Tolstoy would have preferred someone be run over by a train, rather than fade into the sunset. And modernist critics make demands on style other than those Dumas satisfies. He was not an individual genius like Flaubert, spending hours alone searching for *le mot juste* (Dumas, 2003: xii). His narrator is all seeing, not limited in perspective like a modernist storyteller. His characters dwell in "the familiar ground of coherent social thought and behavior, against which the individual figure shows itself for what it is," not in "landscapes that neither know them nor share their conventional assumptions" (Weinstein 343). But the Count lives on, not only resonating across time and space but raising enough religious issues to create a "complex signifying structure" (Norton, 2002: xv) that gives Dumas's novel multiple dimensions of meaning in different cultures and eras.

As a man of African ancestry, Dumas bore what western societies considered the mark of Cain (Goldenberg 178). Following a misreading of Genesis 4.15, black skin was considered the mark of Cain (and Ham) in religious literature used to support slavery, and the protection God offers to Cain's descendants was taken instead as a curse. The Count for most of the book believes that sin can be passed down through the generations, which with his eye-for-an-eye attitude probably makes him something of an Old Testament figure, a French Ahab, needing correction, Dumas lets the reader fill in the Christian possibilities of his redemption, using mystical and hallucinogenic images (the Count likes his hashish), such as the shining cloud of philosophy that helped Christ to heaven, to suggest the possibilities of providence. Other biblical sources for the sins of the fathers being visited on the children can be found in Exod. 20.5 and 34.7, and Deut. 5.9. In Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, where the unbridled vengeance of Shylock provides a model for the Count before his enlightenment, the ignorant character Lancelot Gobbo tells Jessica, Shylock's daughter, that "the sins of the father are to be laid upon the children" (*Merchant* 3.5.2), a view the Count finally rejects.

Although the institution of slavery is remarkable in the novel for not being directly remarked on — just as Mo Yan uses fantasy to avoid direct descriptions of modern Chinese politics — Dumas had the good sense to make Monte Cristo belatedly feel inklings of doubt for seeking revenge not only on his tormentors but

on their descendants. History has done the rest, as can be seen by considering the three best-selling American novels of all time. Care to guess? The first is *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in 1852. The most recent is *Gone with the Wind* (1936). The one in the middle is *Ben-Hur*, composed right near Purdue University in Crawfordsville, Indiana, and published in 1880; and it is a direct knock-off of Dumas' novel. Like Monte Cristo, Judah Ben-Hur is sentenced to the galleys for life by an ambitious Roman officer who knows he is innocent. He survives and returns to Jerusalem looking for revenge. But Lew Wallace evidently felt that Monte Cristo never adequately understood the contradiction of his belief that he was an agent of Providence in seeking vengeance, for in his version Ben-Hur witnesses the crucifixion of Christ and understands a new religion based on love. That is, where the Count of Monte Cristo is Castiglione's courtier gone wild, a master of everything from languages to finance to dueling pistols and architecture, Ben-Hur gets to meet Jesus. (In Mo Yan's later fiction, various forms of the Buddha appear.) But the story is ultimately the same, that of the most wildly popular of all figures in literature, the great man unjustly accused and tormented, seeking his redemption through an uncharted realm of religious inklings, vengeance, and love in its appropriate form.

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Unwilling Sacrifices in Dickens's *A Tale of Two Cities*

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Abstract This essay examines the concept of unwilling sacrifices in Charles Dickens's *A Tale of Two Cities*. While scholars typically attend to the forms of self-sacrifice in the novel, I explore the forms of sacrifice that are compelled by the aristocratic class of pre-revolutionary France and the fraternity of republican citizens of post-revolutionary France. Dickens demonstrates how both ruling classes resort to unwilling sacrifices to preserve political power, structure society, and justify their means of existence. The proclivity for such sacrifices, according to Dickens, leads to the degeneration of society. As the figures of Monsieur the Marquis, Madame La Guillotine, and Doctor Manette exemplify, the implications of unwilling sacrifices effect each level of society, ranging from the national to the individual. Dickens shows how unwilling sacrifices turn society against itself: they upset social harmony, destroy communities, sever familial bonds, and dehumanize individuals. Dickens censures equally the aristocracy and the republican fraternity for the demands they place on the members of society to give up their livelihoods and their lives. The adverse effects of unwilling sacrifice are ultimately a warning to Dickens's contemporary English audience. Thus, Dickens emphasizes throughout *A Tale* that the forced spilling of blood is no way by which any society can be maintained or rehabilitated.

Keywords Dickens; *A Tale of Two Cities*; society; revolution; sacrifice; violence

The first explicit reference to sacrifice in *A Tale of Two Cities* occurs during the intimate conversation between Sydney Carton and Lucie Manette in her London apartment. Towards the end of this touching scene, Sydney, in a rare display of emotional affection, declares himself to be her heroic champion and confesses his desire to sacrifice himself on behalf of Lucie and her family: "It is useless to say it, I know, but it rises out of my soul. For you, and for any dear to you, I would do anything. If my career were of that better kind that there was any opportunity or capacity of sacrifice in it, I would embrace any sacrifice for you and for those dear to

you” (158-59). Thus begins the theme of heroic sacrifice that reaches its culmination when Sydney clandestinely takes the place of Charles Darnay under the deadly blade of Madame la Guillotine.

Sydney’s sacrifice is heroic because the hero willfully lays down his or her life for the preservation of another’s. In Western culture, such a gesture is essentially Christological.¹ The biblical conception of sacrifice is further intertwined with the theme of resurrection in the novel. In a certain sense, Sydney manifests (and reiterates) the sacrificial love of Christ, which, in turn, enables Charles Darnay to be, as Dickens puts it, “recalled to life” (12).

More so than in any other of his novels, Dickens constructs the historic narrative of *A Tale of Two Cities* in terms of dialogic pairings.² That is, he contrasts each of his images and themes with their inverses and opposites. Thus the concept of heroic or willing sacrifice is in a dialogic relationship — an active dialogue, in other words — with the concept of unwilling sacrifice. As the dialogic counterpart to willing sacrifice, which rehabilitates broken familial relationships and fractured societies in Dickens’ work, the concept of unwilling sacrifice marks the degeneration of society on both the microcosmic and macrocosmic level.³ This unraveling of society, engendered most precipitously by unwilling sacrifices occurs on all levels, from the national through the communal and the familial to the individual.

Dickens expresses a great deal of anxiety concerning this type of sacrifice, for he demonstrates throughout his novel how unwilling sacrifice can quickly erode the structures of society. Throughout the novel, Dickens remains focused on the social deterioration that comes from unwilling sacrifice, so much so that Bert G. Hornback asserts that “Strictly speaking, the French Revolution is the crisis of class society; but Dickens chooses to deal with it here as the crisis of all human society” (*Noah’s Arkitecture* 120). In this essay, I will examine the major instances of unwilling sacrifice to show how Dickens connects each sacrifice to the degeneration of French — and, by extension, human — society.

While Countless scholars have studied the acts of violence committed on behalf of society and the self-sacrifices made by the heroes and heroines of *A Tale of Two Cities*, there has been no serious study on the ways in which Dickens renders the victims of the different ruling classes of the French state as unwilling human sacrifices. In *Dickens, Violence and the Modern State: Dreams of the Scaffold* (1995), Jeremy Tambling argues that the violence of the novel revolves around a “primal scene” of murder (131). Specifically, Tambling sees the subtext of violence in the novel as Freudian, stemming from the abuse, sins, and the eventual parricide of the symbolic father: “In the case of *A Tale*, it [the primal scene] was a rape and a murder. The rape has been committed by the Evrémonde brothers as a virtual act of incest

practiced towards the feudal daughter: this is again a sin of the father, and . . . it brings the son, Charles Darnay, very close to execution” (131). Michal Goldberg’s comparative study *Carlyle and Dickens* (1972) analyzes how Dickens utilizes violence as the etiology of many of his characters, and Goldberg also notes that the material of his violence derives substantially from Carlyle’s works: “Dickens’s lifelong and morbid fascination with criminality and the streaks of violence which appear like vivid scars across many of the passages of the late novels point to a similar abruption with the uncontrollable element of human nature” (102). Likewise, in his oft-cited study, *Dickens and Crime* (1978; 1994), Philip Collins convincingly demonstrates how Dickens’s publishing career centered on the criminal aspects of society and the inefficacy of capital punishment, which partly explains why he protested against public executions until 1868(28).⁴ John R. Reed’s *Dickens and Thackeray: Punishment and Forgiveness* (1993) posits that the only effective form of justice that can stabilize society in Dickens’ novels comes from the realm of providence; this form of justice is ordained and dispensed by God (245). He writes, “Dickens wants a regime that combines a sense of justice with a sense of mercy, but under these requirements it is difficult to assign [human] authority to punish” (257). Reed therefore reasons that “true justice is administered finally by providence,” in Dickens’s world, which “does not mean that most offenses are not punished through agency, but that the guiding power for such justice is divine.” (257). Harry Stone investigates in his book *The Night Side of Dickens: Cannibalism, Passion, Necessity* (1994) the ways in which pre- and post-revolution French society sacrifices and swallows whole its victims in an act of symbolic anthropophagy.⁵ He contends that the meaning underlying these acts of cannibalism in the novel is “part of the way Dickens expressed the deep flow of history, the inevitable working of cause and effect, the dire calculus of ghostly sin and ghostly retribution” (162). Finally, David Rosen’s article “*A Tale of Two Cities: Theology of Revolution*” (1998) examines how the sacrifices of Sydney Carton and Miss Pross are related to Christian and mythic rituals pertaining to fecundity. Rosen argues that both types of rituals propagate new life in contrast to the death of the French Revolution. Rosen asserts,

The difference between Carton’s and Miss Pross’s Christ-like sacrifices, and the bloodletting exacted by the revolution is a simple one: the former work, and the latter fails. Carton’s death is an effective fertility-rite in the simplest way: he not only saves the lives of Darnay and Lucie, but allows them to have more children. (178)

My conception of unwilling sacrifices — those demanded by both the French

aristocratic class and the revolutionary proletariat that enact the complete deterioration of society — derives from Michel Foucault’s seminal work, *Discipline and Punish*, in which he theorizes that the body is usurped from the individual by power of the state in nineteenth-century penalizing systems. According to Foucault, the “punishment-body,” which “is not the same as it was in the [sic] torture during public executions effectively,” “serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property” (11). In assigning certain kinds of punishments, the state takes away ownership of one’s body and uses it against him- or herself:

The body, according to this penalty, is caught up in a system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations, punishment has become an economy of suspended rights. (11)

If we credit Foucault’s assertion that the body is no longer the locus of pain but a thing which is controlled by the state, then bodies in *A Tale of Two Cities*, when they are put to death, manifest society’s control over them. Penalized individuals lose control over their bodies and are utilized, punished, and killed by the dictates of that state. Their bodies become sacrifices made unwillingly on behalf of the state. Indeed, Foucault’s concept of the usurpation of punished bodies by the state is something he drew from culturally- and socially-oriented works like Dickens’s *A Tale of Two Cities*.

The first unwilling sacrifice in *A Tale* is that of a helpless child who is trampled by the careening coach of Monsieur the Marquis. The Marquis’s coach itself represents the wanton destruction and death caused by the excesses of the French aristocracy as well as the ability of the aristocracy to control the bodies of the peasant class. The child’s death is sudden, one for which both the child and the parent, Gaspard, are unprepared and certainly unwilling. The child is sacrificed as a lesson for the peasant classes that any impediment or any obstacle that might possibly interfere with the Marquis’s life of comfort and sumptuousness can be stamped out of existence. Dickens describes the carriage as an inexorable vehicle that attacks anything in its wake: “With a wild rattle and clatter, and an inhuman abandonment of consideration not easy to be understood in these days, the carriage dashed through streets and swept round corners, with women screaming before it, and men clutching each other and clutching children out of its way” (114). The key phrase in this description is “inhuman abandonment,” for it reveals how Monsieur the Marquis regards those beneath his

higher social status. They are, in his mind, inhuman cattle, not worth any consideration insofar as they provide him the means to his extravagancies. Therefore, these lower strata of society are to the Marquis expendable. When the carriage stops as a result of “a sickening little jolt,” Monsieur the Marquis is much more concerned about the delay than the reason for the jolt (114). He observes Gaspard running to the carriage to inspect and mourn over his mangled child. Monsieur the Marquis heartlessly inquires, “Why does he make that abominable noise? Is it his child?” (114). The Marquis lacks compassion or even pity for the child’s death, nor can he tolerate the sounds of grief coming from the dead child’s father; in fact it is one of the commoners, “a ragged and submissive man,” who tries to remind him that, indeed, “it is a pity — yes.” (114). Yet, Monsieur the Marquis is incapable of such sympathetic emotions to beings whom he views as less important than his horses: “‘It is extraordinary to me,’ said he, ‘that you people cannot take care of yourselves and your children. One or the other of you is for ever [sic] in the way. How do I know what injury you have done my horses?’” (115). Monsieur the Marquis is evidently inconvenienced by the child’s death not because of its tragedy, but rather because it has broken the routine of his day. As a result of this inconvenience, he transforms this tragic accident into an execution so as to make this death a justification for the aristocracy’s social status.

The Monsieur the Marquis’s reluctant attempt to offer monetary recompense for the loss of Gaspard’s child exposes the aristocratic perception that the working class exists (and dies) only to serve their aristocratic rulers, who are very willing, perhaps eager, to eradicate those they rule. If they are not serving, then they are obstacles that need to be removed. As Foucault notes, the nineteenth-century human body was “entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” as the machinery of the state sees fit (138). The Marquis’s perspective leads John Reed to claim fittingly that “[t]he greatest historical guilt rests with the French aristocracy. The most obvious thing about them in this novel is that they are self-indulgent, arrogant, exploitive, and unjust” (262). They behave in this manner because they are the operators of the “machinery of power.” The Monsieur grudgingly pays Gaspard a single gold coin for the loss of his child — a one-to-one exchange in the Marquis’s opinion (114). However, the coin is quickly thrown back into the carriage (114). This refusal of a supposedly generous offer by Marquis not only infuriates him but provokes him to articulate his real estimation of the working class:

“You dogs!” said the Marquis, smoothly, and with an unchanged front, except as to the spots on his nose: “I would ride over any of you very willingly, and exterminate you from the earth. If I knew which rascal threw at the carriage, and if that brigand were sufficiently near it, he should be crushed under the wheels”

(117).

The Marquis would “very willingly” make unwilling sacrifices of any commoner, and, indeed, the whole working class, if necessity did not demand that he keep them alive to maintain his lavish lifestyle. Still, he can effectively decimate society one individual at a time as an example for the rest, and so the Marquis perpetuates the unbearable system of aristocratic control that allows the summary execution of the other members — or, as the Marquis calls them, the dogs — of French society. “So cowed was their condition,” Dickens explains, “and so long and so hard their experience of what such a man could do to them, within the law and beyond it, that not a voice, or a hand, or even an eye, was raised” against the Marquis (117). The threat of extermination, the complete execution of the working class, is very real because such punishments were a part of their “natural mechanics” (Foucault 104). The Marquis is, in other words, inclined to make these people unwilling sacrifices, even if such a massacre of the lower class would cause the nation’s infrastructure to atrophy — and to some extent, the instances of Gaspard’s child have already withered the health of the state. As Rosen stresses, “The centuries of aristocratic rule have left France a wasteland. In the most palpable, physical sense, the rapacity of the nobility has emptied the Nation’s coffers, and left the countryside barren” (172). Even with a weakened infrastructure, the aristocrats know no better than to depend on the blood of the peasants to continue their wasteful subsistence. On a deeper level of signification, the exchange of a coin for the death of Gaspard’s son is a mock ritual of primeval human sacrifice. Precious metal is no reparation for the severed relationship of a parent and his child. By extension, then, the Marquis not only sacrifices a child but the core unit of society, the family. This unwilling sacrifice furthers the idea that the Marquis “could swallow a great many things with ease, and was by some few sullen minds supposed to be rather rapidly swallowing France” (108). The first sign of resistance incites the Marquis to enlarge the sacrifice of the day from one child to the entire working class, if only he had enough nooses.

The innocent child caught under the wheels of the Monsieur the Marquis’s inexorable carriage of human abandonment becomes a synecdoche of the human sacrifices required by the aristocracy. This first unwilling sacrifice of the novel unveils the one-directional structure of society: the labor of the working class fuels the life of extravagance and indulgence of the aristocratic class. The cost for the upkeep of this kind of civilization — the civilization of the aristocratic class — requires the sweat, tears, and the very lifeblood of the working class. Hence, Stone rightly labels Gaspard’s later execution as another unwilling sacrifice. When the maximum amount of unwilling sacrifices have been given by the working class, when enough blood has

been spilt, and when enough familial relationships have been unmade, the working class, overthrows its opulent executioner in a repayment made in the currency of violence. Dickens asserts that the aristocratic class had long overdrawn their accounts in this currency: "There could have been no such Revolution, if all the laws, forms, and ceremonies, had not first been so monstrously abused, that the suicidal vengeance of the Revolution was to scatter them all to the winds" (328). The abuses of the aristocratic class propagated so many unwilling sacrifices that its members incurred a disastrous debt of violence. This exchange of a life for a life is only the first of many, and as the French Revolution progresses, all the aristocratic executioners will themselves become unwilling sacrifices.

When the French Revolution begins, Dickens narrates how the working class revolutionaries require a similar kind of unwilling sacrifice from both the former ruling class and from among their own ranks in order to maintain its new, bloodthirsty civilization. Indeed, "The brutish swallowing of Gaspard, a swallowing ritualized and glorified by the state, provokes on the part of the people more brutish swallowing yet. When that orgy of retributive feasting begins, Dickens continues to suggest its cannibalistic ferocity" (Stone 171). Indeed, the revolutionary class transformed from the working class swallows whole communities of French aristocratic families:

The novel's willingness to represent both the aristocracy and the Revolutionaries as equal opportunity offenders does not simply repeat in short form a characteristically Romantic ambivalence about the relevance of means to ends. The bloodshed is neither the stain on otherwise admirable ideals nor their consecrating mark and is instead shown to be the predictable outcome of a situation in which membership in a social group became a mortal issue. (Stout 31)

The revolutionaries slaughter these aristocrats as unwilling sacrifices *en masse* in order to protect the integrity of their newly formed Republic.

Although the revolutionaries are a new breed of executioners, the purpose of their wholesale slaughter shares a strikingly similar justification of that of their aristocratic predecessors: the preservation of their society and its divinely ordained civilization. As Stout rightly claims, "Thus, to describe the Revolution as a conflict between political forms is to miss exactly what Dickens finds to lament in the event: that the popular national membership that the Republic instated simply repeated the categorical force of the aristocracy it overthrew" (32). Nowhere is this categorical force more concentrated than on the character of Madame la Guillotine.⁶ Moreover, the revolutionary class also causes society to erode into a more primitive form through

the spectacle of public execution. Foucault maintains that “The public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial, but also a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which power is manifested” (47). In *A Tale of Two Cities* such ceremonies hearken back to France’s bloody past of massacres and genocide. Madam la Guillotine yearns for a constant stream of blood at her feet. Dickens describes this stream as connected by time:

In the black prison of the Conciergerie the doomed of the day awaited their fate. They were in number as the weeks of the year. Fifty-two were to roll that afternoon on the life-tide of the city to the boundless everlasting sea. Before the cells were quit of them, new occupants were appointed; before their blood ran into the blood spilled yesterday, the blood that was to mingle with theirs tomorrow was already set. (360)

These executions occur both synchronically and diachronically, linking themselves to the ritualized slaughters of primitive societies. All this blood, much like Monsieur the Marquis’s chocolate, is emblematic of the excess needed to maintain the prosperity of France’s revolutionary society, in this instance the prosperity of the Reign of Terror, which is measured in the number of beheadings per day. As Dickens sarcastically writes,

It was the popular theme for jests; it was the best cure for headache, it infallibly prevented hair from turning grey, it imparted a peculiar delicacy to the complexion, it was the National Razor which shaved close: who kissed La Guillotine, look through the little window and sneezed into the sack. It was the sign of the regeneration of the human race. It superseded the Cross. Models were worn on breasts from which the Cross was discarded, and it was bowed down to and believed in where the Cross was denied. (283-84)

In a kind of dark farce, Madam la Guillotine ironically represents the “regeneration of society” (Dickens 284). Such a statement is ironic because this form of regeneration depends upon death. It quickly regenerates society by lopping off one head per minute (Dickens 284). Dickens go so far as to depict Madam la Guillotine as an ancient sacrificial altar, one which replaces the Cross. At this altar, human sacrifices are offered to the highest ideal in revolutionary France — the Republic — in order to appease its wrathful fury and bloodlust. Rather than progressing civilization, Madam la Guillotine represents a digression into a primitive time when humans were needlessly sacrificed to idols for the sake of ensuring civilization’s successful continuation. That

continuation, in the consciousness of the Republic, comes primarily through unwilling sacrifices. Indeed, motto of the Republic contains the idea of such a sacrifice, “liberty, equality, fraternity or death” — resounding most on that final imperative, or as Dickens puts it, “the last, much the easiest to bestow, O Guillotine” (285). The word “death” in this motto is conspicuously ambiguous, especially in terms of sacrifice: it can just as easily refer to patriotic self-sacrifice as anarchical unwilling sacrifice.

For the sake of the Republic, Madame La Guillotine's victims are encouraged to be willing sacrifices. Such an effacing ideology leads Robert Alter to remark, in his essay “The Demons of History in Dickens's *Tale*” (1987), that the citizens of the French Revolution, like the previous aristocratic rulers, have “become the slaves of impersonal forces” and “at last are made inhuman by them” (97). Thus, when Charles Darnay is arrested a second time, a patriotic soldier exclaims to Doctor Manette that all citizens should be happy to lay down their life for Madam La Guillotine and the French Republic: “‘Citizen Doctor,’ said the first, with his former reluctance, ‘ask no more. If the Republic demands sacrifices from you, without a doubt you as a good patriot will be happy to make them. The Republic goes before all. The People is supreme’” (303).

The soldier's response implicitly recognizes that the sacrifices the Republic require will almost certainly be unwilling; therefore, the position that the Republic comes before all compels submission from those who would resist. This apotheosis of the Republic and republican ideology prescribes unquestioning submission, but, in reality, this ideology does not make such sacrifices any less unwilling because as the new operators of the machinery of power, they control the bodies of the penalized.

Turning citizens' bodies into unwilling sacrifices for the Republic dissolves any sense of communal identity.⁷ A rigid national consciousness replaces any familial, or even communal, subjectivity. This national consciousness can, at a whim, ask for the life of one of its citizens. Much like Madam la Guillotine, the “Law of the Suspected” continues the degeneration of society into a superstitious and untrustworthy society, inculcated with mob-like principles. Made in “Year One of Liberty,” the “Law of the Suspected” assures that no one can trust his or her neighbor and that everyone will perceive everyone else as a potential opponent to the Republic (283), for the law

struck all security for liberty or life, and delivered over any good and innocent person to any bad and guilty one; prisons gorged with people who had committed no offence, and could obtain no hearing; these things became the established order and nature of appointed things, and seemed to be ancient usage before they were many weeks old” (283).

The society of the French Revolution resorts first to sacrifice and slaughter before seeking real solutions and answers to society's problems.

The fervor of the citizens, enhanced by a singular, aggressive, and prevailing national consciousness, brooks no argument in defense of one's self. To place anything above the Republic is treason. What the French Revolution creates, then, is not so much a judgment on the aristocratic class as much as a firestorm of death, the main purpose of which is the extermination of all opponents — or obstacles — to the Republic. To the extent that an entire social sphere of French society can be wiped out, the revolutionary class actively pursues the demolition of every aspect of France's old societal structure. Consequently, the idea of neighborhood and community, which first organized and maintained the French Revolution (for example, the neighborhood of Saint Antoine in Paris), gives way to the all-powerful and ever-deadly fraternity of republic citizens.

In fact, the final sense of community and class distinction is manifested in the remnant of the aristocracy that Charles Darnay encounters when he first enters the prison of La Force.⁸ The members of the aristocratic community are now themselves unwilling sacrifices demanded as restitution for the crimes of their class as well as their inability to fit within the new regime of the French Republic. While they may be mentally alive, Dickens describes how their physical bodies have already died, sacrificed for the good of the Republic:

Charles Darnay seemed to stand in a company of the dead. Ghosts all! The ghosts of beauty, the ghost of stateliness, the ghost of elegance, the ghost of pride, the ghost of frivolity, the ghost of wit, the ghost of youth, the ghost of age, all waiting their dismissal from the desolate shore, all turning on him eyes that were changed by the death they had died in coming here. (265)

In this room are the last representatives of the abuses of the Aristocracy that sparked the revolution. Yet, these members of the aristocratic class refuse to surrender their customs and social practices, even in prison. They do acknowledge their impending sacrifice at the altar of Madam la Guillotine, but in the meantime, they attempt to subsist within a liminal space between life and death, the perimeter of which space is formed by the walls of the prison. This community, in a matter of a few swift strokes, becomes one corporate unwilling sacrifice. When Darnay reemerges from his cell on the way to his trial, he sees that the entire chamber of his aristocratic compeers is empty and knows that they have all been executed. In a chilling scene, Dickens observes, "Every one of those had perished in the massacre; every human creature had had since cared for and parted with, had died on the scaffold" (291). Here, Dickens

steps into his narrative, as he often does, and labels the unwilling sacrifices on the Madam la Guillontine's blood-soaked altar as an actual massacre.

The unwilling sacrifices of the aristocracy and those of the revolutionary class intersect in the character of Dr. Manette, who, partially executed in terms of his identity, is greatly affected by both (Reed 264). First, moral obligation made him an unwilling sacrifice of the aristocratic class. Dickens saw "the Revolution arising not only from social causes but as a process working itself out in moral terms" (Goldberg 119). Having tended to the death of the peasant girl and her brother, who died trying to defend her honor, Doctor Manette witnessed firsthand the abuses of the Evrémont brothers. The younger had raped the girl and the elder was seeing to the quiet concealment of this shameful affair — shameful not so much for the death of the girl but for the fact that his brother had to contest with girl's brother.⁹ According to Doctor Manette's personal account from prison,

I always observed that their pride bitterly resented the younger brother's (as I call him) having crossed swords with a peasant The only consideration that appeared really to affect the mind of either of them was the consideration that this was highly degrading to the family, and was ridiculous. (341)

With a clear sense of right and wrong, Doctor Manette endeavors to report this criminal behavior to the local authorities, even though he "expected the matter would never be heard of; but, [he] wished to relieve [his] own mind" (342). In fact, he refuses the financial compensation, the hush-up money, for his time at the Evrémont Mansion, just like the citizens at the fountain threw back the gold coin callously proffered to Gaspard (342). However, his attempt to report the crime leads to his sudden and unfair imprisonment in the Bastille. Reed explains that "[a]s a witness to the truth, he becomes the memory they want suppressed, the secret they want hidden" (264). His incarceration erases his identity and transforms him into a mechanical shoemaker, who forgets his family and his place in society and becomes only a number ("One Hundred and Five, North Tower" (44)) for eight years. Imprisonment, especially an unjust one, erases his autonomy and his existence (Rosen 180).

The structure of prisons, as Foucault explains, is a "mechanism" that "automatizes and disindividualizes power," including the power over oneself (202-03). Only with the help of the faithful Mr. Lorry and the tender care of his own daughter, Lucie, does Doctor Manette recover his identity, though never entirely (48-53). Of course, his unjust treatment rightfully causes him to censure the aristocracy: "But, now I believe that the mark of the red cross is fatal to them, and they that they have no part in His mercies. . . . I denounce them to Heaven and to earth" (344). Because of his sincere

probity, Doctor Manette is sent to his “living grave” in the Bastille, for all intents and purposes dead to society, to his family, and to himself. In short, Doctor Manette becomes a living unwilling sacrifice. As an unwilling sacrifice to the secret pleasures and subsequent mistreatments of the aristocratic class, Doctor Manette cannot help but inveigh against their “immunities” and damn their unpunished iniquities (342).

Doctor Manette’s unjust imprisonment is not the end of his sacrifice. His own vituperative report is used against the defense of his son-in-law, who is the son of the elder Evrémonde brother. Using his status as a relic to unwilling sacrifices of the aristocracy, Doctor Manetter enhances his credibility with the fickle jury at the Conciegerie, and in front of the whole mob of France, Doctor Manette is able to successfully advocate for a verdict of not guilty in the first trial and pacify the rabble. Stone describes this mob as always “rapidly grown and rapidly escalating,” which is “both nightmarishly terrifying and wildly exhilarating” (171).¹⁰ But, in the second trial, Doctor Manette’s unwilling sacrifice is reconstituted as his own words are mobilized for the prosecution of Charles Darnay. The Republican jury make Doctor Manette an unwitting purveyor of unwilling sacrifice. His story so infuriates the jury (and the mob) that Charles would, without a doubt now, be sentenced to an immediate death at the foot of Madam la Guillotine: “The narrative called up the most revengeful passions of the time, and there was not a head in the nation but must have dropped before it” (344). Doctor Manette must therefore face the reality that he will have to unwillingly sacrifice his family, which he had just saved from certain death. Once again, his family — the only thing which he holds dear in his second life — will return to oblivion, along with his sense of self. Upon hearing Charles’s sentence, Doctor Manette, starts to revert to the mechanical existence he had in prison and begins to think about mending shoes once again (Tambling 142). To be sure, this sacrifice of family is one that the revolutionary class tries to label as willing: first, because it is “a capital crime, to mourn for, or sympathize with, a victim of the Guillotine” (358), and second, because the complete annihilation of aristocratic families, regardless of their innocence, guilt, goodness, or wretchedness, is one of the major objectives of the Reign of Terror. The president supervising the trial of Charles Darnay remarks to Doctor Manette that the

good physician of the Republic would deserve better still of the Republic by rooting out an obnoxious family of Aristocrats, and would doubtless feel a sacred glow and joy in making his daughter a widow and her child an orphan, there was wild excitement, patriotic fervour, not a touch of human sympathy. (345)

However, no amount of ideological apostrophizing will compel Doctor Manette

to make this sacrifice, either to abandon his son-in-law or renounce a lifetime of happiness, for his daughter and his granddaughter for the cause of the Republic. With this single character, Dickens demonstrates that the demand for unwilling sacrifices — whether they are insisted upon by force or renamed by law — can only lead to the end of families and, by extension, the end of society.

France's revolutionary society itself becomes corrupted by its excessive insistence on death: "So used are the regular inhabitants of the houses to the spectacle, that in many windows there are no more people, and in some the occupation of the hands is not so much as suspended, while the eyes survey the faces in the tumbrils" (385). These are not the extravagancies of the aristocracy, but the thirst for blood of the people, drank up by Madam la Guillotine, which thirst has the same depleting effect on society. For Dickens, the revolutionary citizens "[s]ow the same seed of rapacious license and oppression ever again," which "will surely yield the same fruit according to its kind" (385).

Retribution is just as enervating to France as Inxurious living: both contribute to the downfall of society equally enervating, contributing to the fall of society.¹¹ The executors must not be the only ones who change — the nature of their sacrifices must change as well. Real change, then, is brought about by willing sacrifices like the one Sydney Carton makes on behalf of his friends Lucie Manette and Charles Darnay.¹² In Sydney's own words, "Many lives must inevitably be sacrificed," with the implicit understanding that they are to be willing sacrifices (359).

Unwilling sacrifices, as Dickens presents them, manifest the darker, more primitive aspects of humanity. Sumptuous lifestyles and oppressive legislation may superficially convert unwilling sacrifices into necessary propitiations. Such relabeling, however, does not change how they crimp the development and prosperity of society. Rather, unwilling sacrifices coarsen society, make quotidian spectacles of executions, and destroy human life as though such spectacles of death can make civilization flourish.

Dickens believed otherwise, and his novel is not so much a formal history but a commentary directed at contemporary English society (Goldberg 102).¹³ It urges caution against England's making the same mistakes as those bloody instances that came to define the French Revolution. It warns his audience that requiring unwilling sacrifices from citizens will only bring about society's degeneration into a mob of thoughtless murders (Alter 96).

The dialogical structure of the novel leaves it to readers to realize that what society needs are the willing sacrifices of everyday heroes to fight for far better things and a far better place in which to live. In a certain sense, Dickens offers himself as a willing sacrifice for society as he seeks to cure English society's diseased state by

means of his creative faculties, to write not for the sake of entertainment but for the sake of preservation.

Notes

1. One of Christ's commandments to his disciples is "to love one another as I have loved you. No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you" (John 15.12-14). For more on Sydney Carton's self-sacrifice, see Jennifer Ruth's "The Self-Sacrificing Professional: Charles Dickens's 'Hunted Down' and *A Tale of Two Cities*," 283-99 and Beth F. Herst's chapter on Carton, "The 'Dandy' Vindicated," in *The Dickens Hero: Selfhood and Alienation in the Dickens World*, 145-150.
2. Here, I am engaging with and applying Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, which originally applied to the dialogue between works of literature but which Bakhtin extended to systems of language and thought. Bakhtin's theory asserts that all aspects of language, as expressed in ideas, operate in dynamic relationships in which these aspects are contrasted with previous uses of language. In this essay, I am most concerned about the dialogic relationship of concepts of willing and unwilling sacrifices. See M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*.
3. For more on Dickens's formulation of society and its urban setting in *A Tale*, see Andrew Sanders's *Dickens and the Spirit of the Age* and Myron Magnet's *Dickens and the Social Order*.
4. For more on the Carlyle's effect on Dickens's writing, see William Oddie's *Dickens and Carlyle: The Question of Influence*.
5. Stone was not the first scholar to recognize the references to cannibalism made by Dickens in *A Tale of Two Cities*. Michael Goldberg also notes that this concept derives from Carlyle's history, *The French Revolution* (1837), in which Goldberg intimates an analogical relationship between cannibalism and the voracious desire for death during the French Revolution, a desire is later individualized by Dickens (112). What Stone's study does, however, is to illustrate the full extent of this analogy in Dickens's work. For more information on the effect Carlyle's history had on *A Tale of Two Cities* and other works by Dickens, see William Oddie's *Dickens and Carlyle: The Question of Influence*. For an argument that attempts to lessen Carlyle's influence on Dickens, see Gareth Stedman Jones's "The Redemptive Power of Violence? Carlyle, Marx, and Dickens."
6. Much of the details concerning the guillotine, including the transportation of prisoners such as Carton to the guillotine, derive from Carlyle (Oddie 68-70).
7. Cates Baldrige, in his article "Alternatives to Bourgeois Individualism in *A Tale of Two Cities*," elaborates on the social ideal of the Republic: "the Revolution's assertion that the group, the class, the Republic — and *not* the individual — comprise, or should comprise, the basic unit of society" (633).
8. For more on class conflict and in *A Tale*, see Albert D. Hutter, "Nation and Generation in *A Tale of Two Cities*."

9. For an analysis of the violence against the human body in *A Tale of Two Cities* see Jeremy Tambling's chapter, "Barnaby Rudge, *A Tale of Two Cities*, and *The Idiot*" in *Dickens, Violence, and the Modern State: Dreams of the Scaffold*, 131-146.

10. Stone elaborates on Dickens's use of mobs, "This paradoxical rendering is not surprising. Mobs were always frightening to Dickens — but they were . . . fascinating and liberating as well. Dickens's evocations of mobs usually exhibit this polarity and ambivalence" (171). Similarly, Oddie states that mobs represent one extreme of social order: "The mob, like the prison and the fireside, is a great centralising [sic] emblem, enacting in dramatic form and fusing together such Dickensian (and Victorian) preoccupations as the need for order and control; the fear of cruelty; the horror of anarchy and its converse; the belief in civilisation [sic] and the values of hearth and homes" (101).

11. As Reed asserts, "*A Tale of Two Cities* is a story of guilt and retribution, with retribution as its energizing core. While the narrative demonstrates that retribution operates at a historical as well as a personal level so that nations will eventually suffer for their crimes as individuals do, it must also denounce a retribution brought about by individuals motivated by hatred, vengeance, spite, and other unchristian emotions" (265).

12. Beth F. Herst affirms that the idea of love surrounds Carton's self-sacrifice: "Viewed in the light of his history of determined self-destruction, Carton's final sacrifice scarcely presents the sort of victory of life and love against the forces of darkness so many commentators have taken it to be" (150). For more on Dickens's belief in the power of willing sacrifice to save society, see Gareth Stedman Jones's article, "The Redemptive Power of Violence? Carlyle, Marx and Dickens."

13. John R. Reed comments that as a history, Dickens's novel is able to overlook mercy and downplay compassion, which further augments his warning to his contemporary audience: "Because history does not forgive, there is very little discussion of forgiveness, or even pardon or mercy, in this novel, which is overwhelmingly occupied with illustrating the consequences of unwise, unjust, and inhuman behavior" (257). Alter also notes that "Dickens was attempting something new, as he himself confesses in his letters, in treating this whole historical subject. The fact, on the other hand, that the general strategy of this novel differs from that of his other fiction has the effect of leaving certain regrettable conventional elements nakedly exposed which, in the more typical novels, are submerged in the great swirl of brilliant fascination that can only be called Dickensian" (93). On an archetypal level, Hornback asserts, "The French Revolution is Dickens's symbol, momentarily, for the chaotic present world, pushed to the moment of crisis. And the symbol quickly becomes myth, in Dickens's association of the Revolution as a crisis with calamity of the Deluge and the uncertain world of the Creation" (118).

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(In)visible Violence: Carolina de Jesus's *Quarto de despejo* and Clarice Lispector's *A hora da estrela*

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Abstract This paper focus on Clarice Lispector's *A hora da estrela* and Carolina de Jesus *Quarto de despejo* to compare the different kinds of violence the protagonists endure and how representational violence has silenced Brazilian women writers' voices. The reception of both literary works is different as Clarice Lispector's and Carolina de Jesus's literary voices and literary works are appropriated into mainstream discourse. In *A Hora da Estrela*, Lispector critiques the supremacy of the dominant discourse and presumed transparency through Rodrigo's oppression of Macabéa's agency and life. In *Quarto de despejo*, Audálio Dantas alters Jesus's text by severely editing, changing, and selecting entries he believes to be important. Both literary works depict the various forms of violence women have to overcome to survive in the city of São Paulo. Macabéa and Carolina face violence on different levels as each protagonist tries to fight against victimization to shape their own subjectivities.

Key words Violence; representational violence; Clarice Lispector; Carolina de Jesus

In Latin America, social and economic turmoil in the form of rebellions, protests, wars, dictatorships, and military coups, marked the mid-twentieth century. In Brazil writers such as Manuel Bandeira, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, and João Guimarães Rosa depict this instability in their literary works. In addition to the social, economic, and cultural upheavals, women writers encountered a number of barriers that made it difficult to write and publish in a patriarchal society.

Clarice Lispector (1925-1977) and Carolina Maria de Jesus (1914-1977) are two women authors who changed the face of Brazilian literature through their unique literary voices. Clarice Lispector's most violent and last published work is *A Hora da estrela* (1977), a novel told by a third person male narrator that depicts the life a poor Nordeste, ¹ Macabéa, who moves to the city of São Paulo to search, in vain, for work

and a sense of belonging. Carolina de Jesus's first and most famous published work is *Quarto de despejo* (1960), written in the format of a diary. The story is told from the perspective of Carolina and portrays the harsh conditions of a single Afro-Brazilian mother living in the slums and working as a paper collector in downtown São Paulo.

Although scholars have analyzed each of the works, there is a lack of a comparative analysis between the narratives. The critical reception of each narrative is also significantly different, despite the common theme of violence and marginality. In this article, I juxtapose the two works to rediscover their similarities and differences, as well as to problematize their distinct reception by the general public and literary scholars. I further suggest that Lispector's and Jesus's literary voices are often appropriated and incorporated into the dominant discourse, a case of representational violence. The protagonists of each narrative, Macabéa and Carolina, face physical and psychological violence on a daily basis, as they struggle to survive at the margins of society. Despite their difficulties, they fight against victimization and search for their own sense of self. *A Hora da Estrela* and *Quarto de Despejo* both examine the different kinds of violence the protagonists endure as they try to positively shape their sense of self while critically addressing the representational violence that has shaped Clarice Lispector's and Carolina de Jesus's literary voices.

The social background of the authors contributes to their works. As a diarist, the connection between the life and writing of Carolina Maria de Jesus is naturally more direct. She was born in 1914 in the countryside of Minas Gerais in Brazil. Her mother was a poor rural worker but she managed to send Carolina de Jesus to school for two years, which was enough for her to learn how to read and write. As an adult, Carolina de Jesus moved to São Paulo to live in the Favela do Canindé (*slums of Caninde*) with her three children: José Carlos, João José, and Vera Eunice. The Favela of Canindé is situated in Brazil's largest city, São Paulo. At the time Jesus was writing, Canindé had about 60,000 inhabitants living in poor very poor shacks. Historically, the term favela derives from the War of the Canudos (1896-1897), which was fought in Bahia, a state in northeastern Brazil. In this war, the rebellion against the government was defeated and the veterans were promised jobs in the São Paulo, but given none. Without money most veterans moved into the hills to live in improvised houses, which received the name of Morro (Hill) da Favela.²

In *Quarto de despejo*, when Carolina de Jesus moves to São Paulo, she cannot find regular employment, but she refuses to beg for money. She goes to work as a *catadora de papel*,³ selling to recycling factories whatever she finds on the streets in exchange for a few Cruzeiros.⁴ Carolina de Jesus and her children live in extreme poverty amidst the constant threat of hunger and violence. Despite harsh conditions, she enjoys reading and manages to write diaries, short stories, poems and tales.

Audálio Dantas, a Brazilian journalist who was interested in the social conditions of the inhabitants of the Favela do Canindé, was introduced to Carolina de Jesus during one of his visits. Dantas encouraged her to publish and in 1960, Jesus published *Quarto de despejo*.

The narrative became a worldwide sensation, and was translated into English by David St. Clair two years later with the title: *Child of the Dark: The Diary of Carolina Maria de Jesus*. The book is composed of diary entries from July 1955 to January 1960, wherein Carolina, the narrator, talks about the hardships she has to endure on a daily basis, the different kinds of violence that threaten the safety of her family, and the crushing implications and consequences of hunger. Jesus wrote extensively and published many other works such as *Casa de Alvenaria*, *Pedaços de Fome*, and *Provérbios*. Jesus's writing style is unique, marked by direct syntax filled with metaphors, similes and everyday puns that create an alternative view of Brazilian society and politics. She is often referred to as the Black Cinderella, because she acquired fame and money, and eventually moved out of the favela.⁵ However, unlike Cinderella, her story does not have a happy ending as she is not successful in finding formal employment and she struggles economically. Jesus is proud of her African heritage and she fights victimization through her writing, but after her overnight success she is basically forced back into anonymity and poverty.

Clarice Lispector, on the other hand, was born to Jewish parents who emigrated from Ukraine to Brazil in 1920, when she was only two months old. Lispector lived with her mother, father and sister in Recife during most of her childhood. In contrast to Carolina de Jesus, Lispector enjoyed the benefits of being raised by an upper-middle class family and she graduated with a law degree. As an adult, Lispector lived in Rio de Janeiro and became a contributor to several newspapers. She married a diplomat and they lived for many years in Europe and the United States. She wrote many poems, short stories, and novels that have continuously gained popularity and literary recognition. *A Hora da Estrela* is considerably different from Lispector's previous works because of its explicit descriptions of violence. Lispector tackles visible violence,⁶ depicting the miserable life of a Nordesteira, Macabéa, who moves to Rio de Janeiro and suffers psychological and physical abuse, poverty and hunger. Peixoto comments about Lispector's literary choice: "the strategy for writing the victim no longer entails containment within ideological and narrative structures that minimize the violence, but involves, on the contrary, an unleashing of affective forces" (83). Peixoto emphasizes the brutality and cruelty the protagonist, Macabéa, faces in São Paulo. Nevertheless, Macabéa tries to fight discrimination. Peixoto's choice of the term *victim*, suggests a passive view of a helpless subaltern subject. I believe it is problematic to equate victim with subaltern, because subalternity does not

necessarily imply that the person occupies a position of victimhood. Thus, I avoid the term victim in this article.

To compare and contrast Carolina de Jesus' *Quarto de despejo* with Clarice Lispector's *A Hora da estrela* requires a flexible and ongoing theoretical discussion. Autobiographies have been an intriguing genre, starting with the presumption of a unified self to the constructions of multiple selves, all the while playing with the slippery distinction between fiction and reality. Lesley Feracho explains that the representation of the self can be complex because of "women's historical silencing-social, economic, and artistic" (5). Women writers may find in writing an outlet for self-expression and an opportunity to struggle for empowerment. Lispector and Jesus play with their texts, experimenting with alternative representations and exploring their access to dominant discourse through their writing. *A Hora da estrela* can be viewed as a meta-fiction, with a narrator, Rodrigo, who is also a character in the story. *Quarto de despejo* may be considered as an autobiographical text in the strict sense as Jesus portrays elements very close to her reality and experiences through the voice of the narrator, Carolina. Carolina is used to refer to the voice of the narrator in the fictional work, while Jesus is used to refer to the author herself. The purpose of this distinction is to emphasize the literariness of *Quarto de Despejo*, which is viewed as a kind of *testimonio*.⁷ The implication is that Jesus writes what she sees she does not create literature. However, I argue that like any literary text, Jesus's work features a narrator who emerges from the text, but does not automatically coincide with the author. This choice is intended to challenge the seduction of voyeuristic access to works about subalternity. It is my view that Carolina de Jesus's work is literature.

The reception of Clarice Lispector's and Carolina de Jesus's narratives has been significantly different, both nationally and internationally. Susan Quinlan's *The Female Voice in Contemporary Brazilian Narrative* offers readers a glimpse of the variety of Brazilian women writers. She discusses women's fiction and their literary works, including Yoruba's influence on Brazilian literature. Even so, while writers such as Clarice Lispector are cited and applauded, writers such as Carolina de Jesus are left out of the analysis. Jesus does not even merit mention in the timeline of Brazilian women writers at the beginning of the book of Brazilian women writers. This snub is repeated in Cristina Ferreira-Pinto's detailed collection of Brazilian women authors of the twentieth century. In the given timeline, many writers such as Rachel de Queiroz, Nélida Pinon, and Clarice Lispector are mentioned, but Carolina de Jesus is once again left out. This kind of exclusion of Carolina de Jesus reflects how her writings have been ignored as part of the Brazilian literary canon, obfuscating her voice as a literary writer. In the past, Jesus's fame was momentary and her recognition as a writer was unstable, while Lispector gradually becomes a

consecrated author. In contrast to Jesus's works, Lispector's literary works have a privileged position, usually acknowledged as part of both the Brazilian and World Literary Canons.

The English translations of both works further reflect the different treatment of the narratives. Giovanni Pontiero's translation of *A Hora da estrela* (*The Hour of the Star*) was published in 1986 almost ten years after the original. The English title is faithful to the Portuguese title. The late translation indicates that Lispector's fame had been steadily increasing. By contrast, David St. Clair translated Carolina de Jesus's *Quarto de despejo*, only two years after its original publication, with the title *Child of the Dark*. The proximity Jesus's publication and the translation of her work into English illustrates the momentary attention her narrative received. It is celebrated for its exoticness, but it is excluded from the Brazilian literary canon. The change of title contributes to Jesus's image as representative of a race, because instead of translating her metaphorical title of *Quarto de despejo* into *evicted room* or *storage room*, Clair chooses to change the title to reflect Jesus's subject position, not her literary choice of words. The English title qualifies Jesus's subject position and does not follow the metaphor she created to make a social critique through an elaborate play with language.

Clarice Lispector's fictional works are widely praised for their literariness and their proximity to the dominant culture. Carolina de Jesus is seen as an exotic other, an Afro-Brazilian single mother living in the biggest favela in Brazil, obscuring the importance of her works. Over time, Lispector acquired a literary reputation and is studied as a Brazilian writer, while Jesus's work has not been commonly associated with the canon of Brazilian literature, although in recent years there has been a successful reintegration of Carolina de Jesus's literary works into Brazilian Literature by intellectuals, scholars, and activists. One noteworthy group, LITEAFRO, organized by the Professor Eduardo de Assis at the Federal University of Minas Gerais does groundbreaking work in rediscovering and publicizing works by Afro-Brazilian authors.

Still, Clarice Lispector's narratives have received more recognition, sometimes for questionable reasons. For example, French philosopher and literary critic Hélène Cixous has written extensively about Lispector's works and uses Lispector's fiction to prove her theoretical ideas, in a sense co-opting Lispector's literary voice to fit her theoretical paradigms. In her comments about *A Hora da Estrela*, Cixous notes that "Rodrigo is just a vessel, a prop, with which Lispector writes and reflects herself in Macabéa" (146). She equates Lispector with Macabéa and reduces Rodrigo to a mere vessel. It might be argued, however, that Rodrigo has in fact as active a voice as the narrator, independent from the voice of the author. Lispector does not reflect

herself in Rodrigo nor Macabéa; she creates a literary narrator and character who are distinct from her own personal and authorial voice. Thus Ana Koblucka critiques Cixous's analysis arguing that "the window [which] once again turns into a mirror, the radical otherness of Lispector's narrative experiment in *The Hour of the Star* becomes assimilated into the mosaic of Cixousian poetic imagination" (18). As Koblucka suggests, Cixous uses the narrative to reflect her own theoretical premises. Cixous's reading undermines Lispector's agency as a creative writer. This appropriation induces a rather passive classification of Lispector's ideas, by equating her voice with those Rodrigo and Macabéa. Lispector challenges the dominant discourse that claims to control and define the other, by having her own voice appropriated by an egocentric male narrator. Whether Cixous misrepresents Clarice Lispector by framing her work within Eurocentric ideals will continue to be debated.

Carolina de Jesus has her literary voice appropriated, but to a greater extent, because her editor, Audálio Dantas, has directly manipulated her writing. Through his editing, Jesus's voice is silenced. Her writings are shaped to fit certain patterns and expectations. One must acknowledge Dantas's work as a compiler and editor, since he helped Jesus publish and disseminate her work to a broader audience. Nevertheless, he did select, change, reorganize, and edit Jesus's writing. Several scholars recognize Dantas active role. Lesley Feracho comments that "Jesus and Audálio Dantas (through his editing of the diary) engage their readers' interest by speaking to them" (47). Feracho attributes a significant degree of authorship to Dantas, recognizing his active role in the process of publishing Jesus's diaries. Dantas not only compiles the texts, but, to a certain extent, he re-writes Jesus's *Quarto de Despejo*.

Although Dantas, has claimed a position of transparency for his intervention, saying that he only collected Jesus's writings to publish them, Gayatri Spivak has discussed the danger of writing about the other and the seductiveness of believing in the transparency of such work: When "representing them [subalterns], the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent" (29), because they claim to be only a conduit for the subaltern. Spivak argues that assuming that the subaltern is being clearly portrayed can be seductive but is misguided because any kind of intervention automatically alters the original dynamic. Dantas's editorial work is therefore not transparent; he is a mediator between the author's text and the audience. His selection and organization of the texts entail actively shaping the narrative and its reception.⁸ Although Carolina de Jesus wanted to publish her fairy-tale like stories, Dantas knew that her diaries would have a greater impact on the public and pushed for their publication.⁹ Audiences tend to search for a glimpse of subalternity through a voyeuristic gaze. Jesus the writer of diaries is accepted; Jesus the writer of fairy tales is not.

Another dilemma is that Danta's act of collecting Jesus's writings may be seen as

heroic, as he is associated with bringing light into the dark world of Carolina de Jesus. A parallel can be made with Gayatri Spivak's statement about colonial exploitation in India: "White men seeking to save brown women from brown men" (61). This expression describes most audiences that tend to view Dantas as the important figure who went out of his way to help a poor and helpless Afro-Brazilian woman. Jesus is accepted as a writer because she is not seen as a threat. She is seen as a helpless black woman who is saved by the kind white reporter. This appropriation of the other creates an exotic view of the subaltern position in which they are spoken for, appropriated by a dominant discourse and consequently ignored.

Spivak's critique of the myth "white men seeking to save brown women from brown men" (61) is applicable, when Rodrigo takes on the role of Macabéa's savior in *A Hora da Estrela*. As narrator Rodrigo embodies the figure of the colonizer who believes he has the power to represent and save Macabéa. He writes about Macabéa with a degree of ownership and claims to write not because of his own desire, but out of duty: "What I am writing is something more than mere invention; it is my duty to relate everything about this girl among thousands of others like her" (13). He equates Macabéa to all Nortedinas, suggesting they are all the same and they are all hopeless. And he claims to bring meaning to Macabéa's life by telling her story and saving her from anonymity and darkness.

Behind this mask of kindness lies the appropriation and domination of the colonized by the colonizer. Rodrigo does not care about Macabéa; he is both repelled and attracted to her exotic otherness. He says: "Yes, I'm in love with Macabéa, my darling Maca, in love with her homeliness and total anonymity... In love with her fragile lungs, the scrawny little thing" (68). Rodrigo is seduced by Macabéa's powerlessness, just as a colonizer is attracted to the colonized. He uses unflattering adjectives, and a short nickname, Maca, to refer to *his* Macabéa.¹⁰ Rodrigo does not give Macabéa voice but uses her for his benefit, self-enjoyment, and as a means to reaffirm his own identity and superiority as the holder of knowledge. Through the construction of an arrogant and dominating narrator, Lispector makes a biting criticism of critics and authors who claim to speak for and represent subalterns.

In the work of both Carolina de Jesus and Clarice Lispector, the role of doctors and dentists is problematized. They claim to help the protagonists, but further oppress Macabéa and Carolina. In *A Hora da Estrela*, after several days of feeling ill, Macabéa decides to go to the doctor. Her appearance is that of a poor young woman who suffers from hunger: she goes days without meals, in addition to being deprived of sleep and physical activity. The doctor knows that Macabéa's malnutrition is not caused by dieting, but he chooses to ignore the reality of her hunger: "The doctor took a good look at her and felt sure that she didn't diet to lose weight. Nevertheless, he finds it is

easier to go on insisting that that she shouldn't diet to lose weight" (67). Even though the doctor is aware that dieting is not a concern for Macabéa, he conveniently tells her to stop skipping meals. He searches for the easy way out, choosing not to deal with her real problem: hunger. Macabéa's real problem is not even considered. The doctor does not want to see the reality of her poverty, so he pretends the problem can be easily fixed by eating. Macabéa is forced into silence, as she is not given space to voice her struggle and she is too repressed to shout out.

In *Quarto de Despejo*, when Carolina brings home more money than usual, her son João, asks her to take him to the dentist because his tooth has been hurting for several weeks. Without hesitating or thinking about the cost, she takes him to the nearest dentist.¹¹ At Dr. Paulo's office, Carolina waits her turn and then she explains that her son has a bad toothache. The doctor does not consult her about possible procedures and he just starts to pull out João's tooth. Carolina only has space to ask: 'How much is it, Doctor?' 'A hundred cruzeiros.' I thought the price was exorbitant. But he was already sitting in the chair" (120). Carolina is voiceless to decide what she wants to do with her son. The dentist ignores Carolina, ignores her opinion, because he judges her to have none. Although Carolina has money to pay, she is forced into silent acceptance because she is trapped in the situation.

Despite the violence authorities often inflict upon Carolina, she fights against victimization by positively shaping her sense of self. She learns that to survive in a racist, classist, and sexist society, she needs to care about herself despite the cruelty of others. Carolina takes pride in her African heritage and she tries to positively shape her sense of self. She is very proud of who she is, often proclaiming her African ancestry and challenging the dominant discourse of a racist society. As an example, when Carolina is confronted with a prejudice remark by factory workers, she writes about her resistance: "'It's a shame you're black' [factory workers]. . . They were forgetting that I adore my black skin and my kinky hair [Carolina]" (72). Carolina positively shapes her sense of self by reaffirming that she likes the color of her skin and hair. She asserts her own paradigms of beauty through writing about it in her diary. Even though she is surrounded by negative input, Carolina fights to positively shape her subjectivity.¹²

By contrast, in *A Hora da estrela*, Macabéa cannot positively shape her sense of self. When she is still young, Macabéa loses her parents and has to live with an unmarried aunt who constantly abuses her. Macabéa's aunt is an overly devout religious woman who has a distorted view of society and women's roles. She hits Macabéa, many times in the head, because she thinks punishment is good for discipline: "her aunt rapping her on the head because the old woman believed that the crown of the head was the vital part of one's body. Her aunt would use her knuckles

to rap that head of skin and bones which suffered from a calcium deficiency” (27). Macabéa suffers physical violence from a young age, as her aunt beats her excessively and continuously. This abusive relationship prevents Macabéa from constructing a positive sense of self, as she will always think she has done something wrong and deserves to be punished. She is not encouraged to think about her own subjectivity, she is beaten into silence and isolation from society.

Marta Peixoto assumes that Macabéa is oblivious to reality because “she believes she is happy” (96). Macabéa may be unaware of her deplorable conditions, but her marginality is so great that she cannot articulate personal feelings to think she is happy. She cannot articulate such thought, because she cannot articulate what she feels, likes or desires. She is not living in an illusion; she is living completely adrift from society, marginalized and excluded. Whatever comes her way she simply accepts, believing that she is outside life itself. For example, when her temporary boyfriend, Olímpio, asks her personal questions, she becomes lost and speechless:

[Macabéa] What shall we talk about then?

[Olímpio] About you.

[Macabéa] Me!

[Olímpio] Why the fuss? Aren't you a human being? Human beings talk about other human beings.

[Macabéa] Forgive me, but I don't believe that I am all that human.

[...]

[Olímpio] Look I'm going. You're a dead loss. (48)¹³

This episode illustrates that Macabéa views herself as adrift from others. Her position as a subaltern is so marginal that she is unaware of her identity. Peixoto comments about Macabéa tragic situation: “Macabéa is ‘raped,’ not by one individual man, but by a multitude of social and cultural forces that conspire to use her cruelly for the benefit of others” (90). As Peixoto suggests, Olímpio likes to feel good about himself by humiliating Macabéa and using her at his convenience, constantly harassing her.

Macabéa is not able to positively shape her own subjectivity even though she has social, economic, and racial privileges compared to Carolina, who positively shapes her sense of self and is proud of her African heritage. How is it possible that Macabéa does not see her privileges, desires, or rights as a human being? Rey Chow's essay *Postcolonial Visibilities: Questions Inspired by Deleuze's Method* brings to light such questions. Chow suggests that visibilities have little to do with the physical ability of seeing, but are instead intrinsically articulated with our subject positions — with how and what we are taught to see in our surroundings (65). Macabéa is taught to

repress feelings and she is punished for any transgression. She cannot articulate any kind of identity for herself. In this way, she learns to live without thinking about her own sense of self. Further, Deleuze proposes that the crux of the matter lies between what is visible and what we can articulate: we need to associate or represent our surroundings in order to see our positions, the positioning of others, and the various possibilities within (64-5). As Macabea's oppression prevents her from understanding and questioning her surroundings, she is unable to articulate her own subjectivity. She has been fiercely repressed as a child and young adult; she cannot comprehend her environment or social relationships, which sets her further adrift, away from any possibilities of searching for her own identity. She is clueless about interacting with people and society in general, because she is conditioned to view herself as an outsider, as invisible to others and consequently invisible to herself.

Another significant difference between both protagonists is in the act of writing. Despite the violence Macabéa and Carolina face in the city of São Paulo, the act of writing creates a significant gap between their subject positions. Macabéa is a typist: she only types words and is oblivious to their meanings. Carolina writes her own stories, and is very aware of the language she uses. She uses writing as an outlet and as a means to fight against victimization. Macabéa reflects the loss of identity, meaning, powerlessness, and silence; while Carolina reflects a control of one's subjectivity, and the struggle for empowerment and voice through writing. Although Macabéa has social and economic privileges, Carolina acquires agency through writing and, in this sense, occupies a privileged subject position. Macabéa illustrates subalternity to an extreme, as she experiences complete loss of any sense of self; contrary to Carolina who, although marginalized, manages to positively shape her subjectivity through the act of writing.

In *Quarto de despejo*, Carolina de Jesus longs for some quiet space and alone time. Since she lives in the Favela of Canindé, however, a private room is highly unlikely. She shares a small one-room shack with her three children. Neighbors, children, and street dogs there is no moment of complete silence and solitude surround her. Yet she manages to write several books, tales, and diaries with the paper she collects from the streets. To a certain extent, Jesus defies Virginia Woolf's argument that to write "a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction" (4). Such a scenario is ideal and Jesus often remarks about wanting a separate room to write. Nevertheless, with barely any space, no silence, and lacking economic conditions, Carolina de Jesus manages to write her stories.

Regarding Jesus's search for a separate room, Levine and Meihy remark that "[f]rom the days of her childhood to her final years in self-exile, Carolina's response was to distance herself from others, in order to maintain control over her life. This trait, in

fact, was in many ways the key to her ability to keep her sanity” (143). Even though Carolina does treasure personal space, it is extreme to state that her distance from the others in the *comunidade da favela* is what kept her sane. Levine and Meihy’s arguments imply that Carolina’s neighbors are inferior, unworthy, and could have polluted the brilliance of Carolina if she had spent time with them. Such analysis can be problematic because it reinforces stereotypes that pigeon-hole the inhabitants of the Favelas as corrupting and negative influences. Their further arguments contribute to this stereotypical essentialization of otherness: “She was the one who persisted in reading when others played. She was the one who refused to drink alcohol or to gossip or give in to hopelessness” (143). This statement implies that Jesus views herself superior to her neighbors. Such comments turn Jesus into an example of how success is in the reach of the *favelados*, but they constantly choose to waste their lives with booze, games, and gossip. This is a simplistic view of a greater socio-economic problem: Why are others not writing? Do they even know how to write? Were they able to attend school, even if just for couple of years? What traumas and deceptions cause them to drink? Why is gossip such a degrading activity? Gossip could be considered as a form of storytelling. Carolina de Jesus herself claims to draw inspiration from the talks she hears from neighbors and friends. Levine and Meihy’s arguments need to be examined, because they imply that everyone around Carolina de Jesus could succeed, but she is the only one that has the will power. Jesus should be recognized as an exception and she should not be considered as representative. Although she occupies a subaltern position in the margins of society, she reads and writes which already sets her in a relative position of privilege.

In conclusion, Clarice Lispector’s and Carolina de Jesus’s literary voices are often appropriated to better fit paradigms of the dominant discourse. Macabéa and Carolina face different kinds of violence as they are relegated to the margins of society. Finally, while Clarice Lispector’s *A Hora da Estrela* was adapted into film in 1985, Carolina de Jesus’s *Quarto de Despejo* has not privileged from a similar welcome by the film industry. An ongoing discussion about the different receptions of literary works by Brazilian women writers is important to the re-visioning of Latin American literature.

Notes

1. Nordeste is a feminine adjective used to describe women who are from the Northeastern states of Brazil. The term is a derivation of the term Nordeste, which means Northeast.
2. With time, the term Favela became the term to describe any slums in the hills and outskirts of cities. The favelas grew immensely with the rural exodus during the 70’s and 80’s in which many

people could not find jobs and were forced to live in the precarious conditions of the favelas. Nowadays, some favelas have become extremely big, as with Rochinha with about 200,000 inhabitants. The term favela has been substituted for the term *comunidade*, or *community*, because the inhabitants of these geographical locations have established their own alternative community, with infrastructure, (even if lacking good conditions), shops and lifestyle. The term *favelados*, which refers to people living in the favelas, is no longer accepted because of its negative implication of powerlessness and marginality. The expression *comunidade da favela* is used in this paper as an attempt to acknowledge this change.

3. The name is commonly used in Brazil to refer to the person whose life work is to collect paper / cardboard from the streets. With the advancement of industrialization and introduction of recycling trucks, this kind of work has been largely eliminated, but many still depend on it.

4. The Cruzeiro was the name of the Brazilian currency from 1942 to 1994. This period featured an economy that was quite unstable with high inflation rates.

5. The term Black Cinderella was first used by Robert Levie and José Carlos Meihy in their book *The Life and Death of Carolina Maria de Jesus*.

6. The expression “visible violence” refers to the kind of violence depicted in a text that is usually clearly stated, such as beatings, rapes, hunger, and insults. It is opposite from a disguised violence of repression and oppression, common to Lispector’s earlier works. The term visible can also be viewed in parallel with Chow’s notion of visibility, referring to a kind of violence clearly perceptible from most points of view.

7. John Beverly defines *testimonio* as “a novel or novella-length narrative in book or pamphlet form, told in first person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts, and whose unit of narration is usually a ‘life’ or a significant experience” (31). See Beverly’s *Testimonio: On the Politics of Truth*.

8. Other critics have also acknowledged that in *Quarto de despejo* Carolina’s voice is molded by Dantas to fit an acceptable pattern of diaries or testimonies. Robert Levine and Jose Carlos Meihy published *The Unedited Diaries of Carolina Maria de Jesus*, which contains other diary entries written by Carolina de Jesus in 37 notebooks. Levine and Meihy select extracts to compile one book and the outcome is very different from *Quarto de despejo*. In this collection, the narrator Carolina is more active, aware of her conditions as a poor Afro-Brazilian woman living in the community of favelas and her voice is more intense, critical and with various literary mechanisms. Carolina’s voice in the *Child of the Dark* is screened to fit a particular pattern of diaries, which reinforces the importance of reexamining the narrative to rediscover the subtle power of Carolina’s literary voice.

9. Jesus talked about her desire to publish her fairy tales in several interviews to Brazilian newspapers.

10. In Portuguese, Maca has a condescending meaning, as it is used to refer to a kind of stretcher that transports disabled or injured people. This can reflect how people are always taking advantage Macabéa, and she becomes a means for people to support themselves, much like a bed. Maca is

also close to the word manca, which means limp, and may also refer to Macabéa's condition as a subaltern.

11. It's worth pointing that in most big cities in Brazil, there are dentists and doctors who may not be licensed, or who are poorly trained but have small practices usually located close to slums or poorer neighborhoods. In these practices, there is no scheduling for appointments and people are seen on a first come first serve basis.

12. The term subjectivity, used throughout this paper, is based on Donald Hall's arguments that subjectivity implies a more flexible concept compared to identity, which may have static, unified connotation (3). In this sense, the term is appropriate to delineate multiple identities and, at the same time, a consciousness of one's identity, which the protagonists struggle to achieve.

13. I quote their conversation and maintain the organizational structure of the original narrative because the very division of the lines contributes to the representation of Macabéa's lost sense of identity, and the confusion, and emptiness that engulfs her.

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Consumerism and Chinese Postfeminism: Visual Economy, Chick Flicks, and the Politics of Cultural (Re)Production

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Abstract Chinese cinema uses the consumer habits of young professional women to reimagine post-feminist gender identity. These films employ the visual economy of chick flicks to shape the representational concept of an urban middle class. In them, post-feminist women gain agency not by subverting the dominant patriarchal social order but through economic advancement and emotional independence. As an example of this process, this article looks at how *Go Lala Go!* (2010) legitimizes women's financial freedom and career success within the grand narrative of nation building and economic development, foregrounding the cultural politics of consumerism by portraying young professional women's coming-of-age story in a globalized China. It juxtaposes the career success of the female protagonist Du Lala with the new financial independence and transnational commercialization of China. *Go Lala Go!* aestheticizes the struggles of young office workers as they climb corporate ladders to achieve economic success.

Key words postfeminism; gender identity; Chinese cinema; adaptation; visual economy

Adapted from Li Ke's popular novel *A Story of Lala's Promotion*, Xu Jinglei's film 杜拉拉升职记 *Go Lala Go!* (2010) employs the original novel to present a postfeminist re-configuration of female gender identity. The film adaptation foregrounds the cultural politics of consumerism by portraying young professional women's coming-of-age story in a rapidly globalized China. In the wake of China's economic boom and cultural transnationalism, *Go Lala Go!* strategically embeds the postfeminist media representation of young office ladies within a grand narrative of nation building and economic boost. Juxtaposing the female protagonist Du Lala's career success and financial independency with China's economic development and Beijing's

transnational commercliazation, *Go Lala Go!* aestheticizes young office workers' struggles to climb corporate social ladders as a necessary stage before they enjoy the benefit of economic success. Cinematographically, this film reflects Chinese popular cinema's comfortable attitude toward the assimilation of a Western postfeminist visuality by offering chic costume design and a glamorous cosmopolitanism. The success of *Go Lala Go!* is the combined result of both the film's quick response to a market vacuum in the production of popular culture and its unpretentious celebration of consumerism, which it achieves by glamorizing fashion and style and the consumption of luxury products.

The plot of *Go Lala Go!* traces Du Lala's career development from a young, inexperienced junior office lady to a mature senior executive in DB company, a Fortune 500 American corporation whose Asian headquarter is located in Beijing. As Du Lala adapts to the capitalist corporate culture in her professional life, she also develops a keen sense of gender awareness in her romantic relationship with Wang Wei, a senior colleague. Yet the film does not center on Du Lala's emotional life in a typical romantic-comedy style; instead, it provides a workplace handbook for the generation of young professional women who strive for career success and financial affluence in contemporary China. Accentuating the Du Lala's upward mobility in her career and her prioritizing job over romantic relationships, the film markets itself as a chick flick while also portraying the undertones of masculine gender anxiety. Recently successful women have stratified Chinese society, because traditional Chinese women were generally not expected to be financially responsible for the family, or compete with men in careers. In a sense, *Go Lala Go!* engages in a postfeminist Chinese gender discourse that legitimizes women's fight for financial independence as they proactively participate in China's fast growing international economy.

Although not the first Chinese language film to attempt to tap into the vast potential interests in representing the works and lives of metropolitan white collar workers, *Go Lala Go!* synthesizes the postfeminist women's autonomy in their high fashion style and female sexuality so explicitly demonstrated in the *Sex and the City* franchise (1998-2010) and *The Devil Wears Prada* (2006). Such a combination of career ambition and success is far from kitsch. *Go Lala Go!* aims not merely to dazzle audiences with its runway style fashion and beautiful actors but also appropriates the original novel's avowed intention to serve as a "practical handbook of career development" (Li, 2007).¹ The story becomes an allegorical narrative that alludes to and comments on the highly-consumerized landscape of transnational cultural politics in contemporary China, especially metropolitan Beijing.

The visual style of *Go Lala Go!*'s strategically aestheticizes everyday life in China's cosmopolitan capital, filled with glamorous shopping malls, luxury goods,

and high-end residential buildings that promise comfortable living. But underneath the visual politics of postfeminist cinematic text lies a consumerism that legitimizes women's upward social mobility, a major step in the history of gender politics in China since 1949. Ultimately *Go Lala Go!* qualifies the influence of Western chick flicks by creating a postfeminist protagonist whose high fashion sense co-inhabits with her practical life philosophy.

Visualizing Chinese Postfeminism and Gender Politics in China

In contrast to their Western counterparts, women in socialist China are neither represented as sexual objects nor as subjects with sexual power because “the liberation of women is concomitant with a process of gender erasure” (Lu, *Historical Introduction* 21),² in the sense that a woman's gender identity is devoid of the defining element of a female sexuality. Indeed, the socio-cultural representation of women turns them into agents “politicizing desire, love, and family relations by delimiting and repressing sexuality” (Yue 118). The woman is therefore not looked upon as an object of male desire and pleasure; on the contrary, she is wrapped in the gender-neutral colors of grey and black, viewed as a sister in revolutionary struggles, a comrade in the socialist cause. This gender discourse completely displaces any residual, masculine, political, historical narrative.

As part of this uniquely Chinese background, Lydia Liu (1993) points out the historic difference between Western feminists and Chinese women:

Post-Mao Chinese women are...dealing with an order of reality vastly different from that which feminists in the West face within their own patriarchal society, where the female gender is exploited more on the grounds of her difference than the lack thereof. Being named as the “other” and marginalized, feminist in the West can speak more or less from a politically enabling position against the centered capitalist ideology. By contrast, contemporary Chinese women find their political identity so completely inscribed within official discourse on gender and institutionalized by Fulian (the All-China Women's Federation) that they cannot even claim feminism for themselves. (36)

The dilemma that Chinese women face, therefore, is three-fold: their top priority is to position themselves in the re-configuration of the female subjectivity, and differentiate that position in relation to a dominant patriarchal ideology in order to re-claim the legitimacy of a female identity. Yet because Chinese women are doubly silenced by their gender and political institutionalization, they have to accomplish these tasks without the readily available model of Western feminist movement.

Due to these sociopolitical differences, Chinese cinema cannot benefit from the successful example set forth by its Western counterpart in the cultural representation of Chinese women. Western second-wave feminism, when examining the visual representation of female characters in classic Hollywood narrative cinema, uses psychoanalysis and semiology to reveal how patriarchal ideology is successfully sustained cinematographically in the “men gaze/women being looked at” dichotomy (Mulvey 33, 38). When women are visualized only as passive bearers of men’s gaze rather than active initiators of the cinematic look, they become objectified sexual symbol, the Other that has no agency. Yet Chinese women do not even exist in filmic narratives as a pleasure-giving Other, because they are rendered genderless by the socialist discourse. They are in the frame but indistinguishable from their male comrades; and consequently the pleasure does not exist in looking, but in being integrated with the masculine look.

Surrounded by such unusual circumstances, Chinese cinema must develop an alternative postfeminism that deconstructs the official gender discourse from within. It must break away from the political incorporation of masculine socialist cultural politics. In cinematic terms, there must be a re-imagination of a postfeminist Woman who defines her own gender identity. The need to re-establish a characteristically Chinese postfeminist awareness and its visual representation requires a full embrace of femininity, portraying postfeminist Woman as financially independent, emotionally mature, and sexually conscious, a person who seldom verbalizes her conscious feminist stance or articulates radical political statements.³ Recent cinematic portrayals of female characters reflecting this re-imagination of postfeminist women include Stanley Kwan’s 长恨歌 *Everlasting Regret* (2005), Ang Lee’s 卧虎藏龙 *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000), Xu Jinglei’s 一个陌生女人的来信 *Letter From an Unknown Woman* (2004), and the recent film remake of 花木兰 *Hua Mulan* (2008), which all celebrate the strong, confident, intelligent, and beautiful female protagonist.

This shift in women’s cultural representation in contemporary Chinese language films coincides with a popular sub-genre of the Western postfeminism — the chick flick, which primarily means “commercial films that appeal to a female audience” that both reflected and shaped women’s “new visibility” and “a growing recognition of women’s significance in contemporary culture” (Ferriss & Young 2). Similar to the new postfeminist Chinese women’s attempt to disassociate from previous totalitarian feminist traditions, consumers of chick flicks are “a third-wave feminist or postfeminist generation” that “has rejected or at least questioned some of the central tenets of feminist thought,” and re-appropriated and re-imagined these previous tenets to “refashion their identity” (Ferriss & Young 3). By re-embracing what was unacceptable and diminishing to their predecessors, Chinese postfeminists and their

Western counterparts proactively celebrate their femininity and gender differences.

The postfeminist consumerism of Xu Jinglei's *Go Lala Go!* is embedded in the inscription of an urban middle class. The phrase "middle class" is strategically centralized in the foreword to *A Story of Lala's Promotion* (2007), the original novel: "The protagonist Lala is a typical representative of the middle class. She does not have a well-connected family, but she received decent college education, and she is a stand-up person who believes in success from hard work" (Li, 2007).⁴ Through Lala's characterization, we realize that the definition of middle class is carefully de-politicized to foreground the significance of financial success and career aspiration.

This empowering consumerism attracts the young, well-educated, ideologically Westernized, and financially comfortable Office Lady (popularly known as the OL), the representative of a significant consumer group particularly eager to embrace the socioeconomic freedom depicted in the chick culture. Following the almost over-night boom of China's international commerce and economy, a large population of young college graduates have entered foreign-funded enterprises (*waiqi* 外企) for higher salaries, better benefits, and more significantly, a broader platform that connects them to the globalized consumerist culture. As a representative of this movement, Du Lala is the modern workplace Everywoman whose adaptive struggle is still fresh to those who have made it and instructive and inspiring to those who are trying to make it.

It is the nature of post-feminism not to reverse or overturn the patriarchal gender hierarchy but to offer a similarly structured feminist one. With this goal Xu Jinglei's film visually re-produces the original stress on women's freedom without seeking to manipulate or delimit men. It offers instead a series of representational strategies such as spectatorial positions and costume design, tactfully employed to create a meticulously manicured metropolitan look. The image of a strong, independent, intelligent, sexually conscious, and impeccably attired woman epitomizes the new visibility of women in the postfeminist era.

The film also avoids class differentiations. Du Lala's transformation from anonymity to the top tier of the corporate food chain is conspicuously punctuated by the changes in her job titles and her monthly salary throughout the film. The audience is encouraged to identify with this new consumerist social ladder. Thus on the first day of Lala's work at DB Technology, the Beijing headquarter of a Fortune 500 American company, senior secretary Helen matter-of-factly teaches Lala show class identity can be structured in materialistic terms in the workplace: the "poor petty bourgeois" who makes under 4000 RMB (Chinese currency, with an approximate exchange rate of 6.3:1 to US dollars) a month, the "middle class" managers who own their own cars and make 200,000 RMB a year, the "higher middle class" directors who make more than 500,000 RMB a year and enjoy overseas vacations or expensive outdoor

activities, and the “real rich” president, who makes more than one million RMB a year. Such classification is visually juxtaposed within a single frame to reinforce a carefully defined yet fluid social microcosm within the company. Without explicitly advocating any particular directionality of this class configuration, *Go Lala Go!* nevertheless contextualizes a postfeminist *bildungsroman*, or, a coming-of-age novel, within an acutely consumerist social microcosm.

Fashion Spectacle, Chick Flick, and Visual Economy

By exploiting a visual market economy, Xu Jinglei’s film has changed the landscape of commercial film production in contemporary China. Although not the first Chinese language director to include product placement advertisements, Xu turns the entire film into an unapologetic exhibition of haute couture fashion in the corporate offices nestled in the skyscrapers of Beijing. The spectacle features not only clothes and fashion accessories, but also household electronics, computers, and even interior décor. Characteristic of postfeminist popular culture’s “hyperaestheticization of everyday life” (Tasker & Negra 7), this fashion display was made possible real-life firms seeking to advertise their products. *Go Lala Go!* attracted advertisements worth 20 million RMB, exceeding its budget of 15 million RMB. In other words, the film made a profit even before it was released. With a box office of 44 million RMB in the opening weekend, *Go Lala Go!* grossed an astounding 12.4 million RMB domestically, firmly positioning itself among the highest grossing Chinese films in the past decade.

The commercial success of *Go Lala Go!* testifies to Chinese cinema’s transition to a Hollywood style production mode. Rather than approaching sponsors and investors after the films are made, producers resort to a seamlessly orchestrated marketing strategy that combines accurately pinpointed audience, popular mass media coverage, and strategically selected product placement in the film to secure financial support even before production begins. *Go Lala Go!* followed a path established in the early 2000s, when film director Feng Xiaogang systematically integrated product placement in his popular *hesui pian* (贺岁片, New Year Blockbusters), such as *没完没了 Sorry Baby* (1999), *手机 Cell Phone* (2003), and *天下无贼 A World Without Thieves* (2004). To both filmmakers and sponsor companies, product placement can be the guarantee for commercial success.

It is this success that has become controversial among film critics and moviegoers. Not all “in-text” advertisements are tastefully done, and frequent bombardment by big logos risks brand saturation. Many moviegoers have been upset by the vulgarization of film and the loss of cinema as a fine art. The controversy turns on the politics of visual economy. When films are consumed as commercial products,

how they appeal to consumers determines their use value in the system of capital appreciation. Explicitly articulating its intended audience to be young professional women, *Go Lala Go!* employs a visual style that appeals to a targeted audience that finds it easier to identify with the characters because of their own familiarity with the fashion brands shown, as the film proactively exploits the halo effects of brand names to enhance spectatorial identification. When the audience finds that Lala uses the same brand computer, reads the same fashion magazines, eats the same brand chocolate, and even drives the same car that they do, Lala becomes a more visually concrete character rather than merely a fictional construction.

Not only is Lala easy to identify with, such identification is visually contextualized in a pleasant and inspiring way, making her something of a modern role model. The film begins with an extreme long shot of Beijing's skyscrapers in its Central Business District area, with several landmark buildings clustered under clear blue sky. This establishing shot foregrounds Beijing's trendy cosmopolitan downtown in a deliberately homogenizing manner, powerfully reminiscent of numerous visual representations of New York in the immensely popular TV drama *Sex and the City*. Beijing and New York seem almost identical, equally glamorous. As the camera cuts to a closer view of the buildings, this visual resemblance becomes disorienting yet simultaneously reassuring to its OL audience, because when Beijing appears indistinguishable from other modern cities, its integration into the highly commercialized global economy is even more assured.

Du Lala is introduced against this backdrop of metropolitan Beijing through quick paced cross cuts, where the camera pans among corporate buildings, her comfortable apartment, and the city on the ground level. Her exposition is economically executed with a few shots of her sending resumes electronically, waiting in lines for job interviews, and being interviewed in the corporate meeting rooms. Professionally dressed and confidently gaited, Lala personifies the upward energy visually represented by the high rising buildings and the camera's angle up position in the opening sequence.

Such visual parallel between Lala and the city is conspicuously reinforced throughout the film. Each time when Lala takes one step up the corporate ladder, her visibly more fashionable image is always preceded by snapshots of Beijing, which undergoes similar beautifying transformations. Not only does the film foreshadow Lala's evolutionary trajectory metaphorically by means of such municipal upgrades, it also invites audience to share Lala's gradually elevated point of view by adopting corresponding camera positions from ground level to higher altitude, until the audience, like Lala, can look down at the city from above. Vibrant, chic, confident, and dazzlingly beautiful, Beijing is anthropomorphically the double of Du Lala.

Casting Beijing as a doppelganger for its titular heroine, *Go Lala Go!* maximizes its investment in the visual pleasure of the urbanite audience with mesmerizing fashion design for its star actors, whose combined influence reaches almost all major Chinese language cinemas. Its versatile stars include writer-director-editor-actress Xu Jinglei from mainland China, ethnic Chinese singer-actor Stanley Huang from the US, singer-actress Karen Mok from Hong Kong, singer-actress Pace Wu from Taiwan, and hostess-model Li Ai from mainland China. Together, they represent Xu's ambition to achieve maximum publicity coverage in the film's promotional campaign. In other words, these actors are casted not necessarily because they are the best fits for the characters, but because each attracts a unique body of fans and supporters without costing a fortune to the production. Thus, they become the film's visual capital whose combined purchasing power is larger than the sum of the individuals. Ultimately, audience consumes both their own fantasies about the stars and the fashion trend they exemplify when they watch these beautiful, elegant, trendy actors re-enact familiar scenarios in the office or at home.

Conclusion: Gender, Consumerism, and the Politics of Cultural (Re)Production

While Beijing is cinematically re-imagined "as beautiful as New York," as director Xu Jinglei proclaims (Lin), Lala resembles the Chinese counterpart of the postfeminist "singleton" in Western chick culture. According to Stephanie Genz's (2009) investigation of media representation of single professional women, the singleton "navigates an uncertain course on the postfeminist frontier, fluctuating between backlash pessimism and Girlie optimism in her attempt to displace a dualistic logic and hold together conflicting life components" (138). While Lala experiences ups and downs in her work, her attitude toward romantic relationship does not objectify into a polarizing force against her work. Her character differs from Western singletons such as Bridget Jones in *Bridget Jones's Diary* (2001) or most women in the TV show *Sex and the City*, because Lala does not seem too eager to find herself a man. This dissimilarity might be explained by an oriental feminine modesty that is deeply rooted in the Chinese culture, except that the film allows Lala to enjoy a sexual freedom without any guilt or over-analysis. Lala's determination not to let this interfere with her professional relation with her boss-turned-boyfriend Wang Wei is expressed in a typical rom-com style. When she runs into Wang Wei in the company the day after they have sex, Lala whispers to him, "I had too much to drink, and let's just pretend that it never happened." What is self-reflexively funny is that this is line typically used by irresponsible men, not the other way around.

Lala's apparent aloofness externalizes a new gender discourse in the Chinese cinematic reproduction of postfeminist professional women. In her remapping of a

postfeminist experience, Lala manages to prioritize her career over romance without being stereotyped as the “leftover women” (剩女).⁵ In the subsequent scene, Lala shares her relationship concerns with her brother Manyi, who urges her to take this opportunity while she can still catch a golden bachelor before she becomes a leftover woman. To this, Lala announces that she “should concentrate on work,” because “a good job is hard to come by.” For her, financial security and career success is far more important and dependable than romantic relationships.

An implied either-or logic between work and relationship is dramatized in her hush-hush relationship with her co-worker and superior Wang Wei. Lala is warned on her first day at work that office romance is a danger to her career, because if two employees are discovered to be romantically involved, one of the couple must leave the company. Knowing that she as the inferior employee will have to leave if her relationship with Wang Wei is revealed, Lala avoids making such a sacrifice, a decision reinforced by Wang Wei’s non-committal attitude and a workaholic habits. As Rose teaches her to do, Lala analyzes advantages, disadvantages, reputation, and risk before making decisions, and her ability to hold polarizing forces together eventually enables her to reunite with Wang Wei after their breakup.

Although the film returns to a conformist track when Lala decides to confess her feelings for Wang Wei and quit her job, Lala’s personal choice does not jeopardize her work ethic, nor does it subjugate her to the oppression of the patriarchal stereotype of the left-over women. She remains responsible to her company while also respecting her own femininity and acknowledging her true emotions. In other words, Lala does not try to become absolute equal with men, as traditional feminists would have wanted; rather, she embraces her gender traits and their social and psychological implications, because being different from man is empowering, both at work and in relationships. “I am not like you,” she tells Wang Wei, “I can’t separate work from personal feelings.” By refusing to internalize the masculine code of conduct of the company, Lala preserves her own gender integrity. Eventually it is Lala’s unpretentiousness that cements her relationship with Wang Wai. The sign of this character trait is her financial thriftiness. At one point she brags to her brother that she can save money on food by eating a bowl of leftover soup for a whole week. Dressed in plain, non-trendy clothes and wearing no jewelry, Lala presents an obvious contrast to her female co-workers, who are clad from head to toe with brand name clothes and shoes, complete with exquisite makeup and camera-ready hairstyle.

Such visual differentiation serves as a foil to Lala’s wisdom at work. Because of her ability to economize, she is able to come up with money-saving strategies when she is put in charge of the company’s under-budgeted renovation project. In addition, her habitual economizing subtly distinguishes Lala from her free-spending, fashion-

obsessed Western counterparts, who seldom engage in mundane chores such as cooking or managing personal finances. Lala's down-to-earthiness is thus a healthy antidote to the extravaganza of the film's visual hyperbole in the pristine mise-en-scene, lavish prop design, luscious color scheme, and accessorized costume.

The film establishes Lala's economy by letting us see her shopping. When it begins, Lala is carefully portrayed as a typical low maintenance woman, and her financial philosophy is one of saving and economizing instead of spending. When they get to know each other better, Lala even lectures Wang Wei on how women depressurize: One way is to go shopping, which is too expensive, and the other is to eat — inexpensive, but equally effective. But as her relationship with Wang Wei develops, and as she moves up the corporate ladder, the film allows her to indulge, as if by right in Lala more fashionable fancy clothes, jewelry, and makeup. It further excuses her because she uses shopping as a way to communicate and bond with Wang Wei.

In the movie's most striking post-feminist statement, the adrenaline high of shopping comes to symbolize the coming-of-age of hundreds and thousands of Chinese Du Lalas, who re-examine their desires through the lens of popular media representations. Now that China is undeniably an integral part of world economy and trade, the new generation of Chinese postfeminist women finds this integration empowering through the consumption of Chinese chick flicks. The image of the protagonist Du Lala as a strong, independent, intelligent, sexually open, and professionally successful woman epitomizes the new visibility of career women in the postfeminist era. Capitalizing on contemporary Chinese women's re-evaluation of femininity and gender re-configuration, *Go Lala Go!* portrays women who construct their own gender identity through a postfeminist consumer sub-culture, and who strive for financial affluence and career opportunities without being manipulated and delimited by the dominant masculine gender discourse.

Notes

1. All English quotes from Li Ke's *A Story of Lala's Promotion* are translated by the author, unless otherwise specified. The Chinese original of this quote is, “职场实用手册。”
2. The period of socialist China refers to slightly different historical periods depending on its political implication or socioeconomic development. Politically, socialist China is from begins in 1949 and ends in 1989; and socioeconomically it runs from 1949 to 1992, when the Economic Reformation was implemented. For a more detailed discussion, see S. H. Lu (2001 1-28).
3. Contemporary scholarly publications on Chinese literature and film have yet to address the new trend of Chinese postfeminism, but popular literature and films are presenting an emerging image of a New Woman that invites comparison to the New Woman figure in the 1920s and 1930s, when

Chinese society also underwent significant changes.

4. The original Chinese reads, “小说的主人公杜拉拉是典型的中产阶级的代表，她没有背景，受过较好的教育，走正规路子，靠个人奋斗获取成功。”

5. The “leftover women” or 剩女 is a newly popular term that refers to women who are single, born in the 1970s, and have remained single in their early thirties.. They are typically women who are well-educated, financially independent, and who for various reasons missed the best age to get married and are therefore “left over” in the marriage market.

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Hilary Mantel's *Anne Boleyn*: Locating a Body of Evidence

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Abstract The recent influx of popular culture surrounding the Tudors suggests that something about the time period and the saga of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn is particularly relevant to our modern sensibilities. Critical scholarship seems to be catching on to Tudor fever slowly; in her recent monograph, Susan Bordo explores Anne Boleyn's fame and the way she has been represented culturally over time. Still, though the time period continues to be a popular subject, little has been written about recent adaptations, particularly in the realm of historical fiction. This paper explores the way that Hilary Mantel, in her novels *Wolf Hall* and *Bring Up the Bodies*, paints the body of Anne Boleyn through battle imagery that maps her rise and subsequent decline over the course of the novels. The argument further explores the way this imagery prevents the reader from sympathizing too deeply with Anne; rather, I suggest that Mantel portrays Anne as the master of her own fate. Ultimately, I argue that through the imagery surrounding Anne Boleyn, Mantel creates a body of evidence where historically we have no body.

Key words Anne Boleyn; Susan Bordo; body; imagery; death; agency

Henry VIII's unfortunate queen Anne Boleyn stars in myriad works of historical fiction, from the literary fiction of Hilary Mantel to the perhaps less historical potboilers of Philippa Gregory. Natalie Dormer smolders intelligently (both in and out of low-cut dresses) in Showtime's *The Tudors*, and Natalie Portman schemes and glowers in the film adaptation of Gregory's *The Other Boleyn Girl*.

Though Anne has long been a figure of popular interest, this interest seems to have been renewed late, and the Annes we see now fall into distinct camps. They are beautiful and seductive, like Dormer's and Portman's Annes. They can be identified by their uncontainable sexuality and smoldering eyes, by their scheming brains. These women are smart, no question about it, but their sexuality seems to be at the forefront of their narratives. On the other end of the spectrum are the victimized Annes, the

Annes who are so caught up in romance and love that they fall into ready traps, helpless. In his book *The Historical Novel*, Jerome de Groot identifies this binary that we have created in the second half of the twentieth century: “either Anne as political and problematic or Anne as romantic, passionate, and mistreated...For every work in which she is independent and articulate there is a book such as Gregory’s *The Other Boleyn Girl* which suggests that she was in fact guilty of incest and attempting witchcraft” (74). This inconsistency occurs precisely because we do not have a solid body of evidence for Anne — we have little to actually base our narratives on, and so we must conjecture.

That is, although her reputation looms large in modern culture, we know maddeningly little about the historical Anne Boleyn, in large part because Henry set about abolishing records of her existence almost as soon as he’d condemned her to die. What bibliographic information we do have comes from letters written by the Spanish ambassador Eustace Chapuys, who was in a position to dislike Anne intensely; from biased legal documents and testimonies taken from people who were quite probably under threat of torture; from literature and paintings possibly created by artists with strong anti-Protestant sentiments. Retha Warnicke notes that John Foxe’s sympathetic treatment of Anne’s character in his *Book of Martyrs* may have spurred Catholic writers to pen alternate narratives of the church’s schism (qtd. in Warnicke 19), resulting in histories like Nicholas Sander’s (1585), in which Sander describes Anne as “rather tall of stature, with black hair...[with a] projecting tooth under the upper lip, and on her right hand six fingers” (23-5). Apart from these heavily biased narratives, we don’t actually know what Anne looked like: of the portraits and paintings that bear her name, only one, a portrait in the National Public Gallery, has been largely agreed upon by art historians as a painting of Anne Boleyn, and even this is not necessarily a faithful rendering because of what Tudor historians call symbolic iconizing, or translating an argument about someone’s character into visual text.¹

Not unnaturally we seem primarily to fixate our attentions on Anne’s head, on the circumstances surrounding her death, in a way that might close us off to certain interpretations of her character. In the preface to his biography of Anne Boleyn, Eric Ives discusses the way that we have traditionally looked at Anne through “the prism of her final hours” and the way in which this causes distortion; surely, a woman for whom the King of England would throw away a long-term marriage has importance that extends far beyond the scandal of the chopping block. Still, there is something about her demise that is incredibly seductive to us, perhaps precisely because so much of what led up to it is a mystery. This lack of reliable bibliographic information has led to a huge amount of conjecture, much of which has been incredibly damaging to Anne’s historical reputation.

As a result, the ways in which Anne has been represented are largely problematic, and even the best representations of her seem to fall into one of the two categories mentioned above. In her recent monograph, Susan Bordo examines our relatively consistent fascination with Anne Boleyn as well as the many ways Anne has been portrayed. In what follows I will extend Bordo's work by looking at the first two novels in Hilary Mantel's Thomas Cromwell trilogy, *Wolf Hall* and *Bring Up the Bodies*, in an attempt to determine how Anne's character is treated. Bordo admires Mantel's work, but ultimately finds that she, too, relegates Anne to the scrap heap of calculating women. Mantel is explicit in her author's note to *Bring Up the Bodies*: she does not attempt to rewrite an authoritative history, and neither does her project focus on Anne Boleyn at all — she attempts to resurrect Thomas Cromwell instead, and to see the situation as he might have seen it. It is important to note that in Mantel's novels, the information we receive about Anne is filtered through either the figure of Thomas Cromwell or a narrator who more often than not aligns himself with Cromwell.² As such, we cannot read the information we receive about Anne as necessarily indicative of Mantel's particular feelings about the historical woman so much as we must read them as the biased ruminations of a fictional Thomas Cromwell who was historically set against her. Still, as Bordo points out, Mantel's choice to include and omit certain historical documents and pieces of evidence that could sway her readers' opinions of Anne indicates a decision to portray a stereotypical, predominantly negative Anne Boleyn.

Ultimately, though, I disagree with Bordo's reading of Hilary Mantel's Anne Boleyn as primarily negative. Though this text paints Anne as largely responsible for her own death, I think this responsibility is respected, impressive — Anne is given agency here in a way that breaks the binary de Groot identifies in recent fictional representations. She is, in many ways, the only true opponent for a very shrewd, very watchful Cromwell. Mantel's texts pays a remarkable attention to bodies, and the way those bodies are presented have an incredible effect on the way we respond to characters. Anne's body in particular is presented to readers in a way that allows us to map her rise and fall onto her body; her body is a weapon that she introduces into the game, and it is through this weapon that she meets her demise. In the beginning, Anne is the author of her own text. She acts like a general, is in full command of her body and its interpretation. In *Wolf Hall*, in particular, Anne's body and brain function distinctly: Anne is the "cold slick brain" while her body remains "so small, her bones so delicate, her waist so narrow" (*WH* 185). In this way, Mantel creates an Anne who is simultaneously sensual and strategic, both puppet and puppet master. Essentially, the true Anne resides in her brain, while her body is a weapon to be her alone, when and how she sees fit. I will argue that Mantel creates this distinct separation between

Anne's brain and her body in order to show how Anne's body was created, and later taken up by parties who opposed her power, as a weapon.

Anne as Master General

In *Wolf Hall*, Mantel introduces Anne Boleyn's body as scrupulously controlled. According to Susan Bordo, "[Mantel's Anne] exudes the nervous energy of a modern-day anorexic, her true self and laser focus carefully hidden away, constantly calculating how to keep up appearances lest her secrets be exposed" (Bordo 236). During Anne's first audience with Cromwell, she is described as "sallow and sharp... her fingers tugging and ripping at a sprig of rosemary" (*WH* 184). Later in the novel, Anne's anxious habits lead people to suspect that she has a deformity she is attempting to hide: "sometimes her fingers pull at [her crucifix on a gold chain] impatiently, and then she tucks her hands back in her sleeves" (*WH* 223).³ Mantel's Anne throws fits, she paces, she all but vibrates with nervous energy. Her anxiety points to a constant calculation, a keen mind intent upon calling its own shots.

In keeping with this image of control, Mantel paints Anne and her body through images of battle in which Anne is the master general. Her deployment of her body is primarily, if not solely, strategic. According to Cromwell, "Anne is not a carnal being, she is a calculating being, with a cold slick brain at work behind her hungry black eyes" (*WH* 323). In *Wolf Hall*, Anne is shown to gain plenty of ground based on her body and how much of it she is willing to give over to Henry, yet through Cromwell's sharp observation, we understand that this is no way indicates emotional abandon or a lack of control; rather, Anne coldly uses the tools at her disposal — here, her body — for personal gain without attachment. Her body is parsed out, used strategically in order to gain ground in her affair with Henry. Mantel's narrator notes that "she uses her body like a soldier, conserving its resources; like one of the masters in the anatomy school at Padua, she divides it up and names every part, this is my thigh, this is my breast, this is my tongue" (364). Mary Boleyn reports that when Henry and Anne are alone, "she lets him unlace her bodice" (188). Though the subject matter here is incredible suggestive, Anne's association with it is decidedly nonsexual and atypical of traditional gender stereotypes; the language leaves no doubt that Anne has agency here, and that this agency allows her a very untraditional control over her body that Cromwell can't help but respect.

Further emphasizing Anne's agency, Mantel's narrator specifically links her body to her strategy to usurp Katherine, placing physical descriptions alongside mentions of her plans to displace the queen. Her strategy purposefully and deliberately employs her body to exert control. After Henry names Anne Marquess of Pembroke, she sits beside him on the dais, and we are given a clear picture of the way she uses her body

to her political advantage:

...when she turns to speak to him her black lashes brush her cheeks. She is almost there now, almost there, her body taut like a bowstring, her skin dusted with gold, with tints of apricot and honey; when she smiles, which she does often, she shows small teeth, white and sharp. She is planning to commandeer Katherine's royal barge, she tells him. (357)

The particular attention to Anne's appearance here is arresting. The mention of her black lashes, along with the sweet apricot and honey of her skin, is almost unbearably sensual, while her teeth are animalistic, nearly canine. Further, her body is directly associated with weaponry here. Mantel paints her as a bowstring, poised and waiting, strategic, so that when Anne articulates what it is she wants of Henry here — to commandeer the royal barge — her request is an arrow unleashed. As such, her body is the vessel by which she delivers her greatest attacks.

Though her body is intended for public consumption, Anne herself decides how it is consumed, and by whom — Mantel's language specifically gives us to understand that Anne alone has control over who has full access to it. Even Cromwell, a master of deception and of reading others' deceptions, is at a loss to break through the barrier her body presents to understanding: "Anne's face wears no expression at all. Even a man as literate as he can find nothing there to read" (276). Precisely because of the control Anne has over her body, her face, her own emotions, Cromwell cannot find a foothold. Further, Mantel makes certain that we see Anne's own hand in her control, and in the coldness she presents. It would be easy enough to read Anne sympathetically, as operating only or even primarily under the orders of her father and uncle — a pawn — yet Mantel chooses to deliberately foreclose this reading; her Anne Boleyn has the mental capacity to control her own family. According to the narrator, "[Anne's father and brother] think they are fixing her tactics, but she is her own best tactician, and able to think back and judge what has gone wrong; [Cromwell] admires anyone who can learn from mistakes" (317). Anne herself has agency here, making decisions about her body and maintaining a firm, impenetrable barrier. Her body becomes her weapon: a weapon of mass destruction, as it were, that she alone can command — for the time being.

Though it would make sense to assume that Anne relinquishes control the moment she and Henry fully consummate their affair, her loss of control does not really become apparent until she is visibly pregnant, suggesting further that Anne's agency is intimately tied to the physical appearance of her body in these texts. During Anne's coronation, she is presented as virginal, almost angelic: "The queen is in

white, her body shimmering in its strange skin, her face held in a conscious solemn smile, her hair loose beneath a circle of gems” (429). The ethereal quality the narrator attributes to Anne here along with an acute awareness gives her the air of a sacrificial lamb willingly being led to the slaughter; Anne is offering something up here, and she’s offering it willingly. When she moves to lie facedown in prayer before the altar, Cromwell notes his first real access to her body after years of scrutiny:

Anne is lying in her shift. She looks flat as a ghost, except for the shocking mound of her six-month child. In her ceremonial robes, her condition has hardly showed, and only that sacred instant, as she lay belly-down to stone, had connected him to her body, which now lies stretched out like a sacrifice; her breasts puffy beneath the linen, her swollen feet bare. (432)

The description of Anne here is shockingly feminine and drastically unlike the descriptions we have thus far been privy to. As Cromwell gains access to Anne’s body through her pregnant belly, so do we as readers who are intimately connected with Cromwell’s thoughts and observations. It is important that it is ultimately Anne’s pregnancy that causes her to relinquish her control: in fulfilling her primary duty as consort, essentially taking on the only task that will cement the position she has been feverishly working toward and allowing her fortunes to be dictated by her body and by traditional female roles, Anne sets in motion her own downfall.

Anne’s Queenship and Public Consumption

Though Anne’s body is repeatedly mentioned throughout both of Hilary Mantel’s Thomas Cromwell novels, after her coronation in *Wolf Hall*, there is a shift in the way it is written/spoken about. While in *Wolf Hall*, Anne’s body is her own weapon, deployed to win her own battle, in *Bring Up the Bodies*, it becomes available for public consumption; Mantel crafts Anne’s body as an open-source text: as vulnerable to the interpretations and interrogations of others, and therefore as uncontrolled by Anne. This second novel’s Anne is one who changes based on the characters and circumstances around her; she is described, at various points, as a grotesque creature of excess, a puzzle, and dead meat. In shifting the kind of language she uses to describe Anne’s body, Mantel creates a space for Cromwell to bring Anne down using her body, the very weapon Anne herself introduces into the war, and which, I will argue, ultimately places the blame for Anne’s demise upon Anne’s own shoulders.

The shift in Mantel’s descriptions of Anne’s body is subtle, and it begins with an allowance for interpretation of Anne’s body by other characters. In *Wolf Hall*, Cromwell sees Anne’s body but has difficulty in identifying what its various modes

and parts signify — he admittedly doesn't know how to read what he sees. Her face and body are even presented in terms of texts and literacy, and they elude him: "Even a man as literate as [Cromwell] can find nothing there to read" (276). In *Bring Up the Bodies*, he is tapped in her body in a way that allows him to interpret it, to draw connections between it and his own memories and experiences. He notes:

Anne was wearing, that day, rose pink and dove grey. The colours should have had a fresh maidenly charm; but all he could think of were stretched innards, umbles and tripes, grey-pink intestines looped out of a living body; he had a second batch of recalcitrant friars to be dispatched to Tyburn, to be slit up and gralloched by the hangman...The pearls around her long neck looked to him like little beads of fat, and as she argued she would reach up and tug them; he kept his eyes on her fingertips, nails flashing like tiny knives. (38)

This passage is significant on several levels. First and foremost, it shows Cromwell making connections and associations related to Anne's body, which is a sign that he is beginning to solve the puzzle she presents — and it is her body, the very thing that has heretofore eluded him, that allows him to do so. This is particularly important for Cromwell, who needs access to his enemies in order to bring them down. His dawning access to Anne's body is also the dawn of her downfall at his hands. Further, Anne's body reminds Cromwell of innards, of dead meat and the brutality done at his behest, in a way that suggests her own fate. Anne's hands, ever anxious, tugging and ripping at whatever's in reach, are emphasized, and her fingertips are weapon-like, but this time Cromwell is wary of them, seriously mitigating their threat.

Whereas in *Wolf Hall*, Anne's body is depicted as separate from her mind and as operating under her own control, in *Bring Up the Bodies*, it seems to operate of its own accord, displaying the excess of Anne's emotions. In short, her body betrays her confidence and her control, allowing others to look at her and track her social progress and her state of mind at any given moment. Her body becomes a body of superfluity, and it marks her triumph over Katherine physically; when Anne becomes pregnant, Cromwell links her rise with Katherine's fall, noticing "Anne blossoming as Katherine fails...he pictures them, their faces intent and skirts bunched, two little girls in a muddy track, playing teeter-totter with a plank balanced on a stone" (*BUTB* 96). In comparing the two women's physical states, Mantel paints Anne's body as not only expanding with child, but also as essentially feeding off of Katherine's life force in a nearly vampiric way — she is the physical beneficiary of Katherine's ill fortune. Certainly, Mantel's Anne would not conceive of trying to hide her pregnancy, and neither would she want to hide her triumph over Katherine. But this blossoming is

indicative of a lack of control over the way she uses her body to portray her thoughts and feelings, and it is striking in comparison with the control she exerts over her body's reception in *Wolf Hall*. Anne no longer has the authority to determine who has access to her body and who is denied; the access is written in the expanding lines of her body.

The excessiveness of Anne's body is further drawn out and emphasized in the figure of Mary, Anne's fool, who appears at key moments in *Bring Up the Bodies*. Perhaps most notably, after one of Anne's miscarriages, Mary sits outside the queen's suite and feigns labor in a grotesque display. When Cromwell arrives, she stares right at him and pulls her skirt up, and he notes that "she has shaved herself or someone has shaved her, and her parts are bald, like the parts of an old woman or a little child" (180-1). Mary's shaved genitals render her oddly ageless, but unique and obscene — she flashes them to Cromwell, airing what is traditionally secret and forcing him to look. Because her farcical labor recalls Anne's recent labor, and because she plants herself directly outside of Anne's door during her show, her body is directly related to Anne's in its "rocking and moaning" available for all to see. She is a grotesque, a distorted representation of Anne herself who has taken the private moments of labor and of grief and put them on tasteless display. Thus, she has made Anne's body only further available for public consumption. The link between Mary the dwarf and Anne Boleyn emphasizes just how available Anne's body has become — it has lost its copyright and can be read, interpreted, and even mimicked widely.

Finally, it is Anne's unguarded body, and Cromwell's relatively newfound ability to access it, that offers the key for Cromwell to orchestrate her fall from grace. Once he knows how to read the weapon of her body — once she no longer controls it, but is controlled by it — he can use that weapon against her. Cromwell becomes vigilant in his reading of the text Anne provides: "He is looking very closely at the queen, he feels he knows her as a mother knows her child, or a child its mother. He knows every stitch in her bodice. He notes the rise and fall of her every breath. What is in your heart, madam? That is the last door to be open." Anne's body is described as a puzzle, a closed door just waiting for someone to find the key — and doors are meant to be opened. Cromwell knows Anne even beyond the physical details (which he knows very well indeed, given the attention to the stitching on her bodice), and he watches her closely and steadily enough to catch each of her breaths; he is patient, intimate, connected to Anne in a way that cannot be fabricated. He watches as though, with enough attention to her physicality, he will find a way to break in, and in a sense, he does: "He imagines himself entering Anne, not as a lover but as a lawyer, and rolled in his fist his papers, his writs; he imagines himself entering the heart of the queen. In its chambers he hears the click of his own boot heels" (*BUTB* 240). Here,

Cromwell uses Anne's body — the very organ that keeps Anne alive — to gain an intimate understanding of what makes her tick in order to use the information against her. That he hears his footfall serves both as a sign that Cromwell and Anne are alike — he hears echoes of himself in Anne's innermost heart — and a sign that he has defeated her: he is walking on her heart and destroying its peace. The language of these passages paints Anne's body as accessible to the careful reader — as mysterious, certainly, but as able to be traversed and interpreted and unscrambled. In short, Anne's defenses have been undone.

Even later, after Anne is dead, Cromwell will associate the affair with lawyerly text, open-sourced and maddening and messy, emphasizing that he handled the Boleyn affair by reading Anne's body like a text. He recalls:

It was a triumph, in a small way, to unknot the entanglement of thighs and tongues, to take that mass of heaving flesh and smooth it on to white paper: as the body, after the climax, lies back on white linen. He has seen beautiful indictments, not a word wasted. This was not one: the phrases jostled and frothed, nudged and spilled, ugly in content and ugly in form. The design against Anne is unhallowed in its gestation, untimely in its delivery, a mass of tissue born shapeless; it waited to be licked into shape as a bear club is licked by its mother. (367)

Here, Cromwell's plan against Anne is itself a shapeless fetus, both natural and grotesque. Perhaps nowhere in the novel is the conflation of body and text more apparent or more disturbing. This passage makes Cromwell's method of reading Anne clear as it emphasizes the method of Anne's defeat: her body became readable, a weapon to be used against her by whoever was willing to unknot it, and Cromwell proved himself to be up to the task. Her body, and the accusations of infidelity surrounding her body, is ultimately her undoing.

Anne's Body as Remnant

Early in *Bring Up the Bodies*, Anne says to Cromwell, "We are condemned to fight until the breath goes out of our bodies" (147). In this novel, however, Anne is not even allowed to fight for that long. After Cromwell gains access to her body and innermost desires, Anne's body is painted in the imagery of death, as though she is already dead from the moment Cromwell can control her. Through these descriptions, we see her body as finally and ultimately out of her hands, and as wrenchingly incongruous with her own thoughts and impressions; while Anne has hope that she might be saved, Cromwell knows otherwise, and through his eyes, we look at her body as little more

than dead meat. This imagery is particularly strong at her trial: “She is tainted now, she is dead meat, and instead of coveting her — bosom, hair, eyes — their gazes slide away” (367). Later, Cromwell observes, “She is a tiny figure, a bundle of bones” (393). This imagery suggests that Anne no longer has any say over her body, the weapon she wielded so successfully, at all — she is condemned to die, and that condemnation is written on her very self.

In the end, Anne’s belongings are painted over, replaced, destroyed, all to make room for Jane Seymour. The novel seems to suggest that the dead remain relevant based on what we have left of them: Cromwell’s daughter Grace is relevant while he has her wings to look at, but his wife Liz fades over time. If this is true, then the burning of Anne’s belongings might render her irrelevant, trivial. Ultimately, it is possible to read this novel as portraying Anne Boleyn unfairly, even downright negatively. Anne herself is responsible for her own demise; had she never begun to use her own body as a weapon, it perhaps would not have been used against her in quite the same fashion. Still, Mantel’s own understanding, relayed in her author’s note, of the way that Anne Boleyn carries the projection of the writers who take her up makes me think that Mantel is granting Anne at least a modicum of agency while pointing to the difficult position she inhabited — if Anne’s body was simultaneously the thing she could control and the thing that could get her what she needed, she would have been forced to relinquish control in order to achieve anything at all. Through imagery, Mantel constructs a body of evidence where previously we had no body, and in the process, she shakes up the binary that imprisons Anne Boleyn in one of two equally negative extremes.

Notes

1. See *Anne Boleyn*, NPG 668.
2. “Hilary Mantel Talks About Anne Boleyn,” YouTube video, 4:50, posted by “4th Estate Books,” April 26, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ohx2Lec6dko>.
3. Cromwell sees this as a sign that Anne “doesn’t like to show her hand” — here, the idea of Anne showing her hand is both physical and suggestive of Anne’s control over her current situation. She does not want to show the full degree to which she is orchestrating everything around her, so she hides her metaphorical hand, much like she hides her physical hand to avoid detection of her anxiety.

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“Words, Words, Just Words”: The Dramatic Role of the Narrator in Hilary Mantel’s *Wolf Hall* Audio Book

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Abstract The Royal Shakespeare Company’s 2013-14 stage production of *Wolf Hall* sparked an interest in studying Hilary Mantel’s novel from the perspective of performance. Overlooked in the hype building up to the show’s opening was the fact that one performance of the novel had already been given: Simon Slater’s narrative performance for the *Wolf Hall* audio book. This article examines Slater’s performance in the role of Thomas More, paying attention to several moments of narration that help shape the audience’s understanding of the character. In the process, this article sheds light on the status of audio book narrators as more than mere readers. Rather, any narrator plays an important role in shaping the experience of the novel felt by the listening audience.

Key words Hilary Mantel; *Wolf Hall*; Simon Slater; performance; narrator; audio book

“...audiobooks embody a dramatic performance that is barely traced when a reader confronts the page alone.”

— Michael Hancher, in *Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies* (2011)

Hilary Mantel opens her 2009 Man Booker Prize-winning novel *Wolf Hall* with a pair of prefatory quotations concerning theatre and theatricality. One is a list of the players in John Skelton’s 1520 drama *Magnificence: An Interlude* — a list that includes such allegorical figures as Felicity, Despair, and Perseverance. The other is a passage from Vitruvius’s *De Architectura* on the classic theatre practice of associating tragedy with upper-class characters, satire with “rustic” individuals, and comedy with members of the lower class. Both quotations serve practical literary functions in *Wolf Hall*; the

introduction of Perseverance as an allegorical character foreshadows Anne Boleyn’s performance in the role for the “Château Vert” pageant of 1522, while the quotation of Vitruvius establishes economic class as one of the novel’s thematic concerns. Taken together, however, the quotations have the added effect of foregrounding the role theatricality will play in determining the fates of several characters. Indeed, as readers will soon find out, the universe of *Wolf Hall* is one in which keeping a carefully arranged face and a loyal outward appearance are of paramount importance to one’s continued success.

Given the extent to which *Wolf Hall* demonstrates Mantel’s interest in theatricality, it is fitting that the novel has caught the attention of both the theatre and television industries. Later this year, the Royal Shakespeare Company is set to debut a new dramatization of the novel at the Swan Theatre in Stratford-upon-Avon. The opening is highly anticipated, with several shows selling out tickets well in advance.¹ Meanwhile, the announcement that *Wolf Hall* will also air as a 2015 television miniseries for BBC Two means that fans of the novel now have twice the reason to wait with bated breath. For her own part, Hilary Mantel has expressed both excitement and anticipation for the projects, calling the RSC’s adaptation of her book “a dream come true” and arguing that, with a writing team as strong as the one BBC has hired for the television project, “the original material can only be enhanced” (“Interview with Hilary Mantel”, “Mark Rylance to Head Cast”).

Ironically, the same fans that are currently clamoring to see Cromwell and company make their stage and screen debuts often ignore the one dramatization of the novel already in existence: Simon Slater’s one-man narration of the 2009 *Wolf Hall* audio book. Despite the convincing recent work done by Charles Bernstein, Richard Johnson, and others in demonstrating the theatrical nature of modern audio book narration, popular audiences continue to view narration as something less theatrical, and therefore less interesting, than stage and screen performance.² The proposed reasons for this effect are both numerous and wide-ranging, with recent criticism linking it to everything from the lack of a visual component in audio books to the curiously enduring popular belief that “reading aloud is for children” (Rubery 12).³ Whatever the reason for it, the stigma currently attached to audio book narration as performance art is leading many to overlook the theatrical work being produced by narrators each day.

The following article aims to bring one example of professional narration into the limelight, in the process calling attention to the engagement of audio book narrators with many of the same interpretive issues encountered by stage and screen actors. One part a close reading of Thomas More in the *Wolf Hall* novel and one part a “close listening” of Simon Slater’s performance as More for the *Wolf Hall* audio book,

this article examines how each medium handles several important scenes featuring the once-Lord Chancellor of England. Paying particular attention to moments of ambiguity in the text, the article aims to demonstrate how a narrator's vocal performance of a character has the potential to convey aspects of that character absent from the silent page alone.

A preliminary review of listener responses to the *Wolf Hall* audio book reveals the general acceptance of Thomas More as the "villain" of Mantel's story. Few responses, however, discuss the role that Slater's performance as More contributes to this effect.⁴ A close listening to Slater's differentiation of voices, pronunciation of key words and phrases, and manipulation of certain vocal tones reveals how Slater paints More as a man driven emotionally numb by his years of persecuting Protestants. It is this interpretation of More's character that listeners generally take away from Simon Slater's performance of the *Wolf Hall* audio book.

"Words, Words, Just Words"

Mantel first introduces Thomas More in a scene that flashes back to Cromwell's youth. In this scene Cromwell, roughly seven years of age, is serving as a food carrier at Lambeth Palace. It is in this capacity that he initially meets Thomas More, who, by the age of fourteen, has established himself as a scholarly prodigy and a respected page for Cardinal Morton. Because cardinals' pages like More often imitate their ostentatious schoolmasters — men who "[pass] up and down the house holding nosegays and pomanders" and who speak almost universally "in Greek" — Cromwell intimates that it is not uncommon for cardinals' pages also to demonstrate outward displays of pomp and superiority (104). To offer one example, it is not unheard of for pages to throw food or other objects at fetchers such as Cromwell. Yet in the opening interaction between Thomas More and Cromwell, Mantel chooses not to have More participate in such an overtly condescending practice. Rather, the initial exchange between the two is marked in its ambiguity with regards to More's take on the inquisitive Cromwell. Mantel writes:

One day [Cromwell] brought a wheaten loaf and put it in the cupboard and lingered, and Master Thomas said, "Why do you linger?" But [More] did not throw anything at [Cromwell]. "What is in that great book?" [Cromwell] asked, and Master Thomas replied, smiling, "Words, words, just words" (104).⁵

Professional actors, audio book narrators, and recreational readers alike are presented in this passage with an important interpretive decision, for although Mantel tells her readers that More is "smiling" as he delivers the line "Words, words, just words," she

gives no definitive indication as to what type of smile More is wearing. Earlier on the same page, Mantel notes Cardinal Morton’s opinion that More is “pleasant [of] wit,” opening up the possibility that More’s smile is merely an indication of how amused he is by the joke he is about to tell (104).⁶ Reflecting back on this moment much later in the novel, More also admits the possibility that he was privately laughing or mocking Cromwell as he delivered the line (549-50). If this is the case, More’s smile actually represents an act of condescension towards what he perceives to be a dim-witted Thomas Cromwell.

The interpretation of More’s smile is particularly important to those who are dramatizing the text, for any decision regarding the emotional status of More during the scene will greatly influence how an actor or narrator delivers More’s dialogue. Conversely, any delivery of More’s dialogue in the scene has the potential to reveal information regarding the actor or narrator’s interpretation of the character. In narrating the *Wolf Hall* audio book, Simon Slater interprets More’s smile as an act of amusement rather than condescension. This is reflected in his delivery of the line “Words, words, just words” in several ways (03n, 1:12-1:15).⁷ First, the line is delivered in a noticeably sing-song manner, with Slater regularly oscillating between high and low vocal intonations. Likely reflecting the “pleasant wit” Cardinal Morton referred to earlier in the text, Slater’s delivery of the line next emphasizes the speed with which More thinks of his humorous response. Rather than pausing for a lengthy period of time before delivering the line, which might characterize More’s response as colder and more calculated, Slater only delays his delivery of the line for between a quarter-second and a half-second. This seems an appropriate amount of time for a witty individual to think of a humorous reply, but not so long that the reply feels cold and premeditated. Finally, there is the voice itself that Slater provides young Thomas More. Both higher-pitched and quicker-paced than that of Slater’s default voice of narration, the voice of the fourteen-year-old More effectively conveys both youth and exuberance. This becomes even more evident through contrast upon the introduction, a mere sixteen minutes later, of the grown-up Thomas More. The latter character’s slow, smooth, and deep voice produces a very different effect that is examined in the next section of this article.

Despite its short length, Cromwell and More’s conversation as children generates a number of interpretive questions that both actors and narrators are forced to answer. How does More react to the presence of Cromwell? What is More’s opinion of Cromwell? What type of voice should be offered in the performance of More? At what speed should one speak when delivering More’s dialogue? How do the answers to each of these questions impact what audiences will take away from the scene? All of these questions, and then some, must be considered by performers before delivering

More's single line of dialogue in this scene. Each of these questions, meanwhile, is to some degree answered through a narrator or actor's delivery of More's witty reply to Cromwell.

Given that this scene represents the first appearance of Thomas More in *Wolf Hall*, the interpretation of the character that readers and audiences take away from it will almost certainly influence the way they interpret More in future scenes. In the case of the *Wolf Hall* audio book, fourteen-year-old Thomas More is portrayed as youthful and energetic. Amused by his own sense of humor, young Thomas More comes across as strikingly normal for an individual who spends the majority of his time in isolated study. Though it may not stand out to first-time listeners of the audio book, the full impact of More's normalcy in this early scene will be demonstrated a few moments later, when a very droll, yet very angry, adult Thomas More is introduced to the listening audience.

“The Tide of Filth Never Abates”

When Thomas More next appears in *Wolf Hall*, he is considerably older and much more politically important than he was when he and Cromwell first met. A fourteen-year-old scholar back then, More, by Spring 1528, has emerged as a fifty-year-old councilor to King Henry VIII on matters of state and religion (111). Mantel reveals that, in his capacity as an advisor to the king, More dedicates much of his time to defending the Catholic Church against accusations of corruption and false teachings — accusations typically issued by Protestant scholars such as Martin Luther and William Tyndale. Another responsibility of More's is the recommendation of Protestant texts for religious censorship, a responsibility to which he alludes in his first non-childhood exchange with Cromwell. Mantel writes:

Thomas More, ambling along, genial, shabby. “Just the man,” he says. “Thomas, Thomas Cromwell. Just the man I want to see.” [...] He is genial, always genial; His shirt collar is grubby. “Are you bound for Frankfurt this year, Master Cromwell? No? I thought the cardinal might send you to the fair, to get among the heretic booksellers. He is spending a deal of money buying up their writing, but the tide of filth never abates.” (111)

In addition to discussing More's numerous professional responsibilities, Mantel also goes to great lengths to emphasize how far in the past More has left his comparatively innocent days as a child scholar. Discussing More's work as the author of religious pamphlets, Mantel describes how More “calls [Martin Luther] shit. He says that his mouth is like the world's anus. You would not think that such words would proceed

from Thomas More, but they do. No one has rendered the Latin tongue more obscene” (111). When considered in conjunction with the novel’s earlier flashback to More’s youth, the introduction of Thomas More as an adult powerfully illustrates the change his character has undergone over the last four decades. If humor and wit were the chief characteristics of More as a youth, abject hatred of Protestants appears to be his most noteworthy characteristic as an adult.

Mirroring the changes to More that Mantel hints at in the novel, Simon Slater’s performance as the adult Thomas More is, from an aural perspective, nearly the antithesis of his performance as young Thomas More. While the younger More is a fast speaker, the elder More delivers his dialogue in a slow and methodical manner. Whereas the fourteen year-old More’s voice is higher pitched than Slater’s default voice of narration, the fifty year-old More’s is the lowest pitched voice of any prominent character in the audio book. Although More delivers his dialogue in a playful, sing-song manner as a youth, as an adult his speech is marked for being droll and, at several times, monotonous. The contrasts between Slater’s performances as the elder and younger Mores are thus both numerous and significant.

With regards to establishing the elder More’s anger and frustration towards Protestants, one feature of Slater’s performance stands out as especially important — his relatively consistent emphasis of words or phrases that paint Protestants or Protestant-friendly cities in a negative manner. Though most of the elder More’s dialogue is delivered in the same smooth, deep, and monotonous style, Slater does emphasize certain words by either increasing the volume with which he delivers them or pronouncing specific syllables of emphasized words with a rising intonation. This becomes exceedingly evident as More and Cromwell continue their conversation about the proliferation of texts that have been censored by the Catholic Church. As Mantel writes and Slater narrates:

Oh, but once these Bible men get over to Antwerp, you know... What a town it is! No bishop, no university, no proper seat of learning, no proper authorities to stop the proliferation of so-called translations, translations of scripture which in my opinion are malicious and willfully misleading... But you know that, of course, you spent some years there. And now Tyndale’s been sighted in Hamburg, they say. You’d know him, wouldn’t you, if you saw him? (04c, 3:46-4:18)

In delivering this passage, Slater consistently chooses to emphasize the terms and ideas that make Protestant cities sound bad: “No bishop,” “no university,” “no proper seat of learning,” “no proper authorities,” “proliferation,” “malicious,” “willfully misleading,” and “Tyndale” all receive the emphasis of added volume or abnormal

intonation. The same is true of “the fair,” “heretic booksellers,” and “tide of filth” in the previous paragraph (04c, 3:02-3:18).

Both Mantel and Slater go to impressive lengths to communicate that More, despite his generally genial outward appearance, is a man who harbors a great deal of inner hatred for Protestant theologians and believers. Yet Slater’s performance as the adult Thomas More adds one additional element that is absent from the text alone. By providing More with a stodgy, dull, and monotonous voice, Slater demonstrates the toll that years of anger and frustration have taken on More’s outlook on life. Though as a child scholar his voice was full of energy and exuberance, the elder Thomas More’s voice demonstrates little enthusiasm for anything but persecuting others. When discussing politics, family affairs, and other details of daily life, Slater’s delivery of More’s dialogue is generally very slow and consistent, demonstrating little or no strong emotion at all. Only when he is angry at something does the elder More’s voice truly come to life with varied volume and intonation. This is a fact that is later reinforced through multiple scenes in which More is either very sad or fearful for his life.

“He Died in My Arms” and “I Am Very Much Afraid”

Two of the most memorably emotional scenes involving Thomas More in *Wolf Hall* deal with the Lord Chancellor’s separation from his family. The first occurs near the novel’s mid-point, when More’s father, Sir John More, passes away of old age. The second occurs near the novel’s conclusion, when More is locked in the Tower of London and forced to await his own execution. In Mantel’s text, the two scenes are noteworthy in that they demonstrate a range of emotions from Thomas More; he is profoundly saddened by the loss of his father and extremely fearful as he awaits his execution. In Slater’s audio book narration of the text, the opposite effect emerges. Despite the seeming need for strong displays of emotion in each of these scenes, Slater adds emotion to More’s voice only in the most minimal of ways. The effect is quite profound, for the audio book’s version of Thomas More comes across as much more robotic and emotionally stunted than the character offered in Mantel’s text.

In the *Wolf Hall* novel, the death of Sir John More marks a turning point for the Lord Chancellor. Not only does he begin to demonstrate a range of emotions outside of anger, but he also begins, as he explains to Cromwell, to pay attention to his own mortality. Mantel writes:

“He died in my arms.” More begins to cry; or rather, he seems to diminish, and his whole body to leak tears. He says, he was the light of my life, my father. We are not those great men, we are a shadow of what they were. Ask your people at

Austin Friars to pray for him. “It’s strange, Thomas, but since he went, I feel my age. [...] God has snapped his fingers, and I see my best years are now behind me.” (259)

In many ways this scene is a surprising one. Up until now, the majority of the scenes featuring More have focused either on his dry wit or his general anger towards Protestantism. As such, the somber tone that Mantel establishes in this scene is rather unexpected. Certainly the image of the Lord Chancellor’s “whole body” leaking tears must catch Mantel’s readers off guard. Heretofore depicted as a fireball of anger and frustration, it comes as something of a shock to imagine More suddenly crying in response to an emotional loss.

Equally surprising is Slater’s take on the same scene through his narration of the audio book. Despite Mantel’s explicit note that More “begins to cry” as he talks to Cromwell in this scene, Slater delivers More’s dialogue in much the same manner as he delivered the Lord Chancellor’s dialogue in previous scenes. Particularly when delivering More’s proclamation that his father “died in [his] arms,” More retains the clarity and articulation of a man who is not at all emotionally choked up (08j, 0:00-0:02). Likewise, if not for the fact that the line is delivered even more slowly than Thomas More typically delivers his lines in the audio book, More’s claims that he now feels “his age” and that his “best years are now behind [him]” are pronounced with striking clarity (08j, 0:23-0:34). If More is emotionally shaken up at the loss of his father in this scene, it is not effectively communicated through Slater’s delivery of More’s dialogue.

Slater’s tendency to suppress emotion through his delivery of More’s lines is also on display in the novel’s penultimate chapter, when More is awaiting his execution in the Tower of London. While there, he receives a visit from Thomas Cromwell, who persuades More to admit that he is afraid of the violent execution he faces in a few days. Mantel writes:

“Will you think me sentimental, if I say I do not want to see you butchered?” No reply [from More]. “Are you not afraid of the pain?” [...] “Oh yes, I am very much afraid, I am not a bold and robust man such as yourself, I cannot help but rehearse it a little in my mind. But I will only feel it for a moment, and God will not let me remember it afterward.” (588)

For the same reason that More’s sudden display of sadness is surprising in the earlier scene, the Chancellor’s unprecedented admission that he is “very much afraid” of something in this scene is also somewhat unexpected. Having previously disagreed

with high-ranking diplomats (like Ambassador Chapuys), prominent families, and even the King of England, More has established himself as a generally unflappable individual to this point. Such, however, is apparently not the case as More approaches his impending death.

If Slater's Thomas More is afraid in this scene, it is difficult to tell from his vocal performance. Just as he side-steps Mantel's textual mandate that More begin to cry when discussing his father's death, Slater also eschews the infusion of fear into his delivery of More's dialogue when discussing his upcoming execution. Though he assures Cromwell that he is indeed "very much afraid," of death, since he is not "a bold and robust man such as [Cromwell]," the tone of More's voice as he delivers the line in the audio book strikes the ear as discordant with what he is saying (18h, 2:28-2:44). Rather than actually being fearful for the loss of his life, Slater's Thomas More sounds resigned to his fate. Whether or not it will hurt, he finally declares in uncharacteristically quick-paced fashion, "God will not let me remember it afterward" (18h, 2:42-2:44).

As Simon Slater demonstrates at different points in the audio book, strong emotion, or lack of emotion, in a narrator's vocal performance can have important implications on an audience's understanding of the story being told. In the case of the *Wolf Hall* audio book, Slater typically has Thomas More emote in noticeable fashion only when he is angry. Whenever Mantel's text calls for a display of a different emotion by the character, Slater either adds a minimal amount of the emotion or ignores the textual mandate altogether. Because of this and other choices made by Slater, listeners to the *Wolf Hall* audio book walk away with a much angrier understanding of Thomas More than readers of Mantel's *Wolf Hall* novel.

"Words. Words. Just Words"

By the time Thomas More is arrested and thrown in the Tower of London, he has long since established himself as a very different individual than he was as a child scholar. Between Mantel's textual highlighting of More's anti-Protestant obsessions and Slater's droll-yet-angry performance as the elder More for the *Wolf Hall* audio book, this is made quite clear.⁸ Yet in addition to this, Mantel also chooses to have More undergo a symbolic transformation in the novel. Although the entirety of More's adult life has represented a break from his comparatively innocent childhood, More's symbolic transition out of childhood and into a very dark adulthood is complete only upon his delivery of the same "Words. Words. Just Words" line that he originally uttered as a youth. Indeed, it is upon More's unenthusiastic and disinterested delivery of the same witty joke he amusingly delivered as a youth that the character's symbolic transformation is complete.

While More is locked in the Tower of London, he and Cromwell engage in a series of conversations to pass the time. In one of the final conversations between the two men, Cromwell mentions to More that all he must do to be released from the Tower of London is take the Oath of Supremacy — or, as Cromwell puts it, “You have to say some words. That’s all” (548). After Cromwell proceeds to describe, in lengthy fashion, the life of happiness that More might return to if he agrees to take the Oath of Supremacy, the former Lord Chancellor of England compliments Cromwell on his talent for persuasively using words. It is here that More once again utters his signature line in *Wolf Hall*:

“You should write a play,” More says wonderingly.

[Cromwell] laughs. “Perhaps I shall.”

“It’s better than Chaucer. Words. Words. Just words.” (549)

Thinking More is mocking him by referring to their conversation as children — a conversation in which Cromwell admits he thought More was “laughing at [him]” — Cromwell explodes at More, interrogating him about what he was thinking as the two conversed as youths (549). More, it turns out, has no recollection of the incident that has bothered Cromwell for decades. ““Oh, nonsense,” More says genially. ‘I didn’t know you when you were seven.’” (549).

More’s fundamental inability to remember anything related to the incident is itself telling; he is so far removed from the days of his childhood that he can no longer remember many of the events that took place in it. Yet perhaps the most striking difference between More as a child and as an adult is revealed through Slater’s delivery of the “Words. Words. Just words” line in this scene (17e, 0:09-0:11). The reoccurrence of a line that was originally spoken in a flashback to More’s childhood allows for a direct comparison of that delivery to the one he offers as an adult. Whereas the younger More sounds playful and sing-song, the elder More comes across as disinterested and dismissive. As an adult, all three utterances of the word “words” are performed in the same low, monotonous voice that has characterized much of More’s speech to this point. The word “just,” meanwhile, is emphasized with extra volume and rising intonation, as if to dismiss Cromwell’s claim that taking the Oath of Supremacy is a mere issue of formality. In no way does this delivery of the line retain any of the playfulness and wit that characterized More’s earlier response as a youth. The implication is clear: More’s days of levity are now very far behind him.

Although the novel outlines the major changes Thomas More undergoes between his childhood and adulthood, the audio book allows for a side-by-side aural comparison, thus affording us an additional means for trying to understand More’s

complicated character. Whereas Slater's delivery of the joke as the younger More is noticeably enthusiastic and energetic, his utterance of the line as an adult is very much the opposite. This seems a direct reflection of the lifestyle that More leads at the two different points of his life. Comparatively innocent and isolated as a child, More transforms into an aggressive and violent defender of the Catholic Church as an adult. Years of religious violence ultimately take their toll on More, leaving him emotionally tired and only really capable of demonstrating further anger. If this characterization is hinted at in Mantel's text, it is fully illuminated through Slater's vocal performance for the audio book.

Conclusion

Both Mantel and Slater contribute much to the characterization of More as a man who takes pleasure in the religious persecution of Protestants. This is a fact pointed out on multiple occasions by reviewers of the audio book for Audible.com.⁹ In terms of developing More's character, though, Slater's performance as Thomas More for the audio book goes one step further than Mantel's description of More in the novel. Whereas Mantel remains ambiguous in her description of More as a youth — leaving open the possibility that he was full of condescension and hatred from the start — Slater's performance as the younger More does not support this interpretation. In the audio book, More is not presented as a mean-spirited youth. Rather, he is a young, energetic scholar who is later made cynical and emotionally numb through his constant and never-ending religious persecution of others. Though part of this is communicated through Mantel's text itself, an additional part of this understanding is communicated by Slater through his differentiation of voices, tones, and emphasized words and phrases in the audio book.

Whether or not popular audiences view audio books as dramatic to the same degree as stage and screen acting, it is impossible to deny that a narrator's performance in reading for an audio book adds a dimension of theatricality absent from the silent page alone. If, as the years pass, audio books continue to gain in popularity at their current rate, it is likely that they will begin to be examined more frequently by academic and popular art critics alike.¹⁰ Perhaps this will be the point at which audiences begin to accept the dramatic role that an audio book narrator plays in shaping the audience's understandings of the story being told. As this article illustrates, audio book narrators like Simon Slater have the potential to dramatically change the audience's understanding of a particular character. For the moment, however, the fields of literary and popular culture criticism seem uninterested in taking notice. Only the future will tell whether these dramatic performers will be appreciated or whether they will continue to represent a neglected and marginalized

field of artistic performance.

Notes

1. Per the Royal Shakespeare Company’s website, all but one of *Wolf Hall*’s fourteen first-month shows are sold out as of the date of this article’s authorship.
2. See Bernstein’s introduction to *Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word*, in which the author argues for the term “audiotext” as a distinction between a printed text and a speaker’s acoustic performance of that text. See also Johnson’s “Audiobook Confidential,” in which the journalist interviews professional audio book narrators about the performance of their craft.
3. Matthew Rubery’s critical introduction to *Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies* offers a comprehensive overview of the most common complaints issued against both audio books and audio book narrators. See especially pp. 10-17.
4. Of the 189 listener responses available on Audible.com as of this article’s authorship, 16 refer to Thomas More specifically. Only 3 discuss or hint at the role Slater’s vocal performance contributes to the characterization of More. See the Audible.com customer reviews of *Wolf Hall* by users “RM Simon”, “Luke MacDonald”, and “Erika.”
5. More’s response to Cromwell echoes Hamlet’s famous response to Polonius when asked what the prince is reading: “Words, words, words” (2.2.192). Even a fictional Thomas More would have no way of knowing this, as Shakespeare was born nearly three decades after More’s death. Nonetheless, the echo of Hamlet represents an additional way in which Hilary Mantel demonstrates her interest in theatricality in *Wolf Hall*.
6. The historical Thomas More was well-known for his sense of humor, particularly for his use of irony. Thomas Wilson describes More’s reputation in the 1560 book *The Art of Rhetoric*, writing that “Sir Thomas More with us here in England had an excellent gift not only in this kind [his use of irony] but also in all other pleasant delights” (175). More’s reputation may play a role in certain readers’ interpretations of More and his dialogue in this opening exchange with Cromwell.
7. All in-text citations of audio clips refer to disk number (i.e. “03”), track (i.e. “n”), and time (i.e. “1:12-1:15”).
8. One feature of Mantel’s text not explored in this article is More’s reputation for happily participating in the whipping and burning of religious heretics, typically Protestants. There are repeated allusions to the practice in *Wolf Hall*. For two examples, see page 259, in which Cromwell refers to More’s “whipping schedule,” and 582, in which More claims to have the “whole body of law” and “the whole might of Christendom” behind him when he tortures and burns heretics.
9. See the Audible.com reviews written by “Charles Lawton,” who refers to More’s character as a “butcher;” “Alexandra,” who calls More’s dialogue and behavior “drippingly evil and snakelike;” and “Craig,” who notes that “if you hate Thomas More, you’ll love this book.”
10. See Alexandra Alter’s “The New Explosion in Audio Books” for a full account of the explosion in recent audio book sales and downloads.

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Pauses in *Visit from the Goon Squad*: Aberration Takes Charge, or, Literary Hijinks with the Notion of Time

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
Abstract This essay identifies the “methodological signature” of Jennifer Egan’s 2010 Pulitzer Prize winning novel in the *idea* of pause, combined with the author’s *use* of pause — of the intentional gap in time. The novel’s achronological, seemingly random ordering, the absence of connective summaries, and most particularly the chapter rendered entirely in Power Point oblige the reader to connect moments and events, to understand relationships, thus drawing our attention to the workings of Time itself on the characters’ human strivings. As one character remarks, “Time is a goon.”

Key words theory of the novel; literary characters; pauses; relationships; fictional space


In the Four Tops’ “Bernadette” there’s a moment near the end of the song when the music stops and there’s a second and a half of pure silence. You might have thought the song was over, then there’s another twenty-six seconds. Is that interesting?

Interesting or not, the phenomenon is the central concern of a chapter in Jennifer Egan’s multiple prize-winning *Visit to the Goon Squad* titled “Great Rock and Roll Pauses.” Thirteen-year-old Lincoln Blake is deeply, persistently fascinated by the pauses that occur in certain rock songs — the gaps, the silent moments, when sound stops then resumes. The chapter is the twelfth of thirteen and, unlike all of those that precede it, is written in Power Point.

A sample page. This one establishes the cast of characters:



The chapter's content is the stuff of realism, family conflict, the obsessed autism-spectrum son and his frustrated physician father struggling for common ground. Ah, but the form — bubbles and diagrams and graphs. The last four slides graph the results of Lincoln's research into the nature and impact of The Pause in rock songs, accomplished at last with his father's help. Here he charts the relationship between the length of the pause in the song and its motive force or "hauntingpower."



The chapter follows eleven chapters that, as was mentioned, are all rendered in prose: sentences and paragraphs, dialogue and narrative. They are easy to read and easy to enjoy. Chapter one welcomes the reader in the familiar narrative manner, with a close-up on a character (a thirty-five year old woman) in a recognizable place (hotel washroom) with an interesting conflict (to steal or not to steal):

It began in the usual way, in the bathroom of the Lassimo Hotel. Sasha was adjusting her yellow eye shadow in the mirror when she noticed a bag on the floor beside the sink that must have belonged to the woman whose peeing she could faintly hear through the vaultlike door of a toilet stall. Inside the rim of the bag, barely visible, was a wallet made of pale green leather. (3)

Sasha, the main or focalizing character in this chapter, hungers for the “fat tender wallet” (3), and she takes it, although she is in therapy to cure her kleptomania and on a date that particular night, a date on the verge of collapsing in mutual indifference. The chapter dramatizes a series of intensifying events, mostly cause and effect: possession of the stolen wallet vivifies Sasha, and re-energizes the date. The wallet’s owner desperately confronts Sasha who returns the wallet. The date rises toward sex at Sasha’s apartment. Then while the young man is taking a bath, Sasha opens his wallet and finds an old, creased, penciled note that says, “I believe in you.” And she steals that.

This chapter is followed by ten more, all written conventionally, before the Power Point chapter. Then comes another oddity. Chapter 12 takes place “in the year 202 —”(235), at least ten years past the novel’s pub date. On first read, personally, I found it annoying. It was a rent in the skein of the narrative — a breach in the contract we teachers of fiction writing have been known to discuss with our classes, that fiction writers are said to create between writer and reader, that the narrator supposedly establishes at the outset, in her first chapter, first paragraph, first line sometimes, by means of point of view, distance, diction and syntax, figures of speech.

For example, the famous first line in *A Hundred Years of Solitude*: “Years later when he faced the firing squad Colonel Aureliano Buendia was to imagine that distant afternoon when his father took him to discover ice.” It thrusts into future (firing squad), then sweeps back into the past (discovering ice), declaring in one sentence that the narrative is a linear and surreal. The book will swoop and circle through time, in a world where ordinary things like ice are strange.

A second example of the contract between writer and reader: if you want to introduce a ghost into an otherwise realistic novel so that it does not jar or seem contrived, do it up front, in sentence one maybe, in an offhand, throwaway phrase or dependent clause: *The night the ghost moved into my wife’s sewing room, we were making dinner and arguing about whether or not to have a baby.* Thus is established from the get-go the kind of book that is about to unfold — realist or surreal, detective or horror, comic or tragic. *Welcome, dear reader, to my vivid continuous dream,* says the narrative voice, page 1, paragraph 1. *And may I guide you through it?*

The term “vivid continuous dream” comes, of course, from John Gardner in

On Becoming a Novelist. It's convincing description of the process by which readers apprehend a fictional world:

We read five words on a page of a really good novel and we begin to forget that we are reading printed words on a page; we begin to see images — a dog hunting through garbage cans...an old lady furtively licking her napkin at a party. We slip into a dream, forgetting the room we're sitting in, forgetting it's lunchtime or time to go to work. We recreate...the vivid and continuous dream the writer worked out in his mind (revising and revising till he got it right) and captured in language . . . If the dream is to be vivid, the writer's language-signals — his words, metaphors and so on — must be sharp and sufficient. . . . If not, the dream will be cloudy, confusing, ultimately annoying and boring. And if the dream is to be continuous, we must not be roughly jerked back to the words on the page by language that's distracting. (Gardner 5)

One might think to counter this contract theory with books like *The Sound and the Fury*, where the voice changes completely from pre-conscious Benjy to hyper-conscious Quentin to Jason, who is primarily conscious of money. But still in Faulkner's exquisite book a pattern emerges. A quarter of the way through the book the second voice takes charge, at which point the contract enlarges to embrace the anomaly and normalize it. When we get the third voice, Jason's, we are ready and eager. Egan's oddity, however, plunks just before the end. After eleven vivid, not continuous but at least conventionally written chapters, in her chapter 12, it seemed, Jennifer Egan had let go of my hand, broken the contract, clouded the dream. Oh dear, I thought, having loved the book till now, she's indulging herself. So I skimmed the PowerPoint, fast-forwarding to chapter 13, to relax in the comforts of conventional narrative.

When questioned, however, Jennifer Egan stands by her penultimate chapter, placement and all. She said in an interview that she did not understand the overall structure of the book until the rest of it was already written and she was working on the PowerPoint section. "This book," she said, "is all about the pauses."¹ It is not surprising of course that in the author's view, far from being a mistake, the chapter is the book's capstone or lynch pin. But it bears inspection. Having been assigned to speak for thirty minutes on *Visit from the Goon Squad*, I had to reread the first 11 chapters, and then the book as whole with the following questions in mind. What else, if anything, was unusual about the novel's form? What, if anything, became more wonderful or more distinct by the light of PowerPoint?

For one thing, after chapter 1, we leave Sasha for Bennie Salazar, a music

producer and her former boss for twelve years; his point of view governs chapter 2. Here is something that is at least somewhat surprising, if not wholly unconventional: No matter how we might wish to return to Sasha's smart, sweet, troubled, larcenous mind and her terrible vulnerability, we never do. Whatever else we learn about Sasha comes through other characters' chapters, where she might be the antagonist, a minor character, a mere reference, or absent entirely.

Moreover, this is a pattern or a system that will hold in each of the thirteen chapters that comprise the novel. Each presents a new protagonist in a dramatic situation. The second chapter, featuring Bennie a couple of years earlier when Sasha was still working for him, shows him divorced and snacking on gold flakes to improve his virility, and sneaking peaks at Sasha's breasts as a test. Then comes a chapter from Bennie's high school days when he loves music more than food, point of view a girl in his band who's in love with him, then an African safari in which the children of a powerful record producer crave their father's attention and a guest gets too close to a lion. But we never return to these children though we hear about them, in the same way that we don't follow Sasha through her self-destructive urges or Bennie seeking to restore his musical and sexual passion. These protagonists, also called focalizing characters, those whose thoughts and feelings are rendered for us, appear only once in their central roles and no more.

There are thirteen chapters, and thirteen different protagonists. The points of view vary as well. Sasha's story is told in third-person past tense, the safari chapter is omniscient, there's a second-person chapter, and, of course the one in PowerPoint. And of course time darts and dashes about, starting in 2008 when Sasha steals the wallet, dipping back to 1973 when Bennie's mentor was on safari in Africa, to 1979 and Bennie's high school band, and flashing forward to a decade past the book's pub date (2011). The Seventies through the Twenty-twenties.

Here is a list of chapters with their focalizing characters, settings and approximate dates. Italicized are the roles Sasha and Bennie play in each chapter, however minor.

A

1 Found Objects, 3rd person past tense (Sasha), NYC, 2008. *Bennie named as her former boss.*

2 The Gold Cure, 3rd person past tense (Bennie), NYC and suburb, 2006. *Sasha works for Bennie; he loves her/ lusts over her.*

3 Ask Me if I Care, 1st person present tense (Rhea), San Francisco, 1979. *Bennie in high school managing a band and loving music; bandmate Rhea loves Bennie; Bennie loves Alice.*

4 Safari, omniscient, (Charlie, Rolph, Lou, Mindy), Africa, 1973.

5 You (Plural), 1st person present tense (Jocelyn), Los Angeles, 2005. *Bennie mentioned as the one who told everyone about Lou's stroke.*

6 X's and O's, 1st person past tense (Scotty), 1995, NYC. *Bennie's office, Sasha his fairly new receptionist.*

B

7 A to B, 3rd person past tense (Stephanie), 2002-4, NYC and suburb. *Bennie is Stephanie's faithless husband; Sasha briefly mentioned as Bennie's employee.*

8 Selling the General, 3rd person past tense (Dolly), NYC and 3rd world country, 2008.

9 40 Minute Lunch, 1st person present tense Interview format (Jules) NYC, 1997.

10 Out of Body, 2nd person present tense (Rob), NYC, 1992-3. *Rob is Sasha's best friend, attracted to Sasha's boyfriend Drew.*

11 Goodbye My Love, 3rd person past tense (Ted), Venice, 1990. *Ted is Sasha's uncle, who tracks her down in Venice, where she is self-destructing.*

12 Great Rock and Roll Pauses, Power Point Presentation (Alison), Cal. desert, May 14th & 15th, 202-. *Alison is Sasha and Drew's daughter, Lincoln their son.*

13 Pure Language, 3rd person past tense (Alex), NYC, 202-. *Alex, Sasha's one night stand in chap. 1, now works for Bennie. They by chance find themselves at Sasha's old apartment.*

So designed, the book could read like a patchwork, or a short story collection, nifty beads on a chain. But it is called a NOVEL, the word prominent on the cover of the first edition, as if the publishers had their doubts, or perhaps doubted the readers (*Moby Dick* does not call itself a novel).

But in point of fact — surprisingly, considering its loose structure — *Visit from the Goon Squad* has the forward drive of a full-fledged novel. In part it's because the two central characters recur. Thirteen different characters command their separate stages from chapter to chapter, but reader-interest centers on Sasha and Bennie. After her own chapter, Sasha appears in seven others, Bennie in six. We don't get their thoughts, but like hungry chicks we're pecking for news of them, no matter how remotely conveyed or tangential.

And — a second point — at the end, turning the last page, having read it all at last including the PowerPoint), I found the book start, in a way, to shimmer. This is a personal reaction, but I will try to explain its source, why the book seems in the end more than the sum of its parts. It is affecting in terms of its plot and characters, but it is about more than character, more than whether or not Sasha will curb her kleptomania and live a satisfying life. It inhabits, even embraces, the arena of ideas, the questions of why and how and what are we doing here, our quest to understand

how the world operates. How we get from A to B, as the novel asks in multitudinous ways.

As was shown, the novel is separated into parts, designated A and B. “A to B” is the title of a chapter in which Bennie self-destructs. *From A to Bis* the title of a minor character’s comeback record. Bosco, a once famous, now weak and sick, musician, plans to promote it on what he calls a suicide tour in which he will perform as hard as in the old days and do himself in gloriously.

“From A to B” came up earlier as well, on the lips of an old high school friend of Bennie’s who has failed to prosper. Scotty once in Bennie’s high school band, a magnetic personality and gifted guitarist, comes to see Bennie in his skyline office and says, “I want to know what happened between A and B.” Bennie is married, rich and famous while Scotty is poor and alone, asking the novel’s central question: Why do some people succeed and others fail? What takes you from A to B? Birthright, character, fate, good and bad luck?

The novel explores the question with all the characters, major and minor. Without reentering Sasha’s viewpoint, we still follow her career throughout the novel: attractive and almost formidable as Bennie’s girl Friday, back in college the center of the universe for two young men who love her in different ways, at nineteen turning tricks in Venice, Italy, and trying to stay sane. In her forties she has miraculously re-found her college boyfriend, and has two children.

Scotty rose then fell then miraculously rose. Lou, a music mogul, had sex, money, love and fame, but lost his son then had a debilitating stroke. At the end of his life he was in bed, on oxygen. He or she who was up can come down, and vice versa. The system prevails in the life of the novel’s most minor character, a Samburu warrior whose only role is to dance with Lou’s daughter and annoy Lou during the safari. He reappears, a brief reference, in chapter thirteen as the grandfather of a grad student at Columbia University who is engaged to the daughter of the protagonist in chapter 8. In Egan’s world, there are ups as well as downs. What persists, though, is the absence of connective tissue.

If the book doesn’t answer the question what brought its characters from A to B, it is not because Egan could not figure it out, but perhaps because to her novelist’s mind there is no answer. The point is the question, the need/wish for an answer that forever eludes. Without being at all didactic, being, in fact, playful as well as dramatic and tragic, she explores success in all its aspects — power, money, love, security — along with the driving need to understand what makes one person attain it and another fail, and the impossibility of really understanding.

And Egan’s vision is clarified, and realized too, in her PowerPoint chapter — both by its subject, the Pauses in Rock Songs, and also by its form. In both form and

subject it honors emptiness, the spaces between things in which we strive to connect moments and events, to understand relationships; we strive and fail. This is the realm of questions like whether or not God exists, that we can't answer and at the same time can't stop asking. We read self-help books, how to make friends and influence people, and the universe has its way with us and we die in the end, and only the question remains, insistent, desperate, unanswerable. We have to know; we don't or can't know.

Thus the PowerPoint chapter not only belongs and makes sense in the novel, it governs it. The chapter, which calls attention to pauses, is itself a kind of pause in the narrative. And the *idea* of pause, combined with the author's *use* of pause — of the intentional gap in time — is what we can call Egan's "methodological signature." However momentarily irritating or discomforting, Egan's decision to use it — the method — is her *signature*. Her characteristic manner of achieving her ends has become a statement in itself about what those ends are. The method signifies. The seeming anomaly, understood as intentional, casts the whole project onto a higher floor, or into a new arena. Does it bear repeating? The anomaly or aberration, understood as intentional, casts the issue into a new and more complex realm.

So, far from being a mistake, the PowerPoint chapter controls the novel in both content and form. The pauses in Lincoln Blake's rock songs echo the gaps in time between the moments rendered in the chapters. Lincoln's graph depicts a direct correlation between pauses and music's "haunting power," a power that resides or even stems from the gaps between the chapters. Rendered moments from the long span of years between 1973 and 2025, they ring out, the more resonant because of the spaces, the long silences between them — in which beats the great heart of this brilliant, playfully created universe.

Addenda in Praise of Pauses

"Human freedom involves our capacity to pause between the stimulus and response and, in that pause, to choose the one response toward which we wish to throw our weight. The capacity to create ourselves, based upon this freedom, is inseparable from consciousness or self-awareness." (Rollo May, *The Courage to Create* 100).

"The right word may be effective but no word is as effective as a rightly timed pause to listen" (quote attributed to Mark Twain).

"One sees merely the whole effort of a body straining to raise the huge stone, to roll it and push it up a slope a hundred times over; one sees the face screwed up, the cheek tight against the stone, the shoulder bracing the clay-covered mass, the foot wedging it, the fresh start with arms outstretched, the wholly human security of two earth-clotted hands. At the very end of his long effort measured by skyless space and

time without depth, the purpose is achieved. Then Sisyphus watches the stone rush down in a few moments toward that lower world whence he will have to push it up again toward the summit. He goes back down to the plain. It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me. . . . That hour like a breathing-space which returns as surely as his suffering, that is the hour of consciousness. At each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks toward the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. (Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* 120-121).

Note

1. Jennifer Egan, Interview in BookBrowser.

http://www.bookbrowse.com/author_interviews/full/index.cfm/author_number/1890/jennifer-egan. Accessed May 6, 2014.

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Performing Gender and Fictions of the Nation in David Hwang's *M. Butterfly*

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Abstract Theories of gender and nationalism contribute to understanding David Henry Hwang's play, *M. Butterfly* (1986). By interweaving illusions about sexuality and cultural differences, Hwang creates an ironic play that addresses social myths of gender and national identity. A love affair between a diplomat named Gallimard and a spy named Song is placed within the larger context of a national discourse that hierarchically positions the East-West national identity within a framework that represents China as both other and woman. In *M. Butterfly*, subjectivity is created through a patriarchal, socio-sexual matrix that creates gender as a fictive category based on exclusions. I argue that the rhetoric of gender converges with the rhetoric of nationalism at the site of the body so that individual (gendered) identity cannot be separated from public (national) identity. The connections between gender politics and nationalism suggest that both discourses rely upon imaginative fictions to construct identity.

Keywords feminist theory; nationalism; East-West relations; David Henry Hwang; patriarchy

Theories of gender and nationalism contribute to our understanding David Henry Hwang's play, *M. Butterfly* (1986). Hwang sets his play in a Paris prison with flashbacks to Beijing detailing a twenty-year love affair (1960-80) between a French male diplomat, Gallimard, and Song, a Chinese male spy disguised as a woman opera singer. By interweaving illusions about sexuality and cultural differences, Hwang creates an ironic play that addresses social myths of gender and national identity. The love affair between Gallimard and Song is placed within the larger context of a national discourse that hierarchically positions East-West national identity within a framework that represents China as both other and woman. In *M. Butterfly* subjectivity is created through a patriarchal, socio-sexual matrix that creates gender as a fictive category based on exclusions. Employing Benedict Anderson's definition of the nation

as an “imagined community,” I argue that the rhetoric of gender converges with the rhetoric of nationalism at the site of the body so that individual (gendered) identity cannot be separated from public (national) identity. The connections between gender politics and nationalism imply that both discourses rely on imaginative fictions to construct identity.

In *Gender Trouble*, Judith Butler outlines a humanist feminist perspective that addresses the correlation between identity and gender construction. Butler writes “As a shifting and contextual phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive being, but a relative point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations” (10). These sets of relations, for the most part, function with a dualistic framework so that subjectivity is contingent on having an “other.” Gender functions as an essential set of relations that inform identity and helps to differentiate the self from other. However, Butler argues that even as gender is an essential building block of identity, it is, in fact, entirely fictitious and contingent. Butler traces one argument that begins from this perspective to suggest that identity is constructed within a binary system wherein subjectivity is viewed in terms of masculinity, resulting in the marginality of the feminine gender (11). This view suggests that the active subject can only “be” when in relation to an “unauthorized subject” or object. The inactivity, passivity, or femininity of a person reflects and enhances the subjectivity, activity, and masculinity of another’s identity. In other words, for the construction of “I” there must simultaneously be a relational construction of “You,” or other. Within a patriarchal social structure, the sets of relations that determine agency and identity are influenced by social myths that are maintained by fictive notions of difference rooted in gender.

Fictive notions of difference between men and women can be found in theories such as essentialism or biologism that suggests an individual has a “true nature” or essential core identity. The research of Elizabeth Grosz in *Space, Time, and Perversions* demonstrates this point. Grosz argues that “Women’s social roles [are] . . . the result of culture, not nature, of social organization rather than biological determinants, and thus capable of being changed” (Grosz 50). According to Grosz and Butler, gender can be seen as something produced through culture in order to create polarized differences that define identity. However, since there is no foundational or “true” difference rooted in gender, one must *perform* gender.

Social categories of gender create elaborate scripts detailing how persons should act in order to be a real or “true” woman or man. Judith Butler addresses the ways gender is defined through social performance or masquerade. In certain ways, the masquerade is a necessary result of gender inscription on the body. Butler explains that identity is made through *exclusion*, through excluding what is unacceptable for the different sexes. This exclusion is based on the distinction of interior and exterior

reality as related to the body. The body is the sight of inscribed social, historical, and political meanings so that sexual acts and desires define the gendered person. Butler writes:

In other words, acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this *on the surface* of the body. . . . Such acts, gestures, and enactments generally construed, are *performative* in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitutes its reality. (136)

Butler argues that gender itself is a type of performance constructed and regulated by social myths, rather than an inherent quality of identity. These social myths accumulate at the site of the body, where specific sets of gender relations converge to define identity.

The quote above suggests that identity is produced from social fabrications rather than arising from an essential core. Because there is no core foundation on which identity sits, all actions that define identity are viewed as a performance, i.e., as “playing the part” in the sense that the person must act according to a script that defines their identity. This script is written in terms of gender so that gender is a means through which identity is established. The imagined differences between women and men are merely fictitious and contingent because the body itself knows nothing about right or wrong ways to feel or act, and, for this reason, words, acts, and gestures that define gendered identity are only placed on the surface of the body, rather than imbedded in a genetic code. Precisely due to the fact that gender is a performance attests to that fact that it can’t be an ontological truth; without the performances and exclusions that create gender, gender would not exist. Butler further explains that gender does not reflect any essential foundation of identity because no “true” identity or “essential” interior core exists other than what has been produced/fabricated by socially constructed sets of relations.

In *M. Butterfly*, David Henry Hwang expertly constructs the love affair between Song and Gallimard, who goes on trial for espionage, to reflect certain gender ideologies and cultural fantasies. The play calls into question the foundations of identity based on gender and gender itself as a “truth.” Gallimard, the male French diplomat, believes for twenty years that Song is a woman either by his own foolishness or by the contingencies of gender that allow anyone to perform the role of Woman or Man. Song, the man-as-woman Opera singer, embodies the Perfect

Woman for Gallimard because Song knows what kind of woman he wants: passive, sexually timid, weak. Song supports these myths. S/he tells Gallimard, "Please. . . it all frightens me. I'm a modest Chinese girl" (40). Song reinforces the stereotype of the passive woman and Gallimard buys into it because he relies on *her* image in order to reflect *his* vision of himself as a "real" man.

Gallimard says that he was afraid to find out Song's sexual identity because it would mean that he was even further away from being a "real" man. In other words, real men don't love other men, or, rather, in this heterosexist matrix, a man loving another man is not a "real" man. Real men are defined by loving women. In order to be a Man, Gallimard must find his Perfect Woman, for, without a Perfect Woman, what would he be? How would Gallimard define himself? Judith Butler proposes that, "women must become, must 'be' precisely what men are not and, in their very lack, establish the essential function of men" (45). The binary, heterosexual matrix of identity positions woman as "not having" and man as "having," so that woman's absence of subjectivity supports and defines man's subjectivity. In this way, one can see that the hierarchical, binary framework of identity is specifically patriarchal due to socio-sexual privileges accorded to males, thus defining subjectivity as inherently masculine.

Feminist theorist Luce Irigaray analyzes the meaning of identity and gender in patrilineal, hierarchical, heterosexist societies in her book *This Sex Which is Not One*. She theorizes that women are seen and used as units of exchange. This theory suggests that a woman's value, in fact, comes from her use in an exclusively male economy of exchange that circulates power only between men (171). Thus, women become commodities, losing autonomous worth to a value system based on the exploitation of women's bodies and identities for men's profit. This exchange market is based on an economy of desire that excludes women even though her body is the desired object.

Irigaray's analysis is useful for examining the relationship between Song and Gallimard in *M. Butterfly*. It appears on one level that Song is using Gallimard for military/governmental information and Gallimard is using Song primarily to establish his masculine identity. Ironically, their relationship reflects a paradigm that demonstrates Irigaray's male economy of exchange because both Song and Gallimard are men, albeit one is performing as a woman. It is a relationship based on the myths of gendered identity, equally regarding the construct of Woman and Man, that both believe and perform. The commodity desired and bought is the myth of Woman. This myth socially regulates the male fantasy of "having" a woman that works to define and reinforce masculine identity. Song and Gallimard's relationship is intriguing because, as readers, we know that it is a relationship between two men, yet, Gallimard believes (or pretends) it is a relationship between a man and woman wherein his

heterosexual fantasies can be actualized.

On yet another level, the lovers' relationship functions within a political paradigm and market of exchange between nations. The heterosexual relationship that Gallimard perceives and Song performs reflects national values attached to men and women's bodies wherein the non-white Eastern female is appropriated by the white Western male. According to scholar Rey Chow, male identity is seen as the vehicle for Western nationality to express itself (Chow 81). Within a patriarchal and heterosexual political discourse, Chow contends that the West, as an embodiment of male identity, views Eastern countries as the embodiment of female identity, and therefore positions the East within a dominant-submissive framework of imperialistic power relations. Relative to political relations between Western Europe and China, the Chinese woman's body becomes the inscription site for French/Western ideology and manhood. National identity is thus translated into a gendered identity so that the West is symbolized as Man and the East is symbolized as Woman. The sets of relations based in gender that define a person elicit a similar pattern in the sets of relations placed within a political context that defines nations and national identity. The binary, heterosexual relationship between woman and man can be viewed through a similar perspective when placed within a binary, nationalistic framework between the East and West.

By accepting Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as "an imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign," one cannot escape the distinct connection between the discursive formation of both gender and national identity (6). Anderson stresses that this political community is imagined, that it has no rock solid foundation in reality other than the style in which it is imagined. The significant link that I wish to make here between nationalistic ideology and gender suggests that both are fictive notions that serve to create individual (gendered) identity and collective (national) identity, through socially regulated sets of relations between people and nations. Sociologist Craig Calhoun emphasizes that nationalism is informed by a set of relations to produce a collective identity. Calhoun explains, "A web of interpersonal relationships locates a person locally, but membership in the category 'nation' locates people in a complex, globally integrated world" (7). The correlation between the category of nation and the category of gender is found in the fictive notions and imaginings that create either individual, gendered identity or collective, national identity. The rhetoric of gender and the rhetoric of nationalism blend into one another so that, as Calhoun has noted, nationalistic ideology is necessarily intertwined with gender and sexuality. Henry Hwang's play provides a brilliant example of these theories and their transmutations onto real bodies as expressed in the love affair that occurs between two men, one of whom thought the other was a woman.

In *M. Butterfly*, the man-as-woman character, Song, elucidates this aforementioned dialectic between gender and nationalism during the espionage trial of Gallimard's love affair with Song. When Gallimard is accused of passing French military secrets to China, Gallimard maintains his innocence and true love for Song. Song explains how Gallimard had been duped (for twenty years!) into believing that Song was a woman by drawing an analogy between the West's perception of the East, and men's perception of women:

The West has sort of an international rape mentality towards the East The West thinks of itself as masculine- big guns, big industry, big money- so the East is feminine-weak delicate, poor . . . but good at art, and full of inscrutable wisdom- the feminine mystique. Her mouth says no, but her eyes say yes. The West believes the East, deep down, *wants* to be dominated-because a woman can't think for herself. (83)

Song plays up both gender and national stereotypes of the other in this explanation of Song's duplicity and Gallimard's willingness to "buy into" the masquerade. The rhetoric in the quote above attests to the similar mentality between essentialized notions of gender and national politics, thus reinforcing the idea that the personal politics of gender identity is intricately enmeshed with the public politics of national identity. Song says that the "West thinks of itself as masculine . . . so the East is feminine" (83). This statement implies that within the "discourse of nationalism" the opposing countries are accorded power status that is entwined with gender status (Calhoun 8). Because political power is imagined in terms of gender, the imperialistic mentality of colonial dominance must assume local power of bodies which are understood and accessed in terms of gender.

Gallimard was deceived into believing that Song was a woman not because Song wore great make-up, but because the qualifications of gender are fictive and contingent. Judith Butler's aforementioned arguments regarding gender as masquerade when applied to *M. Butterfly* suggest that anybody can perform gender, just as nations can be imagined regardless of geographic boundaries (Anderson 3). In one sense, nationalism can be seen as the performance of an imagined collective identity. Ernest Gellner points out that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (169). The act of imagining and the act of performance both reinforce the fictive and contingent quality of identity. One can understand, then, the ways in which Gallimard believed Song's masquerade due to the contingencies of gender and the discursive formation of national identity. Gallimard believed that Song is a woman, not only to validate his masculine identity,

but also for the validation of his French nationality. If national identity is symbolized and expressed through the masculine and male identity, then one can understand the convergence of heterosexual male desire with the nation's (political) desires of dominance and control. Both desires are rooted in a patriarchal, dualistic ontology that views difference (the other) as a threat. Therefore, if one labels difference in terms of gender and power, it follows that from the perspective of the masculine West, both women and the East are the objects of desire that are exchanged and dominated. Song's analogous passage between gender and nationality suggests that China is the mirror for France to see itself, just as the gendered category of woman creates a metaphoric mirror for men to see themselves and perform in front of in patriarchal societies.

The feminization of China within East-West colonial discourse works from the same ideology of subject formation based on exclusion, as discussed earlier. Judith Butler notes that, "It is important to remember that subjects are constituted through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view"(13). In order for the West to be a subject, other countries must be found to be an object to reflect the West's subjectivity. Because subjectivity is framed within a masculine discourse, the othering of China involves its feminization because the "other" must be positioned as feminine to reflect the West's masculine subjectivity. Rey Chow explains this polarized power dynamic further: "China is a spectacle, as what facilitates the production of surplus-value in the politics of knowledge-as-commodity, this China becomes, in its relation to the West, 'woman': in the sense that it is the 'other' onto which the unthinkable . . . is projected" (Chow 87). Chow suggests that the other country, China, embodies all the attributes of what the West is not: weak, intellectually submissive, and militarily passive. This dualistic subjectivity reinforces the interrelatedness of gender and nationalism in the sense that power is coded in terms of gender. The threat of the East is not only a political threat, but a threat to the very center of Western national identity that imagines itself as masculine. Masculine identity must assert its power against the threat of emasculation by the other, which is coded in terms of the Feminine as a "deauthorized subject." As Chow notes, the West can project the "unthinkable" onto China because it is a deauthorized subject which functions only in relation to the masculine West. *M. Butterfly* offers rich dialogue regarding sexual and cultural myths that readers can examine in order to contemplate the influence of gender and nationalism on identity.

Gallimard makes gross assumptions about how China, as a political country, will act in war because he buys into the notion that Eastern countries are weak and, thus, feminine. As mentioned above, by connecting weakness with femininity, Gallimard

highlights a significant trend in the discourse of gender when masculine identity is asserted. The fear of emasculation helps sustain the performance of gender. The rhetoric of gender purports that one cannot be a “real” man and be weak or exhibit feminine attributes. Gallimard surmises that China’s military will act the same way in war as Song acts in bed. He says, “Orientals will always submit to a greater force” (46). This reinforces the stereotype that all Chinese are the same, all women are the same, and China is like a woman in the face of a stronger force like France, who is the masculine dominator. Gallimard’s assumptions promote the ideology that Chinese women are not “real” women, but, instead, are more like a mythic symbol of the ultimate desired object: the other gender, the other sex, the other race, the other country. The feminization of China simultaneously disempowers both women and the East while supporting the dominant gender and government’s right to oppress. Gallimard enacts the dominating Western national identity in relation to Song’s dominated Eastern national identity by believing in and performing the socially dictated male fantasy. He says to Song, “You showed me your true self. When all I loved was a lie. A perfect lie. . .” (89). And Song replies, “So, you never really loved me? Only when I was playing a part?” (89). Gallimard has struck home when he says, “All I loved was a lie” (89). Yes! It was a two-fold lie: that Song as a man was masquerading as a woman and that there was even a true origin of identity that Song was covering up by the masquerade. The deceit rests upon the fact that it was a lie constructed upon a lie: that Song as a male had to masquerade or “pretend” or to be a woman and hide his masculine gender, when, in fact, the masculine gender is just as fictive and performative as the feminine gender. All identity is performative because it is rooted in gender and thus far gender has been argued as a fiction, a performance, and a fantasy that has no “true” foundation.

Gallimard’s conflicting social reality and personal fantasy throughout the play forces the reader to question social notions of identity, gender, and nationalism. As readers, we come to realize that Gallimard’s interior reality is actually produced by social discourse and the public regulation of fantasy through the heterosexual politics of the body. The irony is that this relationship between Gallimard and Song is wholly fictitious, due to the fact that Song is male. There is double irony, however, found in the argument that *all* heterosexual relationships are performative, regardless of the “true” gender and sex of the partners because gender itself is a fiction that causes identity to also be a type of fiction. Sexual partners perform their respective gendered identities dictated by social discourse. Gallimard’s futile efforts to find the foundation of “true” identity and his struggle to distinguish between inner and outer reality is manifested throughout the play with his monologues in prison.

After being tried as a traitor, Gallimard tells us that he gladly refuses Song, being

more content with his fantasy of the Perfect Woman. In the final scene, Gallimard decides that the only way to find his Perfect Woman is to *become* his own fantasy. He chooses to become the female character, Butterfly, from the opera, *Madame Butterfly*, who embodies Gallimard's ultimate Woman. Gallimard becomes the other, the Woman, the Oriental, the non-White. He understands that in being a Man he will always have to desire something outside of himself--a Woman. So, in order to resolve the conflict, he embodies his idea of the Perfect Woman inside of himself and changes one gender mask for the other.

Internalizing the lost object of his desire (evoking characteristic traits of Freudian melancholia), Gallimard incorporates this Woman (Butterfly) inside his own identity. Gallimard *is* Butterfly; i.e. he turns himself into his own ultimate fantasy. He says, "Love warped my judgment, blinded my eyes, rearranged the very lines on my face . . . until I could look in the mirror and see nothing but . . . a woman" (92). Throughout this monologue, the stage directions detail him dressing up as a Chinese woman. He dresses himself in a Chinese woman's kimono, a woman's wig and woman's make-up. Gallimard takes off his mask of "man" and puts on the mask of "woman." He trades one gender mask for another and enters into the other side of the performance. Literally and metaphorically, Gallimard moves across the market of exchange in terms of gendered bodies and nations. In the end, Gallimard finally resolves his identity conflict rooted in myths of gender by becoming his own unattainable woman finally attained. His identity no longer depends on some(body) outside himself. Now, the dualities are contained inside himself; the outsider is finally inside.

M. Butterfly presents the regulatory fiction and performance of gender through the relationship between Gallimard and Song. Cultural fantasies and myths of women and China as other are developed by playwright David Henry Hwang in order to question the historical and social foundations of identity. The idea of a foundation of identity, namely gender, is a highly fictitious category that is discursively produced in a binary, patriarchal, socio-sexual matrix dependent on exclusions. Feminist and gender theories call for the acknowledgment of the fictions, exclusions, and contingent foundations inherent within gender and identity. To demonstrate the fictitiousness of gender, I pointed to Song's masquerade and Gallimard's ability to "buy into it" and directed attention toward Gallimard's internal conflict between perceived notions of reality versus fantasy. The process of subject formation is understood within the broader context of the discourse of nationalism that positions the East as Woman, Object, and "other" in contrast to the West as Man, Subject, and the "Self," calling for a closer examination of the influences of state power, global trade, and imperialism within even the most private, intimate relationship of lovers.

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Intramental Fictional Minds in Ian McEwan's *Amsterdam* and *On Chesil Beach*¹

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Abstract This paper examines the fictional minds' mental functioning in Ian McEwan's *Amsterdam* and *On Chesil Beach*. The study primarily depends on the terminology offered by Alan Palmer considering the operation of fictional minds. The paper argues that the initial fragile intermental units within the selected narratives disappear towards their ends because, encountering conflicts, the fictional minds tend to dissent intramentally. Therefore, these narratives can be read as representations of the breakdown process of the intermental units among the fictional minds. In *Amsterdam*, the incipient intermentality between Clive Linely and Vernon Halliday comes to its end when the two old friends' strong egocentrism and aspectuality lead them fundamentally towards disrupting intramental thoughts and actions. And in *On Chesil Beach*, the development of Edward Mayhew's and Florence Ponting's small intermental unit halts when their intermental or shared thoughts are replaced by their inflexible intramental dissents. In both cases, the fictional minds are presented as being unable of going beyond their own perspectives, which are essential for the formation and maintenance of the intermental units. Accordingly, this paper analyses the breakdown processes of the small intermental systems in the chosen narratives.

Key Words fictional minds, intramental/intermental thought, *Amsterdam*, *On Chesil Beach*, Ian McEwan

Ian McEwan and Consciousness Representation

Ian McEwan is one of the "highly respected professional" (Malcom 6) contemporary British novelists, who has paid close attention to the presentation of fictional minds in his works. In his later novels, McEwan primarily explores his characters' individual psychology illuminating "the cavernous makeup of the mind" (Cochran 407). Moreover, according to Lynn Wells, "in all his fiction, McEwan combines a contemporary sensibility about the power and limitations of narrative with a keen

sense of his characters' inner lives and their struggles to deal morally with one another" ("Ian" 252). Therefore, in McEwan's narratives, as it is the case with the selected narratives in this paper, presentation of characters' *inner lives* is considered as one of the central concerns showing the mode of fictional minds' mental workings as well as the way(s) they deal with each other or with the other fictional minds. That is so because, as Matt Ridley states, "The novelist's privilege, according to Ian McEwan, is to step inside the consciousness of others, and to lead the reader there like psychological Virgil" (vii). A particular concern about presentation of the characters' internal or psychological states seems to be dominant in McEwan's *Amsterdam* (1998, hereafter *AM*) and *On Chesil Beach* (2007, hereafter *CB*) where the reader encounters with the fictional event sequences mostly through the representation of the experiencing characters' or focalizer's consciousness although an omniscient narrator orients the transition of information wherever the focalization shifts.

Cognitive Narratology

Cognitive narratology (hereafter CN), according to David Herman, is considered as the "study of mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices" ("Cognitive" 31). It is so because in CN "representation of minds are fundamental to stories" since "stories both shape and are shaped by what minds perceive, infer, remember, and feel" (Herman, "Cognition" 257). Herman therefore considers narrative as a "cognitive activity" (*Basic* 98) since its "meaning potential requires the cognitive activity of readers" ("Cognitive" 33). CN is furthermore concerned with questions that in general deal with narrative production, the fictional minds' mental workings together with their presentation in narrative and narrative comprehension. Moreover, as Alan Palmer points out, "One of the concerns of cognitive narratology is the relationship between consciousness and narrative" ("Attributions" 292), since it intends to evaluate narrative as "tools for thinking"² (Herman, "Cognitive" 32), as a medium of *experience* representation — or as Fludernik proposes, as a function which "*centres on experientiality of ananthropomorphic nature*" (19) — and also representation of the *impact* of narrative events and situations on fictional minds' consciousness (Herman, *Basic* 137-160). Likewise, in the chosen narratives, the central concern seems to be the fictional minds' reactions to the challenging situations and events or their mental functioning in different situations as they primarily both "replicate consciousness in text" (Ridley vii). CN, moreover, intends to connect the storyworlds to the readers' actual world knowledge and experiences treating fictional minds as "the parallel discourses on real minds" (Palmer, "The Lydgate" 152).

Fictional Minds and Cognitive Reader

In CN, characters' cognitive activities are considered as the focus of narrative analysis since plot is primarily shaped by what happens to them within the storyworlds or by the events that become their experiences. Therefore, narrative is in fact representation, as well as analysis, of the impact of some events and situations on fictional minds (Palmer, "The Lydgate" 156). Thus, the question "how fictional minds work within the context of the storyworlds to which they belong" ("Construction" 29), lies at the centre of Palmer's research. Following that and calling his approach to the fictional minds "criss-crossing of the field [...] an interdisciplinary project" (*Fictional* 3-4), Palmer contends that the same techniques people apply in order to understand other people's minds are applied when they, as readers, try to understand fictional minds through attributing mental states to them. That is so, because from both Herman's and Palmer's perspectives — which are also congruent with the general inclination of the postclassical contextual approaches to narrative — a reader is supposed to unfold the possible meanings of narrative by the help of her/his non-literary or anthropomorphic experiences stored mostly in the forms of scripts and frames s/he uses in everyday communications. Moreover, proposing "an excellent representational model of how readers conceptualize characters' psychological states and traits" (Caracciolo 46), Herman and Palmer attempt to show how readers utilize their everyday cognitive frames, which have default values too, and scripts, or their world knowledge, in order to interpret the fictional minds or "to fill gaps in storyworlds" (Palmer, "The Lydgate" 154). Their approaches moreover highlight some of those universal frames that "enable the reader to construct continually conscious minds from the text" (Palmer, *Fictional* 176). Therefore, the questions such as how readers understand stories and how they utilize their cognitive tools in order to access the characters' mental workings are central to CN.

Alan Palmer's Approach to Fictional Minds' Mental Functioning

Palmer in *Fictional Minds* gives an outline of his "newly expanded, postclassical narratology of the fictional mind" approach which relates "some cognitive science notions to the specific area of reader comprehension of fictional minds" (*Fictional* 17, 175). Building his approach on the main previous concepts within narrative theory, Palmer however finds their attention to fictional minds, which "adjuncts to those other fields," insufficient (*Fictional* 2). Accordingly, he theorizes about some techniques that readers can apply in order to figure out the workings of fictional minds in narrative. Readers, according to Palmer, obtain dispersed information from different parts of narrative mainly by applying three techniques, which he calls subframes, in order to construct the fictional minds' embedded narratives or their continuing consciousness frame defined as the "process whereby readers create a continuing consciousness for

a character out of the scattered, isolated mentions of that character in the text" (*Social* 40). These subframes — the relationship between thought and action, intermental or group/shared thinking and doubly embedded narratives — “utilize fundamental aspects of our real-world knowledge of the mental functioning both of ourselves and of others” (*Fictional* 205). Emphasizing that intermental thought does not have preference over intramental one or the vice versa, Palmer however argues that it has been ignored or superseded by the intramental approach within narrative studies. Therefore, Palmer discusses intermental or joint thought as opposed to intramental or individual thought focusing on the communicative action, relationships with intramental thinking and group norms.

Intermental/Intramental Thought and Fictional Minds

In Palmer's externalist approach to fictional minds thought is basically considered “intermental” or “intersubjective first” before being “intramental” or “subjective first” (*Fictional* 5). Intermental thought is considered fundamental to the workings of fictional, as well as real, minds and hence “intermental units are to be found in nearly all novels” (Palmer, *Social* 41). Palmer defines intermental thought in comparison with intramental thought as following:

Intermental [...] thinking is joint, group, shared, or collective, as opposed to *intramental*, or individual or private thought. It is also known as *socially distributed*, *situated*, or *extended cognition*, and also as *intersubjectivity*. Intermental thought is a crucially important component of fictional narrative because, just as in real life, where much of our thinking is done in groups, much of the mental functioning that occurs in novels is done by large organizations, small groups, work colleagues, friends, families, couples, and other intermental units. (*Social* 41)

The stability of intermental units nevertheless is not certain or guaranteed since “a large amount of the subject matter of novels is the formation, development, maintenance, modification, and breakdown of these intermental systems.” Moreover, although intermental units are made up of individuals or individual thoughts but “the whole [...] is different from the sum of its parts” (Palmer, *Social* 41, 44) because it belongs to all rather than to any particular individual or, to put it in other words, “intermental minds consist simply of individual minds pooling their resources and producing different results” (*Social* 50). In other words, intermental thought combines intramental thoughts but it is different from them. To examine intermental activities of fictional minds, Palmer proposes what he calls a “basic typology”

which includes “intermental encounters,” “small intermental units,” “medium-sized intermental units,” “large intermental units,” and “intermental minds” (*Social* 46-48). Nevertheless, as Lisa Zunshine points out, “No all works of fiction cultivate intermental units” (20). Likewise, the small intermental units at the onset of the selected narratives in this study are transitory and prone to imbalance in a way that the overall narratives, instead of cultivating intermental bonds, are presentations of the intermental breakdowns. As it will be shown, to represent the destructive consequences of the breakdown of the intermental units is seemingly the main concern in both *AM* and *CB* — Clive’s and Vernon’s double murder at the end of *AM* as well as Florence’s and Edward’s separation before consummation of their marriage in *CB*.

***Amsterdam, On Chesil Beach* and Intramental Characterization**

The present paper examines two narratives both of which, according to Wells, “focus on a small number of characters engaged in tightly formed relationships and lead to intense dramatic action and climactic endings” (*Ian* 84). In *AM* the communication among fictional minds fails mostly because the intramental side of their mental functioning overcomes the intermental one or the balance between them is disrupted. Moreover, in each of these narratives, “As the novel proceeds, the reader enters the minds of the two protagonists and some other characters, too, and follows their moods, uncertainties, and intimations of mortality and immortality” (Malcolm 192). In other words, “In both books, the characters are either unwilling or unable to recognize the needs of others, and remain trapped within modes of self-serving behaviour that ultimately harm them as well” (Wells, *Ian* 85). Accordingly, the character presentation seems to be the primary focus of the narratives but, to quote Palmer, “characters” in these narratives “face sharp and painful dilemmas relating to attempts to exercise control over other minds and the motives in trying to doing so” (*Social* 64). This characteristic, presentation of characters’ or selves’ relationships with the others, is in fact in line with McEwan’s style too since, as Pascal Nicklas argues, “At the heart of McEwan’s poetology is the desire to look through the eyes of someone else. The confusion of the self and the other [...] in general opens up for Ian McEwan the ethical dimension of literature” (9). Further, the main problem in these narratives appears when the rift between the characters’ intermental units and their intramental thoughts, which cause disequilibrium in the narratives, grows dramatically preventing the central characters from either coming to terms with their own problems or, recognizing them, resolving them through maintaining a balance between their private selves and the social cognitive networks. Fictional minds in the selected narrative fail to do so. Thus, taking into account that “the Ian McEwan we have seen emerging

over the past fifteen years is a complex figure requiring rigorous narratological focus” (James 81), this paper, applying a cognitive narratological approach, explores the fictional minds’ mental workings in *AM* and *CB*.

Dissenting Fictional Minds in *Amsterdam*: Clive Linely vs. Vernon Halliday

Highlighting “an escalating conflict between two friends [...] both of whom are ruthlessly self-promoting” (Wells, *Ian* 84), *AM*, in five parts, recounts the disintegration process of an old friendship between Clive Linely, an eminent composer, and Vernon Halliday, a famous newspaper editor, in the mid-1990s. Having “strong elements of the psychological novel,” McEwan’s Booker Prize winning novella is “part psychological novel and part social satire” (Malcolm 192, 194). The narrative, as put by Wells, primarily illustrates the way two friends are deteriorated by their own “greed, corruption, self-interest [...] and] masculine egotism.” Representing two fictional minds who pursue their intramental thoughts without “compassion” (“*Ian*” 251) for the other(s), the narrative ending in *AM* brings about their final calamity or the total breakdown of any potential intermental units in the storyworld. According to Earl G. Ingersoll, “The narrative focuses on Clive’s consciousness so extensively that in the end his entrapment in the isolate’s hell of solipsism may come as a major shock to readers. Unlike Vernon who is motivated by shabby self-aggrandizement, Clive has the luxury of longer reader sympathy, one suspects, because his obsessive aspirations are culturally legitimated through his art” (“*City*” 128). Furthermore, according to Helga Schwalm, “In *Amsterdam*, empathy as a projection of oneself into the minds of others operates on various levels of plot and narration” (175).

At the beginning of the narrative, while Molly’s crematorium ceremony is advancing, her two former lovers, Clive and Vernon, are talking about the immediate nature of her death, their memories of her and her other two lovers — George Lane, her husband, and the right-wing foreign secretary, Julian Garmony — intermentally despising them. They furthermore agree to make a pact of euthanasia in case of being afflicted by a fatal disease. Their later perceptions and ensuing actions however deadly affect their friendship since they both have “delusions of grandeur of the Ego” (Nicklas 13). They primarily disagree about Vernon’s decision to defame Garmony through publishing his transvestite photographs in his newspaper, *The Judge*, in order to *apparently* prevent him from running for the leadership. Their second deadly confrontation refers to Clive’s decision of non-intervention in a row between a woman and a man, later identified as the Lake Land rapist, while hiking in the Lake District under the pretext of being absorbed in his *genuinely* artistic creation at that moment. Accordingly, their already established intermental unit finally ends in their mutual murder since “Each friend understands the ‘sinister direction’ the other has

taken for the ‘salvation’ of his career, warns him of the dangers, but these ‘parting gift[s]’ are ignored” (Kohn 93). The two disagreements thus exacerbate the already diverging rift in the old friends’ intermental unit bringing their conventionalized cooperation into an unfair competition. The event sequences moreover are unfolding through the strong aspectuality of the two friends revealing their dissenting intramental preferences as well as representing the way they mutually misuse their euthanasia pact poisoning each other in the city Amsterdam.

Being a “quintessentially ‘scriptible’ novel” (Kohn 89), *AM* is mostly a narrative of subjectivity since it is strongly focalized through Clive’s and Vernon’s internal perspectives and, as Nicholas Lezard put, “the book’s deeper subject matter: deception, both of others and of the self” (qtd. in Childs125). Clive and Vernon are presented as being at war with themselves and at the same time with the other(s) because as far as they are controlled by their rational or controllable thoughts and actions they are also prone to their uncontrollable thoughts and desires which invigorate their dissents. Thus, “narcissistic” (Tsai 15) self-centeredness together with “reciprocal misrecognition” (Schwalm 176) can be considered as primary ethical problems of the central fictional minds’ in the narrative. Furthermore, according to Tsai, McEwan criticises both Clive and Vernon for “their pursuit of self-interest encouraged under Thatcherism” (11). The characters’ “irrational” (Malcolm 14) thoughts and actions moreover refer to their “egoistic” inclinations as “Garmony has uncontrollable transvestite desires that destroy his career, while Clive is an egoist who cannot place a woman’s life above his own artistic aims. Vernon’s case is more complex, but even he is driven by a desire for success that makes him deaf to rational argument” (Malcolm 15). Nevertheless, Clive and Vernon endeavour to frame their egoistic thoughts and actions within a strongly aspectual moral understanding turning “each into the cruel analyst of the other’s moral depravity” (Ingersoll, “City” 133). For example, while hiking in the Lake District, Clive pretentiously considers focusing on his music as his “moral duty” rather than interposing in the row scene. Vernon however accuses Clive for ignoring his moral duty by putting his self-interest higher than his human duties. Likewise, when Clive is unable of persuading Vernon, who “constructs himself as a liberal warrior” (Ingersoll, “City” 127), to stop blackmailing Garmony, he accuses him of being an egoist person ignoring the impact of his action on another person’s real life. Their moral perspectives therefore are totally opposing each other. Moreover, in spite of their loyalty to their promises — reciprocal euthanasia — their double murder at the end of narrative, according to Schwalm, “exhibits both friends in a kind of parody of intersubjective reciprocity. Cold-heartedly anticipating and calculating the actions of the other, they both fail to recognize their opposite’s equally nasty schemes” (176). Thus, the two old friends not only cannot agree with each other as

well as with the others to be friends in spite of their disagreements, but also their self-centeredness together with intramental dissents lead them to their annihilation.

In the early part of the narrative, we encounter “two old friends” who have some shared, joint or intermental communions. Looking at Molly’s husband, George, for example, they both share the same thoughts as the passage, focalized through their perspectives, shows: “Her death had raised him from general contempt. [...] Clive and Vernon were strictly rationed because they were considered to make her excitable [...] Clive and Vernon, however, continued to enjoy loathing him” (*AM* 5). They *loathe* George only because he was an obstacle on their way to the attracting Molly. They, in other words, loath him since he did not support them in their self-centred plans keeping them away from his own wife. Presentation of their extremely egoistic expectations therefore reveals the shared manner that their thoughts function in the early parts of the narrative. Furthermore, they are intermental considering Garmony since they both take him as an enemy although in this case Vernon is much more confident than Clive. For example, when Clive is asked to go to Garmony in Molly’s crematorium ceremony, Vernon warns him: ““Hey, Linley. No talking to the enemy!”” Clive’s unvoiced reflection indicates their difference in this case although his discourse is closely overlapped with the narrator’s: “The enemy indeed. What had attracted her?” (*AM* 13). Vernon’s internal ironic assessment of the word *enemy*, indicates their different perspectives on an issue crucial to their friendship and that finally brings about their firstly proclaimed diverging thoughts in case of Vernon’s greedy insistence on publishing Molly-Garmony photographs. The unsaid manner of the initial conflicts nevertheless changes into open confrontations in the later scenes. Although the more Clive evaluates Molly-Garmony relationship, the more he finds it “a mistake” and therefore “unbearable” (*AM* 15), nevertheless, this sense of loathing does not take him to an agreement with Vernon in terms of disgracing Garmony through publishing his transvestite photographs with Molly. Unlike Garmony’s recommendation, “To air differences and remain friends, the essence of civilized existence, don’t you think?”³ (*AM* 21), the two old friends, despite their differences, are not able to maintain their friendship which can act as an instigator of constructing intermental units. Nevertheless, they are some mutual sympathies in the earlier scenes.

The intermental relationship between Vernon and Clive is not broken until their first confrontation after Vernon shows Molly-Garmony’s three photographs to Clive. When Vernon shows him the photographs while recounting eagerly all about injunction, we are told that Clive “showed no curiosity about the photographs and the injunction and seemed to be only half listening” (*AM* 48). Nevertheless, Clive confides in Vernon his intimate request, “help me to die [...] Just as we might have helped Molly if we’d been able.” Vernon’s answer to his close friend’s request is

careful and calculated, “It needs some thought” (AM 49). This double feeling of intimacy never recurs in their future interactions. The impact of Clive’s proposal on Vernon’s consciousness and the reciprocal effects on his own mind are represented as experiencing the “emotional proximity” but its “uncomfortable” (AM 50) nature forces them to leave each other for a while. Such converging or intermental reactions to the same situation moreover indicate the deep level of their engagement which is even more displayed when Vernon, on his way back from George’s home, scribbles a note and pushes it through the front door of Clive’s house — “Yes, on one condition only: that you’d do the same for me” (AM 57). The teleological implications of this pact however change their intermental friendship as well as their fate.

Vernon’s reasoning for publishing Molly-Garmony’s three photographs moreover does not persuade Clive as he asks him: “Do you think it’s wrong in principle for men to dress up in women’s clothes?” (AM 73). Unlike Vernon’s perceptions revealed through his “watching hungrily, waiting for a reaction,” Clive consciously turns his expectation down: “it was partly to conceal his thoughts that Clive continued to gaze into the picture” (AM 70). While looking at the photographs, Clive is represented as a mind reader of both Vernon’s and Molly’s intentions although he tries not to betray his inferences and mental states to Vernon. Comparably, he thinks of Molly-Garmony relationship finding out a connection not between two social selves but between two private selves lying below the visible ones: “For the first time Clive considered what it might be like to feel kindly toward Garmony. It was Molly who had made it possible” (AM 71). This change seems possible because of Clive’s intermental perceptions about Molly-Garmony relationship. That happened because for a short time Clive, pondering on the pictures, reached an intermental bond with Molly as he was able to consider Garmony’s case from her perspective. In other words, going beyond the restrictions of his own narrow perspective, Clive imagines the bond between them from Molly’s perspective too. Garmony, who once was their joint distaste or “pure poison, [...] Vile, [...] and] Terrible for the country” (AM 73), changes into the basis of their disagreement provoking one of the two deadly conflicts in the storyworld. Compared to that, Vernon is considering the case only from his own benefit-seeking personal perspective putting his career advantages and benefits higher than those of the others, including Molly’s. What Vernon considers as the right act — publishing the photographs in *The Judge* in order to disgrace Garmony — is considered an immoral act from Clive’s perspective because he not only considers the events from his own perspective but from the others’ perspectives too (AM 73). Therefore, Clive is aware that Vernon’s intention to stay in *The Judge* as its editor and his dislike of Garmony are the main reasons of his decision to publish Molly-Garmony photographs. In other words, as Wells notes, Vernon’s “real motivations

are completely self-serving" (*Ian* 90). Following that, Clive's intermental bond with Molly and through that his flexibility towards Garmony has no other reason than his tendency to intermentality: "Because of Molly. We don't like Garmony, but she did. He trusted her, and she respected his trust. It was something private between them. These are her pictures, nothing to do with me or you or your readers. She would have hated what you're doing. Frankly, you're betraying her" (*AM* 75). Clive's disposition to aspectuality and intermental thought here however is not the general trend of his thought. He, for example, cannot imagine himself in Vernon's place as Vernon accuses him: "You know nothing, Clive. You live a privileged life and you know fuck-all about anything." Vernon needs a story to save his newspaper more than anything else, otherwise he will be sacked. Therefore, he grabs to whatever at hand in order to stand upright. Their main difference however seems to derive from their different understanding of morality. After his return to London, Clive himself is accused of ignoring his "moral duty" (*AM* 119) in terms of not saving a woman while he was hiking in the rocks. Their mutual accuses accordingly show the breach in their already intermental friendship. When Vernon says: "There are certain things more important than symphonies. They're called people," Clive accuses him on the same basis: "And are these people as important as circulation figures, Vernon?" As it is clear, their different understandings of the same issues reveal their strong aspectualities as well as their intramental or subjective first characters. Following these mutual charges, they articulate their carefully kept inner feelings making the invisibles visible to each other. The contribution of this scene to the general plot of the narrative is considerable because it afflicts the intermental aspects of their friendship. They equally accuse each other for ignoring the other(s) by putting their self-interests higher than those of the others. Vernon accuses Clive of pursuing his own goals while Clive accuses him of not doing "journalism" but pursuing people restlessly from his own office (*AM* 119-120). Thus, Clive and Vernon both attempt to manifest their perspectives reasonable although they never get rid of their unmatched and "self-absorbed" (Malcolm 194) interpretations of their shared subjects.

The incomplete nature of the two old friends' interpretations of the same issues is revealed by the narrator's explanatory comment on the disastrous point they reach. Ascribing the possibilities of misreading to language itself, the omniscient narrator points to the limited nature of the two friends' perspectives reminding us that "It can happen sometimes, with those who brood on an injustice, that a taste for revenge can usefully combine with a sense of obligation" (*AM* 148-149). The narrator's comment shows how the two friends' perceptions of obligation for doing something against what they consider as *injustice*, are afflicted with their personal desires to take *revenge* against each other. To put the same point in other words, it points out the manner they

both pretend to be concerned primarily with justice while they are in fact following their dissenting intramental goals. In this way, Clive's and Vernon's mutual egocentric thoughts that incite their actions bring about the deadly imbalance, on the one hand, to their private selves and, on the other hand, to their public selves because internally and externally they give themselves totally to the intramental thoughts which give rise both to the destruction of themselves and the breakdown of their friendship too.

Unfortunate Misreadings in *On Chesil Beach*: The Imbalance in the Intermental Unit between Edward and Florence

CB is the narrative of Florence Ponting's and Edward Mayhew's failure in consummating their marriage "delineated in painstaking detail" (Mathews 82). It begins with their arrival at one hotel on Chesil beach in 1962 and ends with Edward's retrospective re-evaluation of his treatment with Florence at that night of their separation after forty years. Applying a complicated plot, the narrative, in five parts, merges into each other the events of their entire lives although focusing primarily on their diverging perceptions. The newlyweds' (un)consciously mutual pursuing of intramental drives as well as their dissents over them, as mostly revealed through their consciousness representation, can be considered as the most important reasons of their failure at that night since, as shown in their own embedded and doubly embedded narratives, their intramental thoughts lack any dialogic relationship between them.

Florence and Edward are unable of consummating their marriage since above all their attributions of mental states to each other are incongruent with their true feelings and thoughts; therefore, in *CB* there are elements of "couple's dilemma paralleling the difficulties of 'reading' the other" (Wells, "Ian" 252). Furthermore, this narrative, like *AM*, anchors itself strongly to the reader's world models by presenting a worldly known script — the difficulties of a wedding night. Edward and Florence, according to Wells, "have no socially acceptable way of communicating with one another," and "their relationship [...] represents the coming together of two very different worlds." Wells moreover believes that they "are guilty of poor interpretation of the other: Florence cannot perceive how her imagined scenario excludes a very important form of intimacy for him, and he believes he can represent her entire, complex problem with a single word [frigid]" (*Ian* 85, 92, 96). Wells nevertheless does not seemingly take into account the last confrontation scene on the beach when Edward remains passive while Florence, expecting him to do something, is leaving him forever. What he lacked then was in fact the "imaginary identification with other(s) [Florence]," which according to Nicklas, "becomes such an important ingredient of McEwan's poetics" (11). Furthermore, the impact of the "particular moment in history and the

history of the moment" (Ingersoll, "The" 131) on the newlyweds' mental functioning moulds their intramental dissents. That is so because, according to Ingersoll, "Recently McEwan has focused on narratives in which the impulse of the moment can chart the course of life" ("The" 132) and *CB* is considered as one of those narratives which engages readers deeply since "One consequence of telling the couple's story on their wedding night in something close to 'real time,' to borrow John Lethem's term, is an intensification of the reader's psychological investment in this narrative" (Ingersoll, "The" 137).

Moreover, since the bedroom and the beach scenes are presented alternately through Edwards's and Florence's perspectives, *CB* "is considered a realistic portrayal of the workings of interpersonal relationships by many readers" (Spitz 197). This technique makes the characters' internal perceptions of the other(s) and themselves available for the readers in order to build their embedded narratives. Ascribing this technique to the omniscient narrator of the narrative, McEwan points out that: "it is a presence which assumes the aesthetic task of describing the inside of two people's minds. Then the reader can make a judgement" ("Journeys" 133). Therefore, because of the availability of the inside or content of the two characters' minds, *CB* reader, as well as *AM* reader, "can make his own judgement after the writer had fulfilled the aesthetic task of describing the inside of people's minds" (Puschmann-Nalenz 208) analysis of which becomes feasible using Palmer's terminologies.

Edward's and Florence's inchoate intermental units change into highly growing intramental dissents only during some hours. Edward is represented as being primarily absorbed in his own imagination of possessing Florence, partly regardless of her feelings at that moment, while Florence is represented as experiencing an internal conflict between her own feelings and Edward's expectations that she tries to read or perceive from his behaviours. Although she desperately struggles to maintain their delicate intermental unit, still she finally loses the capacity to overcome her internal conflicts. Thus, they both are to blame in doing so because their narrative, in similar manner to Clive's and Vernon's narrative in *AM*, is not more than presentation of "ascriptions of reasons for acting" since, according to Herman, narratives in general "are bound up with ascriptions of reasons for acting that consist of clusters of beliefs, intentions, goals, motivations, emotions, and other related mental states, capacities, and dispositions" (*Storytelling* 23). Accordingly, Herman believes that "texts like McEwan's [*CB*] may help explain the special fitness of storytelling for folk-psychological purposes" (*Storytelling* 300) in the same way folk psychology can help narrative understanding. Thus, Herman finds *CB* a sample narrative which "enable[s] storytellers and story-interpreters to assess the motivations, structure, and consequences of actions by varying perspectival and attitudinal stances towards those

actions and the situations in which they occur” (*Storytelling* 294).

At the beginning of *CB*, there is an intermental unit between Edward and Florence without revealing any sign of their imminent separation. The newlyweds “seem the closest of friends, trusting and needing one another. Their story is ominous from the onset” (Henry 82). However, this intermental bond is “superficial,” as suggested by the omniscient narrator: “superficially, they [Edward and Florence] were in fine spirits” (*CB* 3), which cues in readers’ mind a possible distance between the characters’ thoughts and their actions. Edward is represented as imagining Florence’s thoughts in the early part of the narrative. These intermental thoughts and actions are nevertheless prone to the characters’ dissenting intramental orientations and their egoistic behaviours (*CB* 4). Furthermore, although Edward and Florence are reported as sharing some internal feelings, for example, they are “desperate for the waiters to leave;” nevertheless, their shared thoughts and plans are not certain but “giddy” (*CB* 5). They moreover are represented as being in agreement about their “parental errors,” their childhoods and their marriage which they intermentally believe is going to be the “beginning of a cure” from the “social encumbrances” (*CB* 6). Therefore, they hope their marriage will be a marriage of minds. At their wedding night nevertheless they are reported as being “Almost strangers, they stood, strangely together” (*CB* 6). Moreover, the disparity between their mental functioning is shown in the following passage: “He wanted to engage her tongue in some activity of its own, coax it into a hideous mute duet, but she could only shrink and concentrate on not struggling, not gagging, not panicking” (*CB* 29). Such different perceptions bring finally about the breakdown of their small intermental unit. Likewise, Edward’s inferences from Florence’s “moan” and her gestures in the bedroom indicate his overwhelmed state or his “unfamiliar ecstasy.” This state coaxes him into imagining further intimacy with Florence. At the same time, remembrance of his own problem, “real danger of arriving too soon,” prevents him from further broodings about Florence (*CB* 30-31).

Edward and Florence in some other scenes are presented as totally two different persons. For example, they have totally different music tastes. While rock and roll is Edward’s favourite music, classical music has always been Florence’s interest and profession (*CB* 38). Considering the impact of his favourite music on Edward’s personality, the narrator, changing the time of story, reports that “for years to come he considered that this was the music that formed his tastes, and even shaped his life” (*CB* 38-39). The defining effects of this *taste* on Edward’s thought and action, or his life as a whole, becomes more considerable when we find out Florence, the would-be musician “revered the ancient types” (*CB* 41), as a practitioner of the classical music and its impact on her calm, introvert and speculative self. Moreover, lack of a strong mental bond with their parents brings about their obligatory formation of a hidden

self, or “the emergence of a new sense of self” (Head 119), which is a stubborn self, pursuing solely its concealed intramental goals. The aftereffects of their historical selves as well as the need to an intermental mind, in order to share their loneliness, bring about a mutual longing in them for an intermental relationship upon which they both act in their first meetings. Nevertheless, they fail to do so since “They are more complex creations [...] with private lives that make the novella’s crisis an emotional (rather than a historical) inevitability” (Head 121) which, according to the present study, leads to the total disintegration of the characters’ intermentality.

Part three is strongly focalized through the couple’s competing perspectives. The narrative perspective, for the second time in this part, changes to Florence and the remaining events in the bedroom are recounted totally from her perspective although the events are recounted retrospectively from E’s perspective later. With the presentation of events through both perspectives, “What had been suppressed (by conventions of politeness and fear of humiliation) now rushes to the surface with a force that overwhelms both characters” (Spitz 201). At the time of their open confrontation on the beach, one can see the distance between what they think (or thought before that time) or their state of minds and what they say. For example, the word “revolting” incites some retaliatory words from Edward’s side (*CB* 144) and their mutual “accusations tend to initiate conflict sequences” (Spitz 210). Edward’s response to Florence’s accusation is more fatal: ““You don’t have the faintest idea how to be with a man.”” These accusations are more than she can bear or, as the narrator puts, “How much accusation was she supposed to bear in one small speech?” They exchange accusations using offending words or phrases such as “bullying,” “ridiculous,” “wheedling” etc. (*CB* 144-145).

In spite of their mutual misreadings, Florence is represented as a shrewd character. Although she evades acknowledging her real problem to Edward since she does not know how to say it, still she unavoidably gives herself into making the rift between them grow. That is because, on the one hand, she tries to be herself *or follow her own character* without being forced into a “disgusting” life and, on the other hand, to be in love: “She wanted to be in love and be herself. But to be herself, she had to say no all the time. And then she was no longer herself” (*CB* 146). Florence’s internal dilemmas can be read as the conflicts between her intramental and intermental orientations: “She wanted to hurt him, punish him in order to make herself distinct from him. It was such an unfamiliar impulse in her, towards the thrill of destruction, that she had no resistance against it” (*CB* 149). The desire to be *distinct* could be controlled by Edward if he, getting out of his own narrow perspective, could take into account their problem from her perspective too. Therefore, they act mostly based on invalid inferences and ascriptions. For example, when Edward says: ““You were

wanting to humiliate me.” The word *humiliate* stirs in her mind a chance to play a card towards her intention (*CB* 148-149). The more their conversation continues, the more they both dare to speak already unspeakable issues. Along their conversation, Florence reconstructs her already conventionalized perceptions as for the first time she finds out that their fundamental problem has already been their politeness and this revealing leads to some conflict sequences and “once the conflict frame has gained momentum, the characters orient towards the expectation of dissent” (Spitz 206).

Although Florence is aware of Edward’s regret after his accusing statements, nevertheless, the moment she thinks about their reunion she finds it unacceptable and finally she takes courage to propose her suggestion to him. Nevertheless, she does not prefer to speak her mind; instead, she reacts to Edward’s statements. While, Edward, in a confessing mode, talks about their relationship using past tense, “I loved you, but you make it so hard.” Florence immediately finds out the intentional application of the past tense while Edward continues his speech: “We could be so free with each other, we could be in paradise. Instead we’re in this mess” (*CB* 150). The word “mess,” we are told, “brought back to her the vile scene in the bedroom, the tepid substance on her skin drying to a crust that cracked. She was certain she would never let such a thing happen to her again” (*CB* 151) although, through looking at herself from his perspective, she finds herself and Edward unpredictable and therefore difficult to read. Such dual states are the driving force for the progression of the frame narrative plot and when she finally stoops to one of them, the intramental one, the denouement appears as a solid fact in front of them. In other words, Florence can be considered as the central controlling force of *CB* plot.

Florence growingly pursues her private or individual self rather than the social or communal one while Edward endeavours to maintain it from the very beginning. Through her proposal, she is in fact following a consciously built intermental unit expecting Edward to agree with her in terms of her proposal, to accept that they can be free and at the same time remain lovers: “We’re free now to make our own choices, our own lives. Really, no one can tell us how to live. Free agents! And people live in all kinds of ways now, they can live by their own rules and standards without having to ask anyone else for permission” (*CB* 154). Her unorthodox proposal, offered under the veil of words, is centrifugal and non-canonical while Edward tends to centripetal and canonical conventions. This disrupting proposal brings Florence’s long internal conflicts to end destroying their apparent intermental unit too. Edward’s reaction to her proposal nevertheless is mutually egoistic and intramental whose emphasis on dissenting rather than assenting brings about the total breakdown of their already constructed intermentality. Yielding to his already established and unavoidable trait, anger, Edward accuses Florence of insulting and tricking him. Since it he calls, he

calls her a *frigid*, an accusation which legitimizes for Florence her mutual accusations and these exchanges bring their cooperative intermentality to its complete end (*CB* 156). After their last exchanges, Florence, aware of the degree she offended him, excuses for her words, “I am sorry, Edward. I am most terribly sorry,” nevertheless, Edward remains silent and motionless: “She paused a moment, she lingered there, waiting for his reply, then she went on her way” (*CB* 157). As it is obvious, she expects Edward to say or do something in order to dissuade her from going away while Edward, not being able to overcome his own egoist pride, remains passive. Accordingly, presentation of Edward’s and Florence’s passage from intermentality to intramentality while representing their mutual impact on each other’s thoughts and actions, as Palmer and Herman argues, are the central concerns in *CB*.

Conclusion

This paper argues that CN and Palmer’s theories can help the reader to examine the breakdown processes of the intermental units in *AM* and *CB*. Palmer considers characters’ mental workings as the fundamental aspect of narrative understanding. Moreover, narratives, according to him, largely represent the formation, (re) construction or breakdown processes of the intermental units which are different from their constituent parts. The *discrete* cognitive units between Clive and Vernon as well as Edward and Florence are not obtained because they are unable of merging their intramental thoughts in order to gain access to a sustainable intermental unit which could help them to solve their problems. The analysis of these narratives suggests that the intramental orientation of the central characters’ mental workings makes them unable of going beyond their narrow perspectives although the four central characters desperately struggle to maintain the fragile intermental units among themselves. Accordingly, Palmer, like the other cognitive narratologists, consider reader central to narrative understanding since s/he, drawing on her/his real world experiences or models, attempts to unfold the manner fictional minds are functioning either intramentally or intermentally. Likewise, *AM* and *CB* not only present the cognitive activities of the fictional minds but also they display what it’s like for them, breaking their intermental minds, to change into enemies. Encountering such narratives, the terminologies of cognitive approach therefore can help the reader to draw on their “real life experiences,” or as cognitive narratologists call them frames and scripts, in order to understand the operation of fictional minds (Neumann and Nünig 156-159).

Notes

1. This article is developed based on my PhD research (2012-2014) at the department of English

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2. McEwan also “uses fiction to understand the mind and to explore human nature, as well as uses words to alter readers’ consciousness” (Ridley viii).

3. Garmony’s civil proposal to Clive is similar to Florence’s proposal to Edward in CB. They both ask for an intermental unit taking into account their mutual thoughts although at that moment no one finds them acceptable.

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Mirror Images in Doris Lessing's *The Summer Before The Dark*

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Abstract *The Summer Before The Dark* is a representative work of Lessing's women portrayal transition from focusing on their outside world exploration to on their inner world seeking. This paper analyzes the novel from mirror images of the heroine and the various implications. Throughout the novel, Kate is depicted looking into mirrors many times, and while she studies her images in the mirrors, adjusting her physical appearance according to different standards, she is actually being through different psychological states, the changes of which reveal the process of her inner growth, maturing, and attaining a final integrated self.

Key words *The Summer Before The Dark*; mirror images; psychological states

In her early writing, Lessing was particularly good at portraying the images of women that have strong will and self-reliance, describing the difficulties, confusions and changes experienced by them in a patriarchal society, and drawing people's concerns about women's issues. During 1960s and 1970s, Doris Lessing began to read and study psychological analysis and Sufism with intense interest. To be exact, Lessing was receptive to Lacan's theories on consciousness and human Psyche and to Sufi concepts of human integration and the realization of it through revelation of inner world. Lessing apply extensively these concepts and ideologies into her writings, and thus the 1970s witnessed Lessing's significant changes in creation principles and artistic style: she began to penetrate deep into women's inner mind, trying to reflect women's consciousness by writing amply about dreams and symbols. In this period, although the novels are still based on the lives of women and their concerns, but the heroines are no longer passionate young women, but rather middle-aged women who ponder deeply over life and marriage, in attempt to get a whole and integrated self in chaotic living situations. *The Summer Before The Dark*, published in 1973 was a representative work of this transition.

Kate Ferreira is a clever and independent girl who grows up in a well-educated

home. She has got the opportunity to study Romance language and literature in Oxford while she meets Michael Brown who just starts his career after ten years of war and training and is seven years older. They fall in love and get married. Kate Brown becomes a full-time housewife, supporting devotedly her husband and their four children. The novel begins when Kate approaches 45, and has finished her sacrifice role as a supportive wife and tendering mother. Now that the husband Michael Brown has a decent job and some private interests on his own, the children, in their grownup age, have their own social life and pursuits; it becomes clear that Kate is no longer needed by her family. Besides, the marital problems and the parent-and-children gap once deliberately ignored now blow her mind. The middle-aged housewife is in turmoil of spiritual crisis, feeling confused, depressed and raged. So when she is invited to work as a translator in a global organization, she accepts it, expecting some changes may happen. Her new experience outside family circle proves fruitful, which involves doing social work, having a love affair, getting sick being alone, and so on. Though it is not all satisfying, it gives her opportunity and perspective to reflect on past life and to ponder deeply over various topics such as age, love and marriage, sex, appearance and reality, and eventually she learns more about herself and gain inner equilibrium. Though she is back and has to face the same family, she is a totally different person.

Studies on *The Summer Before The Dark* have been conducted from various perspectives such as feminism, psychological analysis, characteristic analysis, Bildungsroman, Sufism, etc. I will develop my analysis of the novel from the mirror images of the heroine and the various implications.

According to Lacan, somewhere between the age of six and eighteen months, we enter a so-called “looking — glass or mirror stage”(Bressler 129). In this stage, we literally see ourselves in a mirror while metaphorically seeing ourselves in others image, say, in our mother’s image. Observing this mirror image permits us to perceive images that have discrete boundaries, allowing us to become aware of ourselves as independent beings that are separate from others or our mothers.

Throughout the novel, Kate is depicted looking into mirrors many times, and while she studies her images in the mirrors, adjusting her physical appearance according to different standards, she is actually being through different psychological states, the changes of which reveal the process of her inner growth, maturing, and attaining a final integrated self. Kate’s mirror image changes before and after her journey shows her psychological changes, which illustrate that her journey in the physical world is actually a significant psychological journey of self-seeking.

Mirror Images before the Journey

It is generally admitted that while people especially women are approaching middle age, the female glamour will retard, having no appealing in appearance, fat in body, weak in mental state, even having no love orientations, then they will become bad-tempered, out of date in thinking and manner, and slower in some organs. However, this is not true of Kate Brown in *The Summer Before The Dark*.

Before the summer journey begins, we see that Kate often stands in front of the mirror to make sure that she is pretty, loveable and elegant. The appearance and image that she tries to keep in the mirror resonate with the role that she has been playing in and out of the family; both are up to the traditional standard and up to the expectations of others rather than her own.

Kate looks younger than her middle age, “Ripeness is all. But in Kate’s case it would not at all... tinting her hair, keeping her weight down, following the fashions carefully so that she would be smart but not mutton dressed as lamb” (8).¹ Kate is a woman who follows the major trends in society, “a woman in a white dress, white shoes, a pink scarf around her neck”, “dressed suitably for a family afternoon”, “her hair was done in large soft waves around a face where a few freckles had been allowed to remain on the bridge of her nose and her upper cheeks”.(10) So though approaching middle age, Kate is beautiful, fashionable and sexually attractive in shape, and she is fully conscious of keeping that way. However it is clear that her eagerness to stay young, attractive and be in the fashion is only for others’ sake, “her husband always said he liked them (the hair) there”(10).

Kate is a responsible and serviceable mother and wife, an excellent supporter, a nurse or nanny for her family members in their needs, materially and spiritually. “She would be a base for members of the family coming home from university, or dropping in for a day or week on their way somewhere else; she would housekeep for them, their friends, their friends’ friends. She would be available, at everyone’s disposal”(13). Approaching middle aged, she has gained a lot of experiences and can deal with matters quite easily, like running the house, taking care of the house, etc. , and like a servant, Kate is ready to meet everyone’s needs, and even quite enjoys burying herself in housekeeping work, servicing others, “She was looking forward to it: not only to the many people, but the managing, the being conscious of her efficiency; she looked forward, too, to a summer’s exert gardening”(13). Her contentment comes not from her inner self, but from satisfying others and being recognized by others. Also, when Kate is offered the translator’s job, she takes it only because her husband wants her to do so, and only because it is for his pride and it is for their son Tim’s sake.

Besides, Kate is happy with the image she and her family make for other women and families. “Her first child had been born when she was twenty-two. The last was

born well before she was thirty. When she offered these facts to others, many envied her; a large number of people, in many countries, knew the Michael Browns as an enviable family”(22). Kate enjoys being treated respectably by people in her area at Byron Park Road.

To conclude, the image of Kate in the beginning of the novel shows that Kate is a traditional middle class woman in a well-to-do family. Though she is in her forties, she remains beautiful in appearance and shape, having appealing glamour that attract her husband and other people. In personality, she is sympathetic, serviceable and sensitive and observant, being an angel devoted to her husband and children. She is always fitting in her movements with those of her children and her husband. And she behaves for the expectations of others and seems to be happy with that, too.

However, these are all the ice above the sea. Actually Kate is intellectual and intelligent. She is clever and has finished school early, with a gap of three years before she goes to university of Oxford. She is good at her various languages, and has excellent understanding competence and cognitive ability, “she sometimes did translating for him or his colleagues. She had once even translated a Portuguese novel, which earned her little money, but much praise” (18).

Also Kate is sensitive and thoughtful. “A woman stood on her back step, arms folded, waiting. Thinking? She would not have said so. She was trying to catch hold of something, or to lay it bare so that she could look and define; for some time now she had been ‘trying on’ ideas like so many dresses off a rack” (3). She has always been in thinking and observes the surroundings quite carefully. “Arms folded” indicate Kate gets used to the solidarity for thinking.

So while she seems to be always happily catering others, she feels greatly anguished and suppressed too, especially when she has felt the unfair treatment from her family members: she has been adaptive to her family for the past years without being given gratitude. “There has to be give and take in any marriage. She was quite aware that she was disinclined to examine this area too closely” (12). “she was feeling dismissed, belittled, because the problem of the house was being considered so unimportant”(22). She hides all her real feelings and forces herself to wear the appropriate smile, sometimes sweet, and sometimes humorous and ironic.

The separation of her acting image and her inner mind can be seen in many aspects. Kate makes her hair style the way her husband always likes. She wears shoes and stocking and dress proper for a middle class family. While for her real thought, she will “go barefooted, to discard her stockings, and to wear something like a muumu or a sari or a sarong — something of that sort — with her hair straight to her shoulders”(10). She scales herself down, acting like a mother never giving rein to her own nature. But inside herself, she is depressed, desperate, feeling belittled and

unfairness in the family. She wears masks to hide her emotions but her mind and heart are in chaos.

So when offered the translating job of Global Food, “she felt like a long-term prisoner who knows she is going to have to face freedom in the morning” (16). Kate wants to embrace this longed freedom. But still she hesitates when thinking of Tim who has no plan for the holiday and who she thinks she will take care. It is to be inferred then that Kate has always being in the moral struggle between performing the traditional role of a sacrificing mother and wife and the eagerness to run away from it.

Mirror Images on the Journey

Thanks to the fact that all her families have something to engage on for the summer, Kate is able to spare some time for herself for a journey outside home, first working as a translator and then exploring randomly at will. Being far away from household responsibilities, Kate starts a life completely at her own choice, and more importantly, while confronted with new situations, she is constantly prompted to reflect on her past life and gains fruitful psychological revelation.

The mirror appears 13 times on Kate’s journey, and the number claims the its importance, indicating the images in the mirror at different times closely related to Kate’s self-reevaluation and self-seeking process. By analyzing the various situations of Kate’s looking into the mirror, the exact images in the mirror, and Kate’s meditations aroused, we can peer into Kate’s journey of inner world.

The first time Kate watches herself in a mirror on the journey is when she works for the Global Food and goes to buy dresses for a meeting in Istanbul. She accepts the request from Charlie Cooper to do the organizational preparation for the meeting. By then, her first translating job in the Global Food for two weeks has ended and she has performed excellently. She enjoys the atmosphere of ease and the pleasant feeling there, and is usually too exhausted to think. While in the second week, the pressure is less and she has time to think, “lying awake later since she was not exhausted, she thought that her firstfunction that of being a skilled parrot was being supplanted by one she was used to”(33). She had become what she was: a nurse, or a nanny, like Charlie Cooper. A mother. Never mind, in a few days she would be free of it all” (33). This shows that Kate unconsciously applies her serviceable ability to others into her work and this time she reveals her true feeling to get rid of the mother role in work. Then she is promoted to the organizational side. She sees a “very undermining ‘humorous’ grimace which nullify her official or daylight view of herself”(38). Kate begins to take off the mask at daytime and think. She sees “a pleasant-looking fashionable woman on the verge of middle age, “She could say, as she looked dispassionately at her image, that her shape, her attributes, limbs, waist, breasts,

mouth, hair, neck, were not different from the equipment with which she had attracted a dozen young men nearly a quarter of century ago; no difference, perhaps even better; since so much chemistry and medication and dieting and attention to hair, teeth, and eyes had gone into this artifact”(40). Just as I have explained in the third chapter that Kate is a woman who cares for her appearance, follows fashion and is quite beautiful. Seeing herself in the mirror, she wonders about the change of women’s attractiveness throughout age and the essence of marriage blueprinted by Michael and her when she suddenly realizes that in her marriage she is expected to be sexy and loyal to only one man, her husband, while her husband is never set to one woman, her. The self of Kate awakens.

The second time she looks into the mirror is when she makes up a glossy, gleaming and silky look in the hairdresser’s, which shows the evocation of her young self. Then in the public room, men are attracted by herself “a woman with startling dark-red hair, a vey white skin, and the sympathetic eyes of a loving spaniel” (48), but she wants to be alone and think, “If she observed carefully, unblended by personal vanity or prejudice, it was noticeable that this approaching man, whatever age he was, hesitated almost imperceptibly as he saw she was not a fresh thirty. But he always sat down and seemed pleased enough with what he found: which was an amiable companion for the coffee table” (48). Kate realizes that she can do the organization job well just because “she was unable to switch herself out of the role of provider of invisible manna, consolation, warmth, ‘sympathy’. Not because she needed a job, or wanted to do one. She had been set like a machine by twenty odd years of being a wife and mother” (52). This shows that women in society have been stereotyped as mother and wife and have generated the “sympathetic” personality automatically. However, Kate dislikes of her urge to love and give which seems to her now like a slave and dog.

When she is in Spain with Jeffery, Kate looks at herself not with a glass mirror but with a bosom mirror, which elevates her understanding of her marriage and her role in the family. Her marriage with Michael is based on rational type, “Discussing everything was the root and prop of their marriage” (60). The two books, *The Conquest of Happiness* for Michael and *Ideal Marriage* for Kate are the documents which guide them to arrange the marital things. For this reason, when she knows about her husband’s affairs, Kate is greatly hurt, loses respect for him and disgusts his behaviors. As to her role in the family, “all those years now seemed like a betrayal of what she really was. While her body, her needs, her emotions — all of herself — had been turning like a sunflower after one man, all that time she had been holding in her hands something else, the something precious offering it in vain to her husband, to her children to everyone she knew — but it had never been taken, had not been noticed” (85). Kate realizes that her full devotion to her family and her true love for them go

unaccepted, or even unnoticed, let alone treasured. The subjectivity of Kate grows bigger and stronger. However, when she gets ill on the journey, she wants to go back home for the familiarity and the warmth, though her soul self thinks it mad to return.

After she gets ill and leaves Jeffery, she went back, but can only stay in the hotel since her house is still being let out, a crucial moment for Kate because she almost returns home. she sees in the mirror “a greenish-white face that had flaring scarlet on the cheekbones, and lank slabs of tarnished red hair falling over it, the grey was pushing up fast, the bones of the face were prominent, the skin creased and shabby”(128). Kate seems weak and old because her reflection and repulsiveness about men’s sex affair and her eagerness for the family warmth in sickness tortures her and tires her. Her dead-white face has changed into greenish-white. “Green” associates with illness, but also indicates a new beginning of Kate’s self. She takes a bus to have a look at her house, only to find people watch her for her bad image. Her neighbors, even her best friend, Mary do not recognize her due to her change in shape. She realizes the shallowness of friendship and the loose ties among “knowing people.” She sees that people are all wearing different masks and women are the pleasing actresses who put on different identities and act what they are expected from both men and women. Back in the hotel room, with her hand mirror she looks into her face and sees a true self, “since that morning, the dry brassy crinkly mass of hair had got worse, and her face was an old woman’s”(177). For years Kate has spent requisite amount of time in front of many different mirrors only to learn to see exactly what her husband sees, and she realizes the role she played, a pleasing one, acting what she is expected to.

Living in Maureen’s flat, Kate comes to understand better of mother-daughter relationship and man-woman problems, which helps her assume a healthy subject self. Maureen is about Eileen’s age, and together with her, Kate acts like a mother but not in the same way she does in her family. She treats Maureen as an independent individual who can make her own choice of life. She accompanies her, but never suffocates or imposes her ideas on her. They both are seeking for self identity, supporting each other as a friend. When encountering Maureen’s friends in casual dresses and quite undecorated way, Kate feels upset and embarrassed. “She saw herself in the long mirror: there was nothing for it but to laugh at what she saw it. Five faces stared at a skeleton in a shocking-yellow robe, her hair in a dry mass around a worried face” (196-197). Still she is behaving herself largely on the basis of outside evaluation and expectation. However, Maureen’s friendliness has saved her. “Why didn’t you come into the kitchen before? You must, any time”(199).An equal and normal mother-daughter like relationship is then built, which helps Kate retain more of the subjective self. Maureen also helps her to see through man’s nature

of appearance-orientation. Because of her change in appearance and shape, Kate becomes an invisible woman, unnoticed by people around, but she soon discovers that by just putting on fittest clothes and proper gestures, women even at their forties like her can generate plenty of attentions and glances from men. "Kate stood in front of the long mirror looking at the slim decorative woman — the haggardness of her face had as it were been absorbed by the over-all impression of an amenable attractiveness — and flung off the dress, put on one of those that folded and sagged, shook her hair out, and walked out into the evening"(205). By watching herself in the mirror, Kate knows that her looks and dress makes a big difference. And she realizes the fact that women are always tuned to men's responses. "Men's attention is stimulated by signals no more complicated than what leads the gosling; and for all her adult life, her sexual life, she had been conforming, twitching like a puppet to those strings..."(241)

So when walking across the building place, she finds that her fittest clothes attracts men's whistles, calls and invitations while a small transformation will have the opposite effect, she is in rage. "She was trembling with rage: it was a rage, it seemed to her, that she had been suppressing for a lifetime. This is what you have been doing for years and years and years" (242). She finally realizes that women have always been living as individuals without subjectivity and souls, and her rage here is sharply pointed to the man-dominated society and patriarchy culture. "Love, and duty, and being in love and not being in love, and loving and behaving well and you should and you shouldn't ask and you ought and oughtn't. It's a disease" (252). Kate defines these as invisible chains of demands and expectations for women which have restrained women's personality. Kate no longer feels sad when she is unnoticed, for she is learning to prioritize her own inner feeling and self evaluation to demands and expectations from the outside society, a revelation of the self-seeking process.

Mirror Images after the Journey

The summer journey is about to end, and Kate decides to go home. While she is shopping for presents for her family "She saw herself in windows; her body was back in recognizable shape. Her face had aged. Noticeable" (269). Her hair is undyed, rough and streaky and the widening grey band is prominent. But Kate, with new understanding of self, with vital energy and hope for a new life, cares nothing about those at all.

In the past, she dresses for her husband and children, obeying exactly the dos and don'ts set by conventions and traditions. But now, she has her own judgments and follows her own rules. She would do what she feels like. She would walk into her home with her hair undressed, with her hair tied-straight back for utility; rough and streaky with the widening grey part undyed. Before the journey, Kate is depressed,

raged and desperate in the state of madness. However, after the journey, she thinks she will become a free woman or new born child full of life and hope. Never would it happen again that her little bits be distributed to every member of the family. She becomes an integrated woman who will not live for others. In the past, she has ignored and hid many thoughts and true feelings. Though she feels agonized, raged, and mad, but she never has the courage to step forward to face with the reality. She just tortures herself in the pain. But after the journey, she has got the strength and courage to live for herself. Her life is full of hope now, like a rising sun just lights the darkness.

Kate will be still a mother, but now she sees the role in a new way. She understands that the family always had times of enjoyment in being together and this was true even when there was antagonism between the young ones and the parents. And she concludes “what it all amounted to was that because family life was difficult at times, because Kate played the role she had to, a mother who had to be resisted, fought, reacted against, because she wasn’t always loved and appreciated, then she had to damn it all, see it all as black, as ugly...” (261) Furthermore, she realizes that a woman is born to be a mother — that’s how nature has decided and in a marriage the two take their own part with their own problems. In a balanced tie, a harmonious family is created. She also realizes that she should treat her kids as young adults with their grown-up. With these epiphanies, with a positive and initiative attitude to the responsibility of being a mother, Kate will surely get relieved from feeling burdensome raising children the way she felt in the past, and she will surely have an afresh new life.

Kate will still be a wife, but she will no longer tolerate the injustice and hurt from the man. She would do what she likes and never please the man and behave in the box set by man and society. She has got the fundamental idea of man. She shall never have any illusion from man. She realizes the nature of man being easily seduced by appearance and treating women like emotionless sex toy. In emotional world, women live like a sunflower just for one man while man chases after the titillation and lust. She longs for the mutual respect for the partner of the marriage. She strongly condemns the sex trade and love affairs just for pleasure. The integration of soul and body is of great importance to her.

Throughout the novel *The Summer Before The Dark*, Kate is depicted to have spent more than ten times standing in front of a mirror or a shop window to watch herself. Images in the mirror reflect the looks and appearance of Kate at different stages, but also indicate her psychological state at different times, especially her understanding of subjectivity and its relation with others, or the outside world.

Kate is a typical conventional middle-class housewife. Unlike Lessing’s other women

protagonists who either go through the passive choice of marriage or live up with the bad marriage experience, Kate has a ideal marriage and a good life admired and envied by other women. Before the journey, she is a pretty and supportive wife, a catering and serviceable mother, an angel in the family. However, inside herself, she is agonized, depressed, suppressed and desperate, for she feels the inequality in marriage and the intolerance of her children. She consciously ignores her true feelings just because she wants to maintain the surface happiness and peace of the family. Despite the “humorous” grimace on her face, she is inwardly in chaos and madness.

When the journey, Kate throws off the restrains from family responsibilities and her physical changes of Kate in mirror have been through four phases. First, the housewife unattractive style with healthy and beautiful shape in the first week in the Global Food; second, the attractive woman style in the following work period in the organization; and third, the diminishing of beauty and attractiveness after the journey with her lover Jeffery; and forth, the recovery of her shape after the journey.

Together with the physical changes are the psychological changes of Kate. She has been through from the phase of living for others to the one of living for herself. As the journey begins, she leaves home and buries herself in work at first week; she has no one to please. Then Kate's self awakes and she changes her style to an attractive woman just for herself. When in the love affair with Jeffery, Kate intends not to please that man but she fails to for her partner is sick and she has to attend him. When in the hotel and the Maureen's flat, she has experienced and peered on the pleasing role of women in men's eyes and the appearance oriented nature of man. She is finally free from this bondage of expectations and pleasing role. Also, she no longer masks or ignores on purpose her true feelings, summoning courage to break the ice to be herself and to change her situation if she feels unfair.

The summer journey also gives her new perspectives, leading to her reversed attitude about the family or child-care, changing from self-hatred as a mother and wife to initiative to take the share of it. In the past, she devotes all herself to her children like a fat goose under great pressure while she is not appreciated, loved and needed by them. She feels it a burden for her. However, after the journey, she realizes that as a woman she is sure to give birth and raise children. That is the mission. But to be a mother does not mean to be a slave. Just by having proper involvement in children's life and treating them as independent adults with respect, harmonious mother-child relationship will be just at a hand's reach.

The Summer Before The Dark gives light to the liberation of woman to some extent although it does not offer a golden way for identity-seeking. Kate's deep-rooted traditional ideas has led to the result that she puts herself in the position as an angel in the family. But she is an intellectual, and she is quite sensitive for her

rational thoughts and true feelings about the injustice in such a role. That is what causes her suffering. By unfolding her masks and facing with truth, Kate has found her new self, an integrated self just for her not for others. Her work efficiency and excellence during the journey shows that women can be the backbones of social work like man. Her final return indicates that women shall take the responsibility of family, and the liberation of women shall not go extreme, since it shall mean life and hope rather than destruction. What is important is that women can find themselves free and independent and forge their own individual personality.

Note

1. The quotes of the novel used in this paper are all taken from Doris Lessing's *The Summer Before The Dark*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 2000.) In this paper only the number of the page where the specific quote locates is given.

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Desire, Spirituality and “Regimes of Truth” in South Asian Literature: An Introduction

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This Special Issue on “Desire, Spirituality and ‘Regimes of Truth’ in South Asian Literature” examines the nature of power and its manifestations in various discourses on desire and spirituality in contemporary South Asian literature. According to Michel Foucault, power is the “network of relations” in which entities confront each other. There is no “essence” to power, but only its specific relational forms. In this sense, power is both invisible and functional, and to analyze power relations, we cannot be satisfied with the analysis of actors who use power as an instrument of coercion, or even an analysis of the structures within which those actors operate. Rather, we must recognize that these diffuse power relations are in discourses, or what Foucault once called “regimes of truth.”

The essays in this issue ground the discussion of desire and spirituality in the broader contexts of gender, colonialism, nationalism and the nation-state that shape South Asian society in the Foucauldian project of relating discourses to power. Such a discussion allows one to see how the practices of desire and spirituality, which seem very personal and aesthetics phenomena, are shaped by “the regimes of truth” or the power relations in which we find ourselves.

One of the important dimensions of the regimes of truth is their capacity to make their invisible presence in the everyday practices of people. The contributors of this collection have tried to analyze that invisible presence of power in the South Asian texts and society as the same attempt led Foucault to the analysis of discourses of his society, not to create a new discourse on power or whatsoever but to analyze how power operates through the everyday discourses such as desire and spirituality. The contributors were fascinated by the way regimes of truth embedded themselves in most private spheres of life such as the way human beings self-organize themselves into communities or their acts of self-affectively relating to each other when defining who they are.

Let us see how the essays in this collection analyze the “invisible and functional”

power relations in discourses on desire and spirituality in the contexts of South Asia literature and society.

Vasu Renganathan's "Being Kṛṣṇā's Gōpi: Songs of Anṭāl, Ritual Practices and the Power Relations between God and Devotee in the Contemporary Tamil Nadu" explores the power relations among the poet-saints, devotees and divinities *bhakti* texts such as songs of patronship, singing of victories, praising of kings' caliber and so on. The essay shows the transformation of a diverse form of power relations during the medieval and modern periods demonstrating the paradigm of what Foucault claims that power cannot be understood only as a juridical edifice of sovereignty but disperse in discourses, besides others, of desire and spirituality.

Chandrima Chakraborty's "Speaking through Bodies, Exhibiting the Limits: British Colonialism and Gandhian Nationalism" shows Gandhi's initial self-reproach and his later transformation of the figure of the Hindu ascetic and ascetic practices to contest and alter Western "regimes of truth" about Hindu religion and masculinity. Chakraborty says Gandhi uses nationalist asceticism as a "technology of the self" to decolonize certain types of bodies, behaviors, and desires colonialism had constructed in and through the self-disciplinary practices of the colonized Indian male subject. At the same time, she shows how decolonized discourses and practices of the Gandhism also functions to dominate marginalized castes, classes, religions and genders. This fact interestingly leads us to the observation of how the coercive power of power is capable to resurface even in the discourses that resist it. The observation reinforces Foucault's idea that power is very subtle, pervasive and makes its unacknowledged presence everywhere.

Anna Guttam's "Loving India: Same-Sex Desire, Hinduism and the Nation-State in Abha Dawesar's *Babyji*" explores the hidden presence of power relation in the representation of same-sex love in Abha Dawesar's *Babyji*. Networks of relations that simultaneously challenge and reinforce the regimes of truth intrinsic to Hinduism, class hierarchies, caste divisions and, indeed, the Indian nation-state."

Nida Sajid's "Unruly Voices/Disciplined Bodies: Games of Truth and Desire in Kishwar Naheed's Poetry" observes how aesthetic self emerges out of a pleasure-oriented "*ars erotica*" and transforms itself into an ethical voice that counters against the discourses of patriarchy and the nation-state in Naheed's poems. In a Foucauldian spirit, she tries to show that queer desire is not just an external or independent phenomenon but always finds its expression in the historical discourses of gender and colonialism. Sajid's main point in the essay is there is no homoeroticism that can be told or remembered without simultaneously telling the story of sexuality and colonialism.

Being Kṛṣṇā's Gōpi: Songs of Anṭāl, Ritual Practices and the Power Relations Between God and Devotee in the Contemporary Tamil Nadu

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Abstract This essay illustrates how the dichotomies between divinity and mystic experiences of the poet-saints along with *bhakti* on the one hand, and kings and poets of the sovereign states on the other hand exhibit diverse forms of power relations within the realms of Tamil literary tradition and Tamil culture. The interrelationship between textual tradition and devotional processes has impacted upon the power relations among the poet-saints, devotees and divinities in a number of different implicit ways throughout South India from the beginning of Christian era. As for Tamil, the power relations that originally existed during the pre-Christian era between kings and poets within a dialog of patronship, singing of the victories, praising of kings' caliber and so on transformed into a very diverse form of power relation during the medieval and modern periods where divinity, mystic experiences of the poet-saints along with the perception of *bhakti* play a major role in determining the power relation, demonstrating the paradigm of what Michel Foucault claims that power cannot be understood only as a juridical edifice of sovereign king, institution, group, elite, class rather a technique, a form of power.¹ Two works of Anṭāl namely *Tiruppāvai* (sacred cowherd girl — containing 30 versus) and *Nācciyār tirumōḷi* (sacred utterances of the Goddess — containing 143 versus) are analyzed closely as to how they along with other similar texts play a significant role in the evolvement of diverse forms of power within the South Indian *bhakti* tradition, and thus exhibit a power relation involving the poet, text, divine and the devotee.

Keywords Tamil textual tradition; medieval Tamil Nadu; Religious rituals; power.

Introduction

“One aspect of the Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* which had great social implication was erotic. Mystic experience of the divine sports is almost entirely governed by the erotic feeling and wholly steeped in it, the other sentiments only touching its fringe. The glorification of the sex-impulse is supreme.”²

Bhakti evolved and took a shape in the context of South Indian textual tradition from 6th and 7th C.E. onwards. As a concept, *bhakti* refers to a specific human approach to a revered figure — in this case, a divine — that is distinct from knowledge or ritual practice. The deity is loved, adored, and sought with a desire for a divine-human communion, quite contrast to what the earlier tradition exhibited within the realm of sovereign power involving kings and poets. Thus, the poet-saints’ tradition of the Tamils that became prevalent from the medieval period onwards, especially under the auspicious of both Śaivite (*Śivanaṭiyārkaḷ*) and Vaiṣṇavite (*ālvār*) traditions brought forth a vibrant religious culture among the Tamils within the paradigms of spirituality, personal desire with favorite god, obsessive devotion and the like. In consequence, the amalgamation of both literary and religious practices forces one to rethink how power and its exercise upon subjects play a prominent role in the South Asian culture through literature and religion.

Medieval *bhakti* movements have an exclusive account on the phenomena of eroticism and sex-impulse, especially surrounding the images of Kṛṣṇā, Rādhā, and Gōpīs.³ This is particularly obvious from the literatures of Vallabhaites, Chaitanya of Bengal, Gītagōvinta and others. Presumably, this leads one to define the term *bhakti* as a process of surrendering one’s desires, including that of sex-impulse to god. *Kṛṣṇa bhakti* lays the ground for such a relationship between the Lord himself and the images of Gōpīs⁴ as depicted in the writings of the poet-saints, who play an important role in the South Asian literary textual tradition as well as religion. An intense and much adorable divine–human communion was made possible from the writings of the poets of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* through an adulthood medium of man-woman relationship. The discourse of power relations in the context of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*, thus, constitutes a complex network of objects involving the divine being the supreme power and the poet-saints along with the devotees being the subjects, upon whom the power of god is exercised.⁵ The passionately composed poems of the poet-saints and a number of rituals that the devotees perform, rather obsessively with a passionate integration of such poems are, thus, needed to be defined as, what Foucault calls, the techniques of power.⁶

The word *bhakti* is usually translated as “love” or “devotion”, although “reverence” and “honor” are also within its purview. As a notion, *bhakti* refers to a specific human approach to any revered figure — in this case, a goddess — that is distinct from knowledge or ritual practice. The deity is loved, adored, and sought with a desire for a divine-human communion.⁷ The forms of power relations, thus, can be understood in two different perspectives. First, between Aṅṅāl and the Lord Viṣṇu within the form of divine-human communion of a male god and a female devotee, and second between Aṅṅāl as the divine power and her ardent devotees, who are normally young unmarried women occupied themselves in a series of rituals mostly by chanting the poems of Aṅṅāl. In both instances, the poems of Aṅṅāl play a crucial role in demonstrating as to how they become responsible in manifesting and nurturing the forms of power surrounding the divine object, and at the same time making the devotees to be the subjects of power being acted upon- a process that can be studied within Foucault’s terminologies as production of power as well as subjects, upon which the power is exercised.

Aṅṅāl is one of the twelve poet-saints, who are commonly called *paṅṅiru Alivārs* “lit. twelve of those who engulfed themselves in god’s love”⁸, and she composed two principal sets of poems namely *Tiruppāvai* and *Nācciyār tirumoli*. *Nācciyār tirumoli* poems of Aṅṅāl, in particular, are the attestations for a poet communicating to the Lord with deep emotions especially employing the words of eroticism and vulgarity. But strikingly, what one does not observe in Aṅṅāl’s works, however, is any mention of infatuation between *Gōpīs* and *Kṛṣṇā*, as is overtly expressed in other sources — among the promising ones is Bhagavata *Purāṇā*.⁹ Rather, what one sees particularly in Aṅṅāl’s *Kṛṣṇa bhakti* is a desperate mood of denial from the Lord. These two works of Aṅṅāl, thus, constitute a logical sequence of characterizing Aṅṅāl’s personal attachment to Kṛṣṇā in a straightforward manner as moving from contentment to frustration. In both contexts, the moods of both contentment as well as frustration that Aṅṅāl conveys through her poems constitute the implicit process of power being subjugated upon the individual as Aṅṅāl, who is deemed to be the subject/devotee by revering god obsessively. Thus, the depiction of *bhakti* within the exquisitely presented textual forms is to be considered as nothing other than an attribution or endorsement of power to god. Subsequently, the expression of one’s devotion or *bhakti* by engaging in the rituals of one form or another, strictly conforming to the textual forms is nothing other than a case of subjection, i.e., being exercised or subjugated upon by the power, which is thus assigned to the element of god. In essence, what is attempted in this paper is that any form of religious obsession, is nothing other than what Foucault terms a form of power which makes individuals as subjects. Subject can be either subject to someone else by control and dependence,

or tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both cases suggest, according to Foucault, a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to (Cf. Foucault, “The Subject and Power” 212).

Authorship

The poet-saint Aṅṭāl in the seventh century A.D., laid down her emotions and mystic experiences with the Lord Viṣṇu in a total of one hundred and seventy three delightfully composed poems. Not only Aṅṭāl's poems continue to occupy a central place in daily Śrīvaiṣṇava temple liturgical services and Śrīvaiṣṇava Brahmin marriages, the brides in the marriages are also adorned as Aṅṭāl.¹⁰ In an attempt to capture the heart of the Lord, in one of her poems, Aṅṭāl alludes to the young unmarried women, whom she calls Kōtais, to join her in praising Him whom, according to her, has the power to fulfill their long lasting desires.

vāy pēcum
 naṅkāy! eḷuntirāy! nāṅātāy! nāvuṭaiyāy!
 caṅkoṭu cakkaram ēntum taṭakkaiyan
 paṅkāyak kaṅṅanaip pāṭu...¹¹

Oh! the eloquent girl!
 Oh! the young one! Wake up! Not to be shy!
 Oh! the one with a talented tongue!
 Sing of the Lord with Conch and discs!¹²

The divine authorship, however, is transferred profusely into young unmarried women who, in the tradition, sing these songs as part of a ritual that is performed annually from December to March in the contemporary Tamil Nadu. Thus, one finds the same intensity of emotion and love in parallel, both in the context of how these poems were composed by Aṅṭāl during the medieval period, and also in the context of how the devotees recite them in Sri Vaiṣṇavite temples frequently as part of their rituals. Besides reciting Aṅṭāl's songs to express their devotion to the Lord, the women also proudly enact the role of Kōtais in place of Aṅṭāl.

manatukku iniyānaip pāṭavum nī vāy tirāvāy!
 ini tān eḷuntirāy, ītu enna pēr uṛakkam
 anaṭtu illattārum aṅintu! - ēlōr empāvāy!
 To sing of your beloved, unlock your lips!
 Get up! Wonder, why this deep sleep,

in front of everyone in the house?

Oh! the young one! Get up!¹³

The tone of voice as elicited from these poems, especially in the context of commanding the women to praise the Lord instead of remaining idle at home, is nothing other than a form of exercise of power upon the devotees. In this respect, the emotions and the mystic power as one can experience from Aṅṅāl's poems by reading them are analogous to what is experienced by young women during their recitation of the poems in a very passionate manner. Hence, these poems do contribute to the endorsement of power upon god and it subsequently being exercised upon subjects/devotees under the realm of devotion and *bhakti*. Thus, the subjects tirelessly express their devotion in a selfless, flawless and dedicated manner by engaging themselves in rituals and prayers of various kinds. In other words, the more engaging and poignant the poems are the more power is understood to be exercised upon the devotees in the forms of *bhakti* and dedication. What can one suppose further is that the consciousness of the poet-saints are nothing other than the prime factors as to how the consciousness of the devotees are shaped and re-shaped rigorously and fervently in the Tamil tradition.

The songs of Aṅṅāl are presumably composed with poet's emotions as communicated in three different categories, and each of which represents a typical mood of Aṅṅāl: first, the joyful mood of praising the Lord of his adventures and exquisite forms; second, the poet's curious and longing mood to opt for an union with the Lord; and finally, a mood of frustration resulted from Lord's denial of her request. Notably, the three Tamil months that fall from December through March in a sequence are correlated to each of these three moods progressively transforming from one month to the other. Along the line of these three distinctive moods that the poems convey, one can suitably categorize all of the poems of Aṅṅāl under four major headings namely, a) praising of the Lord by the devotee, b) pleading or begging to the Lord for union, c) the process of Lord's denial and d) development of poet's frustration out of desperation. Thus, these fluctuating emotions, as one can observe from Aṅṅāl's poems, are thus transformed into the young unmarried women of the contemporary Tamil Nadu — the audiences of Aṅṅāl — who engage themselves in conducting the ritual by chanting these poems passionately in front of the Lord.

The rituals as performed in Tamil tradition during the month of Mārkaḷi (December -January) of every year by young unmarried women has an overt intention of pleading to the Lord for a fitting life mate, but with a covert anticipation of expressing their longing for the Lord himself, in the same tenor as to how the poet-saint Aṅṅāl laid down her emotions in her poems.¹⁴ Despite all of Aṅṅāl's songs

which constitute a logical sequence from a joyous mood (of praising the god) to a mood of frustration (with notorious vulgar forms of expressions), only the set of songs (i.e., *Tiruppāvai*) that represent the joyous mood are adopted and recited as part of the rituals, and the other set of poems (i.e., *Nācciyār tirumōḷi*) that represent the mood of frustration are ignored and considered inappropriate for rituals mainly due to their explicit references of vulgarity. Thus, the devotion the way it is represented by the poet contains within it both the praising of the Lord as well as expressing her innate erotic feelings. But from the point of view of the audiences, or the devotees, however, the vulgarity is either suppressed or ignored during their ritual practices considering mainly due to the social stigma surrounding them. “Aṅṭāl’s uninhibited expression of the pain of separation from the beloved, and her incessant yearning for his presence, adding to an occasional use of sexual terminology, appears to have been responsible, in part, for its neglect.”¹⁵ This, in fact, contributes to the status of modern sex as Foucault discusses in his *History of Sexuality* as to how the primary attitude of modern society toward sex was opposed, silenced and, as far as possible, eliminated (Cf. Gutting 92).

Time, Space and Mood

Jayadēvā in his *Gītagōvindā* conforms rather clearly that

the Spring time is the time of love for Kṛṣṇā.
When spring’s mood is rich, Hari roams here
to dance with young women,
a cruel time for deserted lovers.¹⁶

Both *Tiruppāvai* and *Nācciyār tirumōḷi* songs are intertwined together constituting a sequence of fluctuating emotions and feelings of devotees during the three consecutive Tamil months namely, *Mārkaḷi* (December–January), *Tai* (January–February) and *Māci* (February–March), which are the equivalent periods of Spring in Tamil seasons. Out of these three months, however, the month of *Mārkaḷi* is considered to be an evil month, as it is believed that the evil spirits roam around during this month causing many harmful diseases to people. For this reason, the songs of *Tiruppāvai* are sung by young women only early in the morning while decorating the entrance of their houses with drawings (*Kōlam*), which are believed to prevent the evil spirits from entering into houses. Also, the songs of *Tiruppāvai* are popularly known for their praising of the Lord of his magnificent youth and thus have an underlying implication for young women to plead the Lord for an union with their marriage mates in the month of *Tai* (January-February), the month that follows. The month of *Tai*, on the other hand, is

considered to be auspicious, and is believed to bring resolutions to all of the long lasting predicaments. It is also the month when the harvest festival is celebrated with freshly harvested grains from the fields, symbolizing the commencement of a joyful life.

Particularly, the verses from the first part of *Nācciyār tirumōli* are recited during the month of *Tai*, with an underlying intention for a union with their love mates. Followed by these verses, entailed are a set of other verses implying, in contrast, a denial from the Lord by way of Him destructing the drawings of the women. In this respect, the last part of *Nācciyār tirumōli*, which astoundingly expresses young women's emotions of desperation and discontent, are, thus, meant to be recited in the month of *Māci* (February-March). Thus, the three objects of the paradigm of time, space and mood constituted wholly by the textual tradition of medieval Tamil Nadu not only form the part and parcel of a stubborn and unstoppable power relation between the divine and devotee throughout the generations, it also tempts one to analyze this paradigm within the purview of what Foucault considers as 'discourse of knowledge'.¹⁷ If any textual tradition formulates the *power relations* using a set of discursive rules of rituals, and if such paradigm of power versus subject continues to exist historically, one is forced to isolate such a discourse of knowledge as being the cause of both the production of subjects as well as power. Power, for Foucault, is not just the ruthless domination of the weaker by the stronger and it can be a manifold relations of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole (Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* 93-4).

Praising of the Lord and Subjugation of Power

The thirty songs of *Tiruppāvai* mainly enlighten young women in a rather commanding tone of voice, as to how praising and worshipping of the Lord brings them His grace without failure. The order of things that one is supposed to perform as part of these rituals are delineated in the poem (Tiruppāvai 474) as below:

Mārkaḷit tinkaḷ mati niṟainta nannāḷāḷ
 On the full moon day of the month of Mārkaḷi
 nīrāṭap pōtuvīr pōtuminō, nēriḷaiyīr
 Take the auspicious bath, O! the ornamented girls!
 cīrmalkum āyappāṭic celvic ciṟumikāḷ!
 O! the charming and little cowherd girls!¹⁸

The significant reason why one adores the Lord, among many others, is due to his devouring charm, fierce look and endearing body which, again, can be attributed to the various forms of power that he exhibits:

kūrvēṅ koṭuntoḷilan nanta kōpan kumaran
 Fierciful Nanda's son holding a sharp spear
 ērārnta kaṇṇi yacōtai iḷaṅcinkam
 young lion like man of Yasoda, whose eyes resemble fish,
 kārmēnic ceṅkaṅ katir matiyam pōl mukattān
 with clouds like body, red-eyed and a face like the moon¹⁹

Upon praying, he would bestow all of us with his precious grace, an act of subjugation of the individuals.

nārāyaṇanē namakkē paṅai taruvān;
 the lord Narayana shall offer his grace
 pārōr pukaḷap paṭintu - ēlōr empāvāy.
 for the renowned, sing of his praise to attain his grace, Oh! my girls.²⁰

These lines are, thus, mainly intended to highlight the significance and merits of the act of praying to the Lord by female devotees in order to obtain His grace as well as a life mate, precisely the way how Aṅṅāl intended to marry the Lord. Contrary to this, however, as we will see below, Nammālvār's devotion to god does not seem to imply any such personal expectations, instead his poems are intended to simply surrender to the Lord's feet.

Praising the Lord entails one to obtain the material benefits such as rain, good cultivation, abundant milk from cows, besides the spiritual benefit of elimination of sins from present and past life. Aṅṅāl, thus, alludes to the benefits of surrendering oneself to Lord, or as being subjugated by the power of the Lord through many captivating imageries:²¹

...
 vāyināl pāṭi manatināl cintikka
 pōya piḷaiyum pukutaruvān ninṅaṅavum
 tīyinil tūcu ākum; ceppu - ēlōr empāvāy
 Singing of the Lord with your lips,
 thinking of the Lord within your intellect,
 your sins of this birth and the previous birth,

He will eliminate, like the dust fallen in the fire!
Be aware! O! the Cowherd girl!²²

Confiscating ones sins is a consistent theme that one can find in Tamil *bhakti* tradition throughout, invariably both in Vaiṣṇavite and Śaivite poems. This is especially obvious from the poems of the *Tiruviḷaiyāṭar purāṇam*, one of the Śaivite works, where the god promises the devotees of getting rid of their sins when touching the divine water.

Touch this divine water, either knowingly or unknowingly,
be assured you are purified from all your sins and
reach the unattainable heaven
as sure as how a finger that touches the dreadful fire gets hurt
no matter whether it is performed with or without one's knowledge.²³

The imagery of "fire" as attested in both of these poems is mainly to signify the fierce power that the Lord carries and with this power he is believed to be competent of destroying the devotees' sins everlastingly. This, perhaps, requires many sacrifices from the devotees in terms of their ceaseless service and dedication to the Lord, similar to what Foucault refers to in the context of referring to the differences between pastoral power and royal power. "Pastoral power is not merely a form of power that commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock. Therefore, it is different from royal power, which demands a sacrifice of the subjects to protect the throne" (Hubert and Paul Rabinow 333).

Followed by the songs for the month of *Mārkaḷi* from Tiruppāvai are the songs for the month of *Tai* from *Nācciyār tirumoḷi*. While the former set of poems symbolizes the poet's mood of contentment with the Lord, the latter set of poems is made to symbolize the mood of desperation mainly due to a denial from the Lord. Thus, these poems are largely meant for revealing the relentless desire of those women who aspire themselves to unite with their love mates, especially after their long service that is rendered to the Lord during the month of *Tai*. Notably, in these songs Anṭāl pleads to the god of "love" to arrange for an union with the Lord; and in analogous situation the women who recite these songs as part of their rituals desire to be united with their own love mates.

Service to the Lord:
Tai oru tinkaḷum tarai viḷakkit
all through the month of *Tai*, I swept the floors

taṅ maṅṭalam iṭṭu māci munnāḷ
 drew the drawings (kōlam), until the month of Māci
 aiya nuṅ maṅal koṅṭu teru aṅintu
 ornamented the streets with the grains of sand
 aḷakinukku alaṅkarittu, anaṅka tēvā!
 beautified the beauty itself, Oh! the lord of love!²⁴

Desire:

uyyavum āṅkolō? eṅṅu colli
 would I be united with the Lord? Having asked this,
 unnaiyum umpiyaiyum toḷutēn
 I worshipped you and your belongings as well.²⁵

Spiritual power that the Lord enjoys:

veyyatu ōr taḷal umiḷ cakkarak kai
 the Lord in his hand owns a disc that spits fire
 vēṅkaṭaṅṅku ennai vitikkiriyē.
 unite me with the Lord of the celestial.²⁶

With a unique mild tone of voice, this poem sets the ground for the forthcoming desperate mood of the poet. The symbolic mention of the Lord of *Kāma* in this particular poem and in the rest of the poems of *Nācciyar tirumoḷi* decree the state of mind of the poet, as though she is summoning a mediator between herself and the Lord Kṛṣṇā for a union.

The songs that are sung during the month of Māci (February-March), on the other hand, constitute the mood of devastation and desperation due to Lord's blunt denial of uniting with Aṅṭāl. This is especially obvious from the Lord's destruction of the drawings and decorations that the women made throughout the month of *Tai* out of their sheer love with the Lord.

Vellai nuṅ maṅal koṅṭu ciṅṅil
 vicittirap paṭa vīti vāyt
 teḷḷi nāṅkaḷ iḷaitta kōlam
 aḷitti yākilum, unṅan mēl
 uḷḷam ōṭi urukallāl
 ūrōṭum onṅum ilōm, kaṅṭāy
 kaḷḷa mātavā! kēcavā! un

mukattana kaṅkaḷ allavē!

Oh! Rogue! Madhava, Kesava
Don't you have eyes?
with small white sand,
we made these drawings on the street!
you destroyed them mercilessly!
even if you destroy them,
our hearts will only suffer and melt,
but they will never get mad at you!²⁷

The intensity of devotion and the absolute surrender to the divine — despite god's absolute denial — by the devotees do express the effects of power's exercise as Foucault would call it (Cf. McHoul and Wendy Grace 87). This is further evident from a number of confessions that the women make openly while revealing their implicit intentions of sexual fantasies that they have with the Lord.

The Denial

Lord's destruction of the drawings and the decorations symbolically refers to his unacceptability of Anṭāl's repeated requests for union with the Lord.

. . . .
You kick and touch
and break them.
What use to you
of such teasing?
Lord dark as the ocean,
holding the flaming discs,
you know well
even jaggery tastes bitter
when in sorrow.²⁸

The songs of *Māci*, thus, constitute the denial of the Lord, resulting a desperate mood and consequently becoming the cause for her singing of the songs with expressions of abundant eroticism and vulgarity. Notably, the reason for the employment of sexual terminologies throughout Anṭāl's poems are evident from her confession that her private body parts have been the exclusive belongings of the Lord himself ever since her birth.

.....
 cāy uṭai vayiṛum en taṭa mulaiyum
 my abdomen with curves, and my sturdy breasts
 taraniyil talaippukaḷ tarakkiriyē.
 are meant exclusively for the Lord who stands out in the world.²⁹

Lord's act of destruction of "Castles" in Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* literature in general is meant for expressing Kṛṣṇā's playful mood among the *Kōpīs* as against the mood of denial as one finds in *Tiruppāvai*.

The amount of anxiety that Aṅṭāl experienced due to rejection by the Lord is expressed intensely in a poem with an imagery of her distress being judged against an Ox being poked with a sharp nail:

.....
 pārkataḷ vaṅṅanukkē
 paṇi ceytu vāḷap peṛāviṭil, nān
 aḷutu aḷutu alamantam mā vaḷaṅka,
 āṛravum atu unakku uṛaikkuṁ, kaṅṭāy
 uḷuvatōr eṛutinai nukaṅkoṭu pāyntu
 ūṭṭam inṛit tuṛantal okkumē!
 If I can't live offering my service to
 the Lord of the ocean of milk,
 you will learn that I will be crying like
 a laboring ox being poked with a nail
 and left without any food!³⁰

The imagery of *laboring ox being poked with a nail*, thus, proclaims the fact that she becomes a deserving individual to be shown affection and subsequently to be offered the union with the Lord - a case of deep intensity of 'subjugated power' upon the devotee, that one can term within Foucault's terminologies. Strikingly, Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* as denoted in other literatures from Bengal and Rajasthan illustrates Kṛṣṇā's exploitation of the *Kōpīs* for his own desires, without any reference to the denial as we see in Aṅṭāl's poems. To cite an example, Jayadeva's *Gītagōvinta* accuses of Kṛṣṇā as having illicit relationship with cowherd girls.

Why I shocked that you roam in the woods
 to consume weak girls?

The fate of Pūtanā shows your cruel childhood
bent for killing women.
Damn you, Mātavā! Go! Kēśavā, leave me!
Don't plead your lies with me!
Go after her, Krishna!
She will ease your despair.³¹

To quote a song of Mīrā's in a related tone of voice, but with a note of subtle deception by Kṛṣṇā:

jōgiyāri pratiḍi rō mul
hil mil bāt baṇāvan mīṭi
pīchē jāvat bhūl
tōḍat jejkarat nahīñ sajanī
jaise camelī ki phūl
mīrā kahe prabhu tumare taras bin
lagat hivdā mē
To love one not earthly
this is not the root of pain, my friend.
He will speak — oh! so sweetly!
then snap love like a jasmine stem.
Says Meera devoutly
the thorn of waiting pierces without end.³²

Neither in *Tiruppāvai* nor in *Nācciyār tirumōli* one sees such acts of submission and blissful mood of Kṛṣṇā. Rather, Anṭāl despairs, laments and calls for the Lord of Love in desperation for help.

Viraha State and the Mood of Desperation:

Articulating women's *viraha* state of mind in literature has been a familiar topic in Tamil poems even from the age of Sangam, which dates back to the 3rd century B.C. One of the genres of Sangam classics called *Akam* (love life) contains poems exclusively with the theme of women's separation from their male partners and their subsequent alluding for a reunion with their lovers out of desperation. Such songs frequently lament the torturous feelings that the female lovers undergo due to their partners' abandonment in a cruel and unwitting manner. This is apparent from a poem of the Tamil poetess Auvaiyār of the Sangam genre:

How can I understand? The North wind
 swells and moves knowing no limit,
 the pain that rises in my breast brings forth a little shoot,
 it spreads its thick trunk of despair in my soft heart,
 puts out lovely branches made of the rumors in the town,
 opens new, shining growth of unremitting love,
 grows into a great, shameless tree sung by poets,
 and shades all the earth,
 putting out flowers of evil gossip — and still
 he doesn't come.³³

Despite many gossips and rumors among the people from the neighborhood, the lover doesn't seem to return, and this fact is expressed in this poem allegorically with an image of a tree that grew out of every grief that the woman went through after her separation from her lover. The pain started with a little shoot; put out many branches as a result of the rumors in the town; and bloomed with many flowers because of the shameful gossips in the neighborhood. Thus, the largely grown tree with abundant flowers symbolizes the woman who is filled with intense distress and sorrow due to her lover's separation.

Significantly, many of the *Akam* poems identify one of the anticipated consequences of separation as the act of “gossip” and “rumor,” which are not the common traits that one can find in religious poems. Despite the presence of such elements like the poet-saints' lament for lord's separation and abandonment without mercy, no mention of either “gossip” or “rumor” is found in parallel in religious texts. This further substantiates the fact that the poet-saints seclude themselves in a mystic world that is beyond the scope of the material world with ordinary people — a celestial world where one can ponder about acquiring “salvation,” “merits” and so on. This resonates what Foucault rightly calls in the context of pastoral power that it is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world (Cf. Foucault, “The Subject and Power” 214).

Furthermore, what one finds very appealing in the context of the large portions of Sangam poems is understanding of a mood of ‘separation’ only after a legitimate union of the lovers — a practical idea without having anything to do with either the celestial world or any extraordinary power. On the contrary, though, as one can note from the following verse of *Aṅṭāl* that separation occurs without any prior union with god. *Aṅṭāl*'s desperation to unite physically with *Kṛṣṇā* may be further understood from the following verse where she begs *Kāmā*, the lord of love to arrange for her union with *Kṛṣṇā* (*Nācciyār tirumōḷi* 510):

Sacrifice:

kāy uṭai nelloṭu karumpu amaittu,
making the tender rice with sugarcane
kaṭṭi arici aval amaittu,
making the tough flat rice

Mystic:

vāy uṭai maṛaiyavar mantirattāl
by the sacred chants of the eloquents,
manmatanē! unnai vaṇaṅkukinṛēn;
Oh! The lord of love! I pray you!

Power:

tēyam mun aḷantavan tirivikkiraman
The lord who measured all of the three worlds,
tirukkaikaḷāl ennait tīṇṭum vaṇṇam
to stroke me with His sacred fingers

Bio-Power:

cāy uṭai vayirum en taṭa mulaiyum
my belly with curves, and my sturdy breasts
taraṇiyil talaippukaḷ tarakkiriyē
exclusive to the lord, who excels himself in all of the world.
“Can't you grant me this greatest honor on earth: that with his sacred hands
he ”
touches my soft large breasts and my splendid abdomen?”³⁴

Anṭāl's desire to unite with Kṛṣṇā results out of her hatred of the material world along with its mortal men.

. . . .

ūṇṭai āḷi caṅku uttamarku eṅṛu
for the god with discus and conch,
unnittu eḷunta en taṭa mulaikaḷ
my strong breasts that show off steadily
māṇṭavarkku eṅṛu pēccup paṭil
if they are to be offered to any human,
vāḷkillēn kaṇṭāy. manmatanē!³⁵

I will not live — you will realize! Oh! Manmata — the lord of love.³⁶

The reason for Aṅṭāl's act of developing a sense of aversion with the material world and desiring to unite with god is because of her excessive devotion to the Lord Kṛṣṇā since her childhood through her father, who is also a devotee of Kṛṣṇā. The excessive devotion to the Lord Kṛṣṇā can thus be attributed to the repressive power on Aṅṭāl by god's spirituality, as one can understand within Foucault's terminology, but in an innate sense of not involving any physical force whatsoever. Her opening up of her sexual privacies to the Lord and subsequent references to the Lord's physical beauty should be understood in the context of Foucault's expression of bio-power, according to which the sexual body establishes the type of power (Cf. Foucault, "The Subject and Power" 168-69).

In contrast, however, Mīrā's *bhakti* to Kṛṣṇā is not the same as Aṅṭāl in that she desires a union as a servant; a playmate and the like, but never as a life partner as Aṅṭāl does.

mhāṇe cākar rākhā jī
Please keep me as your servant.
Giridhārī lālā cākar rākhā jī
Giridari Laal, please keep me as your servant³⁷

Again, one sees the mood of "separation" and "abandonment" in many of Mīrā's songs on a similar ground:

Dēkhā mai hari maṇ kā thā kiyā.
āvaṇa kah gayā ajā ba āyā,
kar mhāṇe kōl gayā.
khān pān sudh sab bisariyā.
kāi mhāro prāṇ jīyā.
thārō kōl viruddha jaga thārō,
the kāyi bisar gayā.
mīrā re prbhu giridhar nāgar,
the biṇ phaṭā hiyā.
Look how he wounds me again.
He vowed to come but never made it.
Food, drink, my senses — All gone — tell me
where to find them?
why must you shame what you say?

You've whispered
 Yourself away, lifter of the mountain
 Without him my heart splinters³⁸

The separation followed by her longing for union with the Lord are thus understood to be the conducive subject matters of a devotional experience for the women poet-saints — a concept Friedhelm Hardy refers to in his book as *Viraha-bhakti*.³⁹ Suguna Ramanathan, on the other hand, categorizes this state of mind of the poet singers as lying “outside the boundaries of the norms”: One lives in a world of discourse, a practice of power with boundaries, norms and perspectives. These boundaries are uniformly constructed within a particular class, caste, patriarchy and so on.⁴⁰ Thus, the poet-saints attempt to position themselves aside from such boundaries in order to make a direct link with god by their intense devotion. The fifteenth century poetess Mira, for instance, moves away from all of the norms of the routine life and places herself within a boundary that contains in it only her love and god — a boundary that is free from class, caste and other hierarchies of the material world.

rānāji! ab na rahūngi tōri haṭkī!
 Your Highness! Now, you can't isolate me within the four walls!⁴¹

Whereas, Aṅṅāl's aversion from the material world comes only as a result of her obsessive relationship with god and nothing else.

Lord's Takeover of Nammālvār

While the mystical path of the woman saint Aṅṅāl is filled with the elements of eroticism and sexual-impulse, the popular myth of her hagiography having led to a tradition of a ritual practice performed by young unmarried women, a male poet-saint Nammālvār's verses, on the contrary, have influenced the male public as much as Aṅṅāl's poems influenced the women's community — an effect of literary cultures that can be understood in the context of power being exercised upon both male and female invariably. Unlike Aṅṅāl, however, Nammālvār's verses are known for their expression of love exclusively in the kind of affection between god and devotee in the deepest manner possible. Nammālvār expresses his ultimate desire with Lord to be what he calls as *āṭkōl* “Take Over”, a state of being possessed by the control of the Lord. The 1,102 verses (called *Tiruvāymoḷi*⁴² — meaning ‘holy expressions of the mouth, words of the holy mouth’ or ‘utterance/poetics of the holy/sacred’), which are believed to be composed by Nammālvār between 880 and 930 A.D. allude exclusively the magnificence of the Lord in a number of beautifully written verses.

“Anyone who reads his poems can see why the poems are at once philosophic and poetic, direct in feeling yet intricate in design, single-minded yet various in mood.”⁴³ Nammālvār, who was born in a village called *Tirukurukūr* ‘sacred tiny town’ (today’s *Alvār tirunakari*) in the Southern part of Tamil Nadu, sung his songs after his six years of silent meditation under a tamarind tree. Thus, like *Anṭāl*, Nammālvār’s origin is also presumed to be mystic in nature, and it eventually attributes to a divine value to his songs. The name “Nammālvār” literally means “our own *Alvār*” — “people’s saint.” Like all the names of the other eleven poet-saints, the name of this saint is also a nickname, which must have been a later addition.⁴⁴

The significance of the works of Nammālvār and the eleven other saints may be understood well as how the word *Alvār* (a term resulted after the appreciation of the saint’s performance) is used. The Tamil term *āl* means “plunge into,” “deep” or “immerse,” which can be metaphorically interpreted as “engulfed in” or “filled with.” The suffix *ār* is used both as a human plural suffix referring to many people, and also as a singular masculine honorific suffix referring to a single individual. Thus, this word in its entirety means “those whose thoughts are fully filled with” the thoughts of the Lord. They ponder at all times nothing but the fame and the excellence of the Lord; their love to the Lord is so deep in that their state of mind is metaphorically referred to as “swimming and rejoicing/enjoying in the ocean of god’s love.” The following lines in Tamil illustrates well the metaphor of how the act of swimming and being in love with god are entangled to one another.

anpenum inpak katalil nīntit tīlaippār
 Love — called joyful ocean-in swim-and enjoy/rejoice
 Lit. One enjoys swimming in the ocean of love.

‘Saints rejoice swimming in the blissful ocean of love of the Lord’⁴⁵

The Lord Ranganathan of Sri-Rangam (located in an island of the river Cauvery near a town in the Southern part of Tamil Nadu called Tiruchirappalli) is an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu. He is taking a peaceful nap (*ānanta cayanam* ‘joyful sleep/blissful sleep’) on a snake bed in the ocean of milk. The name *ālvār*, thus, interacts with Lord’s joyful mood of sleeping in the ocean of milk along with the saints’ delight of Lord’s love; so does the term *bhakti*, a blissful state of the saints, whose mind is totally engulfed in the love of the Lord. A. K. Ramanujan interprets this medium as a state of the saints who are “taken over” by the love of god.⁴⁶

The Lord Stands as Everythin

One of the greatest powers of god, as stated by Nammālvār in one of his poems is

that he is omnipresent and remains as everyone, everything and everywhere in an all-encompassing manner:

nāṃ avan ivan uvan,
we-inclusive he-that-impolite he-this-impolite he-in-between
avaḷ iḷaḷ uḷaḷ eḷaḷ
she-that she-this she-in between she-who
tām avar ivar uvar,
one's-self(own) he-that-polite he-this-polite he-in-between-polite
atu itu utu etu
that this this-in between which-thing
vīm avai ivai uvai,
they-we they-neuter these-neuter in-between-neuter
avai nalam, tīṅku avai
they-neuter good, bad they-neuter
ām avai, āy-avai
thus they-neuter became-they-neuter
āy niṅṅa avarē
Become stands/remains he-in indeed (Ramanujan 122).

The theology of Vaiṣṇavā tradition, in general assumes that Lord prevails in everything and he himself prevails as everything — all human, neuter and all the other elements of the universe are contained within him; and thus he happens to be everything. Thus, the Vaiṣṇavā's concept of god is what one may term as *saguṇa* — “god with entity,” as opposed to *nirguṇa* “one without any form or entity”⁴⁷.

Spiritual Behaviors of *Takeover* and *Possession*

A.K. Ramanujan discusses the two spiritually loaded terms *takeover* and *possession* in Hinduism and other religions, including among American Indians and elsewhere, by quoting Weston LaBarre's view from the book *The Gost Dance: Origins of Religion*: “The words *takeover* and *possession* are employed more or less synonymously, but two different modes of *possession* of god may be distinguished. The two modes being one in the context of the word *takeover*, as stated in the Nammālvār's poem as ‘obsession toward Lord Viṣṇu,’ and the other in the context of how the Tamil word *cāmiyāṭi* ‘god-dancer’ is understood in Tamil's culture.”⁴⁸ *Takeover* is an instance of one's obsession to the Lord as a result of exercising an extraordinary *bhakti* or devotion. *Cāmiyāṭi*, on the other hand, is an instance of performing a dance or related action by anyone without his or her own consciousness, especially due to

god's *possession*. In this case, the performance is believed to be carried out by god himself by entering into devotee's body as a vehicle. Whereas in the former case, the performance — singing of the Lord — is carried out by the devotee himself within his or her own consciousness. It is believed that both of these receptions are possible only when a devotee gets the *aruḷ* 'grace' of the Lord.

Takeover

ānān āḷuṭaiyān enṛahdē ukantu vantu
 became-he person-possessed that-he had-become possessed came-he
With his own status of being a possessor of all human, came (to me) happily.

tānē yinnaruḷ ceytu ennai muṛravum tānānān
 voluntarily grace offered me fully became-he
he offered his grace voluntarily to me and he became fully of me

mīnāy āmaiṅyāy naraṅkamum āy kuṛaḷāy
 fish-became turtle-became pig-also became dwarf-became
He took the forms of fish, turtle and dwarf

kānār enāmumāyk kaṅkiyāminnam kārvaṅṅanē.⁴⁹
 Seen-not became-that-way Kalki-became-yet dark-colored-he
He is yet to take the form of Kalki (a form that is believed to refine the cosmos). He is the one with dark colored body.

This poem and the other similar poems⁵⁰ ascribe to the idea of how the Lord came into the consciousness of Nammālvār himself, especially by using such expressions like:

... I've caught in him, I contain in him now;
 ...occupied me, became all of me;⁵¹
 took Nammālvār into the Lord himself
 ... and filled me over into himself;⁵²
 he stands there consuming me.⁵³

Such instances of possession of god as entering into the consciousness of Nammālvār takes place due to his excessive obsession to god only in his mind, but not with the control of his body. In the case of the process of *Cāmiyāṭi*, however, both mind and body of the devotee are taken under the complete control of the god. Yet, both cases are believed to be occurring due to devotee's profound *bhakti* — a performance

conducted with the union of both body and mind.

Music and the tradition of *ōtuvārs*

Aḷvār's texts were passed on from one generation to the other with much emphasis on music (*icai*) and mime (*avinayam*), and with less emphasis on the poetry⁵⁴. Both *tiruvāymolī* and the other similar Tamil religious poems are sung in temples especially by a group of people called *ōtuvārs* "lit those who chant religious songs." It is often believed that it is their manner of singing with rhythm and melody are more appealing and having a captivating power than the meaning of the poems themselves. Besides, the unique trait of *antāti*⁵⁵ "end becoming the beginning" type of these poems of Aḷvār's contribute to their recitation with powerful aesthetic appeal.

Another significant point to mention in the context of authorship of textual tradition is what A.K. Ramanujan mentions as *shift* that took place during the *bhakti* period. Both the Vaiṣṇavā (of Aḷvārs) Śaiva of (Nāyanmārs) works during the *bhakti* period in Tamil Nadu caused many shifts, according to him. ". . . from hearing to speaking; from watching to dancing; from a passive to an active mode; from a religion and a poetry of the esoteric few to a religion and a poetry of anyone who can speak . . . From the sacrificial-fire rituals (*yajñā* or *hōma*) to worship *pūjā*." Not to mention the fact that the ritual practices of 'singing,' 'dancing' and performing rituals are continued even until the present in temples and other sacred places of Tamil Nadu keeping these shifts alive for ever, same as Anṭāl's *Tiruppāvai* rituals being performed with abundance of mysticism and devotional fervor on an ongoing basis — an aspect of ritual life that requires to be researched, pondered, to be, in periyāḷvār's sense, engulfed in (*āṭkoḷ*) within one's consciousness in a deep and intimate and personal manner. Thus, the literary texts need to be contextualized within the the realm of how they become instrumental in creation of power with concurrent shifts, as well as how they subsequently become responsible for making the devotees to be subjugated by such implicit power.

Concluding Remarks

The captivating power of literary texts lies in the social knowledge as presented in many literary forms with poignant metaphors, similes, figurative expressions and so on. Literary texts with such elegant presentation of knowledge employing many aesthetically appealing elements within them, on the other hand, lead one to the enjoyment of them in a number of different media, such as being a composer, a reader, a singer, and as a passive listener, as what Ramanujan calls the *shifts* of the media. They also are instrumental in making them fully surrendered to the objects, as portrayed in them as "gods" as well as following rituals very passionately adhering to

the various discursive rules as formulated within such texts.

Thus, the exquisitely composed poems of Aṅṭāl, Nammālvār and the Śaivite poems of the Nāyanmārs contribute not only to the empowerment of the religious figurines of various kinds, they also become responsible for the production of enormous rituals as well as zealous devotees, who are rigorously engaged in such rituals. Consequently, both the processes of empowerment of the mythical religious figures, as well as the exercise of such power upon subjects in the realm of *bhakti* result mainly due to the sophisticated and charismatic nature of religious texts, a phenomenon that is very common in many cultures, but more common in the South Asian culture as discussed in detail in this paper in the context of *Kṛiṣṇa* and Śaivite *bhakti*. What can be termed as a discourse of *bhakti*, thus, is fully responsible for formulating a rigid structure of power relations, which contain within it not only the form of religious literary texts, but also many knowledge of rituals, habits and customs. As a result, the dire expressions of *bhakti* surrounding such religious texts represent the form of power that is exercised upon those who engage in it. This paradigm, which is a formulation of desire, spirituality and other forms of religious expressions, stands very rigid and strong in nature and it becomes unchangeable, unalterable or can be suppressed by any means, whatsoever. This is mainly because this paradigm of textual tradition exhibits within it a complex power relation between the mythically produced god and its human devotees, who are duly disciplined by its power an everlasting obsessive *bhakti*, a devotee's consciousness bring forth. The discourse of *bhakti*, and the power relations that embody within it, thus, brings forth an analogous circumstance of what Foucault constructs as a system of power relations in his *Discipline and Punish*: "The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A "soul" inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the master that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political economy; the soul is the prison of the body" (Foucault, "Discipline and Punish, Panopticism" 30). The subjected devotees with their compulsively entangled *bhakti* on god and religious texts they admire are, thus, confined inside a prison cell, which is nothing other than their soul, in Foucault's terms.

Notes

1. Foucault 1983, 212.
2. Pande 1989, xxxi.
3. "Love has long been a central metaphor for religious experience. . . .The chief mood of *bhakti* is the erotic (*sringāra*), seen almost entirely from an Indian woman's point of view, whether in its phase

of separation or of union. (Ramanujan 316). This paper attempts to study the sringāra rasa in Aṅṭāl's poems from the point of view of separation, as opposed to union.

4. Tamil name for Gopī is kōpiyarkaḷ or kōpi, but the North Indian literatures refer to this term as Gōpī.

5. “. . . form of power applies itself immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law or truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him” (Foucault, “The Subject and Power” 212).

6. *ibid.*

7. McDermott 2001, 6.

8. The works of twelve saints constitute a total of about four thousand songs — called Nālāyirat Divyap Pirapantam “four thousand divine collection” — on Lord Viṣṇu.

9. “Kṛṣṇā's affairs with Gōpīs begin in autumn, immediately after the heavy rains caused by Indra. . . the gopīs hear Kṛṣṇa play his flute in the forest, and the whole world becomes entranced by him. It is this song that introduces the erotic fascination of Kṛṣṇa and motivates the Gōpīs infatuation by relating it to a universal reaction in all beings” (Hardy 499).

10. Venkatesan 2010, 33.

11. The original songs of Aṅṭāl is reproduced in this paper based on the collection and translation by Sundaram, 1987. Unless otherwise mentioned, the translations are author's own. The references to the poems are made from the sequence of poems in the compilation of Nālāyirat Divyaprabandam ‘four thousand songs of the Alvars’. Tiruppāvai poems are included between 474 and 503 and Nācciyār tirumoli poems are included between 504 through 646.

12. Sundaram 1987, 16.

13. Tiruppāvai: 485-6

14. “Andal Thiruppavai: Vijay TV, one of the popular television stations in Tamil Nadu, pays tribute to the saint poetess with the Paasurams recited throughout the month of Margazhi. Children from Padma Seshadri Schools will sing the 1,300 Paasurams while Dr. Damal Ramakrishnan will offer explanation. ‘Andal Thiruppāvai’ will be telecast Monday-Sunday at 6 a.m” (The Hindu, December 2009).

15. Dehejia 1990, 5.

16. Miller 1977, 51.

17. For a detailed discussion on how Foucault's idea of discourse of knowledge needs to be interpreted in a non-linguistic context of social knowledge, see McHoul and Grace, 1993: 26-56.

18. Tiruppāvai:474-1

19. Tiruppāvai:474-4

20. Tiruppāvai:474-7

21. Allegorical representation of poet's feeling is also a familiar tool in Mīrā's songs as well:

herī maim to perma divāni

mero darada na jānai koya!
 ghāyala ki gata ghāyala jāni,
 jo koi ghāyala hoyā!
 Jauhari ki gata jauhari jānai,
 kyā jānai jina koya!
 “Friend, who can know my love’s deep anguish?
 Only one who wounded knows how it hurts,
 Only a jeweler knows a lost gem’s worth. . . . (Bahadur 41)

22. Tiruppāvai: 478-6
23. Parancoti Munivar, 1969, 122.
24. Nācciyār tirumōḷi:504
25. Nācciyār tirumōḷi:504-5
26. Nācciyār Tirumōḷi: 504-7.
27. Nācciyār Tirumōḷi: 505.
28. Dehejia, 1990, p. 81.
29. Nācciyār tirumōḷi:510-7
30. Nācciyār tirumōḷi:512-3
31. Miller 1977, 107.
32. Fathuehally, Sharma, 1994.
33. Cutler, Norman and Paula Richman, 1992, 34.
34. Hardy 1983, 418.
35. Nācciyār tirumōḷi: 508-5
36. “See! I could not live if other men enjoyed my large breasts that grew while I meditated on Kṛṣṇā; it would be like a jackal that roams in the forest stepping upon and sniffing with its nose at the oblations offered by Vedic Sages. (Hardy, Friedhelm, 1983, 418.)
37. Sharma 1994, 57.
38. ibid.
39. ibid. “Viraha-bhakti”: “devotion in which the sentiment of ‘separation’ is cultivated.” 9.
40. Sharma 1994, 12.
41. ibid.
42. The term *tiru* means “sacred” or “divine.” It is common in Tamil that the names of places that have any historic relevance due to either by the visit of any renowned saints or by their special mentions in their religious texts; names of popular religious texts; names of people with divine qualities etc., take this prefix especially to denote their sacred nature. The *Śaivite* saints celebrate 274 holy places and the *Vaiṣṇavas* celebrate a total of 108 places including *Vaikunṭam* “the Heaven.” Thus, all of the terrestrial places are commonly called *pāṭal perra patikaṅkaḷ* or *pāṭal perra stalankaḷ* “places that received songs.”
43. Ramanujan 1981, xi.

44. This nickname must have been given to him as a result of the appreciation of the readers — a case of the relationship between a performer and audience. However, his original names are believed to be *caṭakōpan* ‘angry one with braided hair — signifying the lord Śivā’; and *Māran* “a person with black colored body — signifying the lord *tirumāl* - *māl* meaning black—Viṣṇu.”
45. Ramanujan 1981, 83.
46. *ibid.*
47. Ramanujan 1981, 136.
48. *ibid.* 116-21.
49. Ramanujan 1981, 83.
50. *ibid.*, 76-85.
51. *Ibid.*, 83.
52. *Ibid.*, 76.
53. *Ibid.*, 77.
54. Ramanujan 1981, 135.
55. All of Tiruvāymoḷi poems are sung in such a way that the final word of all of the poems becomes the first word of the following poems — resulting a string of garland to be offered to the Lord.

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Speaking Through Bodies, Exhibiting the Limits: British Colonialism and Gandhian Nationalism

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Abstract This essay examines how Gandhi's understanding of his gendered and religious identity was shaped by colonial discourse. Mahatma Gandhi, like many of his Indian counterparts, came to believe in the powerful narrative articulated by the West that attributed British colonization of India to Indian effeminacy, apathy, and "deviant" sexual behavior. Gandhi's capitulation to British ideals of masculinity in his youth made him focus his critical gaze on his body and it is these "experiments" with him self as a subject that facilitated the formulation of a novel anti-colonial discourse that restructured the body's economy of pleasure prioritizing self-discipline in the service of the nation.

Gandhi's example illustrates that traditions and histories are disrupted not just by the consciousness of dissident subjects, but also by representational practices. Western "regimes of truth" both facilitated Gandhi's initial self-reproach and his later transformation of the figure of the Hindu ascetic and ascetic practices to contest and alter colonialist views of Hindu religion and masculinity. For Gandhi, nationalist asceticism functions as a "technology of the self" (Foucault), as essential to the process of ethical formation, as certain types of bodies, behaviors, and desires are constituted in and through the self-disciplinary practices of the colonized Indian male subject. At the same time, however, nationalist ascetics also became a domain through which to dominate marginalized castes, classes, religions, and genders.

Key Words the body; Mahatma Gandhi; colonialism; nationalism; asceticism

Indian asceticism held a central place in the imperial imagination of Britain. Explorers, travel writers, and scholars had long equated India with a religion, "Hinduism," and asserted that world renunciation was a defining feature of Indian society. World renunciation was first identified as a cultural ideal, and then held responsible for numerous "inadequacies" in the Indian character. British colonial discourse blamed

the purported renunciation of sociopolitical realities within Hinduism for producing otherworldly and indolent colonized subjects, who were physically weak and indifferent to their sociopolitical conditions. Indian nationalist leaders and literati were strongly influenced by such denigration of the weak Hindu male in colonial discourse. It prompted them to engage in varied attempts to reform their religion and themselves. Mahatma Gandhi, aka Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), too, focused his critical attention on his body, and subsequently on the bodies of others, with the intent of improving the colonized male body so that it could become strong, disciplined, and socially productive. Gandhi's leadership of the nationalist movement in India and his innovative response to colonial discourse turned him into an iconic figure in the 1920s and 30s, and he continues to be remembered as the father of the Indian nation in contemporary times.

In this essay, I draw upon examples from Gandhi's life as portrayed in his *Autobiography* (1927), or, what he preferred to call *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, to argue that the body assumed critical importance in Gandhi's anti-colonial movement because of British colonial discourse that inscribed difference on the bodies of its subjects to construct its own authority and legitimacy. The *Autobiography* demonstrates that Gandhi's understanding of his body — gendered, religious, racialized, and classed — was shaped by colonial relations of power.¹ Building upon the insights of French philosopher Michel Foucault, who places the body at the center of the struggle between different formations of power/knowledge, this essay examines how different discursive formations, in this case British colonial and Indian nationalist, inscribed the body differently in their respective “regimes of truth.” Responding to colonial criticisms, Gandhi reworked Hindu ascetic practices to formulate an anticolonial discourse that restructured the body's economy of pleasures prioritizing self-discipline in the service of the nation. He reframed celibacy, renunciation of family, renunciation of material wealth, and restrictions in diet as ascetic practices for the nation seeking to bring about behavioral changes in the population. Cultivating a disciplined body and mind assumed singular importance in Gandhi's political praxis (see, for example, Alter; Chakraborty, Chapter 3). For Gandhi, nationalist asceticism functioned as a “technology of the self” (Foucault), as essential to the process of ethical formation, as certain types of bodies, behaviors, and desires were constituted in and through the self-disciplinary practices of the colonized Indian subject. At the same time, however, nationalist asceticism became a dominating discourse that functioned to marginalize myriad others as well as other ways of resisting British colonial ideologies and practices.

British Discourse on Hindu Asceticism and Hindu Masculinity

Western scholars, missionaries, and administrators produced a discourse on Hindu asceticism that profoundly influenced generations of Western and Indian subjects. To James Mill, renowned for his three-volume *The History of British India*, completed in 1817, which became the prescribed textbook on India for British officers of the Indian Civil Service (Thapar, “Interpreting” 6), the Hindu ascetic signified “an absolute renunciation of all moral duties, and moral affections” (*History* 1: 294). In his widely acclaimed *Homo Hierarchicus*, the anthropologist Louis Dumont argued that “[a]sceticism, not only as a way of salvation, but as a general orientation, the tendency towards a negation of the world . . . ha[s] deeply imbued Hindus” (273). He contended that the individual in Hindu society does not exist in the domain of the worldly householder (grhastha) who is enmeshed in nonindividuated caste society, but in the domain of the world renouncing sannyasi, whom he described as the “individual-outside-the-world” (275). Another well-known scholar John Campbell Oman characterized Hindu monasticism as “gloomy religious abnegation” and as “adverse to patriotism in any form” (*Mystics* 15, 275). Attributing religious detachment to a lack of patriotism, Oman goes on to establish the lack of Indian martial spirit. The missionary-scholar John Nicol Farquhar also saw no virtue in the Hindu notion of renunciation, since, in his view, the Hindu ascetic is “not a servant of humanity” (*Primer* 197). He asserted that unlike Christianity Hinduism lacks the moral vigor to stir “men and women to unselfish service” (*Crown* 277); that “Hindu philosophy . . . leads to inaction” (277); and that Hindu renunciation springs from “indifference” (294).

Relying on this dominant Western understanding of Hindu asceticism, the British viewed the participation of Hindu and Muslim ascetics in the material world — as traders, warriors, and social activists — as an anomaly and as an obstacle to Company rule. The close contact of ascetics with the peasant countryside was seen as a matter for concern, when the British recognized that “monks depended on peasants for agrarian labor, material sustenance, and monastic recruitment; peasants looked to monks for spiritual guidance, religious knowledge, and ideological leadership” (Pinch, *Peasants* 2). Such interdependence coupled with the spiritual authority of the monks, the British worried would allow them to easily incite and lead the masses to rebel against foreign domination. Further, historical evidence of the Hindu ascetic “emerg[ing] as the symbol of dissent and protest” (Thapar, “Cultural” 13) during sociopolitical struggles (such as, most notably, in the 1857 Mutiny-Rebellion) made them suspects whenever there was a widespread movement of unrest.

In essence, the ability of Hindu and Muslim ascetics to engage the masses in anticolonial uprisings was perceived as a potential threat to Company rule (see Pinch; Dasgupta), and later officials of the East India Company specifically shaped

an imperial vision of Indian asceticism as a social and political obstacle to Britain's "humane" imperialism. Seeking to contain the moral authority of the ascetic, the British focused their imperial gaze on wandering holy men, warrior ascetics, and powerful landowning families of hereditary monks. The administrative concern with establishing a sedentary population of identifiable tribes and castes led to the merging of the figure of the ascetic with "powerful wandering and/or predatory groups" that expressed authority "through plunder or by collecting tribute" (Freitag 235). Colonel William Henry Sleeman's sensational history of thuggee/thagi (banditry) — "that extraordinary fraternity of assassins" (297) in *The Thugs or Phansigars of India* — is an excellent illustration of the British claim that Hindu asceticism produced criminals in ochre robes who raided and murdered the local populace. Soon, legislations by the colonial state such as the Penal Code (1833), the Thagi Act (1836), and the Criminal Tribes Act (1872) criminalized the militant, wandering Muslim and Hindu ascetics, as well as other nomadic groups.

Evidently, the linking of colonial knowledge and power worked to effectively differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of ascetic practices and to mark out certain ascetic bodies for punishment under colonial law. The British wanted docile and detached renunciates who could be easily governed; not militant, wandering monks raiding their treasuries, obstructing the collection of taxes, and provoking rural unrest. Colonial representations in literature, history, anthropology, and missionary writings, among others, collectively produced and circulated the "truth" about Hindu asceticism as a world-renouncing doctrine, while colonial legislations punished those ascetics who did not meet this criterion of detachment from the sociopolitical realm. As colonial discourse successfully regulated relations of power between the colonizer and the colonized, with the colonizer marking certain kinds of ascetics as criminals and then claiming to protect the colonized from those same criminals (i.e. law-breaking militant ascetics), they became what Foucault calls "regimes of truth." In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault charts the transition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century from punishment that was ceremonial and directed at the prisoner's body in the form of public execution and corporal punishment to the invention of the prison, where the body is arranged, regulated, and supervised rather than tortured. To borrow from Foucault, as the formation of a corpus of knowledge, techniques, and 'scientific' discourses became entangled with the practice of the power to punish, a new "regime of the truth" emerged (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*30). Thus, in the context of colonial India, Hindu asceticism emerges not as a surplus residue of pre-modern India, but as a historically specific production and circulation of Western discourses that function as "truth." As Foucault writes, "Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts

and makes function as true” (qtd in Hall and Gieben 295). It is no surprise then that the Indian feudal classes and the English-educated middle-classes came to accept this new “‘general politics’ of truth.” They accepted the dominant colonial representation of Indian ascetics as otherworldly (passive and indifferent to their sociopolitical reality) as well as worldly (a threat to law and order and to the native populace) and internalized the colonial views on the negative effects of asceticism on Indian men.

The British argued that the civilizational ideal of renunciation had made the Indian elite passive to their sociopolitical condition, while a hot, humid climate, a vegetarian diet, early marriage, and the lack of a physical tradition — among a litany of other problems — had produced physically weak male bodies lacking in self-control. Since such physically and morally weak men could not be trusted to take on the reigns of the government, colonial rule was presented as necessary for India to emerge as a nation. James Mill, for example, concluded that the “listless apathy and corporeal weakness of the natives of Hindustan” (1: 333) made them “excel in the qualities of a slave” (2: 365). Sir O’Moore Creagh argued that since the “unwarlike classes,” which came from the “Kayasth, Brahmin, and Bania castes,” comprised the bulk of the Indian National Congress, handing over power to these “tyrannical” classes, which had for centuries oppressed the masses, would cause intense popular resentment (16, 233). The imperial mission then was purportedly a philanthropic project that would protect the masses from the tyrannical upper classes as well as from the armed, martial castes and militant Hindu ascetics, and teach the natives to govern themselves.

With the pernicious effects of Indian asceticism on Indian manhood offering explanation for colonial subjecthood and becoming the rationale for denying Indians the right to self-rule, the colonized elite came to embody the “crisis” — or the widely discussed crisis — in masculinity (Sinha 1-32). Consequently, they strived to build moral character and cultivate physical strength, so that they could prove their masculinity and claim their right to self-government (see Rosselli; Chakraborty 25-26). Bodily reform, both personal and collective, offered the possibility of purging the colonizer and rejuvenating the national body politic. Mahatma Gandhi insisted, for instance, that “it is . . . better to suffer the Pindari peril . . . than to seek unmanly protection” from the British and thus “become emasculated and cowardly” (*Hind Swaraj* 44). As nationalist leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Dayananda Saraswati, M.S. Golwalkar, among others, directed their attention to reform their religion and their bodies, ascetic practices for the nation or nationalist asceticism emerged as an innovative means for the elite to employ a telos of collective ascetics as a means of transforming themselves. Through nationalist asceticism the elite hoped to replace British representations of the passive, apathetic

Indian with political entities involved in ethical and responsible nation-building work.

Gandhi: From Eating Meat to Wearing the Loincloth

Gandhi's life illustrates very well how both the subject Gandhi and his nationalist constructions of the Indian male body are produced within the limits set by colonial discourse. This section focuses on select examples from Gandhi's life as portrayed in the *Autobiography* to trace Gandhi's capitulation to British normative discourse on Hindu masculinity in his youth that prompt him to "experiment" with himself as subject. Similar to Joseph Alter, I argue that from his multiple personal experiments with diet, clothing, and sexuality, among others, Gandhi moves on to conduct collective experiments on the bodies of others, which include mass fasting, mass demonstrations, mass courting of arrest, and collective living in his ashrams.

Gandhi self-represents himself as a weak and timid child in the *Autobiography*. He writes, "I was a coward. I used to be haunted by the fear of thieves, ghosts, and serpents. I did not dare to stir out of doors at night. Darkness was a terror to me" (34). The effects of Western regimes of truth on the colonized who is subjected to its discourse is evident in the first experiment recorded in the *Autobiography*: Gandhi's childhood eating of meat in response to the dominant colonial attribution of Hindu cowardice to a vegetarian diet. Gandhi's experimentation with meat explicitly reveals that colonial regimes of truth produced subjects who personified the dominant perceptions and assumptions about Hindu (frequently used as a synonym for Indian) cowardice and physical weakness. For as Gandhi sates, he was influenced by a rhyme (composed by the Gujarati poet Narmad) popular among schoolboys that attributed the political and physical power of the British to meat-eating: "Behold the mighty Englishman / He rules the Indian small, / Because being a meat-eater / He is five cubits tall" (35).

This juxtaposition of the "mighty Englishman" against the "small" Indian was a product of the British attribution of the inability to fight to the vegetarian diet of the Hindus. Growing up in a vegetarian household, the young Gandhi desires to overcome his "innate" Hindu weakness and cowardice and become brave and muscular. As he writes: "I wished to be strong and daring and wanted my countrymen also to be such, so that we might defeat the English and make India free" (*Autobiography* 35). Following the dominant paradigm of imperial masculinity, Gandhi associates eating meat with masculine prowess. He believes that "meat-eating was good, that it would make me strong and daring, and that, if the whole country took to meat-eating, the English could be overcome" (35). Therefore, defying his family's adherence to vegetarianism, Gandhi begins to eat meat, which he understands as a nationalist "duty." Thus, at a very young age, we notice the effects of Western regimes of truth on

Gandhi that prompt him to renounce familiar traditions and practices and experiment with novel ideas as a way to reform his body and establish his manhood.

However, unwilling to eat meat in secrecy, Gandhi decides to renounce the consumption of meat until after the death of his parents (37). Later, in order to receive his family's consent to travel to England to pursue a law degree, he takes a vow "not to touch wine, women and meat" (51). Much of the account of his three years in England is about the obstacles to his vow of vegetarianism: the absence of vegetarian restaurants, the happiness after finding a vegetarian restaurant, the temptations from friends and colleagues to eat meat, and his feelings of alienation because of not eating meat. At one point, to compensate for his vegetarianism, Gandhi makes attempts at "cultivating other accomplishments which fitted one for polite society" (61). He states that "to make up for my vegetarianism," "I undertook the all too impossible task of becoming an English gentleman" (61). *The Autobiography* provides details about Gandhi buying fashionable clothes, styling his hair "in the correct fashion," trying to learn to play violin, and taking "lessons in dancing, French and elocution" (61-2). However, after three months, Gandhi abandoned his endeavor to cultivate a persona fit for "polite [English] society" (61), although he continued to be alert to the significant role of clothing in public life.

Emma Tarlo suggests that Gandhi's first week in South Africa where he arrives to take up his job as a barrister representing Indian rights "marked a turning-point in Gandhi's attitude to dress" (67). A magistrate asks Gandhi, who is dressed immaculately in European attire, to remove his Indian headgear, and Gandhi leaves the court in protest. When Gandhi writes to the press to highlight this incident, it gives him "an unexpected advertisement" and Gandhi realizes that rather than adopting socially appropriate clothing as in his England years, he could adopt "socially unacceptable and provocative" clothing productively to expose injustice and embarrass others (Tarlo 67). Thus, throughout his stay in South Africa, Gandhi experimented with different kinds of headgear, clothing, and shoes. When he finally returned to India from South Africa, he arrived dressed as a Kathiawadi peasant, keenly aware of the public attention that this would generate. In India, too, he frequently experimented with his attire, and, finally, after a great deal of deliberation, he adopted the "loincloth" in September 1921.² Through his adoption of the loincloth, Gandhi hoped to distance himself from both elitism and orthodox class politics and align with the Indian lower classes and lower castes. It was not a religious act or a sign of asceticism, but an intentional body practice. He explained his sartorial choice as "the dress of necessity not desire" (Tarlo 74) that would expose India's dire poverty to the world-at-large, and thereby encourage all Indians to weave and spin in order to clothe everyone. But the masses read Gandhi's shaved head, barely clad, and

emaciated body as a sign of his saintliness drawing associations with the many Hindu sannyasis, Muslim fakirs, and Sufi pirs who wore the loincloth. Asceticism emerged as a central aspect of his far-reaching mass appeal. He was revered as an ascetic: a saint who had voluntarily accepted a position of powerlessness through his physical identification with “the poorest of the poor among Indians,” “the semi-starved almost naked villager” (*Collected Works* 24: 456; 47: 119). By successfully adopting aspects of the world-renouncing ascetic of colonial discourse, Gandhi set himself apart from existing figures of power — English-educated Indians and local kings — and he was looked upon as “an alternative source of authority” (Amin 338). Gandhi’s authority was derived from his innumerable sacrifices for the masses: his rejection of sexual activity, his restricted diet, numerous fasts, his scantily clad body, the pilgrimages on foot, and his numerous internments.

Nationalist Asceticism as “Technology of the Self”

Gandhi’s multiple “experiments” in the attempt to emerge as a self-controlled subject with a meticulously cultivated, disciplined body illuminates how Western regimes of truth that elicited Gandhi’s initial self-reproach also prompted him to contest and alter colonial views of Hindu religion and masculinity. While colonial discourse attributed Indian effeminacy and apathy as essentially unchanging and natural attributes, Gandhi argued that human bodies are malleable, drawing upon his own shifting understanding of his body and providing evidence from the numerous experiments he conducted on his own body. By displaying a voluntary commitment to ascetic practices for the nation, Gandhi hoped that the colonized male subject would demonstrate to the British his moral fortitude, self-control, and courage. At the same time, Gandhi’s veneration as Mahatma, literally, *maha* (Great) and *atma* (Soul), and as Bapu, the father of the nation, resulted in his discourse on the colonized Indian body to become a dominant and dominating discourse, a means to define and police the normal and the deviant. Thus, Gandhian nationalist asceticism, which is the product of a particular encounter between Britain and India, in turn produced history. Gandhi’s nationalist asceticism acquired a sense of authority becoming a new regime of truth in a critical era of India’s struggle for liberation from colonial domination.

Similar to Foucault’s “technology of the self”, which, as Foucault explains, implies “certain modes of training and modification of individuals” that allow people to transform “their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being” (“Technology” 225), Gandhi developed a code of self-cultivation, a set of guidelines for a relation to the self that defines the bourgeois nationalist self and its claim to power and self-rule (Also see, Foucault, *History* 1:120–31). His telos of collective ascetics was not employed repressively against others as a means of control, but was

developed as a means of transforming himself. Through his own multiple attempts at bodily reform, Gandhi sought to teach his fellow countrymen to cultivate their own bodies and, consequently, mount a critique of Western theories on the colonized Indian male body.

For instance, after many struggles to maintain his vow of vegetarianism in London, Gandhi comes across Henry Salt's *Plea for Vegetarianism* and becomes involved with the London Vegetarian Society, and this produces a shift in his understanding of vegetarianism. He now comes to consider vegetarianism as a moral virtue and becomes a vegetarian by choice (*Autobiography* 59). He also reverses his earlier equation between meat-eating and masculine strength: "it is easy to see that Vegetarianism is not only not injurious, but on the contrary is conducive to bodily strength and that attributing the Hindu weakness to Vegetarianism is simply based on a fallacy" (*Collected Works* 1: 33). Here, Gandhi successfully overturns the normalization of a meat-eating imperial masculinity in colonial discourse that produced and then maintained relations of dominance and subordination between the colonizer and the colonized. At the same time, Gandhi's strict adherence to, and celebration of, a vegetarian diet also played an important role in how colonized Indians came to be ranked relative to one another on the scale of nationalist masculinity. Eating a sparse meal devoid of meat was a requirement, if one had to join Gandhi's nationalist movement (which all right-thinking and patriotic sons of the soil were expected to do) or reside in his ashrams as a disciple. As Gandhi's dietary prescriptions emerged as the dominant nationalist dietary norm, nationalist asceticism became an enactment of power. In addition, Gandhi's model of the vegetarian nationalist subject got quickly aligned with brahmanical Hinduism that could then assert its dominance over meat-eating Muslims, Christians, lower-caste Hindus, and outcasts or untouchables. While Gandhi repeatedly directed attention to rural poverty and the ethics of (excessive) consumption to urge Indians to control their desire for food and limit the intake of food, Gandhi's authority as Mahatma in effect established differential relations of power between colonized Indian subjects on the basis of their dietary habits and choices.

Sexual control, which was at the crux of Gandhi's nationalist ascetics, was yet another contested site of power. The British associated the colonized's self-control with his suitability as a political subject and utilized the categorizations of Indian Muslims as "hypermasculine" and Hindus as "effeminate" to reject Indian claims to self-rule. Gandhi recognized that masculinity as action, as doing, rather than as identity, held the possibility of change. He reframed the practice of celibacy and the renunciation of family life (which were stages in a Hindu man's life, according to the classical ashram life cycle) as matters of choice. Arguing that the desire for sex

and material prosperity were impediments to the performance of ethical and political duties, he reserved the transformation of desire (for food, sex, or wealth) into heroism for disciplined and self-controlled Gandhians (or *satyagrahis* — literally, seekers of Truth). Thus, Gandhi conceptualized the vow of *brahmacharya* as requiring not only celibacy and sexual restraint but also control over all the senses: “So overpowering are the senses that they can be kept under control only when they are completely hedged in on all sides . . .” (*Autobiography* 199). However, “[t]hat brahmacharya which can be observed only by living in a forest is neither brahmacharya nor self-control” (*Collected Works* 27: 152) because the really pure are those who desire bodily pleasures but have cultivated a strong will that allows them to renounce bodily pleasures.

Gandhi argues that to combine being a householder with celibacy is higher and purer than the state of sexual activity. For him, celibacy represents sexual energy not dissipated by sexual activity, and he urges a self-imposed restriction — a radical abstention from sex to preserve semen, the “vital fluid” (*Collected Works* 34: 372) — in order to build up spiritual, physical, and mental strength through a struggle against desire. He writes, “Manliness consists in struggling. It is such struggling that moulds us” (33: 433). Unwillingness to practice sexual self-restraint is a sign of cowardice: “A man who is unchaste loses stamina, becomes emasculated and cowardly” (*Hind Swaraj* 97). Further, Gandhi insists that early sexual experience not only emasculates men, it also produces “a race of cowardly, emasculated and spiritless creatures” (*Collected Works* 12: 136). That is, self-restraint is critical for the production of a strong progeny. Such reworking of the ascetic ideal of celibacy and sexual renunciation as service to the nation reveals that sexuality is historically constituted and does not exist independently of the meaning we assign it. Yet, celibacy, as Julius J. Lipner notes, “was par excellence a Brahmin, male prerogative” (56). Thus, as the “self” assumes the position of both subject and object of ethical discourse, brahmanical asceticism signifies manliness. Also, by positing brahmacharya as central to the performance of political and ethical responsibilities, Gandhi privileges the male discourse on sexuality, in that it comes to define both male and female sexuality. For him, sexuality is exclusively about male desire for power and domination and brahmacharya is a technique to control these urges, if not eradicate them completely. *The Age of Consent Act* (1891) aimed to increase the legal age of sexual intercourse for Hindu child brides, but Gandhi asks for the renunciation of what is “legal,” namely marital sex, through the choice of celibacy.³ While offering men the possibility of transforming their personal and political lives, this new husbandly code of honor, however, continued to deny women sexual agency and subjectivity.⁴

At the same time, Gandhi’s encouragement of women’s participation in

the political realm and attempts to feminize the anti-colonial struggle offered a resounding challenge to British colonial ideologies and institutional practices. Gandhi argued, “aggression was the path to mastery of those without self-control, nonviolent resistance the path of those with control” (Rudolph and Rudolph 31). He insisted that European nations have not yet earned the distinction of being true nations because of their adoption of violence (Steger 102-3). Therefore, rejecting British colonial discourse that sought to teach the “native” how to self-govern themselves, Gandhi offered nonviolent resistance or *satyagraha* — an innovative discourse of moral and political reform linked to bodily practices that reworked “feminine” practices, such as spinning, weaving, suffering hunger, and enduring assaults on the body, as the primary mode of political resistance. Rejecting outright the call for the adoption of violence as a means to free India from colonial rule by the Extremist faction within the Indian National Congress, Gandhi’s embodied politics rallied Indians to refute British charges of effeminacy without having to emulate British imperial masculinity or the “martial races” (such as the Gurkhas, Sikhs, Muslims, and Marathas) approved by the British. Colonial discourse focused attention on the body of the colonized Indian as effeminate and non-martial to consolidate its power; Gandhi, too, made the body a site to affirm his power and authority. In other words, colonial discourse opened up a space for Gandhi, the subject who was subjected by colonial discourse, to subject colonial discourse to critique and interrogation; for, as Foucault alerts us, power is both repressive and productive.

The meaning of Gandhi’s term *satyagraha*, from *sat* (truth) and *agraha* (firmness), is soul-force or truth-force (*Autobiography* 292). He explains, “ahimsa [nonviolence] is a renunciation out of strength and not out of weakness” (*Collected Works* 14: 485). It is intentional and purposeful suffering that evolves from within by individual effort. Gandhi writes, “India feels weak and helpless and so expresses her helplessness by hating the tyrant....” Non-cooperation can make the people “strong and self-reliant” as well as “transform hatred into pity” (19: 81). He believes that nonviolent resistance has the potential to transform both the performative subject and those witnessing the performance. Theorizing resistance as visible collective acts, Gandhi adopted practices of mass participation in his nationalist movement, such as non-cooperation with the law, demonstrations, strikes, courting of mass-scale arrests, and mass fasting, to make visible the injustices of colonial rule and increase the ability of the colonized to work in unity to oppose such injustice. Gandhi envisioned *satyagraha* as socially inclusive. He hoped to forge alliances across Indian communities that transcended religious and social divisions (*Autobiography* 126) through his call for *sarvodaya* (service towards others). In addition, through exhibitionist, public acts of defiance, Gandhi sought to provoke the colonizer to

employ violence. The “legal” violence of the colonizer could then be turned into shame, while the nonviolent, suffering colonized resister or victim could emerge as a figure of pity and glory. Gandhi believed that large-scale displays of self-suffering by the collective would eventually weaken the colonial government’s resolve, embarrass them, and compel them to discontinue the use of violence.

Similar to the shift of modern power from its focus on the body to the soul of the prison inmate or the modern citizen that Foucault discusses in *Discipline and Punish*, the Gandhian regime of truth also directs attention to the psyche, conscience, and morality of the civil resister. For Gandhi, the human body is merely a tool to achieve greater things, such as a moral self, an ethical nation, or an egalitarian society. The nonviolent refusal to cooperate with injustice requires that “feeble physiques” (*Collected Works* 32: 444) reflecting modern forms of indulgence to be replaced with bodies “as strong as steel” (15: 55; 26: 143). He conceives his ashrams as centers to produce disciplined minds and bodies that can endure the hardships of satyagraha. He even referred to them as perfect training grounds for “right men” and “right Indians” (qtd in Steger 119). Gandhian nationalist asceticism has as its goal the creation of new persons through the patterning of behavior. The self-disciplinary technologies of the satyagrahis reflect Gandhi’s political economy of the body, which invests the body with utility “only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 26). Gandhi asserts, “It is difficult to become a passive resister, unless the body is trained” and “where there is no strength of mind, there can be no strength of soul” (*Hind Swaraj* 96). The civil resister then has to train his/her mind to be able to put the body on the line, to accept and endure physical pain, and to overcome sensations of pain and suffering experienced by the physical body. By systematic training, self-reflection, self-monitoring, and confession, the Gandhian ascetic nationalist becomes a transformed subject, who is physically trained and psychologically motivated to strive for a different life. Self-discipline, self-improvement, self-introspection, renunciation for the national good, and participation in the nationalist struggle are effects of this particular regime of power and knowledge, as nationalist asceticism becomes a technique to control whole populations by turning them into docile bodies that participate in their own self-regulation.

Foucault’s genealogy of “the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle” (*Discipline and Punish* 7) illuminates how different regimes of truth produced and disciplined the body of the criminal in France. While corporal punishment was a ritual in which the audience performed the important role of re-establishing the authority and power of the sovereign, in the late eighteenth century discipline becomes privatized and individualized within the penal institution. But Foucault’s focus on Europe does not take into account the situation in the imperial colonies where theatrical displays of

power continued to inscribe violence on the body of the condemned. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century British India violent exhibitionism was critical to the display of imperial power. British administrators frequently employed public flogging, hanging, and shooting along with imprisonment to deter resisters and control political agitators. A seminal event in this context is the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar on April 13, 1919, where General Reginald E.H. Dyer fired at a crowd of nonviolent protestors killing between 379 to 1000 people. After the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, Gandhi, who was initially convinced that “India could achieve her complete emancipation only within and through the British Empire” (*Autobiography* 203), rejected British law. In 1921 he launched the non-cooperation movement with a call for the abandonment and rejection of British law courts. In his arrest and trial (March 1922) for the leadership of the movement, he explained his own trajectory “from a staunch loyalist and co-operator” to someone who had “become an uncompromising disaffectionist and non-co-operator” (*Collected Works* 23: 114-18).

Pointing to a new moral economy in the penal institution, Foucault writes, “The punishment-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property.... From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights” (*Discipline and Punish* 11). Practices of segregation, restricted diet, restricted movements, enforced labor, and a regimented schedule all worked to deprive the liberty of the individual in the prison, but it became “the most hidden part of the penal process” (9). In addition, incarceration marked one as a criminal, an object of shame. Gandhi an astute lawyer-turned-politician sought to demonstrate how in the colonial penal institution violence continued to be written on the criminalized bodies of the colonized. Thus, for instance, when Gandhi was imprisoned in Johannesburg in 1908 for failing to register under the Asiatic Law Amendment Act, but was exempted from the prison regulations for black South Africans because he was Indian, Gandhi accepted them voluntarily. He asked for his hair to be cropped and his moustache to be shaved off. When the authorities declined, Gandhi cropped his own hair and even spent two hours cropping the hair of fellow Indian inmates. Thus, he successfully subverted the colonial formulation of differentiated otherness, and the consequent rejection of the positions that the British had mapped onto their colonized subjects (Indian and African). In addition, while the state used prison rules to visibly mark sovereign power on disobedient bodies, with the aim of transforming resistant bodies into compliant bodies, Gandhi chose to inscribe on his body the violence of imprisonment. Thus, during his imprisonments, Gandhi would frequently fast, observe

a vow of silence, restrict his food intake, and wear humiliating clothes to embarrass the colonial authorities.

Gandhi as Mahatma

Gandhi's practices of self-transformation reveal how his understanding of his own body, and the bodies of others, interacted with circulating discourses (legal, scientific, political, religious, and so on) and sociopolitical practices in the late nineteenth century, so that his embodied practices were always contextual and shifting. From his childhood self-image of cowering before the "mighty," meat-eating Englishman, he goes on to offer an embodied politics of nonviolence that challenges both Western constructions of the Indian body and the colonial inscription of bodily difference.

Gandhi's detailed reflections on, and descriptions of, his failures, which prompted him to perform new experiments on his body or to revise his techniques publicly demonstrates his many trials for the national good. Written in weekly installments in *Navajivan*, the *Autobiography* offers fragments and scripted "experiments with truth" from Gandhi's life that illustrate the slow, painstaking process involved in Gandhi's self-transformation. So that Bhikhu Parekh suggests that we call it "an autobiographical biography" (289) because it is "really a story of how he evolved into a Mahâtmâ" (288), or "a biography of Gandhi written by the Mahâtmâ" (289). These "experiments with truth" effectively establish his power, which is "distinct from both priestly power and the coercive authority of the state" (Thapar, "Cultural" 13). Scholars note that the rural masses' faith in Gandhi as Mahatma frequently solicited their participation in the non-cooperation movement. The masses read Gandhi's body within pre-existing patterns of popular belief. Their faith in the power of deities was transplanted on to the Mahatma, a saint added to the Hindu pantheon, who they believed could produce miracles.⁵ This modality of devotional embodiment locates power in Gandhi as a transcendent, divine source, rather than attributing agency to the productive, performative body of the ascetic nationalist subject, the satyagrahi. Thus, as Gandhi's emaciated loincloth-wrapped body consolidates his claim to nationalist leadership and to mahatma-hood, it functions as a tactical element in the functioning of different relations of power. Gandhi's rejection of power in its various manifestations — political, economic, and social — is interpreted as proof of his spiritual authority. As Subaltern Studies scholars have argued it is not Gandhi's political praxis that convinced the masses to put their faith in the Mahatma but rather his religious charisma and the masses' perception of him as capable of removing the colonial affliction (Amin, "Gandhi" 331).⁶

Gandhi was also alert to the close connection between Indian ascetics and the rural populace in colonial India and the ability of ascetics to motivate the masses to

resist structures of domination. He solicited and authorized the participation of Hindu ascetics in the nationalist movement. Gandhi argued that the metaphysics of world renunciation in the practice of classical sannyasa is an escape into self-centeredness; renunciation is futile unless it manifests itself in selfless service and social reform: "In this age, only political sannyasis can fulfil and adorn the ideal of sannyasa, others will more than likely disgrace the sannyasi's saffron garb . . . one who aspires to a truly religious life cannot fail to undertake public service as his mission, and we are today so much caught up in the political machine that service of the people is impossible without taking part in politics" (Iyer 1:138). The participation of Hindu ascetics in the anti-colonial movement with sannyasis changing their ochre robes to Gandhi's *khadi* (hand woven, hand spun cloth) proved the fallacy of the orientalist notion that Indian society has always been otherworldly because of the appeal of renunciation. In addition, it troubled the neat separation of asceticism and politics in British colonial discourse, as Gandhi demonstrated that subjectivities are constituted and self-constituting within particular discursive formations.

Gandhi's reworking of Hindu asceticism and the soliciting of Hindu ascetics to participate in his non-cooperation movement offers a novel account of the emergence and contradictory character of nationalist ascetics. While British knowledge/power produced and consolidated new notions of Hindu asceticism (itself a diverse phenomenon), it also offered an entry point for Indian nationalist leaders to craft their notions of what constitutes the self, as both a subject in the colony and a citizen of the nation-to-be. Gandhi took religion and its associated practices out of the private realm and into the body politic, which opened up possibilities for both the purportedly "unworldly" and "criminal" Hindu ascetics to participate in politics as well as for the physically and morally "weak" householder to perform asceticism for the nation. In other words, "truth isn't outside power, or deprived of power": on the contrary, truth "is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints [a]nd it induces regular effects of power" (qtd in Hall and Gieben 295).

Gandhi's discourse of nationalist asceticism, which was effected by and was an effect of colonial discourse, illuminates that traditions and histories are disrupted not just by those who employ discourse, but also by those who are subjected to it. From his personal bodily experiments, Gandhi embarks on a national program to reform the body politic. Subverting the colonial regime of truth, he produces an oppositional economy of bodies that demonstrates that the colonial state did not have a monopoly over power. As nationalist asceticism emerges as the new regime of truth in India in the 1920s and 30s, it constitutes other categories of difference, as much as it fragments existing social categories. Nationalist asceticism becomes a domain through which to dominate marginalized castes, classes, religions, and genders as the making of

bodies and simultaneously the body politic through nationalist asceticism necessitates definitional others as material effects of nationalist discourse.

Notes

1. This essay draws upon my book, *Masculinity, Asceticism, Hinduism*, particularly, Chapters 1 & 3.
2. Gandhi's attire of a short dhoti was not really a loincloth, but was characterized as such by scholars and the press.
3. The Age of Consent Act raised the age of consent for sexual intercourse for all girls, married or unmarried, from ten to twelve years in all jurisdictions, its violation subject to criminal prosecution as rape. Scholars have argued how this legislation was viewed by the Hindu elite as British encroachment in their domestic lives and became a rallying ground for Hindu men to assert their control over women (see, for example, Sinha Chapter 4).
4. For a detailed analysis of the female body in Gandhian discourse, see Chakraborty 133-135.
5. See Shahid Amin's excellent study of the rumors concerning Gandhi's miraculous powers points to the deification of Gandhi.
6. In his *Autobiography* Gandhi presents himself as "a victim" of the masses' deification. He expresses anger and frustration for his inability to sleep, eat, meditate, or travel freely for the masses' perception of his body as holy and their obstinate quest for his holy sight, or *darshan* (352).

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Loving India: Same-Sex Desire, Hinduism and the Nation-State in Abha Dawesar's *Babyji*

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Abstract When Abha Dawesar's second novel *Babyji* was published in 2005, it was celebrated for its joyous depiction of love and sex between women. What has passed largely unnoticed, however, is the ways in which its representation of same-sex love is intimately tied to discourses of power. From the name of the main character, Anamika (which is also the name of an early South Asian lesbian organization), to the nickname of her first female lover, India, to that of her lower caste lover, Rani (queen), the novel maps networks of relations that simultaneously challenge and reinforce the regimes of truth intrinsic to Hinduism, class hierarchies, caste divisions and, indeed, the Indian nation-state. Such networks of sexual and romantic relation are also common to Dawesar's other novels, *Miniplanner* (2000) and *That Summer in Paris* (2006). Drawing on the work of Ruth Vanita, Suparna Bhaskaran, Alison Donnell, and others, this paper will argue that Dawesar's neglected oeuvre challenges both the often tragic arc of narratives depicting same-sex attraction set in the Indian subcontinent, and the Eurocentric trajectory of much contemporary theory and creative writing which privileges the diaspora as a place of liberation for South Asian queers. Instead, *Babyji* in particular queers the Indian nation (in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's sense) and invites a Khush-centered, situated, reading practice.

Key Words Kama Sutra; queer; Indian nationalism; lesbians in fiction

Abha Dawesar's *Babyji* (2005) opens with the eponymous protagonist, a sixteen-year old upper class Delhi girl, recounting her reading habits, and with them, a transition from (sexual) innocence to experience:

I used to be innocent, driven solely by the ambition to do something great for my country....My knowledge of the facts of life was based entirely on books, and clean ones at that. I read nineteenth-century classics by George Eliot and Emily Brontë. These books never went into any details. To remedy this I decided to

read Vatsyayana's *Kamasutra*....The *Kamasutra* that I force-fed myself seemed completely of another world, alien and absurd. After I read it, however, magical things started to happen. In particular, I met a woman. (1)

From the outset, *Babyji* positions the Indian classic, *Kamasutra*, as a corrective to the colonial legacy of English — and heteronormative sexuality — in India. Best known in the West as a (heterosexual) sex manual, and in India as a book of etiquette, I argue that in Dawesar's novel the *Kamasutra* becomes a source of distinctly Indian queerness, that both radically territorializes love and sex between women, and challenges dominant gay rights narratives that imagine queer liberation emanating from the West (see Ara Wilson, for example). In so doing, the novel maps networks of relations that simultaneously challenge and reinforce the regimes of truth intrinsic to Hinduism, class hierarchies, caste divisions and, indeed, the Indian nation-state.

I will begin by focusing on the *Kamasutra*'s treatment of women's sexualities at some length, because much contemporary South Asian discourse continues to construct same-sex love as a Western import. When love between women is imagined, it is too often portrayed as doomed (as in Deepa Mehta's film *Fire* and Manju Kapur's *A Married Woman*), or possible only in the diaspora (as in the novels of Shamim Sarif). The protagonist's reading of the *Kamasutra*, therefore, not only provides her with instruction in sexual and romantic relations, but provides a decidedly South Asian lineage to her own emerging queerness. The novel's repeated references to the Mandal commission and the high profile self-immolation by a Delhi student that followed its recommendation that caste reservations be adopted at all levels of the education system places the events of the text in the fall of 1990 (Chandra et al 367). Anamika's emerging queerness, and the fissures in the fabric of the Indian nation — made evident both in the Mandal Commission report and in the response to it — are intimately linked. As Gayatri Gopinath argues in *Impossible Desires*, “[q]ueer desire does not transcend or remain peripheral to...histories [of racism and colonialism] but instead becomes central to their telling and remembering: there is no queer desire without these histories, nor can these histories be told or remembered without simultaneously revealing an erotics of power” (2). India's entrenched caste hierarchies are the product of both colonialism and its indigenous Sanskritic heritage; these generate a “politics of truth” that, at the opening of the novel enable Anamika — already head girl at her private school — to imagine herself as capable of greatness, and to cast the nation as an appropriate object for her heroism (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 132). It is through the protagonist's queer desires, and the intimate relations these bring about, that *Babyji* that these regimes of truth begin to unravel, and with them easy truths about both sexual and national identities.

The extent to which the *Kamasutra* represents or endorses love and sex between women remains a subject of scholarly debate. Alain Danielou's 2011 translation, for instance, depicts a woman penetrating her female lover with a dildo in the section on "Virile Behaviour in Women." In Danielou's translation, a variety of woman exists who prefers to make "love to her own kind." Such a woman has a unique label, "svairini," which Danielou alternately translates as "homophile" and "lesbian" (171). His version further emphasizes that "such practices are not forbidden" (172). Walter Penrose utilizes Danielou's translation in his own work and appears to believe it correct. Wendy Doniger, on the other hand, is critical nearly to the point of scorn, maintaining that Danielou has mistaken a lesbian for a "loose" woman and that the svairini is, in fact, anally penetrating a man rather than having sex with another woman (30). Doniger's own 2002 translation reflects these differences in opinion. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, as Giti Thadani points out, in Hindi this same term is used both for a woman who is "wanton" and who experiences sexual desire "like a man" (77). I do not propose to attempt a resolution of this debate. No version of the *Kamasutra* can make any straightforward claims to authenticity, not only due to the inherent problems associated with the translation of any ancient text, but because the *Kamasutra* as we now know it was edited and compiled by the orientalist Richard Burton; "the original quite literally came into being for the purpose of translation" and represents an amalgamation of diverse texts (Puri 615). Vatsyayana's writings on love and sex certainly existed before Burton's intervention, but not usually as a single compendium, and there is uncertainty as to what, if anything, Burton may have omitted in his act of codification.

Regardless of the version one prefers, however, the *Kamasutra* remains an important South Asian text for thinking queerness and its history on the subcontinent. Even Doniger's reading translates the *Kamasutra* as a text where a woman may play "the role of the man," engage in oral sex (28), and where a third gender might exist (though, for Doniger this gender seems to be available only to those sexed male) (27). Walter Penrose goes much further, examining the diverse third gender positions available to women in ancient, medieval and early modern India in considerable detail, and leaves little doubt that, at least sometimes, the occupation of those roles provided opportunities for, and/or coincided with, sexual relationships between women. Indrani Chatterjee comes to a similar conclusion, and notes that prior to the eighteenth century, Indian culture in general was more interested in regulating sexual acts with regard to the relative social standing of their participants rather than with respect to their gender (68). Engaging in sex with one's own sex, or the opposite sex, were not seen as mutually exclusive alternatives. Jyoti Puri notes that the *Kamasutra* also mentions sexual relations between upper class women and their female servants

(618). Even S.C. Uphadyaya's later translation, which seeks to distance itself from the history of sex between women in India (emphasizing its location in the harem and the absence of virile men, deleting all mention of female genitalia), cannot entirely rid the *Kamasutra* of its queer potential (Puri 625).

As such, despite both the critical uncertainty around the *Kamasutra*, and the fact that its treatment of queerness is equivocal, focusing on the *Kamasutra* challenges dominant theoretical approaches to sexuality in the West, particularly Michel Foucault's seminal tripartite work *The History of Sexuality*. If Michel Foucault has achieved a central, if contested place in contemporary queer scholarship in the West, as David M. Halperin demonstrates at length in *Saint Foucault* (1995), his legacy is also decidedly Eurocentric, and at times, orientalist, particularly given his assertion in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* that India (and other eastern locales) possess a pleasure-oriented "*ars erotica*" (57; italics in original) which contrasts with the "*scientia sexualis*" (58; italics in original) of the west. Michael J. Sweet argues that Foucault's approach to non-Western sexuality not only demonstrates that he "was prey to the same fantasies of Oriental licentiousness that afflicted his predecessors almost a century before" (79) but is also a reminder of the ability even of great thinkers to be "spectacularly wrong" (80).

In 1990, when *Babyji* is set, S.C. Upadhyaya's translation, first published in 1961, was the most widely circulating edition of the *Kamasutra* within the English-speaking Indian middle classes (Puri 607). Puri argues that Uphadyaya's translation, whose introduction emphasizes its supposed objectivity and neutrality, "can be considered part of the counterhegemonic, nationalist legacy that sought to destabilize the hierarchies of colonial rule by foregrounding the discourse of science" (625). There is therefore an irony in Anamika's reappropriation of his text for her own, queer purposes, as the novel's protagonist is nothing if not scientifically minded, and frequently uses tropes from physics and chemistry to imagine her interpersonal relationships (13). Uphadyaya's preface states that his rendition of the *Kamasutra* "aims at teaching a person the best method to control and properly guide the desires, particularly the sexual urge, so that the person may be a useful member of the family, society and his country and contribute his mite to their welfare by his way of life" (qtd. in Puri 631). The link between sexuality and nationalism could hardly be made more explicit. That reading the *Kamasutra* sets Anamika on a path of both queerness and, potentially, diasporic life, suggests a counterhegemonic practice that calls into question the truths of that document.

Though *Babyji* won a Lambda Literary Award and a Stonewall Book Award, and was well reviewed both inside and outside India, critical attention to the novel has been scant, and has repeatedly resisted its embrace of queerness per se. Tank Nayan,

for instance, insists that Anamika “favours lesbian relationship in order to express her anger against male-dominance and patriarchal society” and that her same-sex desires are merely “a reaction against man [sic]” (197). Nayan points to the fact that Anamika also appears to enjoy kissing a man at one point during the novel as evidence for the supposedly purely instrumental quality of her queer romantic and sexual relations. For Vanessa Guignery, *Babyji* depicts “a contemporary Indian Sentimental Education” only “tinged with female homosexuality” (309), and understands the novel primarily in terms of a broader interest in borders, boundaries and classification, rather than invested in queerness per se. Guignery is right to point out, of course, that Anamika “upsets gender, class and caste boundaries” (310). Even Sara Ahmed, whose analysis of the novel, though brief, is far more nuanced, argues in *The Promise of Happiness*, that the protagonist’s “lesbian desire, emerging from Anamika’s initial vow of revenge against middle-class morality, becomes a deeply pedagogical act” (154). While I agree that Anamika’s sexual relationships are inextricably tied to her more general coming of age — *Babyji* is very much a bildungsroman — the novel also projects queer life forward into the future, particularly in Anamika’s sighting of a gay male couple with a baby in its final pages (323).

If the novel’s opening page emphasizes that Anamika’s queer desire is not a product of Western influence (but opposed to it), what is equally clear is that queer desire is also juxtaposed with naïve nationalism. Anamika’s coming of age is arguably not just about her sexual awakening, but a political awakening, that requires her to disavow her simplistic desire “to do something great” (1) for India, while struggling with the complexity of attempting to be loyal to a country whose structures of privilege have both benefitted and confined her. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the woman whom the narrator meets on that opening page is nicknamed India by Anamika. Jessica Gokhberg agrees, stating, “*Babyji* presents lesbian desire as an end beyond the self, a mimetic discourse of Indian nationalism that revisions national identity as a larger hegemonic force beyond any single self, but that can be identified only as the self sees it; each self, each individual desire contributes to the wider ‘suprapersonal’ nature of identity” (97). India (the person) immediately challenges what Anamika claims to know about Indians: “[w]e are a nation of taxonomists...it was natural for me to classify people at first sight” (5-6). Yet the object of Anamika’s desire resists classification, a fact that simultaneously threatens and intrigues her.

Names are both significant and a challenge in this novel. To this point, I have referred to Anamika as queer, but she herself does not use this, or any other term, to describe her own sexuality or gender. She asks other characters at various points if women can be gay or homosexual (97), but never explicitly states whether she is considering such a label for herself. I use ‘queer’ here, conscious of its limitations,

because as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick explains in *Tendencies*, it means “across...its roots are “Indo-European” and it is both “antiseperatist” and “antiassimilationist;” “it is relational, and strange” (xii). The fact that Anamika’s desires are both associated with and threatening to the nation, and are associated with resistance to classification makes queer the term that best captures the ways in which the sexual, ontological and epistemological are interlinked in *Babyji*.

The main character’s nickname, Babyji (from which the novel’s title derives), is given to her by Rani, who is both servant and lover. It evokes the ambiguity of Anamika’s status and her uneasy relationship to gender and class privilege. At once a diminutive (as indicated by the incorporation of ‘baby’) and a term of respect and deference, (as indicated by the suffix –ji), the name points to the fact that Rani is older and more experienced than Anamika (sexually and otherwise) yet of a lower class and caste (hence her role as servant). It also performs Anamika’s cultural hybridity in its yoking of Hindi and English. The moniker is indicative of the ambiguity around Anamika’s gender, since the first and second half of her nickname are gendered female and male, respectively. Tripta’s young son expresses overt uncertainty about her gender, asking her if she is to be addressed as a didi (older sister) or bhaiyya (older brother) (93), and Anamika often identifies with or imagines herself in male roles. Yet she does not identify as male; instead, in the spirit of the *Kamasutra*, she experiences desires that are akin to those normatively associated with (heterosexual) men.

Rani and Anamika’s relationship evokes an extant, if covert, tradition of figuring sex between female masters and servants in Indian literature. The best known example is arguably Ismat Chughtai’s short story “Lihaf [The Quilt],” written in Urdu, which Gayatri Gopinath discusses at some length. As she points out, that story “must be understood not as a representative ‘lesbian’ narrative but through the very structures set up by the story itself; these demand that female homoeroticism be located as simply one form of desire within a web of multiple, competing desires that are in turn embedded in different economies of work and pleasure” (145), which also, Gopinath argues, challenges normative depictions of subalterity (148). The feminized domestic space in which “Lihaf” is set is one of both labour and sexuality, and the two cannot be disentangled either in that text, or in *Babyji*.

Walter Penrose maintains that the practice of secluding women into a zenana or harem, practiced by upper class Muslims and Hindus alike, and depicted in “Lihaf,” created opportunities for precisely these sorts of homoerotic relationships, and that, as the illustrations he draws on make clear, were not entirely unknown prior to the twentieth century (23-25). The *Kamasutra* itself notes that when polygamy is practiced, women are likely to remain sexually unsatisfied, and therefore “obtain satisfaction amongst themselves” (qtd. in Penrose 23). Suparna Bhaskaran recounts

how erotic practices between women often continue to be viewed as compatible with, rather than as a challenge to, normative Indian practices of homosociality (138). At the same time, as Gopinath argues, “the slide from female homosociality to female homoeroticism serves to locate female same-sex desire and pleasure firmly within the confines of the home and ‘the domestic,’ rather than a safe ‘elsewhere’” (153). The homosociality of the Indian private sphere can therefore render queer desire simultaneously more and less threatening to the nation-state.

If Chughtai’s story hinges on the unspeakable and uncertain nature of the activity that unites the two women beneath the titular quilt, however, *Babyji* makes sex between women an explicit and unmistakable centre of the story. Indeed, sex performs a variety of functions. If sex with India provides Anamika with opportunities for both education and pleasure, sex with Sheela and Rani provides uncomfortable insights into the workings of power — both inside and outside the domestic spheres. The locations where sexual activities occurs in the novel — Anamika’s childhood bedroom, Sheela’s childhood bedroom, India’s bedroom — not only domesticate queerness, as Gopinath indicates, but call into question the site of the middle-class family home as a sanctified space that in Indian nationalist ideology is supposed to both epitomize, yet remain separate from, the public space of the nation (see Chatterjee). Anamika herself sees families like hers as “the moral fiber of society” (11), and the ethical quandaries that Anamika faces call into question not only her personal morality, but that of the nation as a whole.

Rani repeatedly reveals aspects of herself that unsettle Anamika and challenge the protagonist’s understanding of the servant, and of their relationship. Rani’s given name, Basanti, is revealed quite late in the novel and at India’s, rather than Anamika’s request (143). Anamika is also unsettled by Rani’s knowledge of English (63), lack of bodily shame (10), and the fact that her family of origin had indoor plumbing and running water in their home (63). The moniker Rani, commonly used with servants in place of their given names (16), both serves to incorporate Basanti into the fabric of nation, while also erasing her individual identity. There is a clear irony in making Rani (which means queen) the normative title for women whose class and caste mark them as subordinate. Yet Anamika tries to break away from treating Rani like a servant (30), albeit with limited success (44). Rather, it is Rani who “stared at the chasm that separated my higher birth from her lower one and hopped right over it” (15).

This tendency to erase others’ identities through her happy ignorance of their given names also extends to India, whose given name is actually Tripta (which means satisfaction). Instead, of speculating or asking about Tripta’s history or identity, however, Anamika states:

I drew maps of India and wrote India in the center. I anthropomorphized the map by adding curls on the states of Gujarat and West Bengal. I imagined India's body and the map of the country liquefying the boundaries between various states so that they could overlap...I added two breasts in the bang centre of the map. (43)

This sexualizing of the map of India not only recalls the work of painter M.F. Hussain, but enacts a queer fantasy of the nation. Mother India, so iconic in Indian nationalist writing, film and visual arts, is here made an innately and necessarily queer figure; to love the nation as a loyal female citizen is not, as Gandhi proposed, to renounce the domestic (and with it, sexuality) (see Partha Chatterjee), but to sexualize and render queer both the home and the homeland.

Anamika means ring finger, suggesting the ways in which Anamika's actions are also a queered performance of heterosexual marriage. Indeed, she becomes jealous when she learns that Rani continues to have sex with her husband. Anamika imagines her love life in terms of Draupadi's relationship with Arjuna and his brothers (51). She further believes that her same-sex attractions are innate (139) and grounded in the physical (117), angrily rejecting Adit's charge that her affairs represent a "phase" that will come to an end with her inevitable heterosexual marriage. But his rejection of Anamika's claim to have raped Sheela, after the former digitally penetrates the latter despite her protestation, is also a disavowal of the possibility of sex between women (213). Indeed, Anamika's violation of Sheela is inextricably linked to her fantasy in which the two grow up and marry, with Sheela adopting the role of a stereotypical Indian wife (107).

All of Anamika's most morally problematic actions occur while she is cast in a more masculine role, as Hindi film hero (12), Bollywood villain (179) or Rock Hudson (17). Indeed, she enjoys Tripta's son's uncertainty around her gender, and repeatedly chooses clothes she believes help her appear boyish, as well as mens' cologne (8). For this reason, Sridevi K. Nair argues that *Babyji* as a bildungsroman maps Anamika's achievement of masculine adulthood and that even her rapture over meeting India "mimics male nationalism, especially the importance attached to woman's procreative power and the idea of an 'essence' that is exclusive to womanhood, which is deployed to maintain gender roles under the guise of the 'reverence' accorded women because they are 'maternal'" (149). Indeed, Anamika recoils when she learns that Tripta also understands the world in scientific terms, including taking an interest in the role of the hormone oxytocin in sexual arousal, as well as breastfeeding and maternal bonding. Anamika considers the mother-child bond "sacred;" and begins to wonder if Tripta is "pathological" (245).

It is here that the novel also points out the limitations of the Indian traditions

of queerness as epitomized in the *Kamasutra*, from which Anamika draws. While Wendy Doniger refutes the argument that the *Kamasutra* centres on the domination of women, she nevertheless views the forms of female power enunciated within it as “fragile” (22). Indeed, as Jyoti Puri makes clear, the history of the *Kamasutra* when read from a “transnational feminist perspective” refuses and cannot be contained by the “categories of past and present, of “India” and the “West,” or tradition and modernization-Westernization” (634). All of the extant translations remain “trapped within an unexamined nexus of power” (Puri 635). Yet it equally seems as though few alternatives are to available to Anamika — her best friend’s father and would-be lover gives her a copy of *Lolita* and tries to cast her as its titular character, but Anamika would rather be Humbert (223). Neither option seems very promising.

Therefore, her reading of the *Kamasutra* can only be the beginning of Anamika’s sexual — and political — education. The doctor who comes to Anamika’s school in order to provide sex education to the pupils is another important touchstone. She acknowledges both that sex between women is possible and that homosexuality exists in India (98). Sridevi K. Nair’s complaint that the novel’s depiction of school-based sex education is unrealistic — that no physician would have openly acknowledged the possibility of homosexuality in a Delhi private school in the late 1980s (165-166) — fails to acknowledge the fact that queer sexualities were becoming increasingly visible in Delhi during this period, and not only because of the publicity afforded to Western celebrities such as Rock Hudson (referenced by Anamika in the novel (96)). Paola Bacchetta recounts several high profile suicides among lesbian couples between 1979 and 1990. While “[t]he press produced these women as tragic, dangerous, or simply unintelligible,” many Indians queers and nascent gay rights organizations used the publicity to initiate dialogue around their experiences (Bacchetta 958). Bacchetta also recounts three marriages between women that occurred in the region around Delhi between 1987 and 1989, all of which also received media attention (ibid). While the outcomes varied — one of the marriages described was treated in the media as an asexual solemnizing of friendship, another was annulled by the father of one of the women under section 377 of the Indian penal code — all of these events point to the ways in which love and sex between women was not entirely unknown in popular Indian discourses, and were sometimes quite clearly labeled as lesbian (Thadani 103-4).

Shohini Ghosh points out that while female homoeroticism has been much less frequently depicted in Bollywood cinema than male homoeroticism, it is not totally absent (210). Carla Petievich also documents how rekhti poetry written in Urdu, though written by men, developed a female voice used to express attraction to and desire for females. Though in the twentieth-century rekhti poetry became

a “marginalized” body of literature (51), Ruth Vanita and Saleem Kidwai have exhaustively documented in their anthology *Same-Sex Love in India* (2000) that homoeroticism continued to appear in the literature of every Indian language.

Sridevi Nair argues further that Adit's calm reception of the news of Anamika's affairs reflects the fact of his cosmopolitanism (163). This claim is not, however, borne out either by sociological information around queer South Asian lives or by Adit's negative response to Anamika's report of encountering two gay men raising a child (332). As Suparna Bhaskaran reveals in her extensive catalogue of interviews, Indian parents of queer girls and women respond to the revelation of their childrens' sexualities in diverse ways; greater westernization or exposure to the West does not guarantee a diminshment of homophobia, and indeed, can sometimes incur the reverse. Furthermore, Bhaskaran's interviewees also recount occasions in which friends of a young couple helped the lovers meet in secret and to protect these teenagers from the wrath of their own parents (Bhaskaran 139).

The “theme that lesbianism is not Indian” occurs in late twentieth and twenty-first century India as a response not to the queer rights movement in the west, but in response to the media frenzy surrounding these local events — which involved predominantly lower class Hindu women (Bacchetta 958). Indeed, media reporting which claimed that “lesbianism in not India” was also met by letters to the editor refusing the equivalence between queerness and the west. It is worth noting that at least two of the marriage ceremonies described were decidedly “Indian” in their content. Bacchetta notes one instance in which two women were married by a Hindu priest. Giti Thadani, who examines the reporting around one of the marriages in more detail, notes another couple participated in a traditional Gujrati ceremony that solemnizes friendship between women and also has an “erotic element” (108). She notes, however, that this traditional rite is “no longer positively regarded” in the tribal communities where it originated, and that many tribal women have now converted to Christianity (ibid). That same-sex marriages occurred in independent India as early as 1979 should perhaps not be surprising. Ruth Vanita's *Love's Rite* (2005) recounts a variety of traditional forms of same-sex union, some specifically involving two women. As Partha Chatterjee notes, Indian nationalism constructed a new nationalist patriarchy dominated by upper and middle class caste Hindus via “a system of exclusions” which simultaneously modernized and closely regulated women's sexualities (164-165). These marriages, and the associated media outcry, map a struggle between contesting truths within India on the terrain of Hindu hegemony.

Furthermore, the period depicted in the novel was a major organizational and activist period for the gay rights movement in India. India's first major queer magazine, *Bombay Dost*, began publication in 1990; Sakhi, India's first lesbian

collective, was founded that same year. These two events were not spontaneous ruptures, but emerged from years of earlier activism and coalition building via organizations such as the Red Rose Rendezvous Group, active in Delhi during the 1980s, and the Indian Women's Movement, which was founded in 1979 (see Bacchetta). In the West, specifically South Asian queer groups were emerging at much the same time. In the United States, for instance, a lesbian collective entitled Anamika began in 1985. It may not be a coincidence that Dawesar's protagonist has the same name. Nayan Shah points out that the word *anamika* derives from the Sanskrit and means "nameless" which was intended to "address the dearth of names in South Asian languages for relationships between two women" (142). In fact, a variety of South Asian words have been used to designate women who love other women, such as *sakhi* and *yuvati* (words that arguably had sexual connotation in the original Sanskrit) (see Thadani).

Khush is sometimes used for queer men and women in South Asia, and means happy. Though the novel does not use the term, happiness is one of its central themes. As Sara Ahmed argues, *Babyji* presents a distinctly queer take on happiness. Indeed, queerness gets in the way of Anamika's aspirations for a good and happy life as conventionally understood (Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* 120). Instead, Anamika "refuses to give happiness the power to secure a specific image of what would count as a good life, or of what she can give" (Ahmed, "Happiness and Queer Politics" 15). Indeed, the realization and fulfillment of Anamika's queer desires is not isomorphic with her happiness. To be clear, these desires do not, in and of themselves, produce unhappiness. But in the course of exploring these desires Anamika is forced, rather uncomfortably, to confront her own sexual inexperience, her own ego, her previously unexamined caste and class privilege, and her own varied prejudices. These overtake, at least in her own mind, the more conventional aspects of her life that ought to be normative sources of happiness — her academic and athletic achievements, loving family and supportive friendships. When she converses with the US college recruiter towards the end of the novels, who praises her involvement in extracurricular activities, Anamika can think only of her entanglements with her various lovers (354).

It is heterosexuality in *Babyji* that is repeatedly cast as foreign and threatening. At best, it is associated with a kind of ancient duty, which, as Anamika's mother argues, leaves little room for a "joyful life" (176). Instead, heterosexuality is associated with violence and with ugliness. When Anamika catches a glimpse of a pornographic German magazine that has surreptitiously been circulating among her classmates, she finds most of the models unattractive, and compares them negatively to her three real-life lovers: India, Rani and Sheela. Even male classmates can be threatening. A used condom is left on Sheela's desk at school; Anamika isn't even sure what it is, but

understands that its presence is an act of violation (309).

Chakra Dev, with whom Anamika has a complex relationship, is accused of provocatively leaving the condom there; certainly, he engages in other sexual transgressions in the novel, including drunkenly phoning Anamika to talk about his sexual fantasies and activities. A lower caste Hindu, Chakra Dev is socially excluded at the their elite Delhi school, and also seen as “overdeveloped” because he shaves and has other physical attributes suggestive of adult masculinity (73). He interrupts the relationship between Sheela and Anamika, both via his insistent heterosexual desires for Sheela, and by quite literally walking in on them (128). But he also challenges her claim to knowledge of the nation; Anamika has known him for some time without understanding that his name connotes a ‘backward caste’ yet she has implicitly understood him in caste terms, claiming “he had been born a complete hoodlum with an antisocial gene, just as I had been born with a gene that preferred Sheela’s smoothness to Vidur’s hairiness” (139). This initial assessment, though it superficially clears space for queer identities, also reveals the limits of an identity-oriented approach.

Sheela’s name means modest or good, and it is she whose relationship to queerness is most uncertain in this text. Whereas Rani openly declares that she prefers to have sex with Anamika than her husband (and indeed even receives a beating for refusing him), Sheela sees her relationship with Anamika as a prelude to heterosexual marriage, not an alternative to it. Sheela’s experiences of heterosexuality are virtually isomorphic with her experiences of sexual violence, from constant catcalls (76), to being sexually assaulted on a crowded public bus (78). In contrast, Anamika offers her a certain kind of freedom, albeit one decidedly associated with class, as indicated when Anamika takes her horseback riding (45). It is perhaps no surprise that it is to Sheela, who comes closest to epitomizing an Indian feminine ideal (one Anamika recognizes as such), that Anamika confesses the intertwining of her sexual and national desires in a letter:

I didn’t distinguish clearly between India, my motherland, and India, my lover. I could not distinguish between my motherland and my mother. I talked about making love to the country and achieving a mystical communion with the land, its riverbeds and plateaus. (241-242)

Here, the orgasmic queer communion with the nation precipitated when Anamika first meets Tripta is repeated, but with a difference. Anamika no longer experiences queer desire as an alternative to, or superimposition onto, knowledge of and loyalty to the nation. Instead, she is overtly conscious of same-sex desire as a path to national

insight, one that defies the classificatory impulse that shaped her relationship to Indianness earlier in the text.

When all Delhi schools are closed in the wake of a student's self-immolation (intended as a protest against the implementation of the Mandal Commission's recommendations), Anamika begins to reflect more deeply on the nation and on her own gender: "[f]eelings of shame at being a Hindu in 1984 mixed with feelings of shame for having forced myself on Sheela" (217). The moment when Anamika is finally able to understand — and critique — her own violation of Sheela, coincides with her sudden insight into partition, and the communal violence which has plagued India since (265). It is after renouncing this masculine, and nationalist, prerogative that she becomes more comfortable with her own same-sex relationships, and holds hands in public with Rani for the first time (329). This act reconfigures the very public space through which the women walk, and the streets "seemed new" as if Anamika "had never walked on them" (*ibid.*). Therefore, queer liberation in the novel is associated with public space — but without the need to come out *per se.* Indeed, neither Rani nor Anamika can truthfully be said to be in the closet; Rani moons Anamika on the street at their first meeting. At the same time, Anamika comes to new sympathy for Chakra Dev. Her wish to see him remain in their school and even have the opportunity to speak to Sheela, the object of his desire, is directly related to her deepening understanding of queerness, not least because it is Rani who critiques Anamika for her use of derogatory casteist terms to describe her classmate (349). She begins to realize that embracing her own sexuality means understanding that "life itself... had arisen from disorder" (350), and that she needs to engage with Chakra Dev — and his disordering presence — in order to be a better person. This is a far cry from the commitment to classification that marks Indianness for Anamika at the beginning of the novel.

As Gayatri Gopinath argues, "one of the central tenets of Hindu nationalist ideology is the assignation of deviant sexualities and genders to all those who inhabit the boundaries of the Hindu nation, particularly Indian Muslims" (17). In *Babyji*, it is Chakra Dev who occupies this role due to his caste. Indeed, non-Hindus are conspicuously absent from Anamika's world. This is especially significant, because while the use of the *Kamasutra* as a queer source text is reterritorializing, it is also potentially problematic, in that it associates queerness purely with caste Hinduism, and critiques sex between members of different castes. It therefore continues to marginalize subjects such as Rani and Chakra Dev. Indeed, Anamika moves easily from referring to the *Kamasutra*'s advice for giving a lover pleasure to thinking of India as an object and possession (226). It is telling that she continues to refer to her lover as India at such moments. Anamika's inability to understand why she is in fact

willing to risk her prefectureship for Chakra Dev suggests her ongoing misrecognition of him and of their relationship. Even at the novel's end, she remains surprised that he can dress normatively, speak to adults as well as she does, and shares her choice in cologne.

At the close of the novel, Anamika is wrestling with whether or not she should go overseas to pursue her post-secondary education. Rani rightly recognizes that if Anamika chooses to go the United States, she will also be relinquishing some of her caste privileges; becoming equal, however, may actually be an act of loyalty to the nation. As Gayatri Gopinath points out in *Impossible Desires*, "adherence and loyalties to nationalist ideologies 'that' are fully aligned with the interests of transnational capitalism" (10-11). The relative importance of any prospective move is downplayed — not only because Anamika believes it would be temporary (she compares herself to Nehru and Gandhi, whose overseas experiences arguably invigorated, rather than tempered, their nationalism) but also because she believes going to America is mere "child's play," compared to the challenge of negotiating the new world within herself (347).

Perhaps Anamika's journey mirrors the "shift from 1980s deheterosexed *homespaces* to the nationalizing *India Café* to the nationalizing-inter-nationalizing *India International Center* to a 1990s dominant transnationalizing insertion into *McDonalds*" (Bacchetta 960; italics in original). Anamika's early sexual encounters occur in a variety of domestic spaces: Tripta's bedroom, Sheela's bedroom, her own bedroom. But her initial flirtations occur in very public spaces: the school hallway, a public path, a sports field. Indeed, Anamika's romantic and sexual relationship with Rani becomes as developed as it is precisely because Rani, as a servant, is able to sleep in Anamika's room without prompting suspicion. Her encounter with the gay male couple and their son, however, occurs in Delhi's "Diplomatic Enclave" (322).

Whereas lesbians are frequently depicted as lonely and isolated in South Asia, both in fictional accounts and in scholarly studies such as Giti Thadani's *Sakhiyani* (see 113, for example), Anamika's experience in *Babyji* is quite the opposite. Dawesar's refusal to imagine the queer woman as isolated, lonely or permanently traumatized, insists that queer life in India is viable, and rich in possibilities, for both the queer individual and the nation. The novel therefore maps networks of relations that simultaneously challenge and reinforce the regimes of truth intrinsic to Hinduism, class hierarchies, caste divisions and, indeed, the Indian nation-state. These networks form the basis of "hegemony, social, economic and cultural" (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 133) but also provide the means for resistance.

The party at India's home, which takes place in the penultimate chapter, produces a carnivalesque space in which the many desires that animate the text are openly

spoken, and Anamika's multiple entanglements become known. At the same time, Chakra Dev and Anamika become glued together through a new, though potentially treacherous, friendship (344). By its very nature, the carnivalesque, involves the disruption of hierarchies and normative boundaries, and with its fraternization of students and teachers, parents and children, this party is no exception. While this rupture is necessarily confined in time — teachers and students return to school in their usual roles the following day — they are changed by their experiences. The novel therefore ends on an optimistic — if not happy — note.

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Unruly Voices/Disciplined Bodies: Games of Truth and Desire in Kishwar Naheed's Poetry

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Abstract This article examines the poetry of a contemporary feminist poet from Pakistan, Kishwar Naheed (b. 1940). Using Michel Foucault's later writings, I look at the possibility of reading Naheed's poetry as acts of *parrhesia* where her aesthetic self merges with an ethical voice to create a literature of resistance against laws of patriarchy and the nation-state. I demonstrate how Naheed reshapes the positionality of the poetic "I" and, in the process, transforms poetry-writing into an act of "truth-telling" by creating an assemblage of dialogic voices. I further discuss how Naheed uses this poetic assemblage to specifically challenge the Islamization of Pakistan's legal system under the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). Finally, I theorize feminist poetry from Pakistan as a discursive "game" of vacillating truths and desires that women poets like Naheed employ to weave together issues of collective identity and individual performativity through intersecting narratives of gender, religion, and nation.

Keywords Kishwar Naheed; Feminism; Pakistan; Urdu Poetry; *Zina* Ordinance; *Parrhesia*

We wish to be mute
For those who clap do not use their voices
A voice that is independent is the cry of Mansur
When it is suffocated it becomes Nasir
But at least the mute can scream
Why is that so? How is that possible?

(Naheed, *Distance* 20)

Kishwar Naheed, a feminist poet from Pakistan, ends her poem "Section 144" with these lines to open up the possibility of a voice without speech. Using a section of the Criminal Procedure Code as an allegorical device to describe the pervasive grids

of both patriarchal and state power, Naheed embarks upon a journey to search for a primordial voice that can convey collective dissent in the absence of a dissident community. Section 144 is a legal statute that prohibits public assembly of five or more persons in potentially disruptive situations, and it is frequently invoked by law enforcement authorities to disband protest gatherings. "Section 144" as a poem, however, names an uncanny assembly of voices that defy such laws by learning to speak beyond the sensory schema of the human body. Naheed first looks at a ninth-century Sufi mystic writer, Mansur al-Hallaj, in pursuit of a voice that speaks up against authority as a self-professed embodiment of truth. Al-Hallaj defied the conventions of his times to share his spiritual teachings with others and was publicly executed on the account of heresy by the Abbasid Caliph after a long drawn trial. The accusation of profanity against Al-Hallaj was based, among other things, on his claim that he was "Truth" — an assertion not available to mere mortals in his time. After Al-Hallaj, Naheed turns to someone closer home to show how protest gets stifled in authoritarian regimes. She draws our attention to the death of Hassan Nasir, a poet and political activist, after his arrest under the Security of Pakistan Act in 1960. As a leading figure of the banned Communist Party of Pakistan, Nasir was brutally tortured during police interrogation in Lahore, and succumbed to his injuries while in detention.

Despite suffering the punishment of corporeal death at the hands of a totalitarian law, both Al-Hallaj and Nasir are resurrected as unruly voices in Naheed's poem to signify the power of protest literature that can make the politically mute "scream". Naheed lyrically weaves together Al-Hallaj's spiritual claim to sovereign truth with Nasir's smothered rebellion to converse with the tumultuous politics of Pakistan in her own times. Naheed's writings, along with representing forced diktats of silence, constantly invoke personages in the act of practicing free speech in order to counter the "disciplining" impulses of historical discourse. One way to understand Naheed's need to rebel against conventions of history writing and search for a disembodied voice amid the historical spectrality of radical figures is through Michel Foucault's philosophical engagement with the relationship of an intellectual with truth and society. In many of his writings and interviews, Foucault tries to establish the ethical bind for intellectuals when they speak to governmental power and reflects on the following question: how do writers and intellectuals perform the function of "truth-telling" within the established grids of power and knowledge while addressing institutions and practices that produce and govern citizen subjects? In his early writings, Foucault conceptualizes truth, not as an ontological or transcendental reality, but as an "effect" of various techniques constituted in relation to language, power, and knowledge. While Foucault conceptualizes "regimes of truth" as historical

mechanisms that produce discourses with the function of being true in a specific time and space, he devotes much thought in his later writings and lectures to “games of truth” for articulating the agency of the subject. He hypothesizes two histories of truth, where the first kind is an “internal” history that “rectifies itself in terms of its own principles of regulation.” In contrast to this regulated production of truth, Foucault writes,

it seems to me that there are in society (or at least in our societies) other places where truth is formed, where a certain number of games are defined — games through which one sees certain forms of subjectivity, certain object domains, certain types of knowledge come into being — and that, consequently, one can on that basis construct an external, exterior history of truth. (*Power* 4)

As a part of this “exterior” history of truth, Foucault revisits the Greek term, *parrhesia*, and theorizes “free speech” as follows:

parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, *parrhesia* is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). (*Fearless Speech*, 19)

Parrhesia, therefore, can be seen as a game of truth where “the speaker uses freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, the moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy” (*Fearless Speech*, 19). According to Foucault, *Parrhesia* is a kind of a role or an activity where the speaker says what she believes to be true, leading to a precise correspondence between truth and belief. Consequently, it is in the act of *parrhesia* that a *parrhesiastes* — the one who speaks freely in the face of authority — asserts absolute freedom to counter the disciplinary power of the state.

Like Al-Hallaj and Nasir who appear as *parrhesiastic* voices despite the decree of silence in her poem “Section 144”, Kishwar Naheed is also a poet and an activist who has constantly engaged with the questions of truth, power, and justice, notwithstanding the presence of censorial forces in both her domestic and public life.

For example, in her semi-autobiographical work, *Buri Aurat ki Katha (A Bad Woman's Story)*, she creates a parrhesiastic game by weaving together private reminiscences of living in purdah, getting married and having children, eye-witness accounts of repressive policies of local and national politics in South Asia, the violence during the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the Bangladesh liberation movement, and her own experiences of living under different military regimes in Pakistan. Beginning her narrative with a polyphonic assembly of women, Naheed writes, "In the old chronicles you never find details of incidents, only the judgement and the punishment, to teach a lesson to others" (*Bad Woman* 4). This statement is immediately preceded by a fictional dialogue between Eve and Safia Bibi, a blind girl who was punished with imprisonment and lashes in Pakistan as she was unable to prove the sexual violence behind her pregnancy. Hearing this punishment for a victim of rape, Eve discloses the complicity of patriarchy and law in perpetuating gendered violence by asking Safia Bibi, "Who punished you? Were you alone in this act, absolutely alone?" (4). In *Buri Aurat ki Katha*, much like her other writings, Naheed intersperses the private and public unfolding of events with spectral presences of historical and mythical women who speak freely to each other and to their times about their ostensibly "sinful deeds" in a feminist voice that refuses to be silenced by the label, "bad woman". Naheed's *katha* (story) further collects fragmentary traces of an unrequited love from Laila of an Indo-Persian romance and mythical motherhood from Yashodhara of a Sanskrit epic to make *Buri Aurat ki Katha* a unique "autobiographical *assemblage*", in which "there is no logic to a distinction between the autobiography and the archive or between the history of the self and the history of politics and communities with which it is in dialectical relationship" (Burton 186).

In this article, I read Naheed's poetry as acts of *parrhesia* where her aesthetic self merges with an ethical voice to create a literature of resistance against laws of patriarchy and the nation-state. Foucault, in his essay "Self Writing", engages with the question of how truth figures in the formation of the ethical subject in language. Borrowing an expression from Plutarch, Foucault claims that writing, as an element of self-training, has an *ethopoietic* function i.e. "it is an agent of the transformation of truth into *ethos*" (*Ethics* 209). Writing of the self, as a result, becomes a site for the production of the ethical subject through the material production of discourse. Taking his discussion of ethics further through the concept of *parrhesia*, Foucault asserts in his lectures that a "parrhesiastic activity also endeavored to elaborate the nature of the relationships between truth and one's style of life, or truth and an ethics and aesthetics of the self" ("Discourse and Truth"). He clearly points how "*Parrhesia* as it appears in the field of philosophical activity in Greco-Roman culture is not primarily a concept or theme, but a *practice* which tries to shape the specific relations individuals have to

themselves” (*Fearless Speech* 106). The act of “truth-telling” assumes an interlocutor (thus, making the “parrhesiastic pact” both intersubjective and dialogic); nevertheless, it also exists in the interstitial spaces between collective and individual practices that empower the borders of selfhood itself. In other words, a person practicing *parrhesia* does not only transform her relationship with power, state, and society, but also with her own voice and self.

Kishwar Naheed’s “Speech Number Twenty-Seven”, likewise, is a poet’s provocative demand for the right to speech without fear. Naheed opens the poem with the following stanza to establish the poet’s prerogative to admonish the repressive policies of the nation-state and the individuals who represent it:

My voice is the voice of my city.
 My voice is the voice of my age.
 My voice will influence generations.
 What do you think it is,
 that you call my voice a clamour?
 How can you call my voice
 the voice of madness?
 How can you think
 the coming storm a mere illusion? (Naheed, *Distance* 22)

In this poem, Naheed articulates a poetic subjectivity that can embody resistance against a world riddled with the absence of political will. This need to address apathy in her poetics, as Mahwash Shoaib rightly points out, “consists of daring to confront global, national, social, and canonical norms in a lyrical manner that imagines a new threshold of being” (“Dictionary” 155). As the poem “Speech Number Twenty-Seven” unfolds, Naheed claims that she is no prophet for her times, but she can still plainly see politicians who sit in the back seats of limousines practicing their public speeches. For these representatives of the state, speech is no longer a means to question power, but a rhetorical tool to placate citizens with the illusion of justice. Their disparaging and cynical attitude towards any possibility of political change is apparent in the fact that they memorize each speech by its number and simply repeat it in public without ever bothering to know the issues concerning the audience. In a world where speech is nothing more than a neatly numbered clamour of sounds, the poet’s voice in “Speech Number Twenty-Seven” opens up a possibility of a political revolution by speaking truth and mirroring the indolence of authority figures.

Naheed frequently combines descriptions of political repression with almost utopian visions of truth in order to transform the poetic space into an imaginary

experience of absolute sovereignty. Shoaib succinctly explains Naheed's need to engage with the politics of her times and assert her poetic sovereignty in the following manner:

When dissent is silenced through coercion, self-serving laws of sedition and, ultimately, self-censorship, even control over vocabulary is lost...This becomes no more evident than in the eleven-year military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan, when writers were jailed, flogged, exiled, or banished to publishing oblivion if they dared to voice opposition against the military state. Naheed persistently memorializes in her poetry these opposing voices that are in danger of being silenced. ("Dictionary" 161)

Naheed herself states in an interview, "The whole atmosphere, the events, the brutal murders all effect one's idiom and scenario. It is not just the past few years: at first there was the worst law and order in Zia's times ... then 9/11 took place and, thereafter, there has been continuous brutal action" (Shoaib, "Interview" 174). In this climate of disillusionment, Naheed sees the poetic space not as a means for escape from the political realities of Pakistan, but as the very site to combat them. She writes in *Buri Aurat ki Katha*, "In my poetic journey Pasternak, Mayakovsky and Osip Mendelstam reassured me that 'Poetry is not another name for fulfilment. Let your poems absorb the truth in the same way as truth absorbs everything'" (124-25). For instance, in a poem titled "First-Class Needs of Third Class Citizens", she constructs the desire to speak as an essential practice of freedom, knowing too well the consequences of such rebellion in oppressive regimes. Despite a keen awareness of the fact that any form of opposition will invite the accusation of sedition, she writes

Speaking is our necessity
 whether we speak licking the dust.
 My innocence pleads for itself
 with mouth buried in earth...
 how many people with a voice
 Are still alive in our city?
 Their heads must be chopped for decoration. (*Distance* 46)

Referring to military regimes as a conglomeration of "third-class citizens", Naheed calls living under martial law an exile for people who are deprived of even the "effort to speak". In this atmosphere of terror, Naheed's exhibits her knowledge of how the act of truth-telling is always laced with risk in another poem titled "Soliloquy":

Condemn me!
 For writing the book without lunacy,
 for writing the interpretation of
 dreams with my blood...
 Condemn me!
 For censoring the crucifix of the foe,
 for being the light of burning beacons
 within the range of the wind. (*Distance* 40)

In this poem, Naheed illustrates how a poet can use the space of literature to become a *parrhesiastes*, where she can speak as loudly as possible without knowing who will be her audience or whether anyone is listening to her. In so doing, she performs a significant function of parrhesiaistic criticism, where, according to Foucault, it is not as imperative to demonstrate truth to someone else as to criticize the interlocutor or the speaker herself. In order to criticize her own complicity with structures of power as an intellectual, she constructs the poem as a soliloquy asking for condemnation from an imaginary and invisible interlocutor who has the authority to censure or punish her.

Naheed sees writing as a space for articulating both her subjective experience and also a collective truth interlaced with ethical responsibility. According to her, poetry has been a source of both personal pain and comfort, but it continues to provide her with the means to engage with the life of others in writing and beyond (*Bad Woman* 122-26). However, she refuses to accept any partition between private and shared experience in her writing and asks, “Can you call it a personal experience when a prisoner is being flogged and a microphone is placed before him to relay his screams to the crowd gathered outside the jail, and when I too am part of the crowd?” (qtd. in *Distance* xi). Naheed continues to describe the effect of events in Pakistan on her, and admits that she suffers from both personal and collective pain and anger. In order to articulate these emotions, she writes in “Nightmare”:

The goat awaits slaughter
 and I wait for the morning
 for every morning I am slaughtered at my desk
 for telling lies.
 This is my price...
 I and my country were born together
 but we both lost our vision in our childhood...

In my country women look at the crescent moon and pray...
 Perhaps, to attain a better afterlife for liars like us. (*Distance* 48)

The significance of this poem resides in the fact that Naheed refuses to believe in either her power or moral courage to tell the truth. In a sense, the poem serves as a warning to people against intellectuals who claim to have the moral authority or the social privilege to articulate resistance. She writes how “rusty” times can turn almost anyone into “petty officials” with “rusty tongues” that only know empty words to represent truth in writing. For Naheed, poetry can provide refuge to truth, but it can always be dismissed as fiction or a “lie” by those threatened by it. In order to elevate truth past personal belief, opinion, or cynicism, it is absolutely essential for a poet to understand the inadequacy of an undivided “I” and to look beyond her own self to experience the personal.

Naheed's engagement with the question of selfhood can be interpreted through Foucault's later writings on ethics and subjectivity. While the project of studying the nature of power relations remained central to Foucault's theoretical investigations, his later work tried to look at the technologies involved in the formation of the subject and its ethical implications. In one of his lectures at Dartmouth, he says

Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self or the positive foundation of the self. Maybe our problem is now to discover that the self is nothing else than the historical correlation of the technology built in our history. Maybe the problem is to change those technologies. And in this case, one of the main political problems would be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves. (“Two Lectures” 222–3)

As this quote suggests, one of the main concerns of Foucault's later career was to reconcile technologies that constitute subjects through power-knowledge relations with those technologies of the self through which individuals practice resistance and freedom. In this context, he developed his ideas about the “care of the self” or a set of ethical practices for challenging disciplinary power. Although Foucault has been accused of formulating an almost solipsistic ethics by over-emphasizing the importance of autonomy in one's actions, it is crucial to understand that he did so with the intention of illustrating how individualities merge together to form collectivities and intense social relations. He makes his position clear in an interview:

The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with

others insofar as this *ēthos* of freedom is also a way of caring for others... And the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counsellor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. (*Ethics* 287)

Instead of instituting a narcissistic subjectivity, Foucault underscores how reflexive practices comprising the self can not only broaden the processes of subjectivation, but they can also constitute a potential site for engaging in reciprocal relations with others and creating a collaborative political community. In this sense, the act of speaking frankly in a parrhesiastic act also constitutes an ethical gesture towards the other and amounts to a technology of the self for resisting regimes of truth.

This intersubjective aspect of Foucault's theorization of the care of the self has played a significant role in feminist theory as it assists feminist scholars to analyze processes of subject production and relations of power marked by gender. Patricia Amigot and Margot Pujal, for instance, develop the Foucauldian paradigm of exploring the tension between subjectivation and domination in the following manner:

First, we believe that the processions of the constitution of subjectivity and its production of embodied effects that sediment hegemonic technologies pass, precisely, through intersubjectivity. Second, this claim brings us to think intersubjectivity as the space of possibility for transformation in relations of power. The rules that regulate the workings of truth are never individual or transcendent; they are actuated and re-actualized in practices whose regulation exceeds that of individuals. An intersubjective practice that problematizes configured sexual identities and displaces regimes of truth in which they are inscribed fractures and permits resignification and transformation. Intersubjective practice in this way becomes a site of "empowerment" and a site of possibility for the use of liberatory practices for groups of women. (664-65)

According to Amigot and Pujal, Foucault's explorations of the intersections between collective identity and individual performativity can help feminist writers identify the gendered technologies of both power and the self in order to create subversive strategies for performing collective resistance against the laws of patriarchy.

Naheed too, in her poetry, excavates new modalities for subjectivation by reconciling her poetic self with multiplicity of voices and, in the process, creates an intersubjective space that performs the function of *parrhesia*. While her writings point to the power of literature over public and official discourses of truth, her poetic self-reflectivity reveals the unstable nature of truth-telling itself and presents a dialogic

collectivity of contesting desires. As such, her poetry becomes a site for articulating a “parrhesiastic pact” — especially between women — that refuses to give into the totalizing claims of either the self or the other. In a poem titled “I and I”, Naheed writes

I am not a woman alone;
 many are imprisoned within myself.
 One woman,
 Who joined Adam to her blood...
 Another,
 Who entered the world of man,
 Carried his burden and hers...
 Another,
 Who would not be
Yashodara, or Noor Jahan, or Mumtaz...
 Another,
 Who wrote tales of bravery in the day,
 Of cowardice at night...
 And another,
 Who even now is like a steam engine:
 Keeps drinking water,
 Vomiting smoke
 And keeps going, keeps going, keeps going. (*Illegitimate Voice* 86-7)

Here, the poetic self splits into many fragmented selves — some named, other nameless — to release Naheed's voice from the egotistical confines of her selfhood to connect with multiple singularities. Each “I” in the poem is incomplete in itself, waiting to be completed by another “I”; in this process, each self comprehends the need of the other to complete its unfinished story. In her poem, “The Hand of Fate”, Naheed again evokes an incessant cycle of birth and death to articulate a feminist ethics that connects disparate histories of oppression and resistance. Describing her own poetic self as a “mother”, Naheed draws together real and fictional lives of women into a feminist revolution:

A mother like me gave birth
 To a princess, tall like a date palm,
 Who was burnt by the fire of sword,
 And sacrificed her life.

A mother like me gave birth
 To a wretch like me
 Who has lived drop by drop
 And killed death herself. (*Illegitimate Voice* 49)

By alluding to the nameless mothers who gave birth to women like Meera Bai, Cleopatra, Noor Jehan, and Sassi, she imagines her own self as an embodiment of a primordial motherhood that gives birth to such voices of rebellion, even if they are repeatedly condemned to death and punishment. As Neluka Silva acutely points out in her discussion of feminist poetry from Pakistan: “Since the process of childbirth is inextricably linked with, and takes place within, the female body, it brings into play a range of questions and issues pertaining to the body and its symbolic signification, for instance, as well as its deployment in spatial and national discourse” (38). Like many of Naheed’s other poetic works, “The Hand of Fate” uses the symbolism of motherhood and childbirth to bring together multiple singularities and create a transnational genealogy of feminist resistance. The metaphor of the reproductive female body straddles the boundary between the real and the imagined to resist the disciplinary power of nationalist or religious discourses.

Naheed’s poetry frequently brings the parrhesiastic “I” in conversation with a collective “we” to articulate a feminist ethics and empower women against the patriarchal laws of the nation-state. She reshapes the positionality of the poetic “I” and, in the process, transforms poetry-writing into an act of “truth-telling” by creating an assemblage of dialogic voices. These voices play a vacillating “game” of repressed aspirations and liberated desires by weaving together issues of collective identity and individual performativity through intersecting narratives of gender, domesticity, religion, and nation. Naheed uses this poetic assemblage to specifically challenge the Islamization of Pakistan’s legal system under the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), who promulgated new laws for the establishment an Islamic system of trial and punishment. The Zina Hudood Ordinance and the Law of Evidence related to adultery, fornication and rape, in particular, institutionalized gender discrimination, eroded women’s rights, and strengthened patriarchal beliefs and practices in Pakistan. Naheed describes the ramifications of the Islamization of state laws in the following manner:

During the 14 years from 1979 to 1993, husbands sent their wives to jail on allegations of Zina, so they could marry a second time without hindrance. Brothers accused sisters of Zina, and in gobbling up their inheritance felt their manhood vindicated. Fathers got their daughters accused of Zina to prevent them

from marrying of their own will so that they could lay their hands on the dowry which would make their own lives comfortable (*Bad Woman* 33).

Shahnaz Khan, in her study of women incarcerated in Pakistani jails under the zina laws, states that the state practices associated with the zina laws render the arrest and imprisonment of women natural and normal: "Women are intimidated into becoming docile bodies and participating in unequal relations with their families, their husbands and their employers" (96). In her poem "Charge Sheet 1990", Naheed captures how Zina Ordinance has become a political tool in the hands of a patriarchal society to undermine women's rights:

The lock on my door has been loosened
 But the door remains closed.
 The cloth over my eyes has been removed
 But I still cannot see anything.
 The seals around my lips have been broken
 But I have lost the gift of speech...
 From adultery to a half-witness
 All abuses are meant for me...
 I am free or in bondage
 From adultery to a half-witness
 My charge-sheet is pretty long! (*Distance* 94)

In this poem, Naheed draws the reader's attention to the fact that state laws related to women's bodies do not only lead to corporeal punishment or physical incarceration for crimes they did not commit, but they also force women to regulate their own behaviour and moral conduct out of fear of the possible repercussions of their actions. As Shahnaz Khan notes, "Powerful signifiers of nation and religion render ideas about zina, or illicit sex, a significant regulator of normative morality. Challenging them means not only questioning religion but also the symbolic force that created and continues to sustain the state of Pakistan" (89). Despite the risk involved in speaking against the Islamization of legal system, Naheed uses the poetic space to challenge the moral force of zina laws by raising important issues pertaining to women's rights in Pakistan. In a poem titled "We Sinful Women", she creates an autonomous domain of expression for women to counter the hegemony of state laws and patriarchal norms:

It is we sinful women
 who are not awed by the grandeur of those who wear gowns

who don't sell our lives
 who don't bow our heads
 who don't fold our hands together...
 It is we sinful women
 who come out raising the banner of truth
 against the barricade of lies on the highways
 who find stories of persecution piled on each threshold
 who find the tongues which could speak have been severed. (*Distance* 74)

Naheed intertwines protests against religion, state, and family through a collective “we” to reiterate the inability of the modern nation-state to counter traditional patriarchy and ensure basic human rights for women. The Law of Evidence introduced in 1984, for instance, states that the testimony of two women is admissible only as one reliable source. In other words, the testimony of a woman is considered half that of a man's in the court of law. In the absence of laws that protect women against gendered violence, “We Sinful Women” gives us an assembly of defiant women who refuse to remain silent and commit the “sin” of speaking against their country and religion. As Amina Jamal explains, women of the urban educated classes looked to the modernizing state to implement women's rights till 1977, but their faith in the modern state was shaken during Haq’s regime: “after the introduction of state-sponsored Islamization and the attendant moves to reassign women's place in social and political life, women's struggle for rights and freedom had to be waged against a confrontational rather than reformist state” (67).

Around the time Haq imposed martial law and declared military rule in Pakistan, Foucault gave a series of lectures at Collège de France where, among other topics, he discussed the concept of biopower. According to him, biopower is a technology of power for managing human beings as a group and taking control over entire populations. In his other work, *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault speaks of biopower as a political technology that brought “life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (143). Amigot and Pujal read Foucault’s concept of technologies of the self in conjunction with his elucidation of biopower to offer possibilities for analysing how women are feminized through a range of public/private discourses and transformed into docile bodies for reproducing not only human life, but also patriarchal norms and values. They write,

Power, in its demarcating and discursive construction of objects/subjects, and in other interrelated practices, establishes specific historical processes of

subjectivation. Discourses of women's nature and disciplining and normalizing practices are especially relevant with regard to the production of "proper" feminine bodies and subjectivities. The concept of regimes of power/knowledge provides a way of looking critically at canonical narratives and discourses, whether scientific, religious, or quotidian. (650-51)

This particular feminist reading of biopower is also very useful for analysing how the state laws, religion and patriarchy function as technologies to control gendered populations in Pakistan and how women create different modalities for resisting the disciplining impulses of these regimes. As Silva observes in the context of feminist poetry from Pakistan, writing about the body and soliciting freedom by women and for women "has a clear political imperative within a landscape of religio-social repression and patriarchal authority, since the body is simultaneously a surface on which social law, morality, values, and lived experience are inscribed" (34).

Naheed's feminist poetry, therefore, illustrates various techniques through which the state exercises control over women's lives and turn them into subjugated bodies. In the poem "How Crazy are Those who Love you so Much," she draws our attention to social mechanisms that produce normative ideas regarding gender and sexuality, and how these cultural discourses transform women's bodies into a symbolic expression of male honor and respectability. Describing the love of a husband towards his wife, she writes,

With words of chastity he adorned my hands,
 chained my feet like prisoners,
 and called it modesty...
 He says: 'What more can you ask for?
 Walls of marble, clean and shining
 to keep you safe. The gold lock and chain
 on big, solid black mahogany doors
 at least show that it's all for you,
 for your security, for your love.' (*Distance* 26)

In this poem, Naheed constructs the private realm of "home" as a site for not only producing prescriptive notions of morality for women, but also creating a liminal space for them within the nation-state. She continues writing,

How lovingly and hopefully built,
 this home full of ideals and dreams!

It's been tested with screams,
 making sure that if a sound
 dare penetrate some crevice
 It will turn to foam, exhausted,
 and nothing will get through. (*Distance* 26)

Naheed illustrates how the domestic space lends itself to patriarchal deception by portraying a picture of perfect conjugal bliss, where the “pure” and “selfless” love between a man and a woman provides the foundation of marriage. With greater emphasis on intimate, dyadic husband/wife relationships and the mutual dependency of conjugal relations, such representations condense a woman’s world to the home by maintaining a gendered division of public/private spheres. Naheed, however, constructs “home” as a space of imprisonment instead of conjugal bliss, since it is always open to patriarchal control with the “panoptical gaze” of customs and traditions ensuring regulated behavior.

In order to show the complicity of social customs and cultural traditions with the nation-state, Naheed frequently draws the reader’s attention to the patriarchal practice of *purdah* in her poetry. Literally meaning curtain or veil, *purdah* is a complex set of norms and practices regarding space, body and sexuality that defines a woman’s place within a given social structure. Hanna Papanek defines the *purdah* as a system “related to status, the division of labor, interpersonal dependency, social distance and the maintenance of moral standards specified by society” (8) and theorizes the *purdah* system as following:

...acting at various social and psychological levels, [purdah system] can be conceptualized in terms of two interacting and closely related principles which may be called ‘separate worlds’ and provision of ‘symbolic shelter.’ In a way, they are parallel, rather than mutually exclusive...the first, separate worlds, relates most closely to the division of labor in terms of actual work allocated to different categories of people...symbolic shelter deals with a division of another kind, the complementary and asymmetrical relations between the sexes...[it] becomes a significant mechanism for limiting affect to a specific group through the use of social control mechanisms. Dominance and dependency are integral to its operation. (7-8)

The basic values of *purdah* such as modesty and propriety are appropriated by the state in Pakistan to give shape to a domestic discourse that normalizes a patriarchal family system with gendered separation of spheres of activity. In discursive efforts to

push women into the private sphere of the family and home, as Amina Jamal points out, "proponents of Islamization frequently use the terms 'girl,' 'daughter,' or 'ward,' thereby denying women's legal status as adult individuals who have the capacity to give consent or to enter into contract" (73). To illustrate the erosion of women's rights with the nation-state's appropriation of customary practices of a traditional patriarchy, Naheed writes in a poem titled "I am not that Woman":

Remember me, I am the one you hid
 in your walls of stone, while you roamed
 free as the breeze...
 I am the one you crushed
 with the weight of custom and tradition...
 I am the woman
 whom you bought and sold
 in the name of my own chastity...
 I am the one you married off
 to get rid of a burden
 not knowing
 that a nation of captive minds cannot be free.
 I am the commodity you traded in,
 my chastity, my motherhood, my loyalty. (*Distance* 34)

In her theorization of *purdah* as symbolic shelter, Papanek notes, "What is fundamentally implied in the concept of symbolic shelter is that something or someone needs to be protected, in a given space and time, from forces originating elsewhere. This task requires a very profound differentiation between persons who need protection and those who provide it, and it is here that the deepest inequality is assumed" (35). Naheed also echoes Papanek reading of *purdah* in *Buri Aurat ki Katha*, "The word 'protection' has been attached to the female sex. Protecting her love, shelter, future, position in society. It is fate to be protected by a man" (*Bad Woman* 176). In "I am not that Woman", she questions the meaning of protection and shelter in the name of patriarchal laws when all they do is reduce her entire identity to a traded commodity.

To conclude, as a literary parrhesiastes who refuses to be turned into a docile body or silenced by the forces of censorship, Naheed creates an ethical bind for those with the freedom to write and represent the pain of the other. To a large extent, we can read her poems as gendered practices of aesthetic subjectivation that answer to Foucault's injunction about how the care of the self needs to be interpreted through

the practice of autonomy as an ethical act: “Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (*Ethics* 284). In a poem titled “Ants Consume the Elephant”, for instance, Naheed’s feminist self converges with her poetic self to traverse both the domestic spaces in Pakistan and the global history of violence and oppression. By imbricating both language and self with a poetic ethos, the poet weaves together subjection of individuals with possibilities of collective resistance through her own self-reflective perambulations in the discursive universe of feminist ethics:

On whom should I write a poem now
 That girl
 who cannot marry
 of her own accord
 and those who point fingers,
 her own blood,
 are petitioners of justice
 That darling
 for daring to express her own will
 is wandering between dungeons
 and sees ahead the person who had reared her
 in the form of an assassin
 On whom should I write a poem now
 The city of Kosovo
 where a mother
 has found all her six beloved children
 in the same grave
 Or should I go see in Albania
 in unknown faces
 the same
 crying, lamenting motherhood
 Weak colors fade
 but the color of a mother’s sorrow stays fresh
 who will remove it
 who will forget it
 On whom should I write a poem now (“Selections” 95)

Naheed’s poetry often presents itself as an assemblage of parrhesiastic voices and unrecorded histories that opens up a new space for the reader to imagine “the

possibilities of re-membling voices lost in the discourses of power, those of marginalized women and the disenfranchised silent majority” (Shoaib, “Dictionary” 153). Though the personal experience of living in Pakistan as a woman has been the subject of many of her poems, Naheed constantly engages in imaginative “border-crossings” in search of a language that can voice political and ethical concerns beyond the domain of her immediate experience. In another poem titled “The Poem that Doesn’t Melt in Europe”, Naheed merges her poetic self with the pain of the other to create a vocabulary of shared suffering and represent the imbalance of power between nations of the global North and South:

I was once sorrow, epitome of sorrow
 before seeing
 the crying sobbing women of Bosnia...
 I was once hunger
 before seeing
 humanity in Rwanda eating its own excrement
 in Somalia shredding the hide of camels...
 Darkness, helplessness and barbarity all have their own stench
 This stench is not for those nations
 waiting
 for the end of the last man who asks for his rights. (“Selections”83)

As Jahan Ramazani rightly points out, “when the intercultural tropes, allusions, and vocabularies of poetry outstrip single-state or single-identity affiliations, they can exemplify the potential for generative intercultural exploration” and “evoke noncoercive and nonatavistic forms of transnational imaginative belonging” (339). This sense of belonging, in Naheed’s poetry, points toward the possibility of creative “truth-telling” that liberates poets from the repressive demands of an authoritarian schema of representation and facilitates the formation of an alternate, albeit imaginary, model of citizenship.

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