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**Forum for
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Animality and Ecocriticism

Edited by Scott Slovic

Shakespeare Studies

Edited by Yang Lingui

Book Reviews

Edited by Yang Gexin



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动物性与生态批评研究

司各特·斯洛维克（栏目主持）

莎士比亚研究

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Introduction: Animality and Ecocriticism

Scott Slovic

Department of English, University of Idaho

875 Perimeter Drive MS 1102 Moscow, Idaho 83844-1102, USA

Email: slovic@uidaho.edu

I have often claimed that the two major paradigms within the field of ecocriticism are “place” and “animality.” It is possible, of course, to argue that there are various other themes and concerns in environmentally oriented literary scholarship, ranging from the human capacity (or incapacity) to apprehend phenomena of extreme scale and the ecological implications of our sensory and cognitive limitations for the politics of natural resource exploitation in industrialized and developing nations, to name only a few. But if we’re trying to identify over-arching concepts, our relationships to places of all kinds, small and large, and our understanding of what it means to be alive and to exist in relationship to other living beings may well be the overarching aspects of our “environmental experience.”

Much has been written about sense of place in literature throughout the world. There is, to my knowledge, no literary tradition in any country that is devoid of attention to locality: landscape, climate, vegetation, travel, neighborhoods, country-city tensions, and so forth. Urban writing, and even narratives set entirely indoors, are engaged with the experience of place. At a key moment in his 1848 essay “Ktaadn,” American writer Henry David Thoreau exclaims, “*Contact! Contact! Who are we? where are we!*” This famous utterance suggests that human identity (who we are) and physical location (sense of place) are fundamentally intersecting issues. It makes sense that our writers should explore the human experience by looking closely at the contexts in which we spend our lives.

But, I would argue, much the same can be said about our physical-animal selves and our relationships with other living beings — the complex of phenomena that I tend to describe as “animality.” Not all scholars who study the human body or the meaning of nonhuman animals in literature and the other arts would identify themselves as “ecocritics” per se. The fields of “body studies” and “critical animal studies” are also well developed and important academic disciplines. But I believe there are powerful affinities between ecocriticism and these sister disciplines. In her 2008 article “Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature,” published

in the book *Material Feminisms*, Stacy Alaimo powerfully launched an entire sub-movement within the field of ecocriticism by demonstrating how bodies intersect with the physical environment through the movement of substances from the body out into the world and from the world into all bodies — this is perhaps an over-simplified statement of the idea of “trans-corporeality,” the movement of material phenomena across and through bodies. What is also convincing in Alaimo’s formulation of a new material emphasis in critical responses to the literary, visual, and performing arts is her sense that there is an unavoidable *ethical* dimension to these processes — what we humans do to the natural environment has consequences for the nonhuman realm and for human beings. We have an ethical obligation to weigh these impacts when we make decisions about how to act. Alaimo focuses her discussion, in the 2008 study, on the connections between trans-corporeality and human health (or, more specifically, human *illness*).

But this emphasis on the body goes beyond a concern for *human* bodies, and the articles collected in this special cluster of articles demonstrate a broader sense of “animality” in ecocritical and allied scholarship. I am delighted to offer here a varied gathering of articles by a stellar group of animal-oriented humanities scholars.

Diana Villanueva Romero, from the University of Extremadura in Spain, begins the cluster with her study of xenotransplantation (transplanting an organ from one kind of animal into another) in American author Brenda Peterson’s novel *Animal Heart*. This essay adopts a “material ecocritical” approach to a literary text that questions the ethical shortcomings in two different “dispassionate forms of science”: experimental medical procedures and military testing of active sonar in the marine environment. What is particularly interesting, as Villanueva Romero argues, is how Peterson depicts a kind of communication that seems to occur between the baboon whose heart has been removed and the human host whose life has been saved by the transplant, a material communication that instills in the human recipient a new sense of ethical obligation to other species.

The second contribution to this special cluster comes from Wendy Woodward, of the University of the Western Cape in South Africa, and extends Villanueva Romero’s body-centered approach to trans-species relationships by adopting a posthumanist angle that seeks to illuminate the entanglements and commonalities between human beings and other species (in this case, dogs) by focusing on shared vulnerabilities among “disabled” characters. She quotes Lennard Davis’s line from the introduction to *The Disability Studies Reader*: “To have a disability is to be an animal, to be part of the Other.” This implies that humans whose bodies are somehow different than “normal” have a unique capacity to be sensitive to their own animal bodies and to appreciate the subjectivities of other humans and nonhuman beings. Taking as her

literary texts the Mozambican author Luis Bernardo Honwana's short story "We Killed Mangy-Dog" and the novels *Timbuktu* and *Wild Dogs*, by American authors Paul Auster and Helen Humphreys, respectively, Woodward situates her discussion not only in the context of Cary Wolfe's posthumanist theory and the disability theories of Davis and Ato Quayson, but within the new ecocritical movement, led by such scholars as Elizabeth A. Wheeler and Matthew J.C. Cella, that meshes disability studies and environmental analysis.

While not focused on the body per se, Michael Lundblad's analysis of Mark Doty's memoir *Dog Years* does engage provocatively with questions about illness and death. As Lundblad, who teaches at the University of Oslo in Norway, explains, the American poet raises troublesome "biopolitical questions" in recounting the illnesses and deaths of his human partner and his two dogs. These questions, as presented in this study, revolve around citizenship and activism, particularly asking when it is appropriate to engage in social resistance and when it is necessary to accept one's social or biological condition, including illness and death. Of particular relevance to this special cluster of articles, Lundblad critiques Doty's assumptions about "the inner lives of dogs" and their supposed tendency to live in the present, neither regretting the past nor hoping for a particular future. He is especially critical of Doty's narrative of the decision to euthanize one of his dogs after reading a look on the dog's face: "How is it possible [...] to tell the difference between a look that means 'I don't want to live' from 'I don't want to be in pain,' or, 'I am afraid of death,' or even, 'I want to live,' or 'please don't kill me?' [...] I must [...] question the assumption that we can 'read' dogs so confidently and propose universal lessons from them." This article also presents a subtle distinction between "animal studies" and "animality studies": animal studies, argues Lundblad, challenges "speciesist thinking" in order to improve the way humans treat nonhuman species; on the other hand, the discipline of animality studies focuses on how human and nonhuman lives, including human and nonhuman identities and biologies, are represented textually.

Much as Lundblad considers the biopolitics of our relationships with fellow human beings in comparison with our relationships to companion species (and perhaps other species in general), Aaron Moe, from Washington State University in the United States, also explores how literature helps readers understand the political presence of nonhuman species within a broadly conceived "zoopolis" (a term used by contemporary animal rights theorists Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka), which suggests that animals possess not only rights, but citizenship. Moe argues that poets Emily Dickinson and Brenda Hillman reveal how the American poetic tradition offers a "foundation" for a more inclusive "polis." This project highlights the capacity of nonhuman species to be "makers," not only passive entities that are represented

by human artists, by human agency. The granting of poetic (making) capacity to nonhuman species is a fundamental aspect of what Moe calls “zoopoiesis.” This concept shifts the power relationship between human and other species, suggesting that humans derive their own ability to use language from what they receive from other animals.

If Moe suggests that human language owes its essential vitality to our interactions with other species, Karla Armbruster, from Webster University in the United States, argues in her essay that we enhance our basic ability to engage with the world — to be aware of our surroundings — when we do something as simple as take walk with our dogs. She focuses on Henry David Thoreau, one of the central authors in the tradition of American environmental writing, with particular emphasis on his 1861 essay “Walking,” which highlights the idea that true walking is a way of deeply experiencing the vivid wildness of existence. Armbruster uses the scholarly technique known as “narrative scholarship” to analyze Thoreau’s ideas about walking and several examples of “dog memoirs” in the context of her own life as a dog walker. Many readers of Thoreau’s classic essay have wondered how it might be possible to achieve the elevated “sauntering” he describes, appreciating the sacred richness of ordinary life. According to Armbruster, dogs not only manage to draw our attention to physical nature, but “they also have a unique capacity to help us tune into the unseen, to recognize the existence of an entire world that is literally beyond our senses and wild in the ways it exceeds our capacities to grasp or express it.”

It is fitting that this cluster of extraordinary articles on topics pertaining to animality and ecocriticism (or, more broadly, animality and the environmental humanities) should end with the troubling and “enlivening” exploration of the potential for shared “goodness” in the lives of human beings and flying-foxes. Deborah Bird Rose, who’s based at the University of New South Wales in Australia, aspires in her contribution to this special issue to “enliven our ethical sensibility toward the goodness that is being evicted from the world through human impacts as they directly and indirectly break into and diminish the lives of others.” While she focuses her discussion on flying-foxes, Rose explores much broader questions that undercut, or “disturb,” the idea that prevails in modern, western societies “that the nonhuman world is a place not only lacking mindfulness, but also lacking goodness.” She argues that humans are not the only species that possesses or creates “culture” or “cultural narratives” — that “human cultural naratives are but one type among many.” Although this essay, which concludes the special issue, does not analyze human literary texts in quite the same way as the other articles collected here, Rose dramatically contemplates the lives and narratives of flying-foxes, showing how their stories of “symbiotic mutualism” intersect with other life stories in the Australian

forests.

Perhaps one of the fundamental motivations of the ecocritical attention to the many permutations of animality is the urge to overcome what Rose, echoing philosopher Val Plumwood, calls “the hyperseparated binaries that assert that humans are separate from the rest of the living world.” I hope that readers of all six of these articles will come away from this work with the strong feeling that our human lives are profoundly interwoven with the lives of other species across the planet.

责任编辑：杨革新

A Material Reading of Brenda Peterson's *Animal Heart*

Diana Villanueva Romero

Department of English Philology, University of Extremadura

GIECO-Franklin Institute, University of Alcalá

Alcalá de Henares, Madrid, 28801, Spain

Email: dvillanv@unex.es

Abstract This article analyzes the topic of xenotransplantation in American author Brenda Peterson's novel *Animal Heart* (2004). The transplanting of a baboon heart into a human patient is analyzed as a case of boundary crossing where the dualisms human/animal and spirit/matter are dismantled. Such a process challenges modern techno-science's use of human and nonhuman bodies, proposing instead a worldview where matter and its associated terms — animal and body — are reanimated by the practice of panpsychic and animist-relational epistemologies. In light of such a reanimation of matter, this article uses the framework of material ecocriticism to focus on the baboon heart's nonhuman agentic capacities, which the novelist describes in a way that illustrates the liberating power of literature.

Key words xenotransplantation; science; ecofeminist spirituality; panpsychism; animist-relational epistemology; material ecocriticism

“Life goes more smoothly without a heart”

— Margaret Atwood

In Brenda Peterson's *Animal Heart* (2004), topics such as science, animal experimentation, activism, and the ways of coping with coexisting identities are knitted together in order to reassess humans' relationship with nonhuman animals. The story develops around an episode in the life of animal rescuer and wildlife forensic pathologist Isabel Spinner that forces her to confront her past. She was an orphan who found refuge as a little girl in her connection with animals. Now in her late thirties, she realizes that her natural talent for empathizing with others, her *heart* that her grandfather called “her gift” (*AH* 126), has kept her unaware of her own needs and the possibility of finding someone to love. But this situation will change the moment

she meets her brother Andrew's friend Marshall McGreggor, an aquatic photographer to whom she is immediately drawn. This relationship, however, will take an unusual path after Marshall's heart attack and subsequent surgery, in the process of which he receives a transplanted baboon heart that will transform him in unexpected ways. He grows more conscious of the importance of family and friends, gives in to his feelings for Isabel, and responds to his new heart's demands of giving back to the animal that died for him.

Peterson presents two main instances of how dispassionate forms of science involving the use of animals lead to the erasure of their ethical significance. One is the xenotransplantation — the animal to human transplant — exemplified by Marshall's case; the other is the military use of active sonar and its consequences for marine mammals. Both practices involve the objectification of the animal. Xenotransplantation challenges the limits between the human and the nonhuman, exposing the lengths to which animal experimentation can go on behalf of a type of science that is oblivious to the essential unity of every living being. A similar consequence results from the naval testing of underwater sonar at Kiwanda Beach, Oregon, Isabel's homeplace. This testing affects the wellbeing of the marine wildlife of the area. Science, cast in this second example in the mold of the military, will not respond to the suffering of these creatures, either. It will merely see them as collateral damage of human progress.

In light of these examples, in the pages that follow, the objectification of animals by science, performed by medicine and the military, will be highlighted and contrasted throughout Peterson's novel with other modes of looking at nonhuman species, which may lead to what Henry Beston describes as "a more mystical concept of animals" (24). In these alternative approaches, animals are seen not as fragments of a whole that can be decomposed into repair parts, but as agentic beings with souls. In this article I intend to question the validity of our understanding of animals in today's scientific practices. Within this context, xenotransplantation is an especially suitable image of the contingent status of the species boundary and the instrumentalization of bodies typical of a Cartesian worldview. Reading *Animal Heart* through the lens of material ecocriticism, I will argue, inspired also by ecofeminist epistemologies, that the borders between the elements of the parallel dualisms mind/body, spirit/matter, and human/animal can be blurred by a paradigm shift emanating from contact with non-Western and non-anthropocentric ways of knowing.

Human Hearts and Animal Souls

The two human protagonists of this novel, Isabel and Marshall, come from similar backgrounds. Their respective cultural traditions attribute a great importance to

animals and place. Isabel's family comes from the Hebrides Islands, Scotland, from a culture of Norse and Celtic influence with strong ties with the sea and its creatures, especially the seal. When Isabel was little, her grandfather Ronald used to tell both her and her brother Andrew about their family as descendants of a selkie, a seal-woman called Finoola, who married their great-great-grandfather Angus.

Marshall McGreggor comes from a family where the ancient sea lore of Hawaii mixes with Western culture. His mother, Lillian, is a native Hawaiian who married a university professor from the mainland who also loved the sea. She claims to come from a family descending from the giant sea turtles. Marshall has lived far away from his homeland for years, but the heart attack he suffers while diving will make him reconnect with his roots. At the hospital his mother invokes the power of the sea animals, his *aumakua* or animal guardians, to bring him back to life. Once he has recovered, Marshall reunites with his family who welcomes him with open arms to a culture that makes no distinctions between human and nonhuman animals.

In the novel, these worldviews that concede spiritual power to animals and place are contrasted with the disembodied experience of the universe enforced by the Enlightenment and carried forward by modern techno-science. As feminist biologist Lynda Birke explains, the beginnings of laboratory animal production and the rise of pathology in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century produced "an understanding of the body in fragments — and in turn fragmentable; both shift[ed] the gaze away from the individual, experiencing, contextualized, [sic] self and toward definable symptoms" ("Animal Bodies" 170-71). Animals became a conglomerate of body parts ready to be used at humans' convenience, not a source of wisdom or healing. Images of these fragmented bodies abound in *Animal Heart*. These are present even in the description of Isabel's forensic laboratory where she performs autopsies of the animals that have died as a result of human cruelty. She knows that this place could be mistaken "for a taxidermy shop, with its organized clutter of animal parts" (AH 27) but, as it will be later shown, she approaches these dead bodies with the outmost respect in order to restore them to their integrity. Parallel to this are the descriptions of the bodies of stranded animals lying on the beach in chapter eight or that of the baboon used for experimentation in the laboratory at Roseland Research in chapter fourteen who "[lies] strapped down on a steel operating table" with a "pig heart attached to his own neck artery" (AH 243). Even Marshall's body, a human one, is treated by medicine during his operation more as a composite of parts than as a whole. He sees himself as a body "being harvested organ-by-organ while still alive" (AH 83).

These images serve to present the conflict between two opposing worldviews. One is the reductionistic, fragmented, and mechanistic view of Western science

represented by male scientists like Dr. Lamb, who performs Marshall's surgery, and Dr. Sharp, the expert on bioacoustics who works for the Navy. The other is the holistic, integrated, and organic view of the indigenous people and the women of the story. Animals for them are both kin and spiritual guides with the power to heal. Such an understanding emanates from belief systems, usually referred to as animism, "[involving] the concept that all living creatures, as well as other natural objects and phenomena, are imbued with an invisible soul, spirit or 'essence' that animates the conscious body, but that is able to move about and act independently of the body when the bearer is either dreaming or otherwise unconscious" (Serpell 4). This belief is shared by indigenous approaches as well as by the kind of spirituality endorsed by ecofeminists. Gloria F. Orenstein describes, for instance, how she spent nearly five years studying with Sami Shaman Ellen Maret Gaup-Dunfjeld from Norway, and found that shamanistic practice is ecofeminist because it bridges the distances imposed by Western religious practices between spirit and matter (173). This materialist spirituality,¹ although controversial due to its associations with positions described as essentialist (Warren 119), "recognises that spirit is not a hyper-separated extra ingredient but a certain mode of organisation of a material body, unable to exist separately from it" (Plumwood 223). Through this sensibility, the materiality of bodies acquires meaning as an agentic force, much in the manner in which environmental philosopher Freya Mathews refers to matter when defining panpsychism as a metaphysic that reanimates matter by making it "actually [matter], morally and spiritually speaking" (29). According to her, understanding the world in panpsychist terms implies "a profound shift" in Western thought, for it is compelled to "a shift away from the direction in which it has been drifting since the time of the scientific revolution" (4). It means moving away from the exclusive power of human reason and accepting the idea that matter can also be morally significant. As she contends, we must transcend the will to know and dominate the other and substitute it with a desire for the other. This is *orexis*, a term derived from the Greek *orektos* meaning "longed for" or literally "stretched out for" and normally translated as *appetite*, but which really "embraces three functions: desire, spirit, and wish" (Mathews 60-61). This *orexis* or desire for the other makes possible an appropriate approach to the nonhuman world once is reanimated through a panpsychic perspective. Mathews calls this *encounter* and for her it substitutes knowledge. As a way of illustration she tells her own personal experience of encounter with a solandra, a flowering plant native to warm latitudes. Mathews explains how she had grown especially fond of that plant after having had to relocate it in different places of her garden to protect it. But, when Mathews's neighbor decided one day to lay a concrete trench on his side of the boundary that separated his property from Mathews's, she realized the solandra will

die since the trench will cut through the plant's root system. Mathews thought this was not a plant that could bloom so far south, but the unexpected happened when "the morning of the execution" the solandra offered "a single, extraordinary bloom, a huge yellow trumpet flower" that touched her more deeply than many human responses had before (Mathews 81).

A similar story of human-plant encounter is described by nature writer Priscilla Stuckey who combines animism and feminist epistemology to propose a different approach to the more-than-human world. She explains how she was intrigued by the strength with which the image of a birch tree she knew since childhood appeared suddenly in her mind one day after having lived for many years away from the place where she was raised. This happened only weeks before her brother announced to her that they had to cut the tree down because it had a disease. Stuckey's interpretation was that the tree "had come to say good-bye" and that all the years she had spent living around that tree had created a relationship between them of which she was not aware of (183).

Stuckey realizes that this event is difficult to explain from a Western point of view where dualisms such as body/spirit, human/nature, and subject/object are primordial. Nonetheless, she gains full comprehension of it by looking at it from the perspective of new animism and the epistemology based on personal knowing proposed by feminist philosopher Lorraine Code.

Stuckey explains that new animism was defined in the work of anthropologists Graham Harvey and Nurit Bird-David (188). They both departed from Edward Tylor's definition of animism as "a belief in souls and spirits," but added to this "the prism of relationship for understanding interconnections with beings of all sorts, including human and other than human" (Stuckey 188). This was done because his definition reproduced dualisms typical of the West and inapplicable to the beliefs of many indigenous peoples. This was so simply because Tylor's animism was "focused on the immaterial side of a material-immaterial split," but actually such a divide was not part of many of the indigenous worldviews (Stuckey 188). The determining category was not body or spirit, not materiality or immateriality, but as A. Irving Hallowell explained in his work about the Northern Ojibwe of south-central Canada, that of *person*. These persons may be human but many are not; they are "animal, mineral, plant, cloud, dream, or spirit persons" (Stuckey 188). Of further importance, according to Stuckey, is also the fact that what matters in this kind of worldview is not the physical presence of these persons, but their ability to interact or engage in relationships. This is why Stuckey also resorts to an epistemology based on personal knowing as the one proposed by Lorraine Code who, like Mathews, challenges the objective/subjective dichotomy by considering the knowledge of objects as

independent of the knower. In Code's model subjective elements of knowing are always present: "how to be with [the other], respond to [the other], act toward [the other]" (Code 39). Furthermore, persons are considered as always evolving. And ultimately, both partners in this process of knowing must be open to exchange the "subject" and "object" positions (Code 53).

Ultimately, Stuckey concludes that her experience with a birch tree challenges Cartesian dualism because the knowledge she has gained of it can be defined as: 1) relational rather than objective; 2) contextual, not abstract; 3) built through inner or intuitive attention as well as outer, empirical methods; and 4) communicated through story rather than abstract theory or principles (191).

In the following sections, I will argue that in *Animal Heart* the main characters engage with the animals of the story in experiences of mutual understanding that can be framed within the animist-relational epistemology characteristic of an ecofeminist sensibility and illustrated by Mathews's and Stuckey's works. This reaches a special significance in the relationship between Marshall and his new heart because this organ comes to stand as an agentic part of the baboon Sol, the animal that is sacrificed to prolong the life of the human. By dealing with the difficult exchanges involved in xenotransplantation from an animist-relational point of view, Marshall will manage to make peace between the human and the nonhuman. Matter in the form of the baboon heart will also become enlivened, making science resonate with the need to redefine itself into a more comprehensive and empathic practice.

Xenotransplantation as the Encounter Between the Human and the Nonhuman

Animal Heart revolves around the issue of xenotransplantation. What could seem part of a science fiction story actually responds to, for many, one of the most promising directions of current medical practice: using animal organs or tissue as spare parts for humans. This technique is rendered as revolutionary by some because it may provide humans with an endless source of organs, although it is true that there are some risks involved such as zoonosis or the transmission to humans of diseases specific to the species of the animal donor.² In this respect, for example, in 1999 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued Recommendation 1399 on xenotransplantation, stating that it was in favor of a moratorium on the clinical applications of xenotransplantation given the risks to public health it could involve. Nevertheless, the media abounds with frequent examples of animal-to-human transplantation where generally the risks are "downplayed," as Marie Fox explains, by the emphasis put on the scientific breakthrough implied in such attempts and the benefits for an aging human population in need of organ replacements (154).

The truth is that the use of animal parts for human regeneration and the

prolongation of life is not something new. As David C. K. Cooper and Robert P. Lanza acknowledge, the earliest attempts at xenotransplantation date back to the seventeenth century (27-28). These first attempts took place in 1628 in Padua and later in London, and consisted in transfusions of animal blood to humans. In Russia, almost six decades later a nobleman who had lost part of his skull in battle had it replaced with a piece of bone taken from a dog (Cooper and Lanza 27-28). These exchanges increased dramatically in the twentieth century due to the hopes placed by scientists on this technique as a way to find a limitless source of organs for humans. Indeed, the first successful attempt at organ transplant was made using the heart of a chimpanzee.³ But xenotransplantation has never been exempt from criticism because it touches on the legal and ethical limits of medical research⁴ and goes against the interests of the animals used in medical procedures.⁵ Furthermore, xenotransplantation implies, as Fox contends, a blurring of boundaries between the human and the nonhuman (149). It consists, using Stuart A. Newman's expression, in a "commingling of bodies" that shapes hybrids where the boundary between the human and nonhuman categories are erased and hence provokes an uneasiness difficult to escape (192).

Consequently, in *Animal Heart*, xenotransplantation can be analyzed as a boundary case, that is, a case of boundary crossing where the dualisms human/animal and spirit/matter are dismantled thanks to the animist-relational perspective that informs the main characters' approach to animals. Such a deconstruction of barriers is especially meaningful in light of the tenets of the new materialism. In this respect, material ecocriticism, a new form of ecocritical studies being currently developed by Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann and others, seems especially apt for such an endeavor. Material ecocriticism emerges as a response to the "innovative ways of considering matter and material relations" by the new materialist theory, which has led to "the re-definitions of concepts like matter, agency, discursivity, and intentionality" and thus has affected ecocritical studies (Iovino and Oppermann 75). Through material ecocriticism, Iovino and Oppermann propose to focus "on the way matter's (or nature's) nonhuman agentic capacities are described and represented in narrative texts" (79). In their article "Material Ecocriticism: Materiality, Agency, and Models of Narrativity," they pay attention to various examples of "the representations of nature's agentic powers" in different literary traditions. Some of them refer to nature's manifestations through the power of electricity, landscapes, rivers, and the sea, which can be seen as "examples of ecological nonhuman agents projecting themselves as 'textual forms' of matter and telling their stories through the material imagination of their human counterparts" (Iovino and Oppermann 82). Such a statement brings to mind Mathews's encounter with the dying solandra she had protected for years and Stuckey's experience with a birch tree as a relational agent communicating with her

through the common story they shared. If such an approach is applied to Peterson's novel, especially to the way in which the baboon Sol, the donor, communicates with Marshall through his transplanted heart, it can be argued that the heart of the animal *matters* in this novel as a communicative agent. This allows for an interpretation of xenotransplantation as a bodily text where not only the frontier between the human and the nonhuman is crossed, but the distinctions between matter and spirit are also erased.

As Newman explains, the Christian world has often had an ambiguous relationship with the notions of flesh and matter. In general, in pre-Enlightenment Europe, the Church sustained "the Aristotelian notion that during the conception and development of all living beings matter is provided by the female but remains inert without the animating principle supplied by the male" (Newman 198). Such a vision was later emphasized by Manichaeism, which identified spirit with Good and the male principle, and matter with Evil and the female principle. It is easy to see that this understanding of polarities coincides with the traditional identification woman-nature-animal. Later, in the seventeenth century, Descartes saw the body as a machine that in the case of humans was inhabited by an immortal soul, which redeemed the materiality in which it was contained. The body of the animal, however, was devoid of a soul and therefore of a consciousness. Such approach led to the development of practices such as vivisection. Over time, the comparative study of species, to which Darwin's publication of the *Origins of the Species* (1859) led, laid the foundation for the development of fields such as cognitive ethology as well as concepts such as the embodied mind, among other things, making it possible to envision matter and all its associated terms (body, animal, nature, woman...) as alive. This material turn makes possible to say that there is not such a thing as the spirit/matter divide but that matter is spiritual in the sense that it interacts with other agents. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to contend that alternative epistemologies, like Mathews's pansychism and Stuckey's animist-relationality as well as many of those traditionally held by indigenous people, are verging on the same direction. This is happening thanks to a broadening of perspectives that allows for a deconstruction of dualisms and a more holistic understanding of the forces at play in the world where opposites are replaced by a continuum of intra-actions.⁶

In *Animal Heart* matter manifests itself through the transplanted heart of the dead baboon. The violated bodies of the human transplant recipient and the animal donor become texts in which modern biotechnological practices are inscribed to the effect of showing the contradictions inherent to science and its understanding of bodies. Since one of the ways in which material ecocriticism proposes to interpret the agency of matter is by focusing "on the way matter's (or nature's) nonhuman agentic capacities

are described and represented in narrative texts” (Iovino and Opperman 79), I intend here to analyze the bodies of humans and animals as texts where xenotransplantation opens a space of reflection on the blurring of the boundaries between the elements of the pairs human/animal and spirit/matter. Through this experience, notions of kinship are redefined, and most of all, models of fragmentation characteristic of Western science are substituted by alternative models of integration inspired by indigenous and ecofeminist spiritualities.

Open Minds, Open Hearts: Redefining Science

“The heart of science is feminine. [...] The science I have come to know and love is unifying, spontaneous, intuitive, caring — a process more akin to surrender than domination.”

— Candance B. Pert

In the West, science tends to look at the body from a mechanistic point of view. It is seen as a construct of parts that can be repaired or substituted without paying much attention to the consequences. The result of this Frankensteinian illusion is often that the more advanced scientific techniques are, the more dangerous their outcomes result for human and nonhuman animals.

In *Animal Heart*, the bodies of the human Marshall and of the nonhuman animals used in experimentation become sites where science writes its manifesto. They are literally fragmented by a kind of science that commodifies its subjects in its pretense of progress. Both the human and the nonhuman animals dissolve in the maneuverings of a science that sees no limits in pursuit of its goals. Marshall is given a heart he did not ask for. When he asks Dr. Lamb why they did the transplant, his answer, “We do it, [...] because we can” (*AH* 88), reveals the scientist’s arrogance as the representative of a profession that sometimes forgets it is dealing not only with *the heart* but also with *the soul* of the patient. In a similar manner, the bodies of the animals at Roseland Research Laboratory, from which Marshall with Isabel’s help will eventually rescue the family of his donor, are exploited to create new possibilities for science. These experiments imply the creation of grotesque hybrids which resonate with images Peterson herself recalls in the acknowledgements of her book where she thanks Dan Lyons of England’s Uncaged Campaigns for his “courageous activism on primate labs” and for his “groundbreaking Website ‘Xeno Diaries.’”⁷ This site denounces the xenotransplantation research done by the biotechnology company Imutran Ltd. between 1994 and 2000 in Huntingdon Life Sciences laboratories (Cambridgeshire, UK). These experiments involved the transplant of the hearts and kidneys of

genetically engineered piglets into the necks, abdomens, and chests of hundreds of monkeys captured from the wild.

All this violence renders bodies as desacralized sites for scientific experimentation. Nevertheless, throughout the novel, the heart as flesh-matter imbued with the soul of the baboon and manifesting itself in the life of Marshall, as well as Isabel's compassionate model of science, will serve to counteract the effects of mainstream Western science.

In Marshall's case, the heart transplant has serious implications for him. He is troubled by a surgery that has left him feeling used and disempowered, "not only part baboon," but "also a guinea pig" (*AH* 87). Likewise, as time goes by, he also becomes aware of changes in his personality that make him feel uncertain about his true identity: he evolves from being a detached and independent man to becoming closer to his family as well as a better friend. Interestingly, the women who are close to him and who have a special sensitivity to animals — Isabel, his mother Lillian, and his sister Nohelani — notice right away that something has been altered in him. Isabel and his mother sense as if a "frantic animal" had been placed inside him (*AH* 91). His sister Nohelani feels it too, but believes her brother Marshall is still "the same soul she had loved all her short life" (*AH* 99).

Marshall's transformation began on the operating table. At that moment, he is described as floating above the body of a man he does not recognize as himself at first. The only thing he sees is "emptiness" as if a body without a heart were just a dead piece of flesh. Furthermore, by having his body manipulated by science, he is estranged from it. There is no feeling for the man lying on the table whose "chest [feels] raw, split open like a melon" (*AH* 84). After the surgery Marshall notices that he has changed. He now "[longs] for daily society and family," as if he were feeling more with "the heart of another primate" rather than with his own (*AH* 102). He is also haunted by visions of someone else's life, the baboon that was killed to give him his heart. This happens mainly in his sleep or when he loses consciousness as a result of his dose of immunodepressants. The heart reveals itself to him then. It tries to tell him something in a similar manner to the solandra or the birch tree that startled Mathews and Stuckey, respectively. In Marshall's case the animal heart pleads with him to reestablish a balance lost with the killing of the baboon. This becomes especially clear at a time when Marshall is diving to take some shots of a giant Pacific octopus, Ursula. After a while she dares to hold him with one of her tentacles. This "strange undersea embrace" provokes in him a kind of trance where the boundaries between the baboon and the human vanish and it is difficult to discern a separation between the two:

He felt suction and pressure along his legs and torso as Ursula's arms now gracefully wrapped around him — and then the rectangular pupil floated inches from his mask. His chest expanded, yellow blotches floating before his eyes. But this time Marshall did not lose consciousness. No blackout. No dream. This time, Marshall clearly remembered:

[...]

Then bright lights overhead. His heart is beating strongly again. But he is not the same. He is not on a surgical table or in a tiny steel cage, yet he is alive, conscious. He is somehow inside another's body. Man-animal. He cannot get out. Over time he finds that he can get out when the man dreams or is floating and forgets himself. Like now. Here is another animal. Another kind of mask. He can see everything now. But it is liquid.

How can he get away from the prison of this man's body to find Hara? If he can only make this man see what he sees, and feel what he feels, he might find his family again. They have stolen his body, but not his heart. Not his memory.

Fathoms deep, Marshall remembered the intelligent face, a long primate body stretched out on a steel table. *Hara*, he signed her name. Marshall closed his eyes. Cold deep in his bones. Heat in his heart. The words he once rejected when others spoke them now wafted through Marshall's mind and he shuddered: *I am a transplant. I acknowledge the sacrifice of the dead. (AH 229)*

Thus, the baboon heart becomes an agentic material force in the story, complying in this way with Iovino's and Oppermann's analysis of matter as agentic and as having "‘narrative’ power itself"(83). This force leads Marshall in the end to a personal transformation and a commitment to liberate Sol's family from the laboratory where they are captive.

Marshall's post-transplant confusion is also in accordance with the description of some of the real psychological problems transplant patients find after surgery. Approaches to transplantation from the social sciences abound with descriptions of the uneasiness the reception of a foreign organ causes in the patient (Birke and Michael 259-60; Sharp 365-66; Woods 52, 54). In the novel, Irene, a young woman Marshall befriends in group therapy, explains to him that this may be due to "cellular memory," meaning that "every cell remembers who it belongs to" (AH 117). This explanation is plausible according to studies conducted with heart transplant recipients in various hospitals of the United States. Paul Pearsall, Gary E. R. Schwartz, and Linda G. S. Russek, for example, showed in 1999 that some patients had dreams related to the lives of the donors but not their own, and that some even experienced changes in

food, music, art, or even career preferences that were not explicable by contact with the donor or her family prior to the transplant (65-72). Independently of what the explanation might be, what is interesting is how matter, in this case a heart, manifests itself in a meaningful interaction with the protagonist, as seems to happen with some actual transplant patients.

The heart is certainly a powerful cultural symbol as well as an organ that has traditionally intrigued scientists. From a cultural perspective, according to Juan E. Cirlot, in the vertical scheme of human organs the heart is the central point and as a consequence it also evokes the meanings of the other two important organs: the brain and the sexual organs (141). The brain, in traditional ways of thought, was actually considered as “being mainly instrumental,” while the heart was seen as “the true seat of intelligence” (Cirlot 142). This centrality of the heart implies that “[all] representations of the ‘Centre’ have been related to the heart, either through correspondences or through substitution” (Cirlot 142). This also made possible the connection, in the mystic doctrine of unity, between the heart-symbolism and the love-symbolism “for to love is only to experience a force which urges the lover towards a given centre” (Cirlot 142). Furthermore, according to Jack Tressider, the heart is also considered as “[t]he symbolic source of affections — love, compassion, charity, joy or sorrow — but also of spiritual illumination, truth and intelligence” (n. pag.). As a consequence, as this author explains, it is often equated with the soul. Such identification lies behind the fact that many ancient traditions did not make a sharp distinction between feelings and thought, and considered that a person who “let the heart rule the head” was acting in a rather sensible manner (Tressider n. pag.).

From a scientific perspective, although one that connects with the cultural meaning of the heart, psychiatrist Mohamed Omar Salem reports on the connections between the heart and the brain. He explains that the heart determines, to a certain extent, the functioning of the latter. According to him, some studies show how the heart communicates with the brain in ways that influence “information processing, emotions and health” (Salem 1). He speaks of how John A. Armour in 1994 introduced the concept of the “heart brain” based on the heart’s complex intrinsic nervous system, very similar to that of the brain, which “enables it to act independently of the cranial brain — to learn, remember, and even feel and sense” (Salem 2). This is what makes possible to describe the heart as a “little brain” affecting perception, decision-making, and even creativity (Salem 3). Furthermore, Salem insists that there are other attributes that make the heart a distinct organ. It works as an endocrine gland able to produce hormones like oxytocin, commonly known as the “love” or bonding hormone, that can be found in the heart in higher concentrations than in the brain. It also “generates the body’s most powerful and most extensive rhythmic

electromagnetic field” five hundred times stronger than the brain’s magnetic field (Salem 2). This makes the heart act as a carrier wave for information that provides a global synchronizing signal for the entire body and affects “the ‘magnetic’ attractions or repulsions that occur between individuals” (McCraty, Bradley, and Tomasino qtd. in Salem 2). Furthermore, it participates also in “the processing and decoding of intuitive information” which the brain also receives but often after getting first to the heart. Finally, as Salem concludes, the heart is as determinant of conscious awareness as the brain since increasingly studies show that the brain and the body act together, so the heart is not just another organ but a part of a whole where all its parts are interrelated in what seems an almost cosmic connection (4).

Salem’s study is in line with the field of bodymind⁸ medicine according to which bodies are endowed with a bodymind intelligence that seeks wellness (Pert 18). According to neuroscientist and pharmacologist Candace B. Pert, one of the expressions of this form of intelligence is the neuropeptide molecules that she creatively calls “molecules of emotion.” These chemicals and their receptors determine “our emotions, beliefs, and expectations” (Pert 47). They are an instance of how there is not such a thing as the body and the mind working separately since the neuropeptides and their receptors, that for a while were thought to be found exclusively in the brain, are also found in other parts of the body as well (Pert 187). Thus, as it can be deduced, not only the heart functions as a brain, as Salem explains, but the whole body, as Pert sustains, functions as a mind: “the *mind* is in the body, in the same sense that the mind is in the brain” (Pert 187).

These sort of scientific findings that highlight the body-mind continuity further support the role as agentic matter played by the baboon heart in Peterson’s novel. Moreover, throughout the novel the heart also has an important function because it works on different levels of meaning, which highlight the polysemic nature of this word. On a superficial level, the heart in the book can be taken at face value, literally meaning the “hollow muscular organ that pumps blood through the circulatory system by rhythmic contraction and dilation” (*Oxford English Dictionary* 801). By revealing that both Isabel’s and Marshall’s fathers died as a consequence of a heart attack, the reader is reminded of its essential function for the sustaining of life. Marshall’s massive heart attack will only emphasize such role and become pivotal for the development of the story.

On a deeper level, the heart also symbolizes love, caring, and affection. These feelings are described as central to the lives of both the humans and the nonhuman animals of the story, but are mainly associated with Isabel who is “haunted” by questions of the human heart she is not able to solve through science (*AH* 182). Isabel has a profoundly nurturing way of being, especially with regard to animals. Her job

as forensic pathologist is aimed at investigating crimes against animals and she is also a volunteer in a wildlife organization for which she often looks after rescued sea animals. But deep inside of her is a fear of being personally involved that is born out of the loss of her parents at a very young age. This makes her keep a comfortable distance, especially after her failed marriage, from men like Marshall to whom she might be attracted. At the same time, she has found in science, as her brother Andrew guesses, a kind of protection that allows her to “[run] away from life” and escape “messy stuff — like love” (AH 16). She is easily inclined to love and affection, but knows the possible suffering and uneasiness derived from giving free rein to those feelings. That is why her practice of science as forensic pathologist as well as her activism, which is intrinsically linked to the former, are not devoid of conflict. Both confront her with the tension derived from following the strict protocols of science and the rules of her volunteer work with animals, and being guided by the dictates of her heart. Such tension accompanies her throughout the book, but is progressively dissolved by the need to respond to the practical conflicts the novel describes. In this sense the heart is opposed to the mind, emotion is contrasted with reason. The result of this is a redefinition of both science and activism in light of more integrative and holistic practices. This is best seen in Isabel’s treatment of dead bodies after the massive stranding of whales and dolphins on Kiwanda Beach described in chapter eight.

Isabel and her colleague Marian find that there is not much else they can do for the dead animals except trying to investigate the cause of their demise. Thus, without waiting to have official authorization to conduct such procedure and therefore leaving aside the rules that govern their work, they take the dead body of a Pacific white-sided dolphin to the pathology laboratory and prepare to perform an autopsy. In a very powerful scene, they conduct themselves as if the autopsy were the occasion of a sacred ritual they were about to celebrate: “With a slight bow of her head, Isabel rested both gloved hands on the body of the female Pacific white-sided dolphin and said very softly, ‘I am so sorry for the violence of your death.’ Her words were formal, almost an incantation” (AH 184). Both Isabel and Marian manipulate the dead body as if it were a sacred object that deserves all their respect. This is partly derived from Marian’s indigenous culture — she belongs to the Oskeena Tribe — in which animals are understood as persons, but also emerges out of Isabel’s understanding of her profession.

Before becoming a veterinarian and pathologist, Isabel went first to medical school. There she learned anatomy from Dr. Grayson Elliot who defined this work as a “dying art” and advised his students that, when working with a body, they had to “Be gentle” because “Every body once belonged to somebody” (AH 184). This spiritual

practice of science contrasts with the kind of science practiced by other characters in the book. Both Dr. Lamb, in charge of Marshall's transplant, and Dr. Sharp, the Navy's expert on bioacoustics, go as far as science permits without harboring any moral concerns. In contrast, Isabel and Marian's model of science is more in line with alternative notions of science like the one ethologist Marc Bekoff refers to as "deep science" (635). Such a term, as he explains, is inspired by the ideas behind the "deep ecology" movement, which calls attention to the inherent value of each living being without consideration of their utilitarian value. With this in mind, Bekoff calls for a new model of science where the fragmented and reductionistic framework typical of modern science is substituted by a "holistic and heart-driven science," a "deep science that is impregnated with spirit and compassion" (635). This type of science, according to him, "reinforces a sense of togetherness in which the seer and seen are one," while at the same time "fosters the development of deep and reciprocal relationships among humans, other animals, and other nature, softening our tendencies to control and manage almost everything in sight" (635). As a consequence of these ideas, Bekoff proposes a kind of science led by principles that bring to mind Stuckey's description of an epistemological model that needs to be relational, contextual, built through intuitive attention as well as empirical methods, and communicated through story (Stuckey 191). In this new form of science, using Karen Barad's words, "matter comes to matter" because the other is taken into account (Loc. 2563).

A similar vivification of matter happens in literature, as it has been shown through this analysis of Peterson's novel. This vivification or reanimation in panpsychic terms means "a culture of encounter," "a culture of poetry and song" where by singing the world up is possible "to attune ourselves to the inexhaustible layers of its own unconscious-but-simultaneously-all conscious song" (Mathews 88). William Rueckert contends that "science and poetry [...] can be persuaded to lie down together and be generative after all" (107). As he puts it, a poem or any kind of literature is stored energy and reading is the act of energy transfer from the poem "into the language centers and creative imaginations of the readers" (110). In classical times poetry was understood as a kind of sacred ritual through which the true nature of things was conveyed to the audience. These ideas make possible to argue that knowledge of what is outside of ourselves can be mediated not only through rationalistic modes but also through opening our hearts to the stories matter-body-animal tells us. Such narratives, as Iovino and Oppermann contend, "are *de facto* part of a project of liberation — a cultural, ecological, ontological, and material liberation" (87). Let us then be liberated through literature.

Notes

1. I borrow this term from Val Plumwood who uses it in chapter ten of *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason* (218-35).
2. Given the irony implied in the use of the term “donor” to refer to the nonhuman animal from whom the organs and tissue are removed — they certainly do not freely decide on such donation — critical attention has been paid to the kind of language used in the medical literature on xenotransplantation. Of special interests are Lynda Birke and Mike Michael’s “The Heart of the Matter: Animal Bodies, Ethics, and Species Boundaries.” *Society and Animals* 6.3 (1998): 245-61 and Marie Fox’s article “Reconfiguring the Animal/Human Boundary: The Impact of Xeno Technologies.” *Liverpool Law Review* 26 (2005): 149-67.
3. This first heart transplant happened at the University of Mississippi Medical Center in 1963 and was performed by Dr. James D. Hardy on a 68 year-old patient, Boyd Rush. Since there was not a heart available for Mr. Rush, as a last chance resort, surgeon James Hardy and his team decided to implant in his chest the heart of a genetically close animal, a chimpanzee. Ultimately, the smaller heart of the animal could not pump the volume of blood required by a human body and Rush died ninety minutes after surgery (McLean and Williamson 49).
4. An analysis of the legal and ethical questions involved in the practice of xenotransplantation is offered in Marie Fox’s “Reconfiguring the Animal/Human Boundary: The Impact of Xeno Technologies.” *Liverpool Law Review* 26 (2005): 149-67 and in Sheila McLean and Laura Williamson’s *Xenotransplantation: Law and Ethics* (Hants UK: Ashgate, 2005).
5. Especially helpful for an understanding of xenotransplantation from an animal rights point of view are Lynda Birke and Mike Michael’s “The Heart of the Matter: Animal Bodies, Ethics and Species Boundaries.” *Society and Animals* 6.3 (1998): 245-61 and Tania Woods’s “Have a Heart: Xenotransplantation, Nonhuman Death, Human Distress.” *Society and Animals* 6.1 (1998): 47-65.
6. Karen Barad develops the concept of intra-action in contrast with that of interactions which “presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata” (Loc. 2405). Intra-action means a process through which “the boundaries and properties of the ‘components’ of phenomena become determinate and [...] particular embodied concepts become meaningful” (Loc. 2405-27). This implies that the traditional Cartesian divide between subject and object does not exist prior to the establishment of these relations or intra-actions since both are part of the same material continuum, which is organized through these intra-actions.
7. <<http://www.xenodiaries.org/>>.
8. The term bodymind was first proposed by acupuncture expert Dianne Connelly “[to reflect] the understanding, derived from Chinese medicine, that the body is inseparable from the mind” (Pert 187).

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“Disabilities” and Trans-Species Connections in Luis Bernardo Honwana’s “We killed Mangy-Dog,” Paul Auster’s *Timbuktu* and Helen Humphreys’ *Wild Dogs*

Wendy Woodward

Department of English, University of the Western Cape

Bellville 7535, South Africa

Email: wwoodward@uwc.ac.za

Abstract This paper implicitly engages with the homology of disability and animality as it brings together disability studies and animal studies in its analysis of three narratives with “disabled” characters. It suggests new ways of interpreting disability in relation to humans and dogs. Rather than promoting a humanist interpretation which celebrates the agency and autonomy of the individual, the essay argues for a posthumanist reading of common human-animal vulnerabilities via Cary Wolfe’s theory of trans-species shared being and via Ato Quayson’s theory of literary representations of disabilities. Embodied interconnections with a nonhuman animal “resist” representation as the stories extend human disability into other realms of being, both real and metaphysical. Trans-species entanglements in themselves are border-crossing balancing acts; as thresholds, they proffer conduits to a doubled immanence of human and nonhuman animal. Yet trans-species affiliations between people and dogs who are stigmatised engender a certain narrative of “nervousness” in the stories, all of which end tragically in the death of the characters, both human and animal.

Key words disability; animality; trans-species; literary; narrative

Non-fictional accounts of a “disabled” human deeply connected to a nonhuman animal recur in popular culture. In *The Horse Boy*, an alpha mare and the joy of riding improves the speech of an autistic boy to such an extent that his parents take him to Mongolia in the hope that his uncanny acceptance by horses, as well as visits to shamans, will heal him. In *A Street Cat named Bob*, James Bowen’s life is transformed from a solitary one of addiction and poverty in London by the ginger

cat he rescues and whose presence provides a “sheet anchor to reality” (227) in his withdrawal ordeal. The bi-opic *Temple Grandin* has recently brought Grandin’s life story to a wider public — her struggles against prejudice because of her autism and her extraordinary relationships with nonhuman animals because of her ability to “think in pictures.” Locally, an SABC documentary, *Distant Cousins*, features Kate Jagoe-Davies and the indigenous primates. Paraplegic after an adolescent diving accident, Jagoe-Davies was accepted as a member of the Pringle Bay baboon troop who visited her balcony daily en route to their foraging grounds. Because of her immobility, the baboons were entirely at ease in her presence, going as far as to groom her like a fellow-baboon.

These trans-species affiliations gesture to the possibility that humans who are physically or cognitively disabled may connect more directly with the nonhuman. Perhaps humans, like Temple Grandin, who are othered by society, even ostracised, are primed to form profound relationships across species — either from a desperate desire for connection or from a compassionate recognition of common vulnerabilities. Such bonds may be fruitful and sustaining for both human and nonhuman — as they were in relation to Jagoe-Davies and the baboon troop, vilified in the village for their foraging activities, and in relation to James Bowen and the stray Bob. For Rowan, the “horse boy”, being with horses opened the possibilities of his healing. Grandin’s unusual capabilities have ameliorated the experience of slaughter for cattle in a third of all abattoirs in the United States (Wolfe 128). The popularity of such narratives can be attributed to their potentially redemptive content about a “disabled” human in relation to an animal, and to their concomitant sentimental appeal.

The narrative texts in this paper are far from sentimental, and my reading will focus not on the triumphalism of “Supercrip” stories, which set “an impossibly high standard [that] other people with disabilities can’t reach” (Wheeler 557), with the added dramatic dimension of trans-species connections, but on representations of subjectivities constituted by the embodied vulnerabilities of both human and nonhuman. A conventional negative trope has disability and animality homologised. As Lennard Davis notes, “To have a disability is to be an animal, to be part of the Other” (8). While this homology may recur in the narratives, trans-species connections and the inter-meshing of the human self and the animal other constitute alternative spaces for the characters. Yet both human and animal remain vulnerable physically and socially. None of the narratives, unlike many of the popular non-fictional texts, celebrates such inter-connections as a kind of romantic merging or as a source of alternative empowerment for the disabled human.

Cary Wolfe suggests that animal studies and disability studies have much to offer each other as they both contradict the liberal justice tradition with its primary reliance

on the notions of rights; as Wolfe reminds us, “ethical standing and civic inclusion are predicated on rationality, autonomy, and agency” (127). Certainly, the narratives under discussion of disabled humans and their trans-species affinities with dogs gesture to posthuman epistemologies, as the reader is made hyper-aware of animals’ forms of knowing and interpreting the world. Yet, tragically, this cannot be sustained as the potential of trans-species relationships is foreclosed in all three stories. Death, which is an undeniable contradiction of the humanist subject, features centrally in the texts under discussion: the very title “We Killed Mangy-Dog” describes the action of the short story; the eponymous space in *Timbuktu* refers not to the famed African city but to a realm after death, and in *Wild Dogs* the cognitively impaired Lily is shot by hunters along with many members of the feral dog pack she has joined. The dogs themselves, in all three narratives, suffer from disabilities in further affinities with their humans: both Mangy-Dog (he has no other name) and Mr. Bones in *Timbuktu* are physically challenged by disease and poverty; the feral dogs in *Wild Dogs* might have the freedom of living without strictures but they suffer from the unaccustomed stress of hunting for their food and some are undermined by disease and injury — both of which are disabling.

The very term “disability” is a contentious one as current debates in disability studies attest, and as theorists move away from liberal humanist constructions. Lennard Davis suggests that disability, like impairment be regarded as an “unstable category”; only then can these categories “transcend the problems of identity politics” (271). In his essay on integrating disability studies and ecocriticism, Matthew J.C. Cella suggests, in relation to what he calls “the ecosomatic paradigm,” that bodies and the natural world are not discrete, that they “are not just conterminous but continuous with each other” regarding this merging as a source of empowerment (585). Elizabeth A. Wheeler, in her critique of the “unexamined ableism in ecocritical discourse,” argues that people with disabilities should not be represented as further from nature than those who are able to physically participate in it (553). She stresses the paradox that vulnerabilities may include their own strengths, that “accomplishment” may involve recognition of one’s own “limitations” (566). For Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, because we all evolve into a state of disability as we age, the very concept of disability is “perhaps the essential characteristic of being human” (524). Simi Linton, on the other hand, is impatient with the notion that “everyone is disabled in some way” (520) and is critical of the inadequacies of linguistic formulations which cannot address subtleties of the “disabled-nondisabled configuration” nor what she terms “the formulae of disability and impairment” (519). In a literary context, Garland-Thomson contends that “the blind, mad, lame, crippled, and unusually embodied have fired the imagination and underwritten the metaphors of Western literature. From Sophocles

to Toni Morrison, disability confers distinction on protagonists and drives narrative” (523).

Like Garland-Thomson, Ato Quayson stresses the universality of disability in literature “suggest[ing] that we consider the plot of social deformation as it is tied to some form of physical or mental deformation to be relevant to the discussion of all literary texts” (22). In *Aesthetic Nervousness: Disability and the Crisis of Representation*, Quayson proffers a masterly analysis of literary representations of characters regarded as disabled or impaired. For Quayson, “nervousness” surfaces in the structure and language of novels on the level of character, text, and the (nondisabled) reader because the aesthetic cannot seamlessly incorporate ethical issues which collate with disability (15-19). Further, this dis-ease, Quayson maintains, is redolent of the nervousness surrounding the disabled in “reality” (19). Significantly, for my argument in this essay, Quayson proposes that “[d]isability returns the aesthetic domain to an active ethical core that serves to disrupt the surface of representation” (19). Further, for Quayson “disability is a marker of the aesthetic field as such,” because in its representation it encapsulates ethics as well as drawing attention to the dividing line between the “real” and the “metaphysical” (22). Along with the sublime, he argues, it “inaugurates and constitutes the aesthetic field” and like the sublime, disability elicits language and narrativity even while resisting or frustrating complete comprehension and representation and placing itself on the boundary between the real and the metaphysical (22).

How much more does an embodied interconnection with a nonhuman animal “resist” representation as it extends human disability into other realms of being, both real and metaphysical? Trans-species entanglements in themselves are border-crossing balancing acts; as thresholds, they proffer conduits to a doubled immanence of human and nonhuman animal.

If neither Quayson nor Garland-Thomson theorizes how a narrative might shift when a nonhuman animal features as a significant character along with the disabled or impaired human, Quayson’s sense of the “active ethical core” may be further extended in novels where animals feature centrally in the narrative in trans-species relationships. My concern in this paper, to analyze literary intersections of disabilities and animalities, is congruent with Garland-Thomson’s imperative to “reimagine” or “resymbolise” disability (525, 524) especially in relation to what she terms madness, as well as an attempt to extend Quayson’s construction of disability in my close reading of the Mozambican short story “We Killed Mangy-Dog” by Luis Bernado Honwana and the North American novels *Timbuktu* by Paul Auster and *Wild Dogs* by Helen Humphreys. These fictional narratives have the human characters profoundly connected to nonhuman animals, as they foreground deep affiliations between

cognitively disabled humans and their dogs. Their imagining of the subject, not in humanist terms but in ways which incorporate connections and vulnerabilities, is echoed in Cary Wolfe's particular emphasis on the "shared vulnerability" of humans and animals (140). Wolfe insists that we think beyond constructing service animals, like guide dogs, as merely instrumental in the quest for the disabled human to be seamlessly incorporated into the liberal social formation. Instead, he advocates that we acknowledge an "irreducibly different and unique form of subjectivity," one which is neither *Homo sapiens* nor *Canis familiaris*, neither "disabled" nor "normal," but something else altogether, a shared trans-species being-in-the-world constituted by complex relations of trust, respect, dependence, and communication (141).

Wolfe's conceptualising of an inter-related form of subjectivity is powerfully convincing with regard to imagining cross-overs between human and nonhuman animals which contradict notions of disability and normality. In the texts under discussion the trans-species beings-in-the-world do not live within conventions of animal service or seamless mutuality; instead, they exist in the contingent with an edgy openness. Grosz suggests that "becoming animal" involves risk-taking (174); similarly, a disabled character's longing to become inextricably connected with an animal may involve a distancing from the society which ostracises them. All the characters, human and animal, discussed below are pathologised within the narratives for what Braidotti calls "categorical otherness (zoomorphic, disabled, or malformed)" (526). They are labelled variously, as "not all there" (Isaura), "mad as a hatter" (Willy G.), having "some level of retardation" (Lily). The cognitively disabled characters in these narratives are socially stigmatised: Isaura for not coping at school and for loving Mangy-Dog, Willy G. for his schizophrenia and living on the streets, Lily for being inarticulate and apparently mistreating Dog. The dogs they relate to are also stigmatised: Mangy-Dog in the eponymous story and Mr Bones in *Timbuktu* are street dogs lacking health and beauty, Lily's dog, named simply Dog in *Wild Dogs* lives with the feral pack of dogs who are perceived as a threat by urban-dwellers and farmers alike. The roles that these canines play in the stories do, of course, vary. They could potentially be read as symbolising the constraints under which the ostracised humans have to live or as signifying forms of their animalised madness. My reading will, however, analyze a number of recurring tropes which confirm common human-animal vulnerabilities — trans-species embodiment, language, stigma, and death — and how these tropes impact on the modes of narration and to what extent "aesthetic nervousness" manifests. For Davis, the "hegemony of normalcy" is confirmed by almost all literary texts which could account for the recurrence of deaths, both human and animal, in the narratives under discussion (10).

Forms of Impairment

The categorizing of disabilities is, of course, problematic in its negatively limited construction of subjectivities. In these narratives, however, such fixed categorizing of a physically disabled, cognitively or psychologically impaired character is multifaceted and often deconstructed within the narrative, with the broader society most often guilty of negative stereotyping. Characters who are closer to the disabled person, as well as extra- and intradiegetic narrators tend not to fix the disabled person in a sedimented identity; the self-definition of the disabled characters themselves may also reveal unacknowledged complexities. Like Quayson, I will be using “disability” and “impairment” equivalently, although, as he points out, the latter “refers to the specific physical or cognitive deficiency that leads to a reduced capacity to fully actualize all aspects of one’s life” and the former “to the socially regulated parameters that exacerbate the effect of the impairment” (3).

In *Timbuktu*, Willy Gurevitch assumes that the name of Willy G. Christmas is after Santa Claus, as an “incarnation of the Buddha” (28), speaks to him from the television set late one night. Willy has recently returned to his mother’s Brooklyn apartment after a spell in “the loony bin” (20). The combination of Willy’s family history, his psychological instability and an excess of drugs he “smoked ... snorted ... or shot ... into his veins” (19) as a student culminated in his “schizo flip-out of 1968” (13); the subsequent hospitalisation, shock therapy and psychopharmacological intervention meant that “he was never quite the same again” (13). He lives on the streets except for a few winter months each year in his mother’s apartment. Nearly eight years before the present time of the narrative, Willy acquired Mr. Bones as his guardian, but now the dog himself feels vulnerable at the prospect of life without Willy.

As Willy dies on the streets of Baltimore, the dog is a “nervous wreck” (79). Mr. Bones is disadvantaged by his appearance which renders him unappealing to potential adoption. He is a “hodgepodge of genetic strains ... and to make matters worse, there were burrs protruding from his ragged coat, bad smells emanating from his mouth, and a perpetual bloodshot sadness lurking in his eyes” (4). After Willy’s death, when he has to fend for himself for the first time, he is acutely aware of his lack of capabilities and his physical impairments. Rather than being an “athletic” dog who could hunt birds, he has become a “soft, civilized creature, a thinking dog” (111), worrying about being killed for Chinese restaurant fare.

Mangy-Dog, who lacks a sustained human relationship, is also disadvantaged on the streets. Mocambique, a colonized nation at the time, is the setting for “We Killed Mangy-Dog” a short story written in the 1960s and narrated by the young adolescent

Ginho, who is black. It thematises hyper-masculinity and its attendant dangers: a gang of boys are assigned the task of shooting a severely ill street dog who is known only as Mangy-Dog. Like Mr. Bones, Mangy-Dog himself is physically disabled — emaciated and covered in sores. He is constantly “trembling” and his gait odd as he “sway[s] his head to and fro like and ox, and take[s] such crazy steps that he looked like a rickety old cart” (75). While Ginho is disturbed by his very vulnerability and the power of his gaze, it is Isaura who is more attached to the dog, caressing him and feeding him her school lunch. Ginho rationalises “[b]ut then Isaura was crazy — everybody knew that” (79). The girl is victimised and isolated by the teacher who tells the pupils that “she was not quite right in the head” (79) and by her peers, particularly the girls who encircle her and chant repetitively “Isaura-Mangy-Dog” (79) as though the girl and the dog share subjectivity — or lack of it. Honwana illustrates connections between disabilities and other inequalities: Ginho, mocked by the gang for being a “shit of a black” (108) and nicknamed Toucinho or Porky, strikes up an alliance with the ostracised Isaura because they both care about the dog who is to be sacrificed. At least the cognitively impaired character is supported by a compassionate ally who sees beyond social prejudice and relates, if not entirely openly, to his putative friend.

In *Wild Dogs*, attitudes to Lily, a brain-damaged young woman, are almost universally ambivalent. The novel is polyphonic, with separated sections for each character’s first-person narration, but Alice is the protagonist and the most protracted voice, beginning and ending the narrative. A group of ill-assorted people assemble every evening at the woods just outside town in the hope of retrieving their dogs who have, for various reasons, joined a pack of dogs led by a wolf-cross. Alice describes Lily as a “tiny girl in her twenties,” justifying the juvenile appellation “because she’s got something wrong with her, some level of retardation that keeps her young and guileless as a child” (11). Lily, when asked, is unable to identify the breed of her dog, whom she simply calls “Dog” and whom, she insists she cared for, in spite of her parents’ claim to the contrary which motivated them to dump her dog in the woods. Lily is doubly stigmatised: her body is covered in burns incurred when she rescued her baby brother from a house fire she had unwittingly started, and her mind “lost some brain function” in a botched skin graft operation after the fire.

When Lily takes the others on the walks she did with Dog, the adolescent Jamie who has lost his pitbull mocks her illogicality and castigates her for “[d]og abuse” (21). She had walked her dog very speedily through a child’s playground; Alice assumes “we are all glad for Dog, living in the woods and not having to circle a bench fifty times each morning” (21). Because of this lack of empathy for Lily, nobody notices when she goes missing on a reconnoitring expedition in the woods. Her death, after she has gone feral, could even be attributed to this lack of caring.

Embodiment, Language, Stigma, and Death

On a very basic level, deep intertwined connections between human and nonhuman may counter, or potentially compensate for, the human and nonhuman loneliness of being stigmatised and potentially outcast. Isaura in “Mangy-Dog” is effectively an outsider at school and her interaction with the eponymous dog is judged by her classmates and by the teachers as signifying her “craziness.” Also judged as other because of his colour and being overweight, Ginho is complicit with the currency of hyper-masculinity, even as he is torn ethically because of the planned killing of Mangy-Dog and Isaura’s suffering. After the boy is goaded by the gang, into which he so longs to be incorporated, into shooting the ailing and trembling dog, he hears Mangy-Dog “scream like a person” and then “whimpering” (108). That Ginho cannot differentiate whether the sounds emanate from Isaura, now hugging the dog, or the dog himself, dramatizes their trans-species connection, as well as animalising the disabled girl. Ralph R. Acampora’s notion of “symphysis” is useful in this regard. He defines it as a “jointly held form of bodily consciousness” (114) across species, stipulating that it holds “an ontological and moral dialectic of difference and similarity” (114). Further, for Acampora, vulnerability and compassion intersect in a human’s “symphysical awareness of animal vulnerability” (128).

Honwana foregrounds Ginho’s sense of Isaura’s embodiment as he pulls her off the dog’s body and explains manically, why it is better ethically to shoot the animal, even as he fears the dog’s gaze. She “moaned and went limp all over” (112) as Ginho drags her out of the line of fire but, symphysically, and unlike Ginho, she is able to meet the gaze of the dog with her “wild eyes” (112). Her brave statement of attempting to protect the dog’s body with her own is denied as both she and the dog are feminised in their victimhood by the actions of the gang. Ginho, in a situation fraught with fear and violence, is bullied further by Quim, the gang leader; he urgently grabs the cognitively impaired girl from the body of Mangy-Dog so that the boys can shoot the whining animal, whom Ginho might have already wounded. Ginho himself is overcome with terror as the gang begins to shoot and he and Isaura fall together with the bullets flashing over them. Isaura feels bodily what Mangy-Dog is experiencing as her “body was stiff and jerked at every explosion” (114). Even after the dog is dead the shooting continues hazardously and crazily; still the two lie together as though bodily contact can compensate for their loss.

During this trauma their solace is a kind of inter-embodiment, an extension of their subjectivities across genders and abilities, to compensate for the violent destruction of their trans-species affiliation with Mangy-Dog. Ginho, in a heightened state of panic, is acutely conscious of the girl’s body which seems part of nature itself

especially when she takes her final leave and runs through the trees: “For a long time we could hear the noise of her dress tearing the micaias” (115). Isaura then disappears as a character from the story, although in the final scene back at school, Quim reports derogatorily that she had asked her father to give all of them a “hiding” (116) for shooting Mangy-Dog. While the naïve narrator says nothing, the conversation reveals that he is miserable. Quim hypocritically comforts him and then cajoles him to pass him a crib note in the forthcoming test. Ginho is seduced in his desire to fit in, vulnerable as he is in his blackness and in his apparent “porkiness,” to conform to majority perceptions of normalcy. In his “nervousness” about being seen to be aligned with disability and femininity, he bolsters the ego of the gang leader, even if it means cheating in his school work and betraying the alliance with Isaura.

The ethical core of the story alerts the reader to the social responses to Isaura’s unnamed cognitive impairment, and to the affinities between her, the dog and the narrator. Further, her figuring as the ethical centre in the shooting of Mangy-Dog, to use Quayson’s terms, “disrupts the surface of representation.” Because Ginho never passes judgment on the action and never articulates his feelings, it is incumbent on the reader to interpret the ethics of the story and to understand his emotions through his embodied action. Tragically, in the closure of the story, Ginho is entirely alone without the friendship of the street dog or Isaura. He is still isolated in spite of the attentions of Quim, who merely wants to use Ginho’s intelligence, with the school dynamics indicative of the prejudice the narrator will encounter in the broader colonial society. Like Mangy-Dog, Ginho lacks a sanctuary, either at school or at home — his mother is depicted as a powerless figure sitting on a straw mat on the threshold of their house who cannot prevent Ginho from appropriating his father’s gun and bullets.

Timbuktu reflects retrospectively on the family life of Willy Gurevitch and the inability of his immigrant parents to find any homeliness in North America. As sole survivors in their respective families of the holocaust, their life in Brooklyn was a “posthumous” one, “an interval between two deaths” (16). Their withered existence exemplifies “creaturely life,” a concept which Eric Santner explains as one which opens a new way of understanding how human bodies and psyches register “the states of exception” which punctuate the “normal” run of social and political life. “Creatureliness” will thus signify less a dimension that traverses the boundaries of human and nonhuman ways of life than a specifically human way of finding oneself caught in the midst of antagonisms in and of the political field (xix).

As he grows up, Willy rejects his parents utterly, for their foreignness in North America, for being Polish, for being alien, even as his own psychological instability seems to hinge partly on their traumatic memories. Garland-Thomson notes that “bodies are shaped by their environments from the moment of conception” and

how we “register history on our bodies” (524). Thus Willy registers the history of the holocaust and his parents’ past and present suffering in his being. In New York, his lawyer father has to work at a menial job, his mother once a music teacher is a housewife. His father alternates between silences which last a week, and rage; when his mother is widowed young, she “knew the world was out to get her” (18-19). Also paranoid, Willy challenges the world rather than retreating from it, as she does, so that he is formed “as malcontent, as rebel, as outlaw poet prowling the gutters of a ruined world” (19).

Imagery of the holocaust recurs in the novel as though Willy himself becomes one of the “husk-men,” according to Primo Levi, a characterisation of men in the death camps (Santner xvi). Willy leaves his mother’s apartment for the streets because of her reaction to his tattoo of Santa Claus. She goes “wild, erupting in a tantrum of tears and angry belief” (27) partly because tattooing is against Jewish law, because of the tattooing of Jews in concentration camps and because she believes that Willy has sold out to Christians whom she equates with Hitler. In her mind, the tattoo is tantamount to having a swastika on one’s body. Further, Willy warns Mr. Bones about “the word shelter” (5) where he would be subject to “a lethal injection or a dose of poison gas” (5) which recalls the Final Solution. After Mr. Bones is traumatised by being lost and shot at in a North Virginia field, Willy berates him in a dream for his self-pity; his mother, he relates, was “hunted down like a dog, and she had to run for her life. People get treated like dogs, too, my friend” (150).

In her constant sense of fear, Lily in *Wild Dogs* is also treated badly. Members of the group who have lost their dogs all identify with Dog’s suffering rather than with Lily’s when she demonstrates how she and Dog circumambulated a bench. In the car on a group excursion, Alice narrates how she “starts humming and rocking back and forth in her seat. ‘Where are we?’ she says every couple of minutes, and we all ignore her question after responding the first few times” (33). Once the group get out at an old train station, Lily is “all agitated and jumpy” in her anxiety that a train is coming (35):

She’s always afraid that she doesn’t understand what’s going on, or that she is the only one who does. Always there is danger. Always she has to flee the burning building. She’s never able to be at ease. “It’s all right, baby,” I say to Lily. I reach out and take her hand. “I’ve got you.” (35)

Intent on her nascent relationship with Rachel, however, Alice lets this caring slip. When the group are in the woods subsequently, hoping to encounter their dogs, it is, for Alice, “easy to ignore Lily” (49) as she stands some distance away, then

waves and disappears. Only when her parents become aware of her absence is Lily reported missing, but they sexualize their daughter in their interpretation that she met a boyfriend every evening, not knowing that she went daily with others who had lost their dogs, to search for the pack. Aesthetic nervousness recurs for the reader, who is unsure how to read the clues to Lily's disappearance in the woods and who is confronted by the characters' lack of compassion. Lily's mother, on hearing of her daughter's disappearance, seems unruffled and, suspecting that Lily had committed suicide, assigns it to "God's will" (52). Alice and the others who have lost dogs rationalise that it would be better not to tell the police in case they shoot members of the feral pack. For the reader, who has come to trust Alice as the main narrator, her lack of compassion for the disabled Lily, in Quayson's words, "disrupt[s] the surface of representation." In the meantime, Lily, without Dog, is as lost to the group as the "wild" dogs themselves until she locates the pack. With them, she can resume her trans-species shared beingness in relation to her own dog.

The polyphonic *Wild Dogs* has human voices speaking individually as serial narrators, but Mr. Bones, Willy's companion and guardian on the streets, is the predominant focaliser in Timbuktu. Auster has been criticised for the attendant anthropomorphism and the faux-naïf language (Begley), yet this narrative strategy denotes an ethical choice in which the reader is party to the fictionalised anxieties of a highly intelligent street dog who lives with a psychologically unstable man. Auster also playfully undermines the issue of animals' apparent lack of access to any discursivity, be it human or their own. An experiment that Willy had heard about at college to get a dog to type "Ollie is a good dog" (102) is gently ridiculed. Mr Bones, however, understands human language with some sophistication and because his "master" is a "logomaniac" (7) Mr. Bones had "earned the right to be called the world's leading authority on the subject" (18) of Willy G, according to the extradiegetic narrator. At times the point of view of the dog seems indistinguishable from that of the narrator, particularly in connection with Willy's history. We are also subjected to Willy's rants in direct speech which go on for pages, and some of his truly bad poetry which sounds like the worst of the Beat poets.

Because Willy is represented through the perceptions of a dog who does not judge him for being cognitively impaired, the "ethical core" in relation to a disabled character lacks the aesthetic nervousness that a more conventional representation of a psychologically impaired man living on the streets would elicit. Indeed, much of Mr. Bones' idea of Willy is rendered humorous: the dog believes that "[h]is master was a man with the heart of a dog" (36) because of his unconventionality and his commitment to travelling and living rough. Through Willy's winter-long project to create a Symphony of Smells for Mr. Bones, we are alerted to what Cary Wolfe terms

the “animal sensorium” (130), as Willy acts on his desires to create an art work for dogs based on smell. But the art work fails utterly — Mr. Bones is unimpressed as he regards “the whole world [as] a symphony of smells” (53), and Willy’s marketing attempt is disastrous. Uncle Al, who owns a novelty shop in Coney island, and whom, Willy had hoped, would admire his “invention,” is brutal: “‘You’re out of your skull, Willy,’ Uncle Al said, ‘you’re fucking bonkers, you know that?’ and promptly shooed him outside with his garbage bag of stinks and smells and collapsible cardboard labyrinths” (145-46).

Willy adores Mr. Bones, regarding him as an angel and a spiritual avatar: “How else to interpret the celestial pun [of dog/god] that echoed in his mind night and day?” (43). Auster refuses the patronising attribution of spiritual wisdom to the cognitively impaired or the trope that disability teaches the able-bodied gratitude. Instead, he constructs Willy’s psychological disability within racy, illogical discourse where the voice of the extradiegetic narrator echoes that of Willy himself as well as the inner voice of Mr. Bones, whose sensibilities and knowledge of the world derive, mostly, from Willy’s perceptions. Willy wants to style himself a “saint,” attempting to be kind and selfless, rescuing a drowning girl, a man being mugged. But he is far from saintly:

Mental mishaps dogged him, and whenever the pinball machine in his head speeded up and went tilt, all bets were off. How could a man of his ilk propose to don the mantle of purity? Not only was he an incipient lush, and not only was he a bred-in-the-bone liar with a strong paranoiac bent, he was too damn funny for his own good. (30-31)

If the reader is seduced and entertained by Willy’s pyrotechnical verbiage, certain “nervousness” does obtain within the narrative on the part of other characters who may encounter Willy as a “bedraggled, demented pain in the ass” (32).

The lack of care on the part of a supremely wealthy nation for the psychologically vulnerable is undeniable but Willy’s vagrant life which is represented as vibrant and stimulating from a canine point of view hardly seems deprived. Willy’s death on the streets of Baltimore, and Mr Bones’ subsequent survival strategies underscore their vulnerabilities, however. Willy death ostensibly from TB judging from his symptoms, leaves Mr Bones alone and unprotected in a city he does not know. The dog is well aware of his vulnerability to being taken to the pound where he will be killed. He takes up with the young schoolboy, Henry Chow, whose father runs a restaurant (Willy had always warned Mr. Bones about Chinese restaurants and how dogs were consumed there). Mr. Bones, now named Cal after a baseball player, sleeps concealed in a box at night and is fed too liberally with rich foods. The summer idyll comes to

an end when Henry has to return to school. Too scared to tell his father about the “best friend [he’s] ever had” (137) he berates himself for being a “retarded piece of shit” (137) as though lack of courage signals disability. Chased by Mr. Chow, the terrified dog runs until he ends up in North Virginia where he is adopted by a family, but when they go on holiday and he is lodged in the boarding kennels he becomes mortally ill.

For Mr. Bones, Willy is never a singular, unified subject, and the narration mirrors this in his intertwining with the perceptions of the dog. After Willy has died, he exists beyond death in the mind of Mr. Bones and in the dog’s vivid dreams. When Mr. Bones is housed at the kennels and a seriously ill dog, a false Willy appears, “vengeful and sarcastic...a devil Willy, a Willy bereft of all compassion and kindness” (209). It is a hallucination which recalls Willy’s fear that Santa could morph into Satan, but Mr. Bones is comforted by a subsequent dream in which Willy is his old self and ushers in the dog’s spiritual future. Willy tells him he will not have to be anxious when “the time comes” (221) for him to go to Timbuktu. Mr. Bones is incredulous:

You mean dogs are allowed?

Not all dogs. Just some. Each case is handled separately.

And I’m in?

You’re in.

Don’t kid me master. If you’re joking now, I don’t think I could stand it.

Believe me pooch, you’re in. The decision’s been made. (221-22)

After this dream, Mr. Bones, like a Keatsian poet feels sympathy for nearby sparrows and chickadees “not as nuisances but as fellow creatures” (223) but this epiphany does not divert his bodily feelings of weakness and illness.

Still, he has managed to escape from Dog Haven and encounters a highway which manifests as “a spectacle of pure radiance, a field of overpowering light” (226). He is inspired at the thought that stepping onto the huge road will transport him to Timbuktu, where he will meet up with his beloved Willy “where dogs talked as equal to men” (226). Heaven is not ineffable but clearly delineated in his mind as a “land of words and transparent toasters [which Willy had hoped to invent], in the country of bicycle wheels and burning deserts” (226). He convinces himself that he was not “proposing anything as vulgar as suicide. He was merely going to play a game that any sick and crazy old dog would play. And that’s what he was now ... [a] sick and crazy old dog” (226). Ultimately, Mr. Bones enlists the persona of Willy as he is about to die; in the game of dodging the car, the beauty lies in its paradox, for “[t]he moment you lost, you won” (227). As he courts his death, Mr. Bones imagines a return to his

trans-species connection with his beloved “master.” Unusually, in the fictions of trans-species beings examined here, the nonhuman animal is the consistent focaliser who signals, constantly, his absolute commitment to such an affinity. Through the death of Mr. Bones, the disabled dog unites metaphysically with his cognitively impaired, beloved human companion. The novel itself engages with the metaphysical in its representation of the telepathic connections between Mr. Bones and Willy G., and in the recurring trope of *Timbuktu*, even as the ethical core of the novel confirms Mr. Bones’s inability to exist without Willy and their trans-species affiliation.

In *Wild Dogs* by Helen Humphreys, the stigmatised and brain-damaged Lily dies, but unlike Mr Bones who orchestrates his death, she is entirely victim. Like Isaura, she can only find sanctuary in a canine world, where she expresses her bodily feelings for a dog in spite of finding herself in a hyper-masculinised space of gun-toting men. The anxious and frail Lily has become a trans-species being in reality now that she lives with a pack of dogs in the woods. The group of people with dogs whom they have lost to this pack share such a profound ambivalence to Lily that when she disappears they neglect to contact the authorities (“Everyone will be worried, and no one will care” (112), Lily intuits), a decision they justify because they fear that the police will shoot the dogs in search of her. In the event, hunters are sent into the woods to dispatch the dogs who have, apparently, been attacking “livestock” (82). It is Alice who is the first person narrator of the scene where the hunters emerge from the woods. One man has the dead wolf hybrid, the alpha male of the pack, draped around his neck, as though he is always already fur. The last man carries Lily who has been shot in the head, a fate which Isaura escaped by pure chance. Lily’s body is covered in leaves which “swirl around us as she passes, each one perfect and over, each one a prayer we couldn’t speak, wafting down to clothe us” (84). Given the lack of care for the brain-damaged young woman when she was alive, the quasi-religious comfort-thinking is surely indicative of the characters’ guilt and nervousness in relation to Lily, whom they have failed to protect.

Subsequently in the narrative we are in Lily’s consciousness, a strategy that Humphreys has made more poignant and tragic because, chronologically, she has already been killed. The retrospective representation of her joining the dogs in the woods is, variously, fraught and idyllic, “real” and metaphysical. Initially she cannot distinguish who she is there to save — her baby brother from the fire, or Dog, but soon the dogs find her, swirling around her and protecting her. She becomes dog, reiterating the mantra “Lily is a dog” (114). As a trans-species shared being, she is at the centre of the pack when they sleep as they make a “knot” around her and “it feels good to be tied up with them so snug” (115). Lily also develops dog senses: she loses words, makes sounds like the dogs which “say as much as any words say” (117) and

becomes part of the forest with the frogs responding to her croaking. She moves away from the visual, a sense favoured within humanist identity, to a more refined and animalised sense of smell, touch and embodiment, where she is no longer dis-abled, no longer an outsider but lyrically embodies ferality:

I have smelt my body become as fragrant as the bodies of the dogs. I know fear smells like old blood and the tin sky that happens before a storm. I know the difference between living and dead flesh. I have smelt the world green again. (120)

When the men come into the forest, initially she “seem[s] to have lost [her] words” (121). The dogs attempt to protect her with their bodies but Dog is shot through the ear in front of her. She “opens her rusty voice” making, as she thinks, “a human word” (121).

Her greeting to Spencer, the hunter, is, however, pre-verbal, as he attests. His public excuse for shooting her is that he was not aware that she was human, but in his confessional narration he admits that he knew that Lily was not a dog. He refers to her as “it” and is revolted and threatened by her wildness, by her struggle to stand erect and by the fact that she “was waving and moaning and starting to come towards me. Then it made a screeching sound and I shot it” (133). Most of all, he is repulsed by what he judges as her assertive femininity, by her “ris[ing], snarling and defiant, staring me down” (136) and he confesses that he shot her “not because I thought she was a dog, but because I knew she was a woman” (136). As Lerita Coleman Brown points out, “[s]tigmatised people are needed in order for the many nonstigmatised people to feel good about themselves” (149). While Spencer is not aware, at this moment, that Lily is cognitively impaired, it is her failure to conform to normal, human behaviour which renders her eminently killable. In her disability and femininity she is rendered “part of the Other,” as vulnerable as any nonhuman animal in the face of human violence. In the ethical core of the novel, Lily is sacrificed, then, to notions of the normate and how it is proper for women to perform.

Conclusion

Aesthetic nervousness manifests in what Humphreys scripts for a character who is perceived as disabled socially, even as Lily is represented as adept enough to attain, on a realistic and metaphysical level, the existence of a shared trans-species being. But ferality is too edgy and too abnormal for both human and nonhuman animal for it to be sustained. Normalcy is also reinstated in the closure of “Mangy-Dog”: while a remnant of Isaura reappears in conversation between Quim and Ginho, she is as effectively excised from the story as she had been expelled from school due to her

learning problems. An “aesthetic nervousness” obtains, for Honwana cannot imagine an ending which would involve any recognition of Isaura’s compassion for Mangy-Dog, any incorporation and acceptance of her “craziness” or Ginho’s emotions, even though he has the extra-diegetic narrator beyond the naïve narrations of Ginho implicitly critique a colonial society with its dramatised prejudices against the black narrator, the cognitively impaired girl and their love for a street dog. In the closure of *Timbuktu*, both disabled characters are dead — the only possible milieu for their symphitic acknowledgment of each other is the metaphysical space of *Timbuktu*, which surely confirms the narrative’s aesthetic nervousness of disability and cognitive impairment.

All the writers are bound by an aesthetic nervousness which cannot imagine a lasting connection between a disabled or physically impaired human and a nonhuman animal who might also be disabled or impaired. Trans-species affinities may be sources of love and interconnection but not one prevails. Animals, it seems, may help a disabled human to bear stigma and cope better with the quotidian, but, ultimately, disability and impairment remain tragic and unchangeable. To reach to the ethical core of all these narratives is to be assured, however, that the sharing of trans-species being is, in itself, a potential source of joy, love and creativity, but its very groundlessness and vulnerability cannot hold within cultures which negate the nonhuman and those with disabilities.

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Humanimal Relations in Contemporary U.S. Literature: Biopolitics and Terminal Illness in Mark Doty's *Dog Years*

Michael Lundblad

Department of Literature, Area Studies, and European Languages, University of Oslo
P.O. Box 1003 Blindern, NO-0315 Oslo, Norway
Email: Michael.Lundblad@ilos.uio.no

Abstract This essay illustrates how questions from animal and animality studies can be productively explored in relation to literary and cultural texts, with a particular focus on Mark Doty's recent bestselling memoir *Dog Years*. In this text, Doty recounts the illnesses that lead to the deaths of his human partner, Wally, and their two dogs, Arden and Beau. The question of when to "let go" in order to accept a "good death" can be related to biopolitical questions of citizenship and activism: when (or whether) one should stop fighting the kinds of problems that the text presumably wants to resist, such as homophobia, U.S. imperialist aggression in response to 9/11, and speciesist attitudes toward dogs. The implicit assumption of the text is one that resonates with other recent popular illness narratives; we should not fight death to the very end, but rather accept terminal illness as an opportunity to "live in the moment," supposedly in line with the way that dogs must live their lives. But what are the implications of constructing the inner lives of dogs in this way? And what constitutes a so-called good death, then, if we compare terminal illness with what might be called "terminal injustice?" The focus in this essay is thus on the biopolitics of how Doty's text constructs both human and nonhuman animals at the end of life.

Key words animality studies; animal studies; biopolitics; illness narratives; *Dog Years*

If animal and animality studies are typically interdisciplinary, how might literary studies offer a particularly important contribution to these burgeoning areas of study? At a basic level, the simplest answer might be to say that the way people think about animals and animality is not only reflected but also produced by literary and cultural texts. In other words, novels, memoirs, films, and so on, shape the assumptions we all have — in various historical and cultural contexts — about what it means to be

a nonhuman or human animal, and how we should therefore treat others, whether they share our species or not. It makes sense for literary scholars, then, to explore and analyze literary and cultural texts that have either been influential in relation to dominant discourses of animality or have resisted or challenged mainstream ideas that have been naturalized.

In my previous work I have argued for a distinction between animal studies and animality studies, with animal studies, on the one hand, emphasizing a political or ethical challenge to speciesist thinking, ultimately driven by a desire to improve the way various nonhuman species are treated. Animality studies, on the other hand, can be seen as work from various disciplines that emphasizes instead the history of thinking about and representing animality in relation to what might more typically be seen as cultural studies, of the human kind. Animality studies also pays close attention to how “real” animals are constructed in various ways, and draws upon other disciplines in relation to studying and understanding biological creatures, but emphasizes the implications of how animality is constructed in relation to the situated histories of human identity categories such as race, class, gender, and sexuality.¹ While animal studies has been seen at times as an umbrella term that can contain work that I would call animality studies, it seems useful to me to be able to suggest, for example, that Donna Haraway’s *Primate Visions* is more of an animality studies critique, while *When Species Meet* is more in line with what I would narrow down to call animal studies. But it’s certainly possible to do both, or to go back and forth between animal and animality studies, even within the same work. My recent book titled *The Birth of a Jungle*, to take an example that focuses more on literary texts, is more animality studies than animal studies, with particular attention to what I call the discourse of the jungle, in relation to new ways of thinking about various human identities at the turn of the twentieth century, such as African-American men, homosexuals, and working-class immigrants. But it also takes up questions that might be more aligned with animal studies, such as the nature of dogs and wolves in Jack London’s work, particularly when those nonhuman animals actually push back against constructions of animals as *only* defined by biological instincts, suggesting what we might think of as more complicated — and interesting — “inner lives” (to use a phrase that has been part of various bestselling books about nonhuman animals).

That phrase also connects Jack London, whose books have certainly had a strong influence on at least U.S. readers for over a century, to other kinds of recent bestsellers, such as Mark Doty’s *Dog Years* (2007), which is a memoir about both dogs and illness, among other things. Illness memoirs are a contemporary U.S. obsession, along with the inner lives of animals, and the links between these two kinds of texts are the focus of a new book I am currently working on. To give you

just a few examples of bestselling illness narratives, we might think about works by Lance Armstrong, David Rieff, who writes about his mother Susan Sontag, and Randy Pausch, as well as more “literary” writers such as Terry Tempest Williams, Audre Lorde, and the playwrights Tony Kushner in *Angels in America* and Margaret Edson in *W;t*.² While texts from these writers do not all have obvious connections to animality, I would argue that they actually rely upon and produce discourses of animality, particularly in relation to terminal illness. It might be survival of the fittest, as in Lance Armstrong, or “going off to die” and accepting death as “natural” in Terry Tempest Williams. But in both cases, constructions of terminal illness and a “good death” revolve around animality in relation to what is seen as “natural.” When illness itself is constructed as “unnatural” — such as in “rogue cancer cells” — we can also connect these bestselling obsessions with constructions from other frameworks, such as “rogue terrorist cells,” for example, which raises questions related to biopolitics.³

Doty's *Dog Years* can provide a literary example that engages with these questions, while also illustrating more generally the kinds of questions that both animal and animality studies can explore in relation to literary and cultural texts. In *Dog Years*, Doty recounts the illnesses that lead to the deaths of his human partner, Wally, and their two dogs, Arden and Beau. The question of when to “let go” in order to accept a “good death” can be related to biopolitical questions of citizenship and activism: when (or whether) one should stop fighting the kinds of problems that the text presumably wants to resist, such as homophobia, U.S. imperialist aggression in response to 9/11, and speciesist attitudes toward dogs. The implicit assumption of the text is one that resonates with other recent popular illness narratives; we should not fight death to the very end, but rather accept terminal illness as an opportunity to “live in the moment,” supposedly in line with the way that dogs must live their lives. But what are the implications of constructing the inner lives of dogs in this way? What constitutes a so-called good death, if we compare terminal illness with what might be called “terminal injustice,” in which oppression and exploitation are never ultimately defeated?

The opening chapter of Doty's memoir juxtaposes the inner lives of dogs with the external reality of September 11th. Recounting his own experience of 9/11, Doty can't help but wonder, “With the world in such a state, isn't it arrogance or blind self-absorption to write about your dogs?” (4). A few pages later he remembers a conversation with a new acquaintance who asks him what he would do in the world if “his commitments were all waived” (7). Doty's response — which is that he would “buy a place with a barn, in the country, and open a shelter for homeless retrievers” — is met with a critical reply by his friend, who wonders “why that compassion isn't offered to other people” (7). Doty, perhaps like many animal studies scholars

in the academy today, is angered by the suggestion that compassion is a “limited quality, something we can only possess so much of and which thus must be carefully conserved” (8). “Love,” he argues, “is a gateway to the world, not an escape from it” (8). But what exactly is the nature of this love for dogs that can supposedly open up our understanding of a post-9/11 world?

In Doty’s *Dog Years*, there are three implicit claims that I want to identify briefly and then raise a few questions about. The first is that dogs can supposedly offer a positive and even joyful model of “living in the moment,” mostly because they lack human language and a human form of self-awareness. Doty constructs dogs as inhabiting pre-linguistic bodies, supposedly like humans in an earlier evolutionary moment when “our bodies were not yet assumed into the world of speech” (3). Recent work in animal and animality studies — by Derrida, among many others — has refuted this kind of implicit affirmation of a Lacanian mirror stage to limit subjectivity to the human.⁴ But Doty’s romanticization of pre-linguistic experience essentializes dogs in a particular way: they must embody living in the moment.

In a list of reasons why humans are drawn to dogs, Doty argues that humans are lonelier because we are self-aware, while dogs “live in a state of connectedness ... that we have lost, if indeed we ever possessed it”; dogs are “all right here, involved in whatever it is, and therefore they are a sort of cure for our great, abiding loneliness. A temporary cure, but a real one” (42). A dog dwelling on and fearing death or even depression, then, would seem to be impossible, because of the dogness of the dog. But this kind of essentialism strikes me as problematic both for dogs themselves and for the model Doty wants to make them for human lives. How can we know whether dogs are capable of fearing death the way that humans can? For Doty it is not a question of dogs lacking a soul, but rather lacking language, though he acknowledges other forms of communication later in the text. But if language broadly conceived is no longer tenable as a dividing line between the human and the nonhuman, as animal and animality studies if not a much broader consensus contends, it seems limiting, at best, to assume that nonhuman animals can *only* “live in the present.” And there seems to be a big difference between constructing dogs as an inherent embodiment of joy and exploring their *capacity* for experiencing joy or pleasure, particularly within humanimal or inter-species interactions, as Donna Haraway has written about in *When Species Meet* (2008).⁵

The second implicit claim of *Dog Years* that I want to discuss is related to the first. If dogs embody a joyful kind of living in the present, without the ability to think about death, then humans confronted with death should apparently *choose* to live like dogs, at least at the end of life. This kind of linkage can be seen in the various implications of “dog years” in the title of the memoir; the narrative recounts the many

years Doty spends with his dogs Arden and Beau until their deaths, but the title can also be linked with the briefer descriptions of the final years of his partner Wally, who dies of AIDS. As in Paul Monette's essays, "the concept of 'dog years' [has been used] to describe the situation of persons with AIDS, where every single year must count for many" (264), as Marjorie Garber notes in *Dog Love* (1996). Doty's memoir suggests a model, then, of living each moment fully, rather than dwelling on death, in the face of not only Wally's death, but also the destruction wrought upon New York City on September 11th. The common thread seems to be some form of "acceptance" and a refusal to dwell on the eventual deaths that we all must meet. There also seems to be a logic that sees both terrorism and illness as an opportunity to "re-prioritize" one's life. There are far more problematic versions of this logic in illness narratives out there now that tell us, for example, that cancer can essentially be the best thing that could ever happen to you, such as Kris Carr's film *Crazy Sexy Cancer* (2007). In *Bright-Sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined America* (2009), Barbara Ehrenreich criticizes this kind of thinking, pointing out how it puts the responsibility of one's own bodily response to cancer squarely on one's own mental attitude. If you die, then, apparently you weren't thinking positively enough. As Ehrenreich notes, "cheerfulness is required, dissent a kind of treason" (31).

In *Dog Years*, Doty's partner Wally "accepts" his reality of AIDS. While he isn't necessarily cheerful all the time, the text valorizes the way that Wally's attitude seems to become more like that of his dogs (who are constantly on his bed) as he approaches his death. While Doty rejects the facile logic of "positive thinking," he seems to affirm the idea that the best form of "persistence" in the face of suffering is to withdraw from the world, to live in the present with — and even as — a dog. There are several reasons why I think this logic is problematic. A certain level of privilege is necessary, for example, to withdraw from jobs and responsibilities in order to retreat to vacation cabins, as Doty and Wally do several times in the text. In addition, the kind of "re-prioritization" that this discourse often polices implies that a life spent fighting — in one's job, in one's activism, in one's community — only takes away from what is supposedly truly important: living in the moment with loved ones. Without denying the value of that, it is possible, I believe, to begin to see how "acceptance" of an illness can be linked with "acceptance" of seemingly intractable social problems. If you are privileged enough to withdraw from the messy world of politics because you don't face direct persecution, let's say, then it's okay to focus on yourself at the end of life. Perhaps that is the rightful reward for a Boomer bourgeois progressive activist, or so the logic seems to suggest. But this logic also benefits a state wanting to police its citizens more effectively, if there is less resistance and more acceptance in the face of injustice, particularly if responsibility for either happiness or death is assigned to the

individual, rather than the state.

The third and final implicit claim of *Dog Years* that I want to discuss focuses on choices each individual seems to have about how to die: a good death is supposedly one that is free from invasive interventions, in which the individual does not ultimately die fighting. Accepting illness — like a dog — leads to accepting death — like a dog. In *Dog Years*, the death of Doty's partner Wally is linked in this way first with the death of their dog Beau, from kidney disease and a brain tumor. Both Wally and Beau try various drugs over the course of their illnesses, but both end up eventually slipping away with the “good spirit” that Doty finds so heartening and appropriate. But Beau, supposedly, cannot understand death (in a Heideggerian kind of formulation of animals as “poor in world” and unable to anticipate death “as such”).⁶ Near the end, Doty tells us that “he suddenly lifts his head up and back, looking right at me, his eyes widening, with a look not afraid but wondering, startled. A look that would be read, were it a text in a language we knew, as *What's happening to me?*” (147, orig. emphasis). Both Beau and Wally are ultimately “painlessly swept away” (148), but Wally differs from Beau in his awareness and subsequent acceptance of death. In the case of Wally, whose illness and death are recounted in much greater detail in Doty's memoir *Heaven's Coast* (1996), acceptance of death also leads to a refusal to live one's final days in a hospital, where his life could be “wrenched out of our hands, into this institutional world where he'd be at their mercy, subject to invasion, unprotectable” (HC 87).

I want to underline the phrase “subject to invasion” in order to raise some questions about the discourse of a “good death” here and in other contemporary illness narratives. For progressives like Doty who might be opposed to the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9/11, and who might generally be inclined to label themselves pacifists, it might seem like one must be in favor of “peace” rather than “invasion” when it comes to the institution of the hospital in relation to an individual at the end of life. According to this logic, the antithesis of a “good death” would be one in which the individual dies fighting to the bitter end, summoning all the toxic weapons a hospital can provide, invaded by both treatments and the illness itself. David Rieff's memoir, *Swimming in a Sea of Death* (2008), is perhaps the best example of an illness narrative that condemns this kind of approach, illustrated in the death of his mother, Susan Sontag. Her lack of “acceptance” is certainly the opposite of Doty's Wally. Sontag herself criticizes military analogies in *Illness as Metaphor* (1978) and *AIDS and Its Metaphors* (1989), but her willingness to try what Doty might think of as “invasive” treatments at the end of her own life, as recounted by Rieff, links her with the current champion of that approach, Lance Armstrong, as recounted in *It's Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life* (2000).

Aggressive treatments and clinical trials are not necessarily a better way to approach death for everyone, and an endless war on illness — analogous to an endless war on terrorism — means big bucks for Big Pharma. While it is impossible to simply reject all metaphors for illness, as Sontag argued we should, we might want to at least reject those metaphors that seem problematic politically, such as the war on cancer. But Sontag's model of *not* accepting her illness, rather than being condemned implicitly for its link with waging war, can instead be seen as a productive form of *resistance*: homologous with a political model that refuses to “withdraw” from the struggles of the world, even at the end of life. For Sontag, Edward Said's desire to keep writing up until the very end of his life could be seen as a model of this kind of resistance, as recounted by her son, David Rieff (94-95).

At the end of *Dog Years*, Doty decides to euthanize their dog Arden after interpreting a look. In the end, “what was entirely plain to me in his face that morning was that he was through, that he'd welcome an exit” (212). Doty constructs the act of euthanasia as a solemn form of stewardship that he would want for himself as well: “This is unmitigatedly awful and not so at all; I remind myself this is exactly what I'd want, for someone to love me enough not to allow me to live in pain when I don't want to ...” (213). With the help of lethal injections, Arden is soon “gone, like a whisper, the easiest breath” (213), and Doty pronounces it “*A good end ... a fine end, the best we could do*” (214). But what about the politics of this kind of death if the logic were extended to putting people “out of their misery” if they are suffering because of U.S. military and economic imperialism around the world?

How is it possible, finally, to tell the difference between a look that means “I don't want to live” from “I don't want to be in pain,” or, “I am afraid of death,” or even, “I want to live,” or, “please don't kill me?”⁷ Literary and cultural texts can explore these questions imaginatively, even if Doty's construction of dogs and the lessons he seems to draw from animality in relation to human illness and death seem problematic. But I must also question the assumption that we can “read” dogs so confidently and propose universal lessons from them. Certainly living with a dog — or anyone else, for that matter — can build confidence in one's ability to read an Other. And there is no reason why advocacy for dogs must be an escape from the world. But I would argue that we need an understanding of “companion species” that neither essentializes nor universalizes in a world that is inevitably messy, complicated, and politically dangerous. Literary texts can both reinforce and resist these kinds of messages in ways that warrant further consideration in animal studies, animality studies, and beyond.

Notes

1. For more on this distinction, see my “From Animal to Animality Studies.”
2. Lance Armstrong, with Sally Jenkins, *It's Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life* (New York: Berkley Books, 2001); David Rieff, *Swimming in a Sea of Death: A Son's Memoir* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Randy Pausch, with Jeffrey Zaslow, *The Last Lecture* (New York: Hyperion, 2008); Terry Tempest Williams, *Refuge: An Unnatural History of Family and Place* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992); Audre Lorde, *The Cancer Journals* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1997); Tony Kushner *Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes* (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 2009); Margaret Edson, *W;t* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1999).
3. For more on these questions related to the history of cancer, see my “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” For more on biopolitics in relation to animality, see Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law*, which engages the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Niklas Luhmann, and Jacques Derrida, among others.
4. See Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. See also, for example, Marianne DeKoven and Michael Lundblad, eds., *Species Matters*.
5. See, for example, Haraway’s chapter titled “Training in the Contact Zone: Power, Play, and Invention in the Sport of Agility,” in *When Species Meet*, 205-46.
6. For a discussion of Heidegger in this regard, in a volume that also includes a very brief excerpt from Heidegger, see Matthew Calarco, “Heidegger’s Zoontology.”
7. For more on lives made “killable,” building upon the work of Derrida, see Wolfe, *Before the Law*.

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Toward a Zoopolis: Animal *Poiesis* and the Poetry of Emily Dickinson and Brenda Hillman

Aaron M. Moe

Department of English, Washington State University

P.O. Box 645020, Pullman, WA 99164-5020, USA

Email: aaron.m.moe@gmail.com

Abstract The poetry of Emily Dickinson and Brenda Hillman casts nonhuman animals as part of the polis. Their perspective resonates with the emergent animal rights theory, explored by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, that draws on political theory in order to rethink animal-human relationships in what they call the *zoopolis*. Dickinson's and Hillman's perspectives further inform the zoopolis. For both poets, animals have earned their place in a multispecies polis because of the self-evident manifestations of their alternative ways-of-making. Such poetry calls for expanding both the poetic tradition and the polis to include other animal makers.

Key words zoopolis; zoopoetics; zoopoetry; animals in literature; animals and poetry; animal rights theory

this is the
door(opening it i

think things
which
were supposed to
be out of my
reach
 ,they are like
jam on the shelf everybody guessed

was too high)

from "i'd think 'wonder'" — a poem on seeing a bat
— E.E. Cummings

The canon wars remain a stark reminder of the stakes surrounding literary studies. I recall many years ago reading Ishmael Reed's introduction to his multicultural anthology *From Totem Poles to Hip-hop*, and specifically, his foregrounding of reading practices that generate the "Ogre with One Eye" who fixates on the old canon of the Euro-American literary tradition (xviii–xix). The figure haunts: a hybrid monstrosity; not quite human, but not quite beast; a powerful, clumsy creature whose tunnel-vision eclipses other writers, stories, poems, cultures.

Though the ogre has extended its scope of the human sphere in numerous ways since Reed's anthology, a new awakening is underway, a tremendous shift within the humanities to turn its gaze toward the nonhuman animals living amongst and beyond humans. The now familiar work of Cary Wolfe, Jacques Derrida, and Donna Haraway provided impetus for the shift, and many other thinkers from interdisciplinary fields contribute ongoing momentum. In the 2011 *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka provide a provocative theory that has far reaching implications. "Our aim in this book," they foreground, "is to offer a new framework, one that takes the 'animal question' as a central issue for how we theorize the nature of our political community," and they hope to "shift the debate" surrounding animal rights from "applied ethics to a question of political theory." To do so, they include nonhuman animals within categories once reserved for humans alone: domestic animals become co-citizens; wild animals assume sovereignty; and liminal animals become denizens. Donaldson and Kymlicka address many of the daunting challenges of such a shift, and even though it may seem insurmountable, the theory plants radical seeds for seeing human-animal interactions in new and productive ways. They connect animal rights theory "to broader political theories of justice and citizenship," which can "identify more clearly potential models of animal-human relationships" (1, 12, 23).

Later in their argument, Donaldson and Kymlicka acknowledge the "enormous uncharted territory" that opens up as a result of an applied political theory. "Integrating ... animals into the polis," they suggest, "involves rethinking our shared spaces on multiple levels" (121, 131). The tradition of poetry is one territory that can benefit from such a rethinking, but it is important to recognize that, within the tradition of American poetry, Emily Dickinson already began such work. One-and-a-half centuries later, Brenda Hillman continues it.

Many of the animals Dickinson and Hillman include in their poems are not domesticated, nor are they fully wild; rather, they inhabit an "in-between" space epitomizing Donaldson and Kymlicka's category of "liminal animals" who live in "our cities, and indeed our backyards and homes" (213). Depending on one's bioregion,

liminal animals may include sparrows, finches, hawks, blackbirds, owls; grasshoppers, spiders, praying mantises, butterflies, roly-polies, ants, termites; turtles, lizards, snakes; frogs and salamanders; foxes, deer, raccoons, prairie dogs, squirrels — and many more species. Liminal animals are “visible when they become a problem” — or, I add, when a poet celebrates their presence — but are “invisible as ubiquitous members of the community” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 68).

To carve out space for animal denizenship, Donaldson and Kymlicka first establish what denizenship looks like in the human sphere. Many humans living amongst the citizens of a country assume the category of denizenship: people who opt out of citizenship rights by not voting, by homeschooling their children, or by wholeheartedly refusing to participate in citizenship. Other examples include migrant denizenship, green-card workers (231–40). Crucially, Donaldson and Kymlicka move beyond “human liminality as metaphor” and toward the “actual ways models of denizenship can be used to accommodate a fuller range of diversity in society, and to bring those perceived as deviant, foreign, second class, undesirable, or dangerous into just relations within the body politic” (216). Concerning nonhuman animals, many species living amongst urban, suburban, and rural areas are either opportunists, niche specialists, introduced exotics, or feral animals (219–26). The innumerable liminal animals are often overlooked in animal rights theory and in the imagination of the polis where emphasis is placed upon domesticated animals and upon the shrinking habitat of wild animals and their coming extinction. Even when one sees liminal animals in the category of denizenship, it is a slippery, “hybrid status, with fewer clear fixed points of reference” (251).

Perhaps this is why poets gravitate toward such animals.

In what follows, I foreground the liminal animals in Emily Dickinson and Brenda Hillman’s poetry. Dickinson helps anchor the move within the American poetic tradition to see animals as part of the polis. She also provides a foundation for such inclusion. For Dickinson and many other poets, animals are makers. They participate in the act of *poiesis*, and they impact the making of human poetry. I argue that this perspective — animal-as-maker — made an animal’s integral presence within the polis self-evident to Dickinson. Roughly a century-and-a-half later, Brenda Hillman continues Dickinson’s work as animal *poiesis* and a multispecies polis permeate the last two books she published, *Practical Water* (2009) and *Seasonal Works with Letters on Fire* (2013). Dickinson’s poetry contains seeds for the zoopolis in the American poetic tradition, and Hillman pushes readers toward the implications of those seeds in the context of today’s urgent times.

Liminal Animals, Zoopoetics, and the Multispecies Polis in Emily Dickinson's Poetry

Often, when Dickinson folds liminal animals into her work, she sees their political status as self-evident. When discussing lizards and butterflies in a letter, she provokes, "Are not those *your* Countrymen?" (*Letters* 2:412). For Dickinson, these liminal animals surpass denizenship and attain the status of co-citizenship. They are countrymen, a status that carries with it certain relational duties from humans. In "His Bill is locked - his Eye estranged," Dickinson's speaker vociferates on behalf of a bird. The atrocity leads to a deeper valuation of seeing an animal in the context of political theory:

His Bill is locked - his Eye estranged
 His Feathers wilted low -
 The Claws that clung, like lifeless Gloves
 Indifferent hanging now -
 The Joy that in his happy Throat
 Was waiting to be poured
 Gored through and through with Death, to be
 Assassin of a Bird
 Resembles to my outraged mind
 The firing in Heaven,
 On Angels - squandering for you
 Their Miracles of Tune - (*Poems* 1126)

The poem turns at "to be / Assassin of a Bird." This line break suggests a bewildering silence in which the speaker grapples for the right word: "to be ... Assassin." No other word fits. This bird has not been killed or murdered — two terms that skirt political implications. Written in 1866, the shadow of President Lincoln's 1865 assassination haunts the poem. Regular people are murdered. People with political clout are assassinated. Dickinson's perspective that other species have political status emerges, therefore, in her choice of *assassin*. The assassination stirs an indignation in the poem's speaker, so much so that she enters the state of an "outraged mind." In order to articulate her rage, she climbs the divine hierarchy. Though the bird may have begun as an "animal," he ascends to a political status in the human sphere and then to an angelic status in the divine sphere. Dickinson, though, envisions a mass "firing" of angels in a divine space, and it is difficult to read those lines in today's world without

thinking of the shootings in schools. Such shootings violate places that are sacrosanct. The last line draws readers back to earth: the angels' "Miracles of Tune" becomes a trope for the bird's now silent song. For as the earlier lines of the poem establish, "Death" has "gored" the bird's throat "through and through," violating the sacrosanct place where the species undergoes a portion of his *poiesis*, his makings. The makings have been silenced, for "His Bill is locked."

Herein lies the seed for the speaker's rage. The bird is a maker who undergoes his own *poiesis*. A bond exists across species lines, from the human maker to the animal maker. One reason why this bond is strong between Dickinson and nonhuman animals is because Dickinson made breakthroughs in her own craft through attentively engaging the material-semiotics of other animal makers. Elsewhere, I have called this process zoopoetics, and though the term suggests many facets, I begin with the word's etymology: *zōion*, from the Greek meaning *animal*, and *poiesis*, from the Greek meaning *to make*.¹ Zoopoetics has a close kinship to what Scott Knickerbocker terms "sensuous poiesis": the "process of rematerializing language specifically as a response to nonhuman nature" (2). One of Knickerbocker's early examples explores Gerard Manley Hopkins' "The Windhover," and he focuses on the ways that the falcon's ways-of-being contributed to the innovations found in the materiality (sound, rhythm, form) of the poem (13–14). This epitomizes what I call zoopoetics. Zoopoetics is a needed category — or subset — of eco-poetics, for there is an added energy *when species meet* that is different from the human animal's engagement with plants, streams, mountains, deserts. Furthermore, many species — including humans — are makers, and the process of making is often bound up with an attentive engagement with another species' way-of-being. It goes two ways. As Donna Haraway observes, both species undergo an "ontological and semiotic invention" through the "inventive potency of play" (232, 237) — and when a poet enters that ecotone where and when species meet, the "potency of play" involves *poiesis*.²

In "Emily Dickinson's Animal Pedagogies," Colleen Boggs explores what I call zoopoetics. She develops the term "animal orthography" from an attentive reading of "Many a phrase has the English language" (Boggs 539). Both terms, zoopoetics and animal orthography, help expose complementary dynamics within the poem:

Many a phrase has the English language -
 I have heard by one -
 Low as the laughter of the Cricket,
 Loud, as the Thunder's Tongue -

Murmuring, like old Caspian Choirs,
When the Tide's a lull -
Saying itself in new inflection -
Like a Whippowil -

Breaking in bright Orthography
On my simple sleep -
Thundering it's Prospective -
Till I stir, and weep -

Not for the Sorrow, done me -
But the push of Joy -
Say it again, Saxon!
Hush - Only to me! (*Poems* 333)

Boggs foregrounds how Dickinson “locates animal presence in orthography, in writing itself” (538). The poem demonstrates how human orthography — or the exploration of the sounds of letters and their combinations — is not a monospecies event. The whippoorwill’s *poiesis* quite literally “Break[s] in bright Orthography” every time someone utters *whippoorwill*. Through attentively listening to the bird’s common call, a new, onomatopoeic constellation of sounds broke into the English language.

I am interested, though, in Dickinson’s choice of verb. The speaker cannot sleep, for the *poiesis* of the bird makes her “stir.” After Aífe Murray’s *Maid as Muse: How Servants Changed Emily Dickinson’s Life and Language*, “stir” suggests several provocative implications. Murray uncovers how Dickinson environed herself in the most creative space of the homestead: “even when the poet could have been relieved of the burdens of nineteenth-century domesticity, [Dickinson] remained ‘below stairs’ for portions of the day, baking and writing.” Dickinson drafted poems on “tradesmen bills” and the “reverse of recipes — materials close to hand when spending time kitchen-side” (Murray 9). Murray reminds readers that the 19th century American kitchen was a “volatile space.” The cooking, along with the crackle of an explosive fire, made it the “noisiest room of the house, the location of combustion, spontaneity, of *making*” (99, italics added). As one lingers in the place of the kitchen, the many “baking verbs” such as “sift, stir, dissolve” take on new significance, for they contributed to the “material conditions of actual materials of her poetry-making” (100).

In this light, Dickinson’s choice of “stir” suggests not only a stirring of inspiration or of human energy, but moreover an energy that rises out of mixing together the ingredients of two different species’ ways-of-being, ways-of-*making*,

ways-of-*poiesis*. The “new inflection” of the second stanza only arises through the *stirring* of the makings of more than one species. This happens elsewhere in Dickinson’s poems, most famously — as Boggs highlights (539) — in “I heard a fly buzz when I died.” The poem exemplifies how another species becomes present in the Orthography of human language, but this happens, I argue, because Dickinson once again stirs the *poiesis* of a fly into the “stumbling Buzz” of human poetry (*Poems* 591). If the whippoorwill “Break[s] in bright orthography,” the fly “interpose[s]” himself in the room and throughout the materiality of the poem.

Dickinson, though, pushes things further. The perspective that sees other animals as makers elevates them to a political status, made explicit in the final lines of “Many of phrase” where the speaker pleads, “Say it again, Saxon! / Hush - Only to me!” The speaker of the poem addresses the whippoorwill as *Saxon*, but in the context of the poem, the bird attains political status because of the bird’s trait, in Dickinson’s perspective, of being a kindred poet. This drives Dickinson’s “outraged mind” discussed earlier, for who would shoot another maker? Furthermore, Dickinson anticipates the later arguments of Paul Shepard, David Abram, and W. S. Merwin, all of whom draw a correlation between the depletion of animals and the depletion of human imagination and human language. One must engage the *poiesis* of other species before one can stir their makings into human poetry.

Two poems from 1875 grapple further with the implications of Dickinson’s political theory of animal citizenship. In the first, Dickinson provides several, logical, reasons why one should refrain from seeing a rat as a pest. Rather, one should include the rat within the human sphere:

The Rat is the concisest Tenant.
He pays no Rent.
Repudiates the Obligation -
On schemes intent

Balking our Wit
To sound or circumvent -
Hate cannot harm
A Foe so reticent -

Neither Decree prohibit him -
Lawful as Equilibrium. (*Poems* 1369)

Here, Dickinson casts the rat as a “Tenant,” thereby choosing to include the rat within

the nomenclature often reserved for humans. This rat, for Dickinson, is not a pest. He is a welcome presence within the house. The argument of the poem pushes readers to consider how, after all, rats take up little space, are mostly silent, and moreover, they follow the law of nature over the law of humans: equilibrium. Post-equilibrium ecologists may cringe at such a claim, but that should not detract from Dickinson's radical perspective to include such non-domesticated, non-wild animals as part of the relational responsibility within the human sphere.

In the second poem, Dickinson chooses to include another household presence within the human sphere: spiders. In keeping with seeing other species as makers, this spider is an artist:

The Spider as an Artist
 Has never been employed -
 Though his surpassing Merit
 Is freely certified

 By every Broom and Bridget
 Throughout a Christian Land -
 Neglected Son of Genius
 I take thee by the Hand – (*Poems* 1373)

As the speaker “take[s]” the spider “by the Hand,” she folds him into the political sphere with the rats, flies, birds, butterflies, and lizards. The impetus, though, for such a move is a recognition of and respect for the other species’ way-of-being. Dickinson sees the poetic life of other species as something self-evident. They, too, are makers.

The Spell of Xenotransplantation in Hillman’s Poetry

In an interview with Tod Marshall, Hillman discusses Dickinson’s poetics, concluding “But of course, [Dickinson] couldn’t do it all; poets after her had to continue this work” (114). The context of the quote pertains to Dickinson’s work in general and not to exploring the specifics of animal *poiesis* and a zoopolis; regardless, Hillman continues such work. In an interview with Angela Hume, Hillman reminds readers that ecopoetics “is about nonhuman bodies, too.” She also provides a three-fold definition of place: the “local bioregion,” “symbolic realms ... of spirit, myth, and dream,” and the “material syllable, the composition” (10, 14). Like Dickinson before her, Hillman emphasizes the animal presence within the “material syllable,” both in the sound and in the form of the composition. Just as Dickinson stirred the *poiesis* of whippoorwills and flies into her process of making, so bats, blackbirds, sparrows,

thrush, earthworms, ants, termites, squirrels, and the *poiesis* of many more species emerge throughout Hillman's two books *Practical Water* (2009) and *Seasonal Works with Letters on Fire* (2013). What is more, like Dickinson, Hillman locates animals directly within the sphere of the polis. Dickinson, for instance, would agree that the death of a sparrow calls for a "Partita without Instruments" — the opening poem to *Practical Water*. If nonhuman animals attain status within the polis — either as denizens or co-citizens — humans assume certain relational duties. When a liminal sparrow dies amongst human dwellings, Hillman calls for a burial: there should be "no unmarked graves" in the "neighborhoods of the resisters" (*Water* 3). For Hillman, it is not just the sparrows' song that makes them makers, but the totality of their physical ways-of-being. She sees their movement "half-spinning / back to clefs of grillwork" (*Water* 3), implying a comparison of the sparrow's body to a note on the musical clef of the grill. Unmarked graves of these makers contribute to the "outraged mind" of those who see nonhuman animals as part of the polis.

Hillman explores further Dickinson's concept that a nonhuman animal "Break[s]" into orthography. One of the many dedications in *Seasonal Works* resonates with David Abram's work: TO CHILDREN LEARNING TO SPELL, TO THE SPELL (*Fire* iii). The letters within the alphabetic system still retain a sensuous quality. In *The Spell of the Sensuous*, Abram foregrounds how some animals contributed to the innovative breakthroughs of the form of some letters. The Hebrew word for *A* is the same Hebrew word for *ox*, and the Hebrew word for *Q* is the same Hebrew word for *Monkey*. Turn the *A* upside-down and one sees the ox's head and two horns, and the *Q* becomes a pictograph for a monkey's backside and swinging tail (Abram 101). Animal presence contributes to the spell, and when Hillman emphasizes "CHILDREN LEARNING TO SPELL" in conjunction with "THE SPELL," she conjures the material spell of orthography. Any parent has witnessed the tremendous profusion of animals throughout children's books — especially in books and puzzles focusing on the ABCs (see Fig.1). When a child learns alphabetic letters, she or he does so by attentively imagining how the body of the animal merges with the form of a letter, not unlike the early Semitic scribes who invented the *Q* and the *A*. Provocatively, in *Why the Wild Things Are: Animals in the Lives of Children*, Gail Melson, a scholar of child development, exposes the correlation between language acquisition and interacting with animals (71–98). She locates her argument within an evolutionary framework and the biophilia hypothesis that, simplified, sees the childhood mind "wired to vibrate to animals as dense packets of information" (188).³ Paul Shepard, on whom she draws, called this process *mindings animals*, which contributes to a "reciprocal spiral of consciousness" as one animal engages another (6–7). Melson also traces how, when children grow up, by and large, society weans them off of the pervasiveness of

animal presences in childhood (78, 140, 146).



Figure 1 Puzzle Pieces merging the form of letters with animal ontologies

The animal bodies once fused with the forms of letters dissipate. If, however, human intelligence *is* connected to animals, such a weaning has detrimental consequences with regards to the human imagination. Melson mentions that Shakespeare, nonetheless, generated over 4,000 animal metaphors/images (157), suggesting that some adult minds still “vibrate” when and where species meet. As Cummings shares, seeing a bat makes him “think things / which / were supposed to / be out of [his] reach” (354). The minds of Dickinson and Hillman, too, “think things” not thought possible in language through attentively engaging other species’ ways-of-being. Many other literary writers experience this as well as evidenced by William Faulkner’s *As I Lay Dying* and Franz Kafka’s *oeuvre*. Adult minds still “vibrate to animals.” The *spell of spelling*, acquired in childhood, continues to develop through the imaginations grappling with animal presences in the materiality of making human poetry.

Like Dickinson, Hillman’s *poiesis* is a multispecies event as she stirs, for instance, the “fire” of “spoken bird poetry” into her poems (*Fire* 1). In “Two Summer Aubades, after John Clare,” the towhee *breaks in bright orthography*: “pp cp cp cp chp chp” (*Fire* 27). Hillman gravitates to the space where animals and letters meet, such as “the vowel of an owl/the owl of a vowel” (*Fire* 19), and she unabashedly recognizes how the “crows are writing poems no one can read *aw aw aw aw*” (*Fire* 67). Another poem, “The Letters Learn to Breathe Twice,” begins with children who “form letters with pencils,” and as the poem progresses, Hillman stirs the *poiesis* of geese into the auditory and visual dynamics of the poem:

When the danger of fire has passed,
 the children (even when wanting to text)
 form letters with pencils,
 tracing gray skin around
 the unsayable while geese honk ~
 overhead oñ-oñ-oñ- in their ~ ~
 wedge of funny adults. The children ~ ~
 try to be normal, though ~ ~
 no one knows what normal is ... (*Fire* 63)

With all due respect to the American poet Walt Whitman, Hillman's "oñ-oñ-oñ-" more closely imitates the geese's vocalization than "Ya-honk" — but like Whitman, Hillman's poetry suggests that birds and humans share the "the same old law" of *poiesis* (Whitman 38–39). The innovative move of including iconic representations of the geese through the tildes emerges from an attentiveness to another species' ontology. Furthermore, the visual dynamic illustrates one way that a poem epitomizes one facet of place as Hillman defines it: "the material syllable, the composition" (qtd. in Hume, 14). For Dickinson and Hillman, the place of a poem contains the *poiesis* of myriad species.

Hillman creates several tropes that further explore the *poiesis* of nonhuman animals stirred into human poetry. In the spirit of Jed Rasula's *This Compost*, these tropes become the "composting medium" for readers who linger in the lines (9). First, in "Ecopoetics Manifesto: A Draft for Angie," Hillman establishes the trope "poem-as-animal": "such a poem like an animal could graze or hunt in its time, exploring each word, carrying symbolic rhythms, syntax & images directly between the dream & the myth" (*Fire* 29). These lines (directly or indirectly) echo Ralph Waldo Emerson's call for a poetic "architecture" that moves like the "spirit of ... an animal" (Emerson 290). The trope empowers readers to imagine how the poem's ontology has been shaped by, informed by, and made by an attentiveness to the ontology of other animals. Second, Hillman establishes at the opening of the first section the interconnections between sex, fire, letters, and more: "vowels ... sex ... loops in consonants ... spoken bird poetry ... are [all] made of fire" (*Fire* 1). Later in a poem, she further develops the sensual qualities of letters through pointing toward an erotic energy:

shadows wait under the stakes
 as anarchy waits in the novel or sex
 waits in college, a feeling
 individual letters have before

a word is spelled — ; (*Fire* 30)

The primal energy of sex informs the primal energy of letters just prior to spelling a word. As Hillman says, “a vowel can start a fire.” The erotic energy further develops the play on the “spell” of “spelling.” The poems capture new groupings, new spellings from an openness to the (sensuous) *poiesis* of other species.

In “Till It Finishes What It Does,” Hillman’s trope of xenotransplantation provides yet another way to imagine the animal presences within the material composition of a poem:

the tiny valve of the pig beat inside
 our father’s heart, like the spokes
 of the sun-disk, in a hieroglyph —
 above the squiggly river symbol (*Fire* 46)

The pig’s valve merges with the hieroglyphics of a sun suggesting that the vitality of human language, poetry, and imagination depends upon animal presences. The poem does not mention the term “xenotransplantation” — nor does it need to in order to subvert it. A fear of human animality may make one think that the “tiny valve of a pig” is a foreign (*xeno*) presence within the human heart, but the animal valve readily functions within the human. Likewise, one may think that the gestures and vocalizations of animals are “foreign” to human language — or that human language is somehow separate from animal ways-of-being — but animal *poiesis*, like the valve of the pig, readily animates the material semiotics of the poetic page. The Darwinian revelation of continuity between the species is not just physiology; it involves the sphere that once seemed to separate humans from animals: a physiology capable of rhetoric and poetry.

Poetic xenotransplantation occurs in the playful poem “Imitating a Squirrel at My Job.” Here, the poet need not highlight that the squirrel participates in the polis, though Hillman does playfully compare the squirrel to Napoleon. The speaker is not in the woods or in the countryside, but rather at work. The poem epitomizes the zoopoetic dynamic as the innovations in form emerge from an attentiveness to the squirrel’s *poiesis*, but this dynamic occurs in the space where two species meet. The squirrel, as an often overlooked “liminal animal,” is not fully wild nor fully domesticated. She or he chooses to dwell amongst humans. The poem’s celebration reinforces how the squirrel’s status within the polis is, like Dickinson saw it, self-evident:

When i get a little speedy
 at work & part of the brain says *Calm down!*
 i hear near our ear, in the outside tree:
speckle-speckle-speckle-speckle speckle
uh uh uh — you gonna tell a squirrel that? calm
 down & try to be cheerful ...
 Try to be ch-ch. Try-to-be-ch-
 Trytobechchchchch. Try to be-e-e.
 Trytobech ch chrfl-trytobechchchrrrrfl.
 trytobeeeee, tobechchchch. You
 gonna tell a fast in the skull
 till it shapes the cone
 & tornado drops it
 squirrel that? You gonna
 tell the uhuhuhuhuh — aw aw aw
 when it nut-nut-nut up
 stands like Napoleon, paw paw
 paw ahw ahw ahw, try to be ch
 try to be chchchch
 try to be calm and chchchcheerful,
 aw aw all cute gray fast & craving-colored — (*Fire* 66)

Though it may be tempting to scan over the inventive spellings, slowing down and reading them phrase by phrase, syllable by syllable, reveals a marvelous “stirring” of the squirrel’s *poiesis* and human language. The phrase “try to be cheerful” breaks open through a series of onomatopoeic and visual iterations not unlike the way Dickinson’s whippoorwill “Break[s] in bright Orthography.” Effectively, Hillman “transplants” the squirrel’s *poiesis* into the materiality of her poem making it a multispecies event.

Poetic xenotransplantation impacts the polis. The little creatures of the world — the pests, the invaders, the insects — and the poet achieve a solidarity in the joint work of taking down large systems. The little creatures are not simply part of Hillman’s poems, for their ways-of-being become the model for political activism. Early on, Hillman establishes a kinship with the small animals of the earth: “Is poetry pointless? Maybe its points are moving, as in a fire The letters of this poem are also lucky to have a job for they are insects & addicts & thieves” (*Fire* 14). The poem-as-insect trope continues gaining momentum: “t t t t ermites riddle the wood / ... fly / up, drop wings at some point, brain- / light termite. Poet” (*Fire* 30). The

poet is most powerful not as a mammal, but as an instinct. In “A Brutal Encounter Recollected in Tranquility: An Essay from November 9,” Hillman’s allusion to the British poet William Wordsworth places political activism in the same sphere as nature poetry. Instead of a “nature” being recollected, Hillman recollects the events of Occupy Berkeley on November 9, 2011. Robert Hass and Brenda Hillman went in support of the students. They both witnessed police brutality and suffered inflictions themselves (Hass). Throughout Hillman’s recollected poem/essay, she plays with the presence of ants. The resisters’ “feet no longer touch earth but connect other feet underground”; she “admires the anti-heroic line of ants”; she emphasizes “we cannot forget the ants under us making smart corridors in the wet ground, even ===== under the Chancellor’s house”; she suggests a “group” of ants or of humans “can be mystical or a mob”; and she concludes that “ants reach other ants at the edge of the lawn; they pass the message along” (*Fire* 83–84). One may suspect, at first, that Hillman draws on the ant merely as a potent trope for the activist. However, the context of the both *Practical Water* and *Seasonal Works with Letters on Fire* suggests that Hillman foregrounds the work of actual ants who shape the poem’s materiality through poetic xenotransplantation (“=====”) and who can slowly eat away at large systems to the point of dilapidation. In *Practical Water*, for instance, the earthworms on the steps of the state capitol building move beyond being a trope for the activist to joining the activist in a joint solidarity (*Water* 10–11). She muses, in *Practical Water*, upon how an attentiveness to nonhuman ways-of-being opens up possibilities: “If bees can detect ultraviolet rays, there are surely more possibilities in language & government” (*Water* 33). The poet/activist makes breakthroughs in her makings and in her political involvement through exploring and learning from other members of the polis: worms, ants, termites.

Hillman intersperses a refrain throughout *Seasonal Works with Letters on Fire* regarding how the *lord of literature* has grown tired, weak, stagnant — ineffective. One arc throughout *Seasonal Works*, then, aspires to awaken the *lord of literature* through a daring poetics. Hillman grounds such daring poetics, though, through an allusion to an earlier poem by another poet of fire: Percy Shelley and his “Ode to the West Wind.” The allusion is subtle, but in “Coda: Suggested Activism for Endangered Seeds,” Hillman modernizes Shelley’s comparison of words to “wingèd seeds” and to “sparks” as she discusses making a poem, cutting it into “seed-like syllables,” and mailing them to the “CEOs of Monsanto, AstraZeneca & Novartis” where they can enact the “meaningless gesture” of “tumbling onto desks of corporations.” The speaker knows little may happen in the short term, but she also knows “the word-seeds will outlast you” — and she envisions a hope that such seeds may, to echo Shelley, “quicken a new birth” (*Fire* 59; see Shelley 616–18). Animal presences

infuse Hillman's "wingèd seeds" and can contribute to an awakening. But if this awakening is going to happen, the *lord of literature* must be revitalized. One way to revitalize literature is through exposing the animal presences therein, and expanding the tradition to include other animal makers.

Imagination, the Work of Zoopoetry, and a Multispecies Polis

As many ecocritics and ecopoets have argued, ecopoetry works against the failure of the imagination. To put it another way, the cultivation of the imagination is a crucial task of the real work poetry can accomplish. I see zoopoetry as a needed category within the broader scope of ecopoetry. Zoopoetry is the stuff of xenotransplantation, of stirring the *poiesis* of another species into the process of making human poetry. Hillman and Dickinson's zoopoetry cultivate the imagination, for as they stir the *poiesis* of many species with their poetry, readers witness a xenotransplantation of animal ways-of-being. Moreover, both poets assume a self-evident stance that other animals are *makers*, and therefore part of the fabric of the polis. This insight contributes to the greater movement within animal rights theory to see nonhuman animals as either co-citizens, denizens, or as sovereign — but it is a crucial contribution. Donaldson and Kymlicka provide a theory for such possibility, and the poetry of Dickinson and Hillman directs the imagination to bring such a theory toward fruition. It is hoped that more readers begin to see the poetic and political status of nonhuman animals as self-evident.

My emphasis upon the ways human language, poetry, and imagination depend upon animals may seem, at first, to reinforce an anthropocentric approach to animal studies. Animals matter because of how they nurture our minds — so the criticism runs. In *Animal Studies: An Introduction*, Paul Waldau rightly exposes the ways some scholarship inadvertently reinforces human exceptionalism even while attempting to undermine it (11–12). Similarly, in *Poetic Animals and Animal Souls*, Randy Malamud encourages readers to be critical of animal poetry, asking "what [animal poetry] reveals about people's relationship with animals and about how human culture frames this relationship" (60). If Hillman and Dickinson went no further than to celebrate the ways animals burst into human language, then, indeed, their exploration of animal *poiesis* surmounts to little beyond a profound source of poetic material. However, animal *poiesis* pushes Hillman and Dickinson to see nonhuman animals as *makers* and therefore as contributors to the life of the polis. They offer a radical "frame" for humans to grapple with human-animal relationships within the polis.

The above exploration ought to be enough to at least jar the Ogre with One Eye into seeing that nonhuman animals are necessarily and inextricably woven throughout the poetic enterprises of both Emily Dickinson and Brenda Hillman. But to push the

perspective further, another radical step must be taken. When discussing the poetic tradition, we need to begin with the continuity between humans and other animals. If nonhuman animals are going to gain prominence within the polis, we need, as a starting point, to see many species as *makers*, capable of *poiesis*. Both Dickinson and Hillman see such a capacity as self-evident. Literary studies can contribute, therefore, immensely to such a project. Instead of introducing the origin of the poetic tradition solely within the human sphere, we can start with the nonhuman by drawing on Aristotle. He claimed, of course, that the “general origin of poetry” involves the instinct or impulse to “imitate” (Aristotle 2:2318). Other species, too, imitate. Examples abound, but take, for instance, the bowhead whale who migrates beneath the Arctic ice in spring. In *Thousand Mile Song*, David Rothenberg includes a couple of pages on how multiple sounds of ice infuse the song of the bowhead (194–96). Could this be a form of a place-based poetics, that is, a process of making songs that integrates one’s environment innovatively into that process? The interiority of a bowhead’s psyche is beyond our grasp at this point, but isn’t the evidence of the sounds of ice enough? It is time to extend Knickerbocker’s theory of “sensuous *poiesis*” to the bowhead whale. When discussing the process of sensuous *poiesis* in Wallace Stevens’ “The Idea of Order at Key West,” Knickerbocker foregrounds how Stevens rematerializes the sounds of the sea to such an extent that the reader hears the ocean’s sounds “pushing through the poem” (23). The bowhead whale’s *poiesis* rematerializes the sounds of ice so that the creaks and groans of non-whale nature “push” through the whale’s song. In Donaldson and Kymlicka’s schema, the bowhead is part of the zoopolis as whales possess sovereignty over their own wild places. Seeing them as *makers* in the same tradition as Dickinson and Hillman’s sparrows, whippoorwills, squirrels, and many other species helps give the whales’ political status weight. Aristotle has already planted the seed for such a move. The bowhead expands their repertoire of making through following the impulse near the origin of poetry: they innovatively imitate the sound of arctic ice as they migrant vast distances of darkness.

Zoopoetry ought not be limited to the human sphere; rather, it expands from the work of poets like Hillman and Dickinson who stir animal *poiesis* into their makings to species like the bowhead who are makers in their own right, innovatively imitating the sounds environing them. Only then will the ogre begin to see, as self-evident, the status of animals as *makers* and therefore as members of a multispecies polis.

Notes

1. In *Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of Poetry*, I provide a thorough foundation for the zoopoetic process, and I trace it in the *oeuvres* of the American poets Walt Whitman, E. E.

Cummings, W. S. Merwin, Brenda Hillman — as well as in the gestures and vocalizations of other animal makers such as beluga whales, elephants, and mimic octopi. Concerning Hillman, the monograph is limited to her 2009 *Practical Water*, while this article engages her 2013 *Seasonal Works with Letters on Fire* in which Hillman, in many ways, provides new insights into the animal presences within human *poiesis* and political activism.

2. I see Donna Haraway's *When Species Meet* to be consanguineous with Donaldson and Kymlicka's *Zoopolis*. From the first paragraph onward, Haraway frames her argument in terms of an "autre-mondialisation" — "other-globalization" — that is a multispecies event. This coexistence of species occurs in the polis through "retying some of the knots of ordinary multispecies living on earth" (3). Donaldson and Kymlicka retie those knots through an application of political theory to nonhuman animals.

3. Melson summarizes the biophilia hypothesis early in her argument: "The biophilia hypothesis ... suggests that a predisposition to attune to animals and other living things is part of the human evolutionary heritage Biophilia depicts children as born assuming a connection with other living things." The biophilia hypothesis has a tremendous amount of explanatory power with regards to early cave art, animals in dreams, and the animals permeating the process of language acquisition.

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Walking with Thoreau in Mind and Dogs on Leash

Karla Armbruster

English Department, Webster University

470 E. Lockwood Ave., St. Louis, MO 63119, USA

Email: armbruka@webster.edu

Abstract This essay takes as its starting point the challenge posed by Henry David Thoreau's 1861 essay "Walking," which suggests that even the shortest walk around the neighborhood should be approached as a quest for wildness, a quest that must be taken up in such a "spirit of undying adventure" that the walker must be prepared "never to return." The author draws on her personal experiences to explore the ways that such a Thoreauvian walk might take shape in the suburban and urban environments where most people live in the contemporary United States. She proposes that bringing a dog as a companion may enhance the wildness of a walk, despite the ways that dogs can work against many of Thoreau's values by functioning as distractions and added responsibilities. In this essay, she explains the literary tradition that treats dogs as guides to wildness and the more-than-human world in order to argue that, if we pay proper attention, dogs' sensory capabilities in particular can point us toward the invisible wild dimensions of the natural world.

Key words dogs; Henry David Thoreau; walking; wildness

Though Henry David Thoreau is best known for his retreat to the cabin on Walden Pond, where he stripped his life down to the most basic physical necessities in order to pursue higher spiritual truths, it is the act of walking that best characterizes his work. As Henrik Otterberg points out, the walk, ramble, and excursion are fundamental to Thoreau's writing and thinking, both as the methods by which he gathered information and developed ideas and as the narrative structure for many of his talks, essays, and books. By the time Thoreau completed the essay "Walking" in 1861, near the end of his life, he was able to represent walking as a practice that brought mind and body into alignment: the best way to leave the distractions of everyday life behind and seek out the wild wisdom of the more-than-human world.

Thoreau's essay "Walking" was the culmination of a lifetime spent exploring the woods and fields around his home, thinking deeply in response to what he saw,

heard, and otherwise experienced, and pondering its significance further in many of his lectures and published works. I can't say the same for this essay, even though I have now lived more years than Thoreau ever did. I have moved too often to develop the intimacy with a place that Thoreau achieved with the area around Concord, Massachusetts, and I have filled my life with too many commitments to employers, students, family, and companion animals to spend the kind of time he did exploring. When I first read "Walking," though, I was dismayed to realize I was one of the many he describes as never having taken a real walk, since I inevitably "come round again at evening to the old hearth-side from which [I] set out" (244). The true capital-W walker, or saunterer, is equally at home everywhere, he tells us, and the idea of joining this select company captured my imagination. In my attempts to become a Thoreauvian walker, I have faced many impediments, but I have also had time to wonder if there might not be ways to achieve Thoreau's goal by methods other than those he used — to reach the same destination by a different path, to use a walking metaphor. Specifically, since so many of my best walks have occurred in the company of dogs, I would like to ask the question, "How might a dog detract from — but also contribute to — the quest to achieve a Thoreauvian walk?"

I did not always aspire to artful walking. In 1981, I was a freshman at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. When I arrived on campus, I was overwhelmed by many things: the fact that I was eleven hours away from home without one familiar face to ground me; the fact that the sun was behind the clouds and — as I would discover — would not come out for the next thirty days; the rugged beauty of the campus with its waterfalls and steep hills; and the fact that I was expected to walk everywhere I needed to go, even when those steep hills were covered with ice. I had grown up in a semi-rural area, and like most people who live in such places, I was used to driving almost everywhere. The idea that my only form of transportation to class, to stores, to the library, to the movies was my own two feet — even if it was raining! — made me a little indignant. And then there was the pace. From the moment I set off walking, I would be marking time, asking myself "Are we there yet?" and resenting every step, fuming that I didn't have a *Star Trek*-style transporter that would just beam me from my dorm room to my destination in an instant. So I walked, but I walked fast, impatiently, unhappily, with only my destination, and my distance from it, in mind.

It wasn't always that way — as a child, I ran all over the neighborhood, often in bare feet, on roads, in the woods, through my neighbors' backyards. But that was different. I wasn't trying to get anywhere by any particular point in time. I was wandering, looking for familiar sights, like the spring beauties and wild Sweet William that appeared on the edges of the woods in early spring, or occasional visitors, like

the black snake eating a baby squirrel that transfixed all the neighborhood children one afternoon, or the unexpected, like the stand of pine trees I found one day after climbing over the barbed wire fence and entering the forbidden territory of Bruton's Woods — a breathtakingly silent and serene expanse of needle-carpeted ground filled with shafts of sunlight and gently waving branches. Without a destination, I didn't think of myself as condemned to an inferior means of getting there. Walking was the only way to be in the landscape, to move across fences and creeks, and it went hand-in-hand with being open to whatever the place had to offer.

Without realizing it, I was taking what you might recognize as a Thoreauvian walk. Or was I? After all, I always knew where I was and wound up safe in bed at the end of the day. Although Thoreau starts his essay by warning us that he will be making an extreme statement, his description of a true walk is still a daunting one. He tells us that even “the shortest walk” around the neighborhood should be approached as a quest that we take up “in the spirit of undying adventure, never to return” (244). He adds, “If you are ready to leave father and mother, and brother and sister, and wife and child and friends, and never see them again; if you have paid your debts, and made your will, and settled all your affairs, and are a free man; then you are ready for a walk” (244).

I actually paraphrased this statement when starting off on a walk of my own about four years ago, at the Association for the Study of Literature and Environment conference in Victoria, British Columbia. It was supposed to be a simple conference field trip to the East Sooke Wilderness Park, planned to take about three hours. As someone who grew up watching the American television show *Gilligan's Island*, I should have known to be wary of a “three-hour tour,” but it seemed pretty tame at the beginning: about 50 of us filed onto a bus and ate our box lunches along the way. When we learned there would be no guide, I was a little surprised, but we were each given a map, and the directions seemed simple enough. But the friend I was walking with and I fell behind the rest of the group, the trail grew hard to follow once we reached the rocky coast, and eventually we found ourselves trapped in a sort of peninsula surrounded by ravines filled with salal, a dense evergreen shrub that can grow up to ten feet high.

We could feel the chill coming on as afternoon bled into evening, and we moved up a little incline to get into the sunlight. As the light dimmed and the cold crept up the hill, I was overcome with the realization of my physical vulnerability, of how cushioned my daily life was by human technology and infrastructure like central heat, electric lights, and even simple blankets and jackets ... all things I didn't have right then. Facing the strong possibility of spending the night out there, I didn't really think I was going to die ... but I realized how limited my innate capabilities were, that the

world is not inherently accommodating of the needs and whims of humans, and how much of it is dangerous, confusing, or at least uncomfortable when confronted by a person equipped with only a bottle of water and a travel toothbrush and toothpaste.

Without at all meaning to, I had gone on a Thoreauvian walk: I left the path, I got lost, and I was at least temporarily overwhelmed by my insignificance and physical limits and thus came to a new understanding of my place in the universe. If nature is, as Thoreau described in “Walking,” our “vast, savage, hovering Mother ..., lying all around, with such beauty, and such affection for her children, as the leopard” (271), it was the vastness and potential savagery that hovered over me that evening rather than the affection. The beauty was, I discovered, easier to appreciate after we were found, as we hiked out along the coast by moonlight.

If a trip to the wilderness and the intervention of Search and Rescue is what it takes to go on a Thoreauvian walk and return to tell the story, though, most of us won't get that opportunity. But I don't think literally getting lost is the only way. Thoreau did most of his walking close to home, and in the end, his quest was a spiritual one more dependent on attitude and perception than on physical location. He was in search of wildness, a quality that he associates with areas uncultivated or unvisited by other humans; with the swamps maligned by civilized society; with a general urge for freedom; and even with the “wild habits and vigor” that still wells up in domesticated animals, “as when [his] neighbor's cow breaks out of her pasture early in the spring and boldly swims the river, a cold, gray tide, twenty-five or thirty rods wide, swollen by the melted snow” (268).

How can we best walk in search of wildness today? Walking to get to a particular location won't do, since it's far too focused on a specific, practical goal. Neither will walking for exercise, which Thoreau compares to the sick taking medicine at appointed hours. Instead, he insists, walking must “itself [be] the enterprise and adventure of the day” (247). Given the potential for domesticated animals to exhibit wildness that Thoreau identifies, though, I propose that walking with a dog might be one way to achieve the type of walking he advocates. In fact, when I went on my semi-Thoreauvian rambles as a girl, more often than not I was accompanied by a dog, or was in pursuit of one. I didn't walk them on a leash much, as I do today, since dogs in that place and time often ran loose. But I did inhabit their universe, run next to them, follow them, or even bump into them as we each went about the small adventures of our day. The sound of my beagle mix Cory desperately baying in the woods, presumably chasing a rabbit, was common background music to my own activities.

Thoreau did not have a regular canine companion on his walks, though his friend Ellery Channing's dog Bose often accompanied the two of them when they went

roaming together. In fact, Wesley Mott, editor of *Bonds of Affection: Thoreau on Dogs and Cats*, tells us that Thoreau was actually more of a cat person whose last detailed journal entries before his death focused on the habits of his family's kittens. And he certainly didn't have a dog or any other domesticated animal with him during his time on the shores of Walden Pond. If you think of his emphasis in *Walden* on paring down one's obligations and possessions in order to create time to read, observe nature, and pursue spiritual awakening, it's easy to understand why. Dogs can demand significant commitments of money, time, and attention — and besides, they might have chewed his books, dug up his beanfield, or chased away the groundhog he contemplated eating raw. On a walk, they can be very distracting. Right now, I walk with my three dogs, and though they have learned to walk together in a certain order — Allister on the right, Mr. Miggy in the middle, and Belle on the left — if one veers across our path to sniff something intriguing, leashes get tangled. I'm constantly scoping out the horizon for situations that might cause barking or pulling, such as other dogs, rabbits, or softball games (since Allister, my big German Shepherd mix, has an inexplicable phobia about organized sports involving balls). My mind is not free to contemplate the details and meaning of my surroundings, and as Thoreau writes, "What business have I in the woods, if I am thinking of something out of the woods?" (248).

On the other hand, dogs do get you to walk. That's how I came back to walking, even before I read Thoreau's essay. When I started graduate school, I took with me a dog that had shown up at my parents' house over the summer, a little beagle-terrier mix that I named Annie. In the next eleven years, I would live in five different cities and towns, moving into a new apartment or rental house almost every year. And each time, it became increasingly important to me to find all the good walking places nearby, a quest that many people who live with dogs will identify with. The closest we came to wildness in our walks was probably when we lived in Colorado, where we walked with my partner and his big Dalmatian Caval almost every day on the Coal Creek Trail, a nice path along the creek that ran through a pasture containing a small herd of mules and horses. In two years, I never saw anyone feed them, ride them, or otherwise care for them — they were a self-sufficient unit, almost wild in a way Thoreau would have appreciated. But there were also coyotes, whom we heard howling at night but almost never saw. One afternoon, though, I had both dogs on the trail off leash, and another dog came bounding up. Well ... not a dog, I suddenly realized — a coyote! The coyote approached Caval, seeming to invite him to play. I had heard rumors that coyotes would do this in order to lure dogs into an ambush, and so I called Caval back and chased the coyote away, shouting and waving my arms.

In the recent outpouring of memoirs written about life with dogs, this idea — that dogs can help attune you to aspects of the natural world that you might not otherwise

encounter or notice — surfaces regularly; perhaps, as our societies grow increasingly urban and isolated from many wild animal species, it is exactly this promise of a connection to nature and even wildness that makes these books so popular, given that many of them, such as the best-selling *Marley and Me: Life and Love with the World's Worst Dog*, are preoccupied with the dog's unruly behavior. More thrillingly, as in my experience with the coyote, dogs sometimes enable an encounter with a wild animal that would otherwise have remained hidden. In Ted Kerasote's *Merle's Door: Lessons from a Freethinking Dog*, the dog Merle draws the author's attention to a grizzly bear off to the side of the path they're hiking together, with an expression that Kerasote compares to the patient look that a parent gives a child: "See, you almost missed that" (251). In this way, you might say dogs can serve as the kind of guide Thoreau was looking for when he wrote, "Unto a life which I call natural I would gladly follow even a will-o'-the-wisp through bogs and sloughs unimaginable, but no moon nor fire-fly has shown me the causeway to it" (275).

Some of the things I've encountered walking with dogs that I would never have found on my own are not as thrilling and beautiful — or potentially dangerous — as a coyote or a grizzly bear: there was the stiff-as-a-board dead groundhog, the various rotting corpses, and of course a smorgasbord of excrement, starting with goose and deer and moving into varieties more exotic and difficult to identify. Thoreau was not one to be put off by the disgusting, representing epiphanies about immortality with such inelegant symbols as the rotting corpse of a horse and an insect burrowing out of a wooden table in *Walden*. He identifies the wild as that which can overwhelm civilization, which in many ways opposes or works against it, and the dog's obsession with everything that rots and stinks must qualify as an affinity for wildness when it's viewed in those terms. And sometimes dogs just break the rules, albeit culturally constructed rules they may not know about: for example, once Annie followed a cat she was chasing right into the house where the cat lived, since the door had been left open, and on another occasion I barely stopped her from dashing into a chapel where a wedding was taking place. But for Thoreau, wildness is also "the raw material of life" (262), a source of revitalization for those overcome with the demands of culture — and dogs can certainly model that kind of revitalization for us. Allister cannot resist the puddles that always form after it rains in the low-lying park where I often walk; despite her gray muzzle and mild arthritis, she bounces from one small pool to the next, rolling in them, emerging not only dripping with muddy water but reinvigorated, with a spark that I can only call wild joy in her eyes. And puddles are just the start of the list: whether chasing a squirrel, darting from one scent to the next in a landscape freshly washed by rain, or rooting in the trash, dogs are masters of drawing vitality from the forbidden, invisible, and even seemingly unattainable elements that lurk in

the wild corners of the world.

But the fact that a dog can get you out walking and draw your attention to wild, messy, even unpleasant aspects of nature is not the real key to why a dog can be your guide to a Thoreauvian walk. The journey for Thoreau was always metaphysical as well as physical, and while dogs are famously creatures of their bodies and desires, living in the moment, they also have a unique capacity to help us tune into the unseen, to recognize the existence of an entire world that is literally beyond our senses and wild in the ways it exceeds our capacities to grasp or express it. In “Walking” Thoreau writes that

the highest that we can attain to is not Knowledge, but Sympathy with Intelligence. I do not know that this higher knowledge amounts to anything more definite than a novel and grand surprise on a sudden revelation of the insufficiency of all that we called Knowledge before — a discovery that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy. (273)

And what if it is the dog whose intelligence we sympathize with? We all know that dogs experience aspects of the world that we don't: specifically, the high-frequency noises and the multitude of scents. In 1933, Virginia Woolf captured the latter beautifully in *Flush: A Biography*, her imaginative re-creation of the life of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's spaniel, writing,

There are no more than two words and perhaps one-half for what we smell. The human nose is practically non-existent. The greatest poets in the world have smelt nothing but roses on the one hand, and dung on the other. The infinite gradations that lie between are unrecorded. Yet it was in the world of smell that Flush mostly lived. (129-30)

In her recent book *Inside of a Dog: What Dogs See, Smell, and Know*, Alexandra Horowitz quantifies Woolf's idea of the “practically non-existent” human nose when she tells us that human noses have about six million sensory receptor sites, compared to over two hundred million for sheepdogs and over three hundred million for beagles. The difference in smell experience is exponential, she concludes (71). So what is the dog's world of smell like, this network of intelligence that exceeds our sensory capacities? Horowitz conjures the experience through an extended comparison:

Imagine if each detail of our visual world were matched by a corresponding smell. Each petal on a rose may be distinct, having been visited by insects

leaving pollen footprints from far away flowers. What is to us just a single stem actually holds a record of who held it, and when. A burst of chemicals marks where a leaf was torn. The flesh of the petals, plump with moisture compared to that of the leaf, holds a different odor besides. The fold of a leaf has a smell; so does a dewdrop on a thorn. And *time* is in those details: while we can see one of the petals drying and browning, the dog can smell this process of decay and aging. Imagine smelling every minute visual detail. That might be the experience of a rose to a dog. (72)

And your dog lives in a much richer (and perhaps more distressing) world of sounds than you do, too: he or she can hear the non-stop high frequency pulses emitted by the crystal resonator in your digital alarm clock and the bodily vibrations of termites (if you have them) in your walls. Though we can't experience these detailed worlds of scent and sound directly, if we pay attention as we walk with them, dogs offer us a wealth of signs that show us they are there, just as a sheet thrown over someone rendered invisible might reveal the person's outlines: the focused sniffing when the dog stands immobile as a rock as you tug on the leash, the ears suddenly pricking up even though you don't hear a thing, the nose to the ground, snuffing along a trail that zig-zags into the undergrowth. To borrow the words of New Zealander Ian Wedde, who writes about his Rhodesian ridgeback Vincent in an essay called "Walking the Dog," attending to the needs and abilities that differentiate dogs from humans "extends the range of what's mysterious in the world," ultimately "enrich[ing our] ignorance" (358). A dedicated cultivation of this type of ignorance, an enriched sense of the vast networks of life conducting themselves outside the limits of our insufficient senses, is a practice in which our dogs can be our guides — a practice that could bring us closer to finding what Thoreau sought on his walks: a wildness that exceeds our capacity to know.

Based on Thoreau's journals and published works, one of the most common ways dogs entered his consciousness was when he heard them barking and baying in the night, either from their yards or while hunting on their own in the woods. Surprisingly, he rarely complains about these sounds ruining the silence or disrupting his thoughts, instead characterizing them as refreshing or heroic and speculating that the "sweet and melodious" voice of the hound may have been the inspiration for the hunting horn (qtd. in Mott 4). At times, he finds in their persistent noise a reassurance of the sound and tenacious state of nature. In one of his later journal entries, he comments more specifically on the experience of listening to this potentially annoying noise, one of the "commonest and cheapest": in his view, it tests the "appetite for sound," striking fresh and healthy ears as the rarest music would, "just as a crust is sweeter

to a healthy appetite than confectionary to a pampered or diseased one” (qtd. in Mott 32). Like the barking of the dogs in nineteenth-century Concord, Massachusetts, wildness is all around us, even in the most common corners of our lives, if only we can learn to apprehend it. We don’t need to venture into the wilderness. We don’t need to stalk wild animals. We don’t need to scale mountains. Just as our most basic form of travel, walking, can transport us into elevated intellectual and spiritual realms, our most taken-for-granted, common companion — the dog — can help us open ourselves to the wild richness of the world, not only by enriching our sense of how limited our experience of that world really is, but also by leading us off the path, both literally and figuratively, breaking us out of our accustomed modes of perception and challenging us to see (and smell and hear) the everyday, even the disgusting and annoying, in new ways.

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The Goodness of Flying-Foxes

Deborah Bird Rose

Environmental Humanities Program, University of New South Wales

NSW 2052, Sydney, Australia

Email: deborah.bird.rose@gmail.com

Abstract This essay takes up the challenge issued by philosopher Val Plumwood to subject our cultural narratives to a critical re-think. The focus is on the narrative that only humans live with and through cultural narratives. Opening the analysis to multi-species cultural narratives, the essay engages with the wider question of what is being lost in the world through the direct and indirect effects of human wreckage. The analysis focuses on philosophical/theological questions of the goodness of creation. Working with the case study of flying-foxes (*Pteropus* spp) in Australia, the essay proposes that a Levinasian ethics of intersubjective responsibility pervades the plenum of life on earth. Through the work of James Hatley, in particular, the essay offers an enlivened account of symbiotic mutualism as evidence of goodness, and explores the ripples of goodness that flow from mutualism. The cruel violence against flying-foxes is offered as just one example of the on-going disaster of human rejection of the goodness of creation.

Key words philosophy; biblical narrative; flying-foxes; multi-species analysis; cultural narratives

Introduction

The on-going debate and critique concerning the appropriateness of the term “Anthropocene”(Crist 2013) goes hand in hand with the fact that the earth has entered an era of escalating ecological change. Most of the changes, while experienced differently in different parts of the world, will not favour the continuation of life in the networks of flourishing complexity that now prevail. The dire consequences of human actions over the past few hundred years are well expressed by Nick Mansfield (2008). He contends that “the material violence of the past emerges, reincarnate, re-fleshed, in our future, and in a politics for which our last centuries of politics cannot prepare or even forewarn us” (para 14). Furthermore, he concludes that while we are facing an event-to-come, that event is in fact already with us in the present:

The politics of climate change will be experienced differentially, as determined

by race, religion, wealth, nationality and locality. It is being experienced now. The abandoned city. The drowned nation. The unwanted guest. The feared race. The oppressive democracy. The ruthless freedom. The vile law. The risks of justice. The unmanaged change. The unpredicted revolution. The unimaginable end. (para 29)

Of the many questions that arise for human beings at this time, the one that concerns me here is that of what, exactly, is being lost in the more-than-human world. We know a lot about numbers. They are very useful in assessing and comparing loss in this time of degradation and extinction. Beyond numbers, though, what is being lost? I turn to studies on the goodness of creation in order to engage with an ethics of responsibility in the face of loss. Working with a case study of Australian flying-foxes, I aim to enliven our ethical sensibility toward the goodness that is being evicted from the world through human impacts as they directly and indirectly break into and diminish the lives of others.

Cultural Narratives

Val Plumwood was one of the world's great contributors to the analysis of how Western rationality sustains the ecological crisis we are now entangled within (*Environmental Culture* 83-84). She held the view that what is required of us in this time of looming catastrophe is "the courage to question our most basic cultural narratives" ("Nature in the Active Voice" 113). These words ask us to trouble the status quo, to trouble our conventional wisdom, and to keep on troubling the dominance of all the ideologies that are ruining the earth's capacity to thrive as a home for life. The narratives Plumwood dedicated her life to questioning, or troubling, are the hyperseparated binaries that assert that humans are separate from the rest of the living world. Binaries include the idea that we (humans) are mindful, while they (nonhumans) are mere matter; that we make meaning, while they follow their individual species-specific instincts; that we are actively in control, while they are there to be manipulated (*Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* 49-59).

These words pose cross-cultural questions: who, for a start, is the "we" whose cultural narratives are in need of being challenged? On the one hand, western modernity has globalised itself to such an extent that the problems produced by the crisis of reason are global problems. In this sense, all humans on earth today have work to do in challenging western modernity's cultural narratives. On the other hand, not all people's cultural narratives are enmeshed in binaries; in this paper the "we" I focus on is primarily western.

Plumwood offered an alternative to what she termed hyperseparated, sado-

dispassionate, scientific modernity. She was proposing a philosophical animism (Rose 2013) which she offered as a way to “begin to negotiate life membership in an ecological community of kindred beings” (Plumwood, NAV 121). The idea of ecological communities that include but are not confined to humans requires the fundamental proposition that nonhumans live their own meaningful lives. I will not argue the case for this proposition, as it is already the subject of an enormous and rapidly growing literature (see for example Bekoff 2002; Bekoff and Pierce 2009; van Dooren and Rose 2012; de Waal 2008; also Plumwood 2002: 167-95).

The great cultural narrative that is being unsettled in all these new understandings of nonhumans is the narrative that we are the only creatures with cultural narratives. It seems ever clearer that we inhabit a world of life in which human cultural narratives are but one type among many. We are thus drawn into numerous disturbing questions. Clearly, the mere fact of the existence of nonhuman cultural narratives troubles western modernity. In addition, the narratives themselves are troubling because they unfold outside dominant story-lines that rely on human-centrism and progress. They aren't all about us. There is a further challenge: that dialogue between humans and nonhumans can be something other than a process whereby humans gain instrumental knowledge in order better to manage and control nonhumans.

I am proposing that the most basic cultural narrative we need to disturb is the predominantly western idea that the nonhuman world is a place not only lacking mindfulness, but also lacking goodness. At its widest, therefore, the challenge of questioning cultural narratives starts up a vast domain of trouble. For if life on earth is created in the mode of “goodness,” is there even a place, at this time, for humans? Our species is the great perpetrator of wreckage. Do we have the capacity to be part of goodness? Is this a matter of choice? Can we learn from nonhumans?

In addressing these questions, I want to bear in mind that even within modernity there is no single narrative. And of course within the category “human” there are so many narratives that it is only the hubris of western modernity that allows the idea of a universal narrative. Accordingly, let theology trouble philosophy, let philosophy trouble science, let science trouble theology, let east trouble west, let Indigenous trouble Settler. And in that mode of disturbance, let us have the courage to pay attention to more-than-human creatures.

The Challenge of Goodness

In recent years I have been engaging with the works of a remarkable but little known philosopher named Lev Shestov. He was born in 1866 in Russia, and was educated there. From 1895, he lived sometimes in Russia and sometimes in Germany or Switzerland. After the revolution he emigrated to Paris where he wrote and taught.

As his work was translated into French he became a key figure in both religious philosophy and existential philosophy. He died in 1938. Bernard Martin, who has translated much of Shestov's work, writes that for Shestov "the gods of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century man — science, technology, the idea of inevitable historical progress, autonomous ethics, and most of all, rationalist systems of philosophy — were ... idols, devoid of ultimate meaning but terrible in their potentiality for destruction" (*The Life and Thought of Lev Shestov* 12).

In place of rationalist-dominated modernity, Shestov offered a philosophical celebration of the joyous qualities of life on earth. His deep plea for the western world was for us to regain the capacity to acknowledge that the earth is good. In a particularly powerful passage he asked: "Why should creation not be perfect? ... No one, neither of our time nor even of the Middle Ages, dared to admit that the biblical 'very good' corresponded to reality, that the world created by God ... was truly good." Shestov's desire within the whole of the work was to restore to European humanity the capacity to see the world in its goodness — to find contemporary ways to recover the divine "very good" (LTL 63, 70).

The refusal of goodness is one of the hallmarks of high modernity, not least because the core project of "progress" works implicitly and explicitly against the given by always seeking improvement. Whilst remaining mindful of the strands of modernity and counter-modernity that cherish and praise "nature," I want to remain with the fact that the banner of progress has been accompanied by massive violence in forms that include genocide, ecocide, ethnocide and specicide. Further, every great act of violence has been framed within modernity as a way of improving life. In James Hatley's words, mass death "denotes a doubled action: one murders in the flesh what one has already rendered in one's thought as morally inconsiderable" (*Suffering Witness* 55). This is to say that the ideology of violence holds that the eradication of certain others will improve the world. As Zygmunt Bauman reminds us again and again, although we know a lot about prejudice in relation to violence, "we know little about how to stave off the threat of murder which masquerades as the routine and unemotional function of an orderly society" (*The Holocaust's Life as a Ghost* 10). Violence as a form of progress positions mass killings as "creative destruction, conceived as a *healing surgical operation*" (HLG 11), undertaken in the interest of better economies or environments. Bauman's work relates specifically to human violence against other humans, but it is equally pertinent to human violence against the whole of the nonhuman world. As Plumwood has shown, hyperseparated binaries have been deployed to develop the categories of those whose lives matter, and those whose lives do not. It is a short step from managing others to denigrating them, and then to deem their lives to be of no consequence.

The logic of progress plus the question of goodness equals the idea that life on earth as it exists is not good (enough). Perhaps the most powerful conjunction of these ideas has been brought into the scholarly world through the work of Lynn White Jr. In his study “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” he demonstrates the Biblical origins of anthropocentrism — that creation was for, and solely for, humans (1205). He further demonstrates that “a marriage between science and technology” has been the key to implementing anthropocentric control over nature in the western world (1203). White’s essay continues to be widely discussed, and has sparked a scholarly return to the Bible in order to find alternative meanings that might be recuperated. Numerous essays indicate that while a role for humans that involves care rather than domination can be recuperated, it is difficult to avoid the anthropocentrism of the stories (see, for example, Tirosh-Samuelson 2001).

One needs to connect the story of creation with the story of expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as Carolyn Merchant does, in order to get the full logic of a world deficient in goodness. This is the powerful cultural narrative of a fallen world which is intended to serve the interests of the human species. It is therefore a world in radical need of improvement (or redemption) (Merchant 2004). This is primarily an occidental view, as White says (1204), and it denies the goodness of the earth’s own life. To repeat Shestov’s point: no one in the West “dared to admit that the biblical ‘very good’ corresponded to reality, that the world created by God ...” was truly good.

Recently, however, the American philosopher James Hatley, an expert on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, has initiated a major study on the goodness of creation (Hatley 2012). Levinas, as is well known, propounded a deeply challenging ethics of intersubjectivity and relationality, articulated through the trope of the face. In Levinas’s analysis, the face is the other before whom I am always already responsible. A number of excellent recent studies are abolishing Levinas’s apparent human-centric vision of the ethical subject (for example, Perpich 2012). Others are working to include joy (along with suffering) in the analysis of ethics, for example Mooney (2012).

Levinas wrote about creation in the context of Genesis, and he sought to trouble philosophy with a consideration of creation. He continued the project of bringing western humanity into ethical encounter with the goodness of creation, and thus of the goodness of life on earth. Hatley asks the tough theological and philosophical question: does creation require anthropocentrism? In a radical departure from Lynn White Jr, Hatley discerns in both Levinas and the Bible a way to allow the whole of creation to be engaged within the domain of ethics.

It will be recalled that the Book of Genesis starts with God’s breath rippling across the water, and moves through six days of creation, on each of which God looks at what he has done and says that it is good. On the sixth day He creates humans, and

on the seventh day He gazes upon the totality. Levinas argues that the sixth day of creation, with its focus on humans, is the day on which humans are required to learn about being human in relation to other humans. This intra-human story is extremely important, and so it should be. However, the story does not stop on day six. Levinas's reading is that the story goes on to the Sabbath, or seventh day, and, in Hatley's words, to reach the Sabbath we must move "beyond our own particular interests to an ethical and so social, political, historical, and *ecological* involvement with our fellow creatures of flesh and blood or even tissue and sap" ("The Original Goodness of Creation" 268). The Sabbath brings all of creation together in its goodness. This reading allows us to think of creation as the on-going story of life as it comes forth into relationship. The goodness of creation is always emerging in the relational responsibilities through which life keeps on coming-forth. It arrives in its renewal (264).

Flying-Fox Life

It is now possible to turn to flying-foxes and to consider their participation on on-going creation, their offerings and blessings, their narratives of participatory life. Flying-foxes are megachiroptera: term chiroptera means "hand winged." There are two suborders: mega and micro. Worldwide, megachiroptera include 166 species of flying-foxes (Pteropids; many of them also known as fruit bats) and blossom bats. Microchiroptera include 759 species. The two suborders are quite different, size being only part of it. Microchiroptera navigate by echolocation (animal sonar); they are small and feed mainly on insects but there also are blood-eating vampire bats, fish-eating bats, and other carnivorous bats. In contrast, Megachiroptera all feed on plants. They navigate principally by sight, and many of them are large. Pteropids, or flying-foxes, are the largest "bats" in the world. Unlike microbats, they navigate by sight and other senses, and do not echolocate. Also unlike microbats, they live exclusively on plant foods, primarily nectar, pollen and fruit. They are arboreal and they forage by night.

In Australia, the largest male flying-foxes weigh about one kilogram and have wingspans of up to 1.5 metres (Hall and Richards, *Flying Foxes* 1-3). There is no way of knowing the flying-fox population figures prior to British settlement, but certainly the numbers would have been in the thousands of millions. Four main species of flying-foxes make up the Australian contingent: Black Flying-fox (*Pteropus Alecto*), Grey-headed Flying-fox (*P. poliocephalus*), Little Red Flying-fox (*P. scapulatus*), and Spectacled Flying-fox (*P. conspicillatus*). By preference they travel widely in search of pollen, seeds and fruits, covering vast areas during an annual round as they follow flowering and fruiting trees and shrubs. At this time, both grey-headed and spectacled

flying-foxes are listed as threatened under the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (summarised from Booth et al. 2008).

Although the evidence is clear that flying-foxes prefer the Myrtaceae flowers and forest fruits with which they are co-evolved, the clearing of native vegetation and its replacement with commercial fruit crops has left them little choice. Biologist Francis Ratcliffe came out to Australia in 1929 sponsored by the state governments of New South Wales and Queensland to investigate the orchardists' problem. He was asked to provide information on flying-foxes; the desire amongst many orchardists was less for information than for quick measures for eradicating flying-foxes. Orchardists, along with many other people, held what we might call a zero-tolerance vision. Basically, they wanted flying-foxes gone forever. Their "us" and "them" boundary offered no place for co-existence or mutuality. Ratcliffe's research led him to the conclusion that total eradication of flying-foxes was impossible. He concluded as well that their populations seemed to be in fairly rapid decline owing primarily to human-generated factors; it thus seemed possible that the problem would not last too much longer (*Flying Fox and Drifting Sand* 10).

His findings were as prophetic as they were alarming. Like much of earth life today, flying-foxes inhabit zones of increasing conflict and terror. Ratcliffe reported, for example, that in the 1920s the "Brisbane and East Moreton Pests Destruction board" counted 300,000 flying-fox deaths achieved under a bounty system (discussed in Martin and McIlwee, "The Reproductive Biology..." 104). With government approval, people for decades shot, poisoned, gassed, burnt, and electrocuted flying foxes. In the 1990s there were estimates of 100,000 or more grey-headed flying foxes being shot annually (Tidemann et al, "Grey-headed Flying Fox"). Continuing today, humans are attacking flying-foxes in maternity camps, using water cannons, smoke, helicopters, firecrackers and paintball guns, to note a recent, unusually horrific case.¹ As the horror of wholesale slaughter continues, we are in the situation of trying to save two endangered species. One of the numerous social contradictions impacting on the lives of flying-foxes is that a species like the grey-headed flying-fox is both protected as an endangered species and is legally shot in fruit orchards.

The Joys of Mutualism

In contrast to the violence that exists between some humans and flying-foxes, there is a fantastic love story of the co-evolution of flying-foxes and their preferred trees and shrubs. Flying-foxes live by preference on pollen and nectar, and so they live by chasing blossoms. Eucalypts and Melaleucas are their favourites. Many of these trees and shrubs produce huge clusters of light coloured showy flowers that are perfectly adapted to be visible at night. Furthermore, many of them actually produce their

nectar and pollen at night so that their peak of desirability coincides with the nighttime flyout of their main pollinators (Eby, “The Biology and Management...” 36). Many tree species flourish best across generations when pollen is carried from tree to tree (outcrossed pollination), and flying-foxes perform this service beautifully (Hall and Richards, *Flying Foxes* 83-84). Flying-foxes, for their part, are highly attuned to smell, have excellent night vision that is especially attentive to light colours, and have foraging patterns that get them moving from tree to tree across wide areas (Hall and Richards, *Flying Foxes* 82-83). They often travel fifty kilometres per night getting food, and many of them travel over a thousand kilometres per year. They are the primary pollinators for numerous species, including rainforest species for whom they are also seed dispersers.

The scientific term for this relationship is symbiotic mutualism. A growing body of research is showing that mutualism complements competition and is utterly fundamental to life on earth (Margulis, *Symbiotic Planet*). Mutualism requires sufficient levels of continuity for the relationships to be sustainable, of course. In Australia, blossoming takes place sequentially, and flying-foxes are readily able to know when trees start to bloom hundreds of kilometres away from where they are camping, and to fly off to find the nectar; humans do not know how they do this (Eby, “The Biology and Management...” 24). Because of their capacity to travel widely and opportunistically, they are superbly adapted to the patchy distribution of Australian flora, and to the boom and bust pulses of El Niño influenced abundance.

One of the impediments to thinking about goodness in nonhuman contexts is the tenacity with which scientists sustain their commitment to the separation of self and other, and their commitment to what they define as selfish. Within scientific theory, mutualisms “are inherently selfish interspecific interactions that increase the fitness of both species” (Thompson, *The Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution* 246). Mutualism is deemed to be selfish because it is not altruistic. Clearly, there is a huge problem in the terminology — it hinges on an either-or discrimination: either an action is wholly for one’s self (selfish), or it is wholly for another and at a cost to one’s self (altruistic). This is a terrible, hyperseparated contrast. It is terrible for understanding mutualism, terrible for understanding relationality, and irremediably terrible for understanding the goodness of life on Earth.

And yet, this terrible contrast finds an eerie echo in a great deal of thought about ethics, including in some of Levinas’s work. As is well known, Levinas finds an ethical call in the face of suffering. Even in the moment in which he seems to confirm the beauty of embodied existence, and its susceptibility to the experience of goodness, he also affirms that embodied life entails that one is “to be exposed to sickness, suffering and death” and thus “is to be exposed to compassion, and, as a self, to the

gift that costs” (Levinas, quoted in Hatley, “The Original Goodness of Creation” 265). I am not dismissing suffering, and nor am I dismissing costs to self — we all understand suffering and cost and know that they matter. As I contemplate flying-foxes, though, questions are inescapable: What about joy? What about ecstasy? What about Eros? What is the nature of these calls, and do they bring us into ethics?

Levinas’s profoundly simple and at the same time complex vision of responsibility in the face of others is given eloquent expression in the Hebrew term *hineini*. Hatley translates the term as “here, I” (Hatley, OGC 264). He and I are provisionally glossing the term as “Yes!” That is, we gloss it as the unconditional assent to life. *Yes!* takes us beyond the dualism of selfishness vs altruism, and beyond the self-other dyad. Hatley always emphasises the other others who are part of the story. Creation, he is saying, is all about entanglement: the participation of all living entities in relationships that “make responsibility the very articulation of the real” (Hatley, “OGC” 275-76). Blossoms and flying-foxes help us to think that our open entanglement in the context of creation radically exposes us and others to the fullness of life. It is neither selfish nor altruistic: it is life for life, life for self and other, life between and amongst a multiplicity of creaturely beings. Within the entanglements of creation, we all call and respond; we are all saying *Yes!*

We do this knowingly, but we also engage in the great *Yes!* without even thinking about it. Levinas uses the term “elemental” to denote those givens of earth that make life possible, such as gravity, light, and air. In the lyrical prose of Alphonso Lingis, “We live in light, in warmth, in liquidity, in radiance ... the elemental makes one’s eyes luminous, one’s hands warm, one’s voice voluble and spiritual and one’s face ardent” (*The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common* 126). The elemental surrounds, pervades, animates and holds living beings. It would make no sense to try to choose to live outside the elemental, but of course we can choose to disregard, denigrate and disparage it, or even try to imagine that somehow we deserve all these blessings (Hatley, “OGC” 265).

Communication amongst earth creatures takes many forms, as is well known (for example, see Curry 2008). Again in Lingis’s great words, language begins with insects’ “repetitive vibratory chant.” They are “reiterating and reaffirming the forces of beauty, health, and superabundant vitality” (51). Much of the communication on earth has nothing to do with us humans; one would only need briefly to reflect upon insects to realise that they are not at all chanting to or for us. But, my story is about flying-foxes.

Let us consider the lush, extravagant beauty, flamboyance, and dazzling seductiveness with which Eucalypts say *Yes!*. They burst open sequentially, even patchily. And when they burst, every twig says “*Yes!, More!*” — more buds, more

flowers, more colour, more scent, more pollen, more nectar — more, and more, and all that can be conjured from within the tree to reach out into the world with this great, vivid, multisensorial call: *Yes!*

A human is likely to be struck by the seeming extravagance of it all, and to reach for her camera. For their part, flying-foxes respond to the call of Eucalypts and Melaleucas with their own *Yes!* They sense this great blossoming invitation, and they leave their home camps and come racing to the trees. Their responses include their long tongues that are perfectly adapted to sucking up nectar, and their furry faces that pick up pollen and distribute over 70% of it intact (Hall and Richards 82). They carry Eucalyptus futures on their furry little faces, and across the patchy and increasingly fragmented landscapes of contemporary Australia, the renewal of woodland and forest life hinges on this specific *Yes!* Forest futures are borne on the fur and the tongue, and on the wings that beat through the night carrying the animal to the tree, and carrying the tree's gifts to the future along to other trees.

Symbiotic mutualism situates mutualist creatures in relations of interdependence with others, and so the needs of each constitute calls to others. In these joyful relationships creation is visible; philosophically, creation is evidenced in how creatures bear the traces of response (the trace of the infinite, to use Levinas's term). The point is that traces of creation are all around us, and within us, and approach us, and we are already responsible (Hatley, OGC 263). Analytically one states this ethics of trace in the singular. In life, however, traces dazzle across "the rich textures of a created world" (268). In sum, the goodness of creation is visible in its traces; the traces are spangled across the plenum of life, and in manifestations of the elemental as well.

We have opened the concept of face to include communicative events that announce *Yes!*, and so we can say that each face is multi-sided — it is its own announcement, and at the same time it offers an edge for engagement. These "edges" are, in a Levinasian sense, sites of emergence of creation. They are sites of gifts, sites of benefit, sites of response and responsibility. When two creatures meet, through for example their whiskers and pollen, there is a site and moment of mutual gift and mutual benefit. In this mutuality is renewal (Hatley's term). Every creature has a multispecies history — it came into being through other others. Each individual *Yes!* is both itself and the reflexive history of its mutualists and multiple others. In the presence of Myrtaceous trees one sees flying-fox face traces; in the presence of flying-foxes we can see the traces of dry sclerophyll woodlands and rainforests. We see histories and futures — creation in this widest sense — revealing itself. This is an awakening to goodness because this is the real: the entanglement in the past, present and future of mutual gift. The profoundly simple expression *Yes!* sets up proximity, and chains of connectivity; it is a call to others, who themselves call to other others.

The goodness of flying-foxes is found in the trees; the goodness of eucalypts is found in soil and rain; the goodness of the rainforest is found as well in the lives of cassowaries, and in the air we all breathe, and so it goes on, and on. There is no way to determine where goodness, connectivity and responsibility stop. In flourishing life systems they do not stop.

Learning to Say Yes!

This enlivened awareness of mutualism challenges many narratives. At the same time, it also invites and entices. In the faces of others we see that we too are traces of others' lives and gifts, and thus of creation. We experience mutualisms, proximity, and reflexive calls that continue to entangle and renew. Goodness surrounds us in its apparent extravagance because the goodness of creation is not measured drop by drop, but rather flows in a fabulous dance of desire.

We breathe in, we breathe out, we live to celebrate another day, and as we do, we may also think about what is refused when we turn away from all this abundance. Instead of nurturing mutualisms, we frequently offer a resounding “no.” Every “no” also has its ripples and reverberations: it carries across animals and trees, photosynthesis and oxygen, even into the breath and the soul, and into the heartbeat and rhythms of life itself.

I began this essay with the question of what is lost in all the wreckage of the Anthropocene. My answer is not exhaustive by any means, but it is wrenching. Creation is being lost. Its goodness is under attack. Life's capacity for life is being lost. In this time of anthropogenic wreckage, the goodness of life calls us to become much better at saying *Yes!* We are going to be asked, again and again, to take a stand for life, and this means taking a stand against some kinds of death — against the violence that pushes a threatened species ever closer to the point of no return, for example.

A stand in favour of life requires a certain faith: faith that there are patterns beyond our known patterns; that in the midst of all that we do not know, we also gain knowledge; and that in the midst of all that we do not, indeed cannot, choose, we also make choices. That in the midst of terrible destruction, life finds ways to flourish. And that the goodness of creation does, indeed, include us.

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Note

1. I am referring in particular to the recent attack on flying-foxes in the Queensland city of Charters Towers; the attack was justified by the need to improve the quality of life for humans. See for example: “Man is the Only Animal That ...” (<http://deborahbirdrose.com/2013/12/10/man-is-the-only-animal-that/>).

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How Influence Works in Shakespeare's Creation and Re-Creation

Yang Lingui

Department of English, Donghua University
2999 North Renmin Road, Shanghai 201620, China
Email: shks100@gmail.com

The specter of influence is still haunting literary and cultural studies in the new millennium although postmodern theories have removed disciplinary boundaries that used to fence literature. The orthodox theory of influence, which is defined as the relation of writer to writer and writer to tradition based on the imitation model of literary history, has long been problematized even since the heyday of New Criticism when literature was considered an autonomous entity that only involves writer and text. Taking cues from T.S. Eliot's emphasis on the order of tradition that canonical writers have presumably made,¹ later New Critics went beyond the authorial intent. Although more sources of influence have been elaborated in textual features to testify to writer's subjectivity in the formalist criticism, the then dominant approach shares with orthodox theory a notion of influence based on binariness, causality and hierarchy in the tradition of literary order, which from a postcolonial perspective even endorses imperialist cultural hegemony. Challenging that order along with the authorial autonomy, critics of post-structuralist persuasion diminish the importance of influence as they put author and text in broader context, and particularly as they consider writing as an intertextual practice, in which the author is decentered from the role of text and meaning construction. Theorists, who see the necessity of the "death of the author," even separate influence from intertextuality. With or without the author, however, the problem of influence roams the now haunted house of literature, albeit in different ways as in various models of postmodern intertextual studies.

After a brief review of theoretical arguments about influence, this essay inquires about how influence works in contemporary discourses of Shakespearean intertextuality. Shakespeare as influence in literary and cultural history, as well as his literary and cultural influences, which have come into the formation of the texts attributed to him, has demonstrated a number of postmodern modes of intertextual conception. In some sense, Shakespeare's ways of intertextuality, if not anachronistically defined, have encouraged modern authors to develop their

approaches to intertextuality and influence. Meanwhile, contemporary critics attempt to theorize modern and postmodern intertextual practices that appropriate his texts. Some of the modes, furthermore, may even be applied to an analysis of Eliot's modernist intertextual configurations of Shakespeare as we will see in other essays of this *FWLS* issue.

Before Harold Bloom updated his *Anxiety of Influence*, its 1973 version or the concept in the book title had retriggered the already heated debate over influence for a couple of decades. Perhaps against an anxiety² over Eliot's definition of the western tradition, Bloom gives a Freudian edge to the theory of tradition and influence in literature. For Eliot, tradition works in the artist's consciousness of the past and postulates his loss of personality or a "continual self-sacrifice": "What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable."³ In Bloom's terms, influence acts upon the aspiring poet by exciting an oedipal or patricidal urge to rebel against the precursor(s). For Bloom, "Poetic Influence — when it involves two strong, authentic poets — always proceeds by a misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation" so that the history of western poetry after Shakespeare is "a history of anxiety and self-saving caricature of distortion, of perverse, willful revisionism" (*Anxiety* 30). Elaborating on a reactive, dialogic poetics in the six revisionary ratios or patterns, in which poets devise texts by making intentional "misprision (misreading)" of earlier texts by the predecessors, Bloom develops an approach that marks a shift of critical focus from author to text and sees literary history as a network of connection between texts, and writing as an intertextual activity.⁴ This view seems to align with the post-structuralist discourse of intertextuality.

Nonetheless, theory of intertextuality in post-structuralism, especially that influenced by Julia Kristeva, tends to see intertextuality not as a way of influence but as its displacement. The literary text in this view is not the product of the individual author only; it is rather produced by a network of texts that includes history, culture, along with other literary texts. Any text "is constructed as a mosaic of quotations" and "is the absorption and transformation of another" (*Desire* 66). Intertextuality thus "situates the text within history and society, which are then seen as texts read by the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them" (*Revolution* 59). As a result, post-structuralists regard writing as rewriting in a social and historical process in which the author's identity is lost in intertextual anonymity, a notion that is associated with Roland Barthes's concept of "the death of the author." When the author "enters into his own death," the text or word or "voice loses its origin" (Barthes 142). There are only parallel texts that are not restricted within the cause-

effect scenario. Influences are not counted since points of origin are not in the sources. In addition, without the binary subject-object relation or the hierarchy of the primary and the secondary, no one should be in the privileged position. If influence means some anxiety over the dominance of the status quo, removal of the authorial figure in intertextual practices virtually fits in the postmodern, postcolonial quest for multiculturalism and egalitarianism. This denial of influence exists not only in the acceptance of Kristeva's theory in the last decades of the 20th century but also in the construction of her theory itself. A Bloomian anxiety is latent in the Bulgarian-French philosopher's struggle for identity with background as an expatriate and in her intertextual revision of Bakhtin's spatialization of literary language according to Friedman.⁵

Kristeva's influence, literally, on the discourse of intertextuality and on intertextual practices is another story, though, notwithstanding salient resistance to the "orthodox" understanding of her theory. Followers of post-structuralist theory actually divide in viewing the role of the author in intertextuality. Friedman has noted different ways of cross-Atlantic adaptation and application of French theory (155-60). As discussed earlier, in fact, Bloom's dialogic theory of influence already incorporated the discourse of intertextuality during the early introduction of post-structuralist theory to the United States although Bloom's dialogue is limited to that between texts.⁶ In addition, multiple forms of intertextuality have been developed in its intertextual importation, such as Jonathan Culler's "transposition" of the theory with an integration of Bloom's and Barthes's positions in an argument for the "rebirth" of the author (Friedman 155-56) and Nancy Miller's model of "political intertextuality" (157).

As a focal point, the presence or absence of the author is responsible for division in French post-structuralist theory and in its American modes of intertextuality. However, the author is always there in Bloomian and Eliotian theories of influence. Bloom's writing agent experiences an internal struggle and has to react to the suppression of the influential predecessors to claim for a poetic identity through conscious misprision while Eliot's poet has to take external influence, the tradition of great poets, as a condition for identity by surrendering to the tradition and imitating influences. What's more, if we rethink of Eliot's poetic writing, we may well see how it falls into a mode of intertextuality. Most importantly, all theorists and writers, from Eliot to Bloom⁷ and to post-structuralist critics, have engaged Shakespeare for intertextual uses in their poetry and for illustrating their theories.

Shakespeare's importance lies not only in that his texts function as the canonical prototypes to rival against or pretexts for creative inspirations, but also in that his skills in creative uses of influences from his peers and classical sources exemplify

intertextual practices. And in most cases, influence and intertextuality are compatible and can be interchangeably used. Shakespeare offers various modes of intertextuality. In the seven types of intertextual transactions in early modern literature, as Miola observes, most are evident in Shakespeare (13). In *Julius Caesar*, for instance, the playwright departs from his proximate source in Thomas North's English translation of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* by aggressively reworking the historical narrative into dramatic form (19-20). Shakespeare revises classical traditions of character and situation in *King Lear*, *Hamlet*, and *The Tempest* by "creating various combinations of character, action, and genre" (21). As an example of genetic intertextuality, Shakespeare adapts Petrarch's conventional lover into the Romeo figure in *Romeo and Juliet* (22). To be sure, Shakespeare's innovative ways of rewriting always provide models for imitation, emulation, creative revision, and critical exploration.

Essays in this issue of the *FWLS* approach the problem of Shakespeare and influence with unique analyses and fresh observations that illustrate, supplement, or critique theoretical models of intertextuality discussed above.⁸ First of all, Jill Levenson investigates how the Bard is immanent in a review of political adaptations of Shakespeare in modern drama since the 1960s, an era when literature began to be politicized. In this context, modern playwrights adopt Shakespeare as a model but not without ambivalence towards his authority. In the two notable kinds of political appropriations — postcolonial revisions of *The Tempest* in particular and feminist rewritings of Shakespeare in general —, modern playwrights approach Shakespeare in "a range of styles from subtle parody to undisguised insults" with mixed feelings.⁹ Their ambivalences are also rooted in "the anxiety of influence" in Bloom's terms. The anxiety has motivated them to free themselves from the examples of their predecessors. According to Levenson, "modern dramatists have crossed Shakespeare with other texts in both their art and their thinking, practicing intertextuality which always comments, often subversively, on the writers quoted." As such, modern playwrights disrupt the Shakespearean prototypes with the often celebrated non-Shakespearean material — from music to elements of Caribbean culture. This approach to influence is an example of the Miller model of "political intertextuality,"¹⁰ through which feminist and postcolonial revisionists assume their agency in intertextual dialogue with their dramatic predecessors and peers. Though disrupted or subverted, Shakespeare is always recalled in these adaptations since practitioners of the political methodology of intertextuality, as well as of that of Bloomian anxiety, "have refused to let the author die" (Friedman 159). Subjectivity of the author is essential for postmodernists to assert their own identity, and influence is welcomed back in revisionary rewriting of Shakespeare for justices in contemporary society in terms of gender, class, and race. For that reason, political intertextuality antithetically

coexists with Bloom's anti-political intertextuality in the American critical scene.

If for postmodernists Shakespeare's afterlife is in revisionist, parodic, political intertextuality, he lives in tradition for modernist Eliot. Francios Laroque's essay studies Eliot's intertextual uses of Shakespeare and other writers in *The Waste Land*. Shakespeare exerts influence on the modernist in two ways: the Bard's rewriting of classical and Renaissance material offers the latter a practical example of the past literary riches to appropriate; Eliot reworks the tradition by frequently drawing on Shakespeare's canon, as for Eliot, Shakespeare is "the creator of the English language and the pillar of tradition" as well as a modern. In his long poem *The Waste Land*, written shortly after his modernist treatise *Tradition and the Individual Talent*, Eliot fragmentally yet explicitly alludes to Shakespeare's poetry and plays. These Shakespearean allusions have an ambivalent function. As Laroque concludes, the image of Will in the "Waste Land" echoes "the poem's deep pessimism" and "hope of a possible re-creation"¹¹ at once. In a nutshell, Eliot's modernist mode of intertextuality is based on a vision of Shakespeare's influence on, and his central position in, English or American literary tradition, and this vision is pervasive in intertextual studies of Shakespeare even after the Kristevan model and the American variations of post-structuralist theory have taken hold of the landscape of literary and cultural studies since the 1960s.

Alongside the Anglophone modes of intertextuality in Anglo-American literary scholarship, comparative scholarship in East Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world has contributed cross-cultural modes of intertextuality to literary and cultural studies. Influence is not a word of taboo in the cross-cultural or inter-literary approach to intertextuality, even though comparatists are aware of its colonial, hegemonic use in traditional conception. Rather, they recast influence in intertextual uses for comparative literary and cultural studies across national borders. As Juvan argues, studies of influence in transnational comparative scholarship "have indeed long exceeded the limits of simple hierarchic and binary relations between two authors, works, or national literatures" (4). In various theorizing attempts, discourses of diverse nature, including Kristeva's denial of influence and Bloom's insistence on it, are interwoven in intertextual formulations, so that intertextuality in literary scholarship has "provoked the appearance of polycentric and pluralistic models of influence as discursive force and other inter-literary relations" (8). By reading socio-cultural practices as texts and comparing them with Shakespeare's texts, Ibrahim Yerebakan's essay in this issue offers us a look into one of the new models. Yerebakan investigates into the problem of honor killing and honor-based violence in Shakespeare's early modern drama and in certain contemporary tribal, patriarchal communities in the Middle East and elsewhere. This intertextual analysis lets us see that our encounters with honor-related

violence are true no matter if they are in imaginative work or in real life. In this sense, comparative intertextual studies collapse various boundaries, such as, between the literary and non-literary, text and context, east and west, past and present.

Finally, Sophie Chiari's biographical approach to Shakespeare's intertextuality returns Shakespeare to his time, when the playwright had to rival for creative identity with his contemporaries, who were both his precursors and peers in creative work. Bloom has expounded on how Shakespeare might have encountered his "anxiety of influence" in his relations with Marlowe.¹² Patching clues drawn from Shakespeare's plays, Chiari relates Shakespeare's growth, from a green hand to a dramatic master, to his relations with Robert Greene's critique of his originality in *Greene's Groatsworth of Wit*, and argues that Shakespeare returns favor to his ill-fated predecessor and shows his appreciation of his precursor in dramatic allusions. Moreover, Shakespeare makes Greene his "posthumous intellectual collaborator" and beautifies his best enemy by "taking up the same poetic topics in order to develop them in unexpected directions." Meanwhile, a lesson the young writer learns from his predecessor is that he may "cultivate his reputation not only by imitating, but by rewriting Ovid, thereby further differentiating himself from his proud rival."¹³

Shakespeare's "intertextual" appropriations and appreciations of his influences — his precursors and peers — may well be a lesson for contemporary theorists: theoretical discourses are intertextual practices and are always subject to further intertextuality. To second the point, we can also suggest that along with the rebirth of the author to literary creation, influence must be restored to the critical terrain of intertextuality. Theorists and critics "have come full circle, back to the fabric of a text, this time an intertextual web of critical discourses that are endlessly woven and rewoven" (Friedman 173), and fortunately, Chiari's findings may evidence Friedman's assertion that "[c]entral to this (intertextual) reweaving of the critical discourses of intertextuality is the reinsertion of the author, along with some of the biographical and historical methodologies of influence studies (173).

The canonical Bard still has a position in the postmodern discourses of intertextuality. His influence is materialized in studies of his intertextual construction and more importantly in similarly intertextual deconstructions and reconstructions, which help perpetuate his tradition, if not his locus in the western canon as well as his afterlife in postmodern eras.

Notes

1. In the early 20th century, Eliot granted a positive sense to tradition in *Tradition and the Individual Talent* (1919) and depersonalized the individual talent in his theory of "Objective Correlation" as defined in his essay "Hamlet and His Problems." For its Euro-centrism, Eliot's notion of tradition as

the great minds of Europe is at odds with postcolonial, feminist, and cultural theories.

2. In formulating his own theory, Bloom may have experienced *agon*, as defined in his book, struggle against his New Critical mentors as well as Eliot in inventing his identity in poetic theory by revising this theoretical precursor.

3. Eliot, *Tradition* (online), section II, par. 9.

4. It must be noted that Bloom's revisionary intertextuality is against parodic reconstructions of Shakespeare in ideological or political readings by postmodernists.

5. See Susan Friedman, 147-48. Also, Friedman historicizes Kristeva's conception of intertextuality, which this study is indebted to in the discussion of poststructuralist theory. See Friedman, 146-53. Marko Juvan offers another historical review of theories of intertextuality that have "reshaped the understanding of influence" as he concludes (8).

6. Bloom rejects reading literary texts as social-political documents and has not considered socio-cultural context as a factor of intertextual dialogues. His "context" refers to relation of a text to another or other texts: "The meaning of a poem can only be another poem," as Bloom asserts in his *Anxiety of Influence* (94).

7. In Bloom's books, from *The Western Canon* to *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human*, he upholds Shakespeare's supreme position in the western canon and advocates a "secular religion" of bardolatry (*Invention*, xix). Shakespeare's originality lies in "the depiction of self-change on the basis of self-overhearing" so that his characters have become "free artists of themselves" (*The Western Canon* 46). *The Anxiety of Influence* remains his most influential theoretical work. In the Preface to its second edition, he examines Shakespeare's uses of sources from Ovid and Chaucer and adds a discussion about Shakespeare's debts to his peer Christopher Marlowe. Bloom did not think of this influence when he published the first edition of the book, which traces Shakespeare's influence on modern literature through John Milton and James Joyce. Most recently, he once again comes back to the topic of influence in his 2011 book *Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life*, his "virtual swan song," in which he reflects on his work in literary criticism and reiterates Shakespeare's centrality to literature, his career, and his life. Once again, he insists that aesthetics is an individual rather than societal concern yet in a milder tone than he did in the 1990s. At that time he defended the canon and Shakespeare against scholars of the "School of Resentment" — new historicists, feminists, and Marxists — who have been influenced by French thought and attempted to expand the canon with the concerns of justice in terms of class, gender, and race.

8. Several of the essays, including those by Levenson, Laroque and Chiari, are revised versions of papers presented at "The Third International Symposium on Shakespeare" (November 16-17, 2013) organized by Wuhan University and the Shakespeare Association of China.

9. See Levenson in this journal issue. Quotations from essays in this issue are not paginated.

10. Friedman has offered a detailed analysis of how Nancy Miller has incorporated theories of various sources — not merely French post-structuralism — to come to terms with her methodology of political intertextuality (159-62, 175).

11. See Laroque's essay in this issue of the journal.
12. See note 7 of this essay.
13. See Chiari in the issue.

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“The Bard is Immanent”: Politics in Adaptations of Shakespeare’s Plays Since the 1960s

Jill L. Levenson

Trinity College, University of Toronto
6 Hoskin Ave, Toronto, ON M5S 1H8, Canada
Email: jilleven@trinity.utoronto.ca

Abstract Appropriations of Shakespeare in modern drama since the 1960s have become increasingly politicized as they responded to such pressing contemporary issues. This study identifies and discusses two notable kinds of political appropriations: postcolonial revisions of *The Tempest* in particular and women’s rewritings of Shakespeare in general. Of course, the political component of Shakespeare adaptations in modern drama predated the 1960s. By then the name “Shakespeare” had acquired an array of meanings. It signified not only the historical person and his works, but also the attitudes determined by their receptions from culture to culture. By adapting plays, productions could articulate national aspirations or criticise an existing ideology. Like “Shakespeare,” modern and postmodern playwrights had maintained an international presence which often displayed political bias. *The Tempest* has generated modern dramas from Brazil to Zambia, usually focusing on the subject of imperialism and race. Probably Aime Cesaire’s *Une tempeste* (1969) remains the best known of this group. Several tragedies — *Romeo and Juliet*, *Hamlet*, *Othello*, and *King Lear* — have inspired women’s plays which raise questions about sexuality and gender. Many of these have been produced and published in English-speaking countries by accomplished playwrights such as MacDonald, Elaine Feinstein and the Women’s Theatre Group, Paula Vogel, and most recently, Young Jean Lee (2010). In a few cases, interesting combinations occur: for example, Philip Osment refers to *The Tempest* in *This Island’s Mine* (1988), but he also addresses questions of sexual orientation and the roles of women in twentieth-century Western society. Djanet Sears rewrites *Othello* in *Harlem Duet* (1997), yet she explores black history as well as the status of women in contemporary America. Finally, considering these modern plays as a group illuminates each one and simultaneously throws light on a single important path taken by dramatic adaptations of Shakespeare in the late twentieth century.

Key Words Shakespeare; modern drama; political appropriation; postcolonial

revision; women’s rewriting

The quotation in my title comes from Ann-Marie MacDonald’s notes on the text of her play *Goodnight Desdemona (Good Morning Juliet)* (2), a rewriting of two Shakespearean tragedies that developed in part as a collaborative project during the late 1980s. A woman’s revision of Shakespeare, MacDonald’s adaptation represents a distinct trend which has become apparent since the 1960s, a period of major cultural realignments in various parts of the globe which forced adjustments of concepts like race, class, gender and sexuality. Appropriations of Shakespeare in modern drama became increasingly politicized as they responded to such pressing contemporary issues. Against this background the following paper will identify and discuss two notable kinds of political appropriations: women’s rewritings of Shakespeare in general and postcolonial revisions of *The Tempest* in particular.

Background

Of course, the political component of Shakespeare adaptations in modern drama predated the 1960s, accompanying the earliest plays from this period which began during the mid-1800s. Over the long century between the 1850s and the 1960s, the name “Shakespeare” had acquired a wide array of meanings, a palimpsest which still exists today. It signifies the historical person who lived between 1564 and 1616, as well as the plays and verse attributed to him. It also signifies the attitudes towards both author and works determined by their reception; and reception varies not only from culture to culture, but even within cultures. Local appropriations of “Shakespeare” often become means through which a country or one of its regions articulates national aspirations. By adapting plays, productions can endorse an existing ideology or censure a repressive one, as they did throughout Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. “Shakespeare” the classic can be politically charged to speak many languages with many voices. In the broadest sense, as Margot Heinemann writes, “Shakespeare has become part of the way that literally millions of people, consciously or unconsciously, imagine and fantasise and think about the world” (228). When people think about the world politically, they usually attend to the distribution of power at various levels of social interaction.

Modern drama provided playwrights with a vital new lexicon to articulate their thoughts about Shakespeare and the world. As I’ve indicated, specialists have long set the chronology of modern drama between 1850 and the present, starting with plays created by important dramatists of the nineteenth century who lived into the twentieth century.¹ Consequently, the term “modern drama” refers primarily to dramatic texts of the modern period, extant or not, rather than productions of Shakespeare’s plays

or theatre history; but the distinction can blur when the staging of a well-known script like *Hamlet* appears extreme enough to constitute a new play. Within this chronological and generic frame, “modern drama” begins with Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), August Strindberg (1849-1912), Anton Chekhov (1860-1904), and George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950). It coincides with two dynamic and influential aesthetic movements: modernism, which started to develop in the mid-nineteenth century, and postmodernism, which probably coexisted with modernism in the mid-twentieth century before displacing it. As a result, “modern drama” has belonged continuously to a period of radical experimentation in the arts. While the prevailing view of the world during this era has remained more pessimistic than hopeful, a response to such changes as industrialization, secularism, and war, many artists have searched for novel forms to represent the spiritual crisis. Modernist and postmodernist playwrights too have rejected established conventions, freeing themselves to follow Ezra Pound’s advice: “make it new.”² Among other strategies they have rearranged the standard components of narrative (plot, character, point of view) and made highly original use of technical innovations. Like the palimpsest concept of “Shakespeare,” they have maintained an international presence which often displays political bias. Modern plays echo not only dramatic and literary precursors, but also Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

To complete the background for this paper, some gaps remain to be filled. First, the plays to be considered — the women’s rewritings and postcolonial dramas — constitute only a tiny fraction of modern dramas influenced by Shakespeare. Substantial evidence, such as published scripts and theatre reviews, reveals hundreds of modern plays related to Shakespeare. Should our calculations include ephemeral productions, the kinds performed by amateur groups and local theatre festivals, the number might increase to thousands. The number has continued to grow enormously since the millennium. Second, dramatic appropriations of Shakespeare during and since the 1960s address a wide variety of political subjects: they include Edward Bond’s *Lear* (1969-71) and *Bingo* (1973-74), which criticize social irresponsibility in Shakespeare’s art and in the twentieth century; Ariane Mnouchkine’s *Norodom Sihanouk* (1985), which comments on a complex political leader and genocide in Cambodia; and Tom Stoppard’s *Rock ‘n’ Roll* (2006), which portrays upheavals in Czechoslovakia during the twentieth century. It is rare, however, to find small groups of modern adaptations focusing on similar contemporary issues. Finally, most modern playwrights who adopt Shakespeare as a model express their ambivalence towards his authority. They have criticized what they conceive as either his aesthetic or his politics. Their mixed feelings, determined by the temperament and self-consciousness of each artist, have emerged in a range of styles from subtle parody to undisguised

insults. Almost from the outset, modern dramatists have expressed ambivalence not only towards Shakespeare, but also towards notable playwrights of their own era. They have experienced compounded variants of what Harold Bloom calls “the anxiety of influence,” the unpleasant sensation which motivates writers to free themselves from the examples of their predecessors. In a related development which began early, modern dramatists have crossed Shakespeare with other texts in both their art and their thinking, practising intertextuality which always comments, often subversively, on the writers quoted. I’ll attempt to point out in the analyses which follow how women playwrights and postcolonial revisionists express their ambivalence towards Shakespeare and intermix his texts with others. In this group of modern plays, the non-Shakespearean material — from music to elements of Caribbean culture — is often celebrated, and it disrupts the Shakespearean prototypes.

The Women’s Part

Women had adapted Shakespeare’s life and art in modern dramas well before the 1960s, but even the best of these plays remain obscure today. In particular Clemence Dane (the name adopted by Winifred Ashton), an early feminist and prolific artist, wrote *Will Shakespeare — An Invention* in 1921. This script anticipates later rewritings by women in its complexity, nuance, and concentration on female roles. Dane’s Shakespeare becomes the sum of his encounters with three women: Anne Hathaway, his wife; Mary Fitton, conceived here as his lover and the model for the Dark Lady of the Sonnets; and Queen Elizabeth. As a whole the dramatic narrative implies that these multifaceted figures determine the protagonist’s future glory. Notably, Shakespeare’s works become the source for his life history as Dane mentions or echoes more than half of the canon.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, and approximately a decade apart, two Canadian plays challenged Shakespeare’s influence in even more complicated dramatic formats: MacDonald’s *Goodnight Desdemona (Good Morning Juliet)* and Djanet Sears’s *Harlem Duet* (1997). Both of these later plays went through more than one version in performance and workshops; and both interrogate Shakespeare through his canon. They borrow his techniques, but adapt them in a mix of new ideas and arts, from Jungian psychology to concert music and jazz. In both, the protagonists are women.

MacDonald’s play draws on two Shakespearean tragedies, *Romeo and Juliet* and *Othello*; and its heroine goes through the three-part trajectory which Maynard Mack describes for Shakespeare’s tragic protagonists. Initially the audience hear her distinctive voice; then she follows a cycle of change to become her own antithesis; and finally there is a recovery of sorts. But MacDonald makes adjustments to the

formula, rearranging it for comedy. At the beginning, Constance Ledbelly sounds like a dry and defeated academic. At the conclusion, she experiences a triumphant epiphany: she realizes that she is an “Author” (with a capital “A”); a golden hand rises up with a message that confirms the realization; and the pen behind her ear turns to solid gold (87-88).

The narrative arc of this play as a whole starts and ends in Constance’s university office; but as the first act concludes the action descends through a rabbit hole (actually, a wastepaper basket) into a surreal space where Constance enters into Shakespeare’s texts. There she finds characters revised by MacDonald: an Amazonian Desdemona; a domesticated Romeo and Juliet. By Act III, Constance herself has been reconceived as Constantine, a cross-dressed male figure. In the process of these Jungian metamorphoses, she gains the self-confidence to interpret Shakespeare’s plays according to her own lights, and thus she becomes “the Author.” Moreover, the author of this modern play demonstrates a comic cycle of change by using early modern theatrical devices in carnivalesque abundance, from dumb shows to blank verse to cross-dressing and doubling. The play opens with three dumb shows, occurring simultaneously, followed by the Prologue spoken by a Chorus in blank verse (5-6). Although the action starts with three fully developed scenes in two acts, following Constance’s transition from one reality to another, it picks up speed in the Shakespearean dimension as the nine short scenes in Act III follow in quick succession. MacDonald adopts Shakespeare’s method of composing in scenes and applies it in a unique way, distinguishing the two worlds of her own comedy.

If MacDonald relies on Jung to challenge Shakespeare’s characters and genres, Djanet Sears turns to music and to recordings of significant moments in African-American history. Sears’s title, *Harlem Duet*, hints at these two components of her play, as well as the dialogue she means to have with Shakespeare. The Prologue and most of the twenty scenes in two acts begin with both music and black voices. As the drama opens, the stage direction specifies: “*the cello and the bass call and respond to a heaving melancholic blues. Martin Luther King’s voice accompanies them*”(21). As it closes, “[a] *berlyne blues improvisation of ‘Mama’s Little Baby’ cascades alongside a reading of the Langston Hughes poem ‘Harlem’*”(114). In between the music constantly modulates into new forms, adding a distinctive element of continuity to the drama.

Harlem Duet draws on Shakespeare’s *Othello*, making prominent use of the name “Othello” and the symbolic prop of a handkerchief; occasionally it quotes Shakespeare’s text. In this version of the tragedy, an African-American woman is the protagonist. As Sears herself describes her rewriting: “It is a tale of love. A tale of Othello and his first wife, Billie. [...] [T]his is Billie’s story” (14-15). A white

woman, Mona — short for “Desdemona” — will become Othello’s second wife: the audience hear her voice, see her arm and hair, but never view her face. Sears tells Billie’s story in three distinct narratives against three historical backdrops: 1860-62 (years leading to the Emancipation of the slaves); 1928 (year belonging to the Harlem Renaissance); and contemporary Harlem. In each narrative the conclusion is tragic, madness or death, as the play “explores the effects of race and sex on the lives of people of African descent” (14). Sears deconstructs Shakespeare’s tragedy and reassembles parts of it in three discontinuous stories. The narratives in *Harlem Duet* do not follow any recognizable order in relation to one another or the play as a whole. As they intersect unpredictably, they create an impression of fragmentary and deceptive events which may replicate what Sears perceives as the African-American experience.

These two Canadian plays belong to a total of twenty or so recent Shakespearean adaptations in which women dramatists have probed feminist issues. Scattered through the decades which led from the late twentieth century to the early twenty-first, the women’s scripts originate in English-speaking countries: Great Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. If some of these adaptations are clearly comic and others incline towards tragedy, the most powerful experiment with genre and form. The plays by MacDonald and Sears should be linked with other innovative adaptations by women: for example, *Lear’s Daughters* (1987), by The Women’s Theatre Group and Elaine Feinstein; *Desdemona: A Play about a Handkerchief* (1993), by Paula Vogel; *Lear* (2010), by Young Jean Lee; and *Desdemona* (2011), a collaboration between Toni Morrison (American Nobel Prize laureate) and RokiaTraoré (Malian singer and songwriter), with American stage director Peter Sellars. As the titles indicate, most of these plays take a tragedy as their point of departure. Since men often dominate the genre, which tends to marginalize women, subverting a Shakespearean tragedy allows the modern rewritings to centre on the rights of disempowered women.

Aftermath of *The Tempest*

Together, the feminist plays can be grouped chronologically with other genres which have dealt with similar issues in different forms, such as fiction and poetry. Dramatic adaptations which centre on postcolonial matters resist such neat groupings, both with one another and with nondramatic genres. Most of them originate with one play, *The Tempest*, which became a subject of interest in Central and South America during the 1890s, a time of conflict between Spain and the United States. Various writers — in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Colombia — alluded to or drew on *The Tempest* in an array of genres: essays, manifestos, a journal, poetry. They focused

on questions of political authority as articulated in Shakespeare's play, especially through the relationship between Prospero and Caliban. Since the 1950s, writers from the Caribbean and Africa have adapted both *The Tempest* and Caliban. Again, the genres vary, from essays and novels to drama and poetry. Leading this mid-twentieth-century reassessment of Shakespeare's play, Octave Mannoni analysed the revolt in Madagascar with an important document written in French: *Le Psychologie de la colonisation*, 1947-48 (translated into English as *Prospero and Caliban*, 1956). Mannoni argued that Caliban, the colonized, needed firm control; but the writers who followed Mannoni identified with Caliban and rehabilitated the character. According to scholars, the period 1957 to 1973 in Africa and the Caribbean was "marked by a rush of anticolonial sentiment" and a preoccupation with *The Tempest* (Nixon 557). A majority of the colonies won independence at the time, events coinciding with the civil rights movement in the United States and the student revolts of 1968.

Clearly, artistic and other discourse deriving from *The Tempest* concerns not only questions of what constitutes individual power, but also questions of what constitutes state power. Addressing the latter, it extends beyond the scope of most women's adaptations in more than one way: a chronology that stretches from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century; a geography that embraces more than half of the world's continents; and a range of languages including French and Spanish, as well as English. Seven dramatic adaptations cluster between 1969 and 1998, no two from the same country.

The first of these plays is also the best known, having been produced in diverse sites from New York to the West Indies. Originally written in French, Aimé Césaire's *Unetempête* premiered in 1969 and was later translated into English as *A Tempest*. The subtitle reads: "Based on Shakespeare's *The Tempest*: Adaptation for a Black Theater"; and the list of "CHARACTERS" specifies:

As in Shakespeare

Two alterations:

Ariel, a mulatto slave

Caliban, a black slave

This version identifies one addition: "Eshu, a black devil-god" (n.p.). But it contains several, starting with a metatheatrical episode for which a stage direction instructs:

Ambiance of a psychodrama. The actors enter singly, at random, and each chooses for himself a mask at his leisure.

Like a director, the Master of Ceremonies suggests roles for the actors and calls for

the stage effects of “a storm to end all storms” to begin the production (1).

The action unfolds in ten scenes unevenly divided among three acts. For instance, the two scenes of Act I mimic the first two scenes of Shakespeare’s play: a short, explosive sinking of the ship and a long, expository introduction of the characters on the island. By comparison, three relatively short scenes compose Act II, the initial one an invention which allows a debate about means to achieve freedom from Prospero between Caliban and Ariel. In this sequence and Act III, the modern play departs from the order of the scenes in Shakespeare’s. Césaire’s conclusion differs strikingly from the original: figures and traditions from Caribbean culture upset Prospero’s plans, and in the end Prospero remains on the island.

As a whole, the structure of Césaire’s adaptation represents his challenge to Shakespeare’s *Tempest*, which is an elegant narrative seemingly under Prospero’s control. Close reading of the earlier script reveals a magician/artist in conflict with himself; but Césaire seems to view Prospero in one dimension, a European invader who experiences his power by tyrannizing over those he has subjected. Césaire’s Prospero loses his grip when Eshu disturbs his entertainment for Miranda and Ferdinand: “Power! Power! Alas! [...] My power has gone cold” (49). As the play closes, Caliban promises to crush Prospero’s world, because Prospero lacks the will power to leave:

I’m sure you won’t leave.
You make me laugh with your “mission”!
Your “vocation”!
Your vocation is to hassle me.
And that’s why you’ll stay,
just like those guys who founded the colonies
and who now can’t live anywhere else. (65)

With this adaptation, Shakespeare’s *Tempest* becomes a confrontation between Prospero and Caliban, colonizer and colonized, mediated at some points by Ariel. The closing lines suggest that Caliban wins the contest:

In semi-darkness Prospero appears, aged and weary. His gestures are jerky and automatic, his speech weak, toneless, trite.

...

In the distance, above the sound of the surf and the chirping of birds, we hear snatches of Caliban’s song:

FREEDOM HI-DAY, FREEDOM HI-DAY! (68)

Almost two decades later, Philip Osment's *This Island's Mine* (1988), a Gay Sweatshop production, makes *The Tempest* an analogue for his portrayal of oppression by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government; and both Great Britain and the United States represent colonial oppressors. This script requires eight actors to perform nineteen roles, three of the parts — Prospero, Caliban, and Miranda — from Shakespeare's play. References to *The Tempest* begin with Osment's title, which comes from Caliban's famous speech in Act I Scene 2; they continue with moments of rehearsals and finally performance of Act I, Scene 2, the last a quotation of the entire fifteen-line speech beginning "This island's mine" (119-20).

In Osment's appropriation, Shakespeare's *Tempest* becomes a play-within-a-play, a paradigm informing the action which takes place in the course of thirty-four short scenes. If *The Tempest* observes the unities of time, place, and action, *This Island's Mine* tells several stories which intersect. The modern play centres these narratives on families, multiplying the two small units of *The Tempest* into various configurations subject to contemporary pressures, especially discrimination based on sexual orientation, social class, race, and religion. In the late twentieth century, Osment finds disturbing correspondences in the subjection of Caliban; and Shakespeare's magical island becomes an England feeling stress not only from its own prejudices, but also from its fraught relationship with America. That failed bond is personified in the decision of Miss Rosenblum, a refugee in London from Vienna, not to elope to the United States during World War II with Stephen, a returning GI.

Like the best of the women's plays, Osment's adaptation gains its power from experimenting with genre and form. The dramatist specifies in an "Author's Note": "This play is written in a mixture of narrative and dialogue and any production has to be flexible enough to incorporate both these styles" (83). The two styles appear on the page as a kind of free verse; and one modulates into the other without warning, even in a very brief speech. Here is Miss Rosenblum in conversation with Martin, one of her boarders.

But the old lady halts him,
Pinching his arm in a bony grip:
"Do not think it cannot happen here!" (88)

Characters fluctuate between a fictional mode and a theatrical one; changing impressions distance the audience from events and individuals in a Brechtian way. As the fourth wall shifts, witnesses to Osment's play are constantly forced to alter their perceptions of the action and to engage with its meaning.

In its artfulness, Osment’s *This Island’s Mine* supports the conclusion that what recent political adaptations lack in numbers, they compensate by means of intellection and originality. They constitute an important current in the latest popular rewritings of Shakespeare for theatre, a postmodern channelling of the plays into the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. By “specialists” I mean the editors of and contributors to the international quarterly journal *Modern Drama*, published since 1958, and Myron Matlaw, who compiled *Modern World Drama: An Encyclopedia*, published in 1972. This definition was challenged in 2003 with a collection of essays, *Modern Drama: Defining the Field*, edited by Ric Knowles, Joanne Tompkins, and W.B. Worthen.
2. This was also the title of a book explaining Pound’s critical method.

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Will in the “Waste Land”: Shakespeare and Eliot Revisited

Francois Laroque

Institut du Monde Anglophone, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3

32, rue Cassette 75006, Paris, France

Email: flaroque@orange.fr

Abstract In *The Waste Land*, T.S. Eliot juxtaposes fragments from the past — from classical antiquity to Dante, Shakespeare, Marvell, Webster, and other authors, so as to enhance the insanity of the modern world and the emptiness of modern city life. Sex is joyless and sterile in *The Waste Land* and such vision echoes Lear’s vision of the vagina as the mouth of hell as well as the pessimism of sonnet 129. “Th’ expense of spirits in a waste of shame” can thus be regarded as Shakespeare’s exploration of the waste/waist land of desire and sex as well as the Renaissance pictorial tradition of anthropomorphized landscape. Shakespeare’s music thus serves Eliot as a foil or ironical counterpoint to call attention to the seedy realities of modern love. Shakespearean echoes in *The Waste Land* serve to comfort Eliot’s pessimism even though the allusions to *The Tempest* may be taken as a way of restoring or re-creating a less lurid or dreary world view.

Key words Shakespeare; T.S. Eliot; *The Waste Land*; modern life; pessimism

This paper will essentially focus on Eliot’s debt to Shakespeare in *The Waste Land* and, since all of Eliot’s explicit allusions to Shakespeare in his poem have all been duly identified and commented upon by editors and critics, I will mainly insist on a number of so far unnoticed or neglected Shakespearean sources and analogues in order to interpret them in terms of musicality and theatricality. All the more so as we may think of the five sections of *The Waste Land* as a miniature play in five acts with such *dramatis personae* as Marie, Stetson, the hyacinth girl, the Lady with bad nerves, Madame Sosostriis, the typist and the clerk, Lil and Albert, Mr Eugenides, Tiresias, Phlebas the Phoenician and the Fisher King, the last voice in “What the Thunder Said.” Of course, the analogy has to stop here because this rather heterogeneous collection of characters is made of voices that mingle, overlap or coruscate as the case may be in some overall chorus. They are also names in a long, collective stream of consciousness where it is sometimes difficult to know who exactly is saying “I” other

than the poet himself or its various namesakes or avatars. Bearing this in mind, we will remember that the poet of *The Waste Land* was also the author of *Murder in the Cathedral*, *The Cocktail Party*, *The Confidential Clerk* as well as other plays while Shakespeare, the Elizabethan and Jacobean playwright, also wrote two epyllions (*Venus and Adonis* and *The Rape of Lucrece*), of *A Lover's Complaint* and 154 sonnets.

Shakespearean Echoes in *The Waste Land*

Eliot's 1922 poem may indeed be read as a long dramatic monologue with no narrative or plot, characterized by a technique of compression and fragmentary allusion. It brings together, rather than blends high and low culture, street ballads, jazz tunes and Wagnerian arias from *Tristan and Isolde* and *Göttersdämmerung*. Such contributions may have inspired the end of Baz Luhrmann's *Romeo + Juliet*, whose musical score ranges from a number of pop songs to Mozart's *Requiem* and Isolde's *Liebtestod* for Juliet's final scene in the Capulets' vault. So, what is now often hailed as typical postmodern *mélange* dates back to the early days of modernism, just as modernism itself is deeply indebted to the early modern period and to Shakespeare in particular. Indeed, this babble and babel of voices is a device often used by the bard in his echoic, paronymic system where superimposition is used to multiply or complicate meaning as in Hamlet's equivocations or in the Fool's off-hand association of riddles, ballads, bawdy innuendo and snatches of song in *King Lear*. Eliot's poem also juxtaposes fragments from the past — from classical antiquity to Dante, Shakespeare, Spenser, Day, Marvell and Webster etc — along glimpses of the present so as to enhance the inanity and sterility of the modern world. So, in the "Burial of the Dead," the moment in the Starbergersee and the Hofgarten (respectively a Bavarian lake and a public park in Munich), closing time in an East End pub, sex in a squalid bedsit all "summon up remembrance of things past" (Sonnet 30) successively evoke the double suicide of Archduke Rudolph of Habsburg and his mistress Marie Vestera in Mayerling on January 30th, 1889, Ophelia's madness and suicide in *Hamlet* as well as Ferdinand and Miranda in *The Tempest*. All these voices express their own wretchedness in a London turned into a modern, or modernist, version of Dante's Inferno, while all the historical and literary allusions form an intricate web of high culture meant to enhance the gap between a prestigious past and a rather sordid present. In other words, the fragments from Dante and Shakespeare reinforce the despondency of modern life but, to Eliot, this is part of a tradition which was part and parcel of great poetry. According to Eliot:

Tradition [...] cannot be inherited; if you want it you must obtain it by great labor. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly

indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. (*Selected Essays* 60)

So, tradition is the result of hard work, and the Shakespeare tradition in Eliot is anything but inherited. Indeed, according to Eliot's mother, Charlotte Stearns Eliot, wrote in a letter dated 1905, when Thomas was only sixteen, "he ha[d] [...] read practically all of Shakespeare, whom he admires, and retains with much in memory."¹

Section II of *The Waste Land*, entitled "A Game of Chess," refers to Middleton's *A Game at Chess*, a play built like a big chess game and which satirizes the Jesuits and King James's aborted endeavors to arrange a Spanish marriage for Prince Henry, but it also echoes *The Tempest* when, at the end, Ferdinand and Miranda are discovered playing chess when the latter accuses the young Prince of cheating ("Sweet lord, you play me false," 5.1.172). Then a pastiche or rewriting of Enobarbus's description of Cleopatra's "apparition" in her barge on the river Cydnus (*Antony and Cleopatra*, 2.2.198-233) is added to those reminiscences, thus making the whole passage a rich Shakespearean palimpsest. Incidentally, it should be remarked that the clerk and the typist's brief, sordid affair in "The Fire Sermon," placed at the geometric centre of the poem, sounds like a send-off of Shakespeare's famous purple patch (itself partly lifted from Plutarch's *Life of Mark Antony*) where the androgynous figure of Tiresias rolls into one the two characters of Enobarbus and Mardian, Cleopatra's eunuch. Moreover, the magnificent exotic seascape is here rendered into a claustrophobic and rather gloomy interior, the boudoir of the lady with bad nerves, both a temptress and a neurotic Cleopatra, whose oriental origins are suggested by the presence of a "seven-branched candelabra." The "strange invisible perfume" floating around Cleopatra is replaced by the "strange synthetic perfumes" used by her modern London counterpart, while Antony's "dolphin-like" "delights" (5.2.88-9) are here frozen into a "carved dolphin" "framed by the colored stone" (ll. 95-6). Now "[t]he glitter of her jewels" may further hint at Romeo's description of Juliet at the ball when he exclaims: "She hangs upon the cheek of night/As a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear" (1.4.158-59). The jewel simile is a beautiful conceit and a felicitous quibble which, insofar as it encompasses Juliet's so far unknown name ("jewel" and "Jule," Juliet's nickname, are indeed virtually interchangeable as acoustic twins), already suggests a possible answer to Juliet's later question "What's in a name?" (2.1.86). The pun indeed provides a

concrete illustration as to how signifier and signified may coincide so as to become the two sides of the same coin. All of a sudden, Romeo's artificial and heavily rhetorical poetics comes to life as it is converted into a rich hypotyposis made vibrant with meaning and real emotion. As to the "Ethiop's ear," the image seems to anticipate on the Egyptian lady, Cleopatra, since the later love tragedy can also be read as a mature, Oriental version of *Romeo and Juliet*. Whether T.S. Eliot had this in mind when he wrote his poem is difficult to ascertain, but it remains that the beginning of "A Game of Chess" hovers somewhere between *Titus Andronicus*, *Romeo and Juliet* and *Antony and Cleopatra* while also alluding to Ovid, Virgil, Milton and Pope's *Rape of the Lock*. Eliot's poem is thus saturated with literary references that multiply and disseminate in apparently endless echoic variations just as Shakespeare's plays and poems combine many sources and intertextual allusions which create parallel worlds, complex superimpositions and of course conflicting interpretations in a constant embarrassment of riches.

Now, the *trompe-l'œil* above the antique mantel in "A Game of Chess" harks back at the Philomela episode in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* which Shakespeare took up and reworked in his early Senecan Roman tragedy, *Titus Andronicus*, where the mutilated Lavinia is the dramatic counterpart of the mythical figure raped by King Tereus. So, the rewriting or incrustation of classical and Renaissance stories into his own playtexts is definitely part of Shakespeare's use of intertextuality, a way for an author to appropriate quotations which Montaigne calls "entreglose," i.e. as mutual borrowing. In that respect, Eliot's modernist methods appear as little different from those of most or all of Renaissance poets and playwrights.

Enobarbus's description of Cleopatra in *Antony and Cleopatra* may also refer to the well-known *ekphrasis* in Shakespeare's *Rape of Lucrece* (ll. 1366-1463) where the long description of the Trojan war is represented on the "hanging piece" in Lucrece's bedroom presents a visual parallel between the wrack of the ancient city and the rape of a woman, while, at the end, Lucrece identifies with the ruined face of Priam's wife, Queen Hecuba:

In her the painter had anatomized
Time's ruin, beauty's wrack, and grim care's reign.
Her cheeks with chaps and wrinkles were disguised:
Of what she was no semblance did remain.
Her blue blood changed to black in every vein,
Wanting the spring that those shrunk pipes had fed,
Showed life imprisoned in a body dead (ll. 1450-56).

The difference between Shakespeare and Eliot are quite obvious here. Leaving aside the prosodic and rhetorical aspects, it mainly lies in the fact that the bored typist is bored and remains passive in front of the young clerk's "assaults" ("Exploring hands encounter no defence") while Lucrece, the victim of Tarquin's violent lust reacts in shrill, harsh way to defend her womanly honour. With the allusions to Philomel, "so rudely forc'd" (l. 205) and, indirectly, to Queen Dido through Augustine's "To Carthage then I came" (l. 207), then to Ophelia with the possibly violated "belladonna" in "A Game of Chess," Eliot also lays stress on cruel, brutal, even barbaric forms of sexuality as well as on the fates of seduced and abandoned women.² Sex is totally joyless and sterile in *The Waste Land*, whether it is debased and neurotic among the wealthy or promiscuous and abortive among the working classes (ll. 159-64). In *King Lear*, the vagina is described by the delirious king as the mouth of hell ("there's hell, there's darkness, there's the sulphurous pit," 4.6.123-24), while, in the Sonnets, "none knows well/To shun the heaven that leads to this hell" (Sonnet 129). If it is true that, under the influence and at the suggestion of "il miglior fabbro," Ezra Pound, Eliot essentially uses Dante's *Inferno* for his London version of "Une saison en enfer," my impression remains that, with its witches' cauldron, echoed in Augustine's "cauldron of unholy loves," and its "blasted heath" (1.3.77) in *Macbeth* as well as in the misogynous lines quoted above, Shakespeare's presence and personal vision of hell lies not far behind.

Indeed, if *The Waste Land* may be regarded as a landscape poem, its landscapes are first and foremost landscapes of the mind. Their topographies are always more or less reversible and they may alternately refer to the outside world or to the human body or body parts in its generally anthropomorphic vision. For instance, at the beginning of "The Fire Sermon," "the last fingers of leaf" that "clutch and sink into the wet bank" blend a vision of early wintriness (or late autumn) with a filigree evocation of Ophelia's drowning, she whose "good night ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good night, good night" (*Hamlet*, 4.5.69-70) has just been heard as the closing line of the previous section (ll.171-72). The notion of anthropomorphic as well as anamorphic landscape concealing a human head or body was a familiar one in Renaissance painting and one which Shakespeare was fully aware of. The poet resorts to it in *Venus and Adonis*, for instance, when Venus invites the young man to "Graze on [her] lips, and if these hills be dry,/[To] stray lower, where the pleasant fountains lie" (ll. 233-34).

In "A Game of Chess," the spectral dialogue of anonymous questions and answers seems to combine various echoes from *Richard III*, *King Lear* and *The Tempest*:

"What is that noise?"
 The wind under the door,
 "What is that noise now? What is the wind doing?"
 Nothing again nothing.
 "Do You know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember Nothing?"
 I remember Those are pearls that were his eyes (ll. 117-24).

Besides the line from Ariel's *memento mori* song in *The Tempest*, those lines may also echo Clarence's nightmare in the Tower in *Richard III*, when he dreams that he has drowned and is in hell:

O Lord! Methought what pain it was to drown:
 [...] What sights of ugly death within my eyes!
 Methought I saw a thousand fearful wrecks [...]
 Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl,
 Inestimable stones, unvalu'd jewels,
 All scattered in the bottom of the sea.
 Some lay in dead men's skulls, and in the holes
 Where eyes did once inhabit, there were crept —
 As 'twere in scorn of eyes' — reflecting gems
 That woo'd the slimy bottom of the deep,
 And mock'd the dead bones that lay scatter'd by [...]

And for a season after

Could not believe but that I was in hell,
 Such terrible impression made my dream (1.4.21-63)

The passage offers a good illustration of how Shakespeare's dramatic poetry gradually developed from long description to crisp, nutshell phrases by compressing ten lines of *The Tempest* into Ariel's single "Those are pearls that were his eyes." In this, Eliot followed the enlightened guidance of Ezra Pound who advised him to get rid of traditional syntax in favour of juxtaposition and parataxis ("These fragments I have shored up against my ruins," l. 430). Such poetry is full of holes and erasures like some broken Greek vase or some half-effaced Etruscan fresco. It is a big jigsaw for us to try to put together again. For all that, it is no game either. It is a reflection of the neurosis and mental instability of modern man, "mixing memory and desire," past and present in a sort of heterogeneous jumble or mumbo jumbo. While in *Howard's End*, E.M. Foster wanted to "only connect," the desperate King Lear-like speaker in "The Fire Sermon" exclaims "I can connect/Nothing with nothing" (ll. 301-302).

In Shakespeare's tragedy, the old king who had answered Cordelia's "nothing" with "nothing will come out of nothing" (1.1.89-90) will later prove unable to connect anything with anything:

Nature's above art in this respect. There's your press-money. That fellow handles his bow like a crow-keeper: draw me a clothier's yard. Look, look, a mouse: peace, peace, this piece of toasted cheese will do't. There's my gauntlet, I'll prove it on a giant. Bring up the brown bills. O, well-flown bird, i'the clout, i'the clout! Hewgh! Give the word (4.6.86-92).

Like Hieronimo in *The Spanish Tragedy*, King Lear is mad again. His is the apparently incoherent babble of insanity while the various speakers in *The Waste Land* prove learned ventriloquists. Accordingly, Eliot duly acknowledges his debt to Kyd's revenge tragedy as well as to Shakespeare whose texts work like a chamber of echoes in the poem.

For Eliot, "the difference between Dante and Shakespeare is that Dante had one coherent system of thought behind him" and, "in making some very commonplace investigations of the 'thought' of Donne, [he] found it quite impossible to come to the conclusion that Donne believed anything. It seemed as if, at that time, the world was filled with broken fragments of 'systems.'" In other words, the notion of the "absence of a coherent system" or of a "world filled with broken fragments of systems" directly anticipates on Eliot's poetic method and it openly acknowledges his debt to Elizabethan playwrights and poets and to Shakespeare in particular.

The "Will Sonnets" in *The Waste Land*

Romeo and Juliet is a play notorious for its embedded sonnets as in the opening sonnet-Prologue or in the sonnet which the two lovers share after meeting at the Capulets' ball. I find it intriguing that *The Waste Land* should offer a similar *mise en abyme* of this traditional form of love poetry dating back to Petrarch's *Canzoniere*, since Eliot seems to have embedded a double sonnet in "The Fire Sermon." The first runs from line 235 ("The time is now propitious as he guesses") to line 248 ("And gropes his way, finding the stairs unlit..."), and it is regular in form and rhyme pattern except for the concluding false couplet ("kiss/unlit"). The second goes from line 249 ("She turns and looks a moment in the glass") to line 263 ("And a clatter and a chatter from within") and is also regular except in the third quatrain ("waters"/"hear") which also repeats "Street" in lines 258 and 260. But the rhyming couplet ("The pleasant whining of a mandoline/And a clatter and a chatter from within") has been restored at the end. But the topic of the sonnets with their spiritless fornication and "half-

formed thought" of the "lovely woman" who puts a record on the gramophone to hear Ferdinand's reaction to Ariel's "Full fathom five" seems hardly appropriate for these pseudo-Elizabethan sonnets that sound like a vain, empty parody of the original ones. We are here far from the exalted view of love or the harmony expected in the use of such traditional poetic forms.

Well, if this is probably true of such Petrarchan sonneteers as Sir Thomas Wyatt, Sidney or Spenser, it hardly applies to Shakespeare who, in the Sonnets, derides and parodies their repetitive *clichés* and poetic conventions, or else uses them to his own subversive ends like the expression of jealousy, same-sex love or crude eroticism if not downright obscenity, as in the "Will sonnets." "Th' expense of spirits in a waste of shame" could thus be read as Will's exploration of the Waste, or "waist" land in the tradition of the anthropomorphic landscape. This may be thought of as a cynical reduction of the poem's scope, but after all Eliot's vision of love and sex is pretty lurid and disheartening in the poem, especially as it is set against such romantic figures as those of Tristan and Isolde, or of Ferdinand and Miranda in *The Tempest*:

The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers,
Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends
Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs are departed.
And their friends, the loitering heirs of City directors,
Departed, have left no addresses. (ll. 177-81)

If the "silk handkerchiefs" may evoke Othello's "pledge of love" (5.2.212) to Desdemona which Iago perverted into the "ocular proof" (3.3.362) of her alleged sexual betrayal, one should also stress the indeterminate "other" in "other testimonies of summer nights", which may well refer to such discarded trash as used condoms. Moreover, the repetition of "departed" here sounds like a knell, like the gloomy burden that accompanies and suggests the fleeting copulations of summer nights with the added allusion to the merry-go-round of love in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. But, just as sonnet 129 presents lust as "perjured, murderous, full of blame,/Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust" (ll. 3-4), "A Game of Chess" alludes to the rape of Philomel "by the barbarous kind/So rudely forced" (ll. 99-100). So, love and sex are not only seen as boring, sterile or tragic activities in *The Waste Land*, they are also grotesque as in the scene between the clerk and the typist. In the "Will sonnets", the tone is sometimes of a rather scathing, snarling misogyny in the series of jeering addresses to the Dark Lady:

Will will fulfil the treasure of thy love,

Ay, fill it full with wills, and my will one.
 In things of great receipt with ease we prove
 Among a number one is reckoned none.
 Then in the number let me pass untold,
 Though in thy store's account I one must be;
 For nothing hold me, so it please thee hold
 That nothing, me, a something sweet to thee.
 Make by my name thy love, and love that still,
 And then thou lov'st me for my name is Will. (Sonnet 136)

In a similar vein, Eliot does not only attack his female characters as insignificant, frivolous or predatory. He must also cut down his ideal and model, Shakespeare himself, as in the line "O O O O that Shakespeherian rag," in a downright parody which alludes to a famous 1911 jazz song by Irving Berlin and Ted Snyder, "That Shakespearean rag" by Buck, Ruby and Stamper, whose chorus goes:

That Shakespearian rag—
 Most intelligent, very elegant,
 That old classical drag,
 Has the proper stuff, the line "Lay on Macduff,"
 Desdemona was the coloured pet,
 Romeo loved his Juliet—
 And they were some lovers, you can bet, and yet,
 I know if they were here today,

 They'd Grizzly Bear in a diff'rent way,
 And you'd hear old Hamlet say,
 "To be or not to be,"
 That Shakespearian rag, etc...⁴

So, Shakespeare, whose word music serves Eliot as a foil or as an ironical counterpoint to enhance the seedy realities of modern love, is himself being gently mocked or rather teased through the allusion to the popular rag tune which almost everybody would have had in mind in the "roaring twenties." The rag tune that springs up "out of the blue" after two inserts from *The Tempest* and Webster's *White Devil*, two plays that deal with death and the sea-change that seems to follow it, indeed sounds as unexpected as it is disconcerting. As Scofield puts it, "Such mobility of mind and quickness of response can be jarring, nearly manic. Like Hamlet's it can

modulate in an instant, from the depths of anguish to a light humour [...] because it cannot bear much reality" (121).

Conclusion

To close this Shakespearean excursus into Eliot's *Waste Land*, I can only repeat that Will's presence in the poem is no real surprise or major discovery. This is common to both Joyce's *Ulysses* and Eliot's poem, two major modernist texts which both appeared in the very same year, in 1922. Shakespeare is probably more important than Homer's *Odyssey* in Joyce's novel, partly thanks to Stephen Dedalus's "Hamlet theory," which is linked to the essential question of filiation and paternity. The difference between the two authors, who did not really like each other, is that Joyce keeps expanding, modulating, connecting when Eliot suppresses, restricts and disconnects in order to introduce breaks, gaps, holes to be filled out by his readers' imagination or personal culture. One wrote a comic Irish 24-hour *Odyssey* that stresses homecoming while the other indulges in a long lament over his sense of exile, depression and frustration.

My own impression is that various disseminated allusions to *Hamlet*, *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Coriolanus*, *The Tempest* and the Sonnets in *The Waste Land* are only the tips of a vast literary iceberg. The identifiable quotations in the poem indeed also serve to hide more important underlying quotations, some of which I have tried to unravel and clear out in this paper. If, in the notes that Eliot appended to his poem, the references to Shakespeare remain rather minimal, more is certainly to be found in that particular direction, as Eliot wrote his piece in an archaeological manner, inviting us to dig deeper and further in order to excavate unseen frescoes or sunken treasures. The memory of texts to him (what he calls the "pastness of the past") indeed remained an essential dimension of literature and of the activity of reading just like the "art of memory" was thought of as absolutely essential in the Humanist training that prevailed at the time of the Renaissance. A good and well-trained memory was a fundamental asset for the Inns of Court lawyers in order to remember important arguments as well as the examples to illustrate them, just as it was for the common players who generally had to learn their parts in less than two weeks' time. So, Hamlet's "while memory holds a seat/In this distracted globe" (1.5.96-7), where the "remembrance of things past" sounds like some sort of intellectual stronghold protecting against universal chaos and dissolution, should be set against the final paragraph of *The Waste Land*. Indeed, like "Soliman and Perseda," a play within the play in sundry languages at the end of Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*, the poem as a whole sounds like a desperate, panicky recapitulation of the fears of apocalyptic destruction that have filtered through some of its infernal, horrifying visions. No less than five languages (English, Italian, Latin, French, and Sanskrit) are used in the last

eleven lines to end on “Shantih, shantih, shantih,” a phrase which in Sanskrit means “the peace that passeth understanding” — in which we may hear a form of hope for some sort of spiritual healing — but which may also be heard as the more ominous echo of the English “shanty town.” Obviously, what is “falling down, falling down, falling down” is less London bridge, as in the well-known nursery rhyme, than the “tour abolie” of Gérard de Nerval’s “Desdichado” (“The Unlucky”) sonnet in *The Chimères*:

Je suis le veuf, le ténébreux, l’inconsolé,
Le Prince d’Aquitaine à la tour abolie,
Ma seule étoile est morte et mon luth constellé
Porte le soleil noir de la mélancolie.⁵

This is probably reminiscent of Elsinore’s sweet, melancholy Prince dressed in his “inky cloak” (*Hamlet*, 1.2.77) and to whom the world is nothing but “a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours” (2.2.268) while more openly alluding to the Biblical episode of the fall of the Tower of Babel after men are punished for their pride by suddenly forgetting their originally common tongue and begin to speak in sundry languages.

Shakespeare and Shakespearean allusions in *The Waste Land* thus serve an ambivalent function. Indeed if Shakespeare may rightly be regarded as a modern as a multiple, “myriad-minded” author in his almost systematic resorting to puns and polysemy, he remained for Eliot as for most English people as a whole, the creator of the English language and the pillar of tradition. So, if the image of Will in the “Waste Land” does echo the poem’s deep pessimism, it may also restore some illusion or hope of a possible re-creation, as in the case of Leontes in *The Winter’s Tale*, or of pardon and redemption in *The Tempest*.

Notes

1. Letter dated 1905, qtd. in Martin Scofield, “Poetry’s Sea-Changes: T.S. Eliot and *The Tempest*.” *Shakespeare Survey* 43 (1990):121.

2. On this, see Sicker: “From the first belladonna in ‘A Game of Chess’ to the typist, Eliot has radically simplified and consolidated his female archetype, stripped her of motive, memory, and desire until she is definable only as a single mechanical impulse. After the typist there is but one remaining step in Eliot’s reduction process — the merger of the archetypal male and female, the self-castrating Fisher King and the masturbating belladonna, in the figure of double-sexed Tiresias” Philip Sicker, “The Belladonna: Eliot’s Female Archetype in *The Waste Land*.” *Twentieth Century Literature* 30.4 (1984): 429.

3. T.S. Eliot, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca." *Selected Essays*(London: Faber & Faber, 1932)136-38.
4. See David Ward, *T.S. Eliot Between Two Worlds: A Reading of T.S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays* (London: Routledge, 1973)99.
5. "I am the widower, the disconsolate mourner,
The Prince of Aquitaine with his abolished tower.
My only star has died and my constellated lute
Wears the black sun of melancholy's suit." (my translation)

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Shakespearean Theatrical Works in Relation to Contemporary Social Practices of Honour-Based Violence

Ibrahim Yerebakan

Department of English Language and Literature, Recep Tayyip Erdogan University
53100, Rize, Turkey

E-mail: ibrahim.yerebakan@erdogan.edu.tr

Abstract In his comedies as well as tragedies, Shakespeare confronts the themes of honour and shame, male social standing, female chastity and subordination of women, questioning the prevailing patriarchal attitudes of his time, which victimise both men and women. This article is intended to make a comparative analysis of honour-related crime as Shakespeare alludes to again and again in his dramatic works and as they appear today in honour-centred societies, the Middle Eastern cultures in particular, where honour killings still hold a notable weight. Bringing together Shakespearean examples and its contemporary extensions as practices by traditional cultures, the study reveals that honour-related violence, whether in Shakespeare's time or societies today, East and West, has been an on-going issue, and neither the Renaissance as an age of great discoveries nor technological advances of the twenty first century managed to wipe out this practice. The analysis demonstrates that honour-related violence which occupies a significant space in Shakespeare's texts also serves the richness and diversity of his dramatic oeuvre, and therefore this particular subject is worth investigating further from broader historical contexts and contemporary perspectives.

Key words Shakespeare; honour killing; patriarchy; feudal societies; the Middle East; Turkey

Oh Fate, take not away thy heavy hand.
Death is the fairest cover for her shame
That may be wished for.

Much Ado About Nothing (IV.i. 113-115)

Committing crime in the name of personal or family honour is an all-too-familiar

phenomenon in the contemporary world. Killing or terrorising women for their illicit sexual activities was familiar also to the Shakespearean world. The purpose of this study is to correlate Shakespearean examples of honour killing with the contemporary practices of the violence as trans-historical, trans-geographical matter of wrong patriarchal traditions and cultures rather than religion. Virtually no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken so far, which links Shakespearean texts to honour-based violence as practiced in contemporary, patriarchal communities. The present study, therefore, offers an assessment of the historical context of the crime in Shakespeare and in contemporary tribal societies as well as an evaluation of the similarities and differences of the practices of honour killing as exposed in Shakespearean theatrical works and as currently experienced in the contemporary world. Particular references to Shakespearean dramatic works will be made in order to track and explore the way these texts enlarge our understanding and the root causes of this worldwide barbaric tradition.

The Turkish Perspectives

The 2007 Turkish State Theatre Company's sell-out production of *Romeo and Juliet* in the city of Van, the easternmost province of Turkey and an ethnically Kurdish region, was no exception to the fact that human dilemmas Shakespeare explores transcend specific centuries and particular civilisations. The production immediately called to mind the present day problem of so called "honour killing" which still persists as a grim reality among the feudal tribal communities in the country.¹ *Romeo and Juliet*, the first play by Shakespeare ever staged in the province made sensational headlines in the Turkish media and newspapers alike: "The City of Van Warmly Embraces Shakespeare," "Romeo-Juliet Will Die in the City of Van." During my private conversation, one of the young actors in the production also expressed that the whole team was surprised to see the enthusiastic reception of the performance by the younger audience. In an interview, its young director, Kemal Bashar, stressed that the ethnic conflict between the feuding families in the play was overlapping with the current situation and feudal structure of the region ("Romeo-Juliet Van'da Ölecek!" 2). Critics did not even hesitate to associate directly the fictional world of *Romeo and Juliet* with the current horror stories and the fates of young Turkish or Kurdish women killed mostly by male relatives and even by their lovers in the name of family honour (Maro 2). In this context, it would not be quite accurate to say that Juliet is actually the victim of an honour killing as such, since she is not killed either by her father or her lover; she takes her own life out of despair when she sees her lover dead. However, it is important to recognise that Juliet's death is certainly caused indirectly by her father's rejection of her marriage with a man she deeply and honestly loves.

Empathizing with Juliet's reaction to Paris, particularly the young viewers of the Turkish production felt that the series of events unfolding in the play were all too familiar ones; the story of the loss of an innocent young couple for reasons of family honour, the story of a young girl forced by her family to marry a man she does not like, or the story of a father who loses her daughter as an indirect result of this loveless match. The audience admitted that they were experiencing similar kinds of unfulfilled, unrequited, illicit love affairs often obstructed by the "Turkish-Kurdish divide" and terminated by the respective families who share different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. They confessed downheartedly that love between members of different cultural groups did exist, recognising no obstacles, no boundaries; yet the feudal structures of the families, the patriarchal culture, and ethnic differences were among the greatest obstacles. They were by no means enemies of one another but the families were; the families would not leave their sons and daughters to themselves. The immediate, outright response of the younger audience to the production sums up for us the seriousness and the magnitude of the problem:

Probably, we all are of the same opinion and have reached the consensus regarding what we experienced in the play; we think about the loss of young lives in our society today and yesterday. This is the city of Van; anything is possible here, one day an honour killing and another day a long queue in front of the box office to watch a Shakespeare production. (Maro 2)²

The audience's direct equation of the story of *Romeo and Juliet* with the current situation in eastern Turkey points to the fact that honour-related crimes are still being committed in the country, showing no sign of slowing down, and spreading at an alarming scale despite the legislative reforms carried out under pressure from the European Union. Hardly a week passes without gruesome footage and news of yet another honour killing in Turkish media. Once a taboo topic, honour killing is now being debated in public, featured on televisions and movies. Even Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk's *Snow* recounts a journalist's investigation in Batman, a poor and rural south-eastern Kurdish town, deeply influenced by conservatism, where teenage girls, mostly rape victims, considered to be dishonoured, are killed by their relatives or commit suicide as a result of family pressures and baseless accusations that they have brought dishonour on their families and therefore they must clean their shame themselves. Turkish feminist novelist Elif Shafak also concentrates exclusively on the notion of honour killing in her recent novel, *Honour*, where she takes up a story of a half Turkish half Kurdish immigrant family living in London. In one of her articles to the *Guardian*, Shafak also denounces the crime as "a symptom of Turkey's strict

patriarchal society. It's time we faced up to this horror" (2011). A survey conducted in 2011 revealed that "nearly 1,000 women were murdered in Turkey in 2009 — a 1,400 percent increase from 2002" (Qtd., Kiener 187). In most cases, victims are young women with offences ranging from "stealing a glance at a boy to wearing a short skirt, wanting to go to the movies, being raped by a stranger or relative or having consensual sex" (Bilefsky). As a punishment for talking to boys, a sixteen year old girl was secretly assassinated by her family members in 2010 in south-eastern Turkey (Kiener 185). In such honour-bound societies, a man's ability to preserve his honour exclusively depends on to what extent he can publicly demonstrate his power to protect his "good name" by eliminating those who damage it. One academic survey of the 180 prisoners of honour crimes in 44 Turkish prisons demonstrated that hundred percent felt neither remorse nor regret for their act, and in some cases the victim's relatives even praised the perpetrators (Gezer). In her analysis Shafak draws attention to another appalling aspect of the crime: "women who are closest to the victims can at times support the decision to kill or remain indifferent to what is taking place" (2012).

Honour Killing: A Middle Eastern as well as Universal Phenomenon

Honour killing is cited by an Amnesty International report as the most serious crime against women in the name of family or community honour ("Pakistan: Honour Killings of Girls and Women" 2-3). Today this inhumane practice is often linked with the Middle Eastern geography or Asian communities and cultures.³ Whilst honour-related violence is often identified by researchers as a mainly Muslim practise and considered to be exclusive to Islamic cultures, the problem is not apparently unique to any geography or a particular community of the world. These crimes "cross socioeconomic classes and education boundaries, and are part of cultural practices rather than of specific religious beliefs" (Laviosa 186). Often characterized as a global scandal, the problem is spreading rapidly among many communities, rural as well as urban. Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Yemen and Palestine have the highest per capita rate of honour killing in the world (Goldstein 31). Isolated incidents of honour killings have also been reported in western countries including Sweden, Britain, Holland, USA, Germany, and most recently, Canada. Fisk identifies the practise as "one of the last great taboos: the murder of at least 20,000 women a year in the name of 'honour', a vile tradition that goes back hundreds of years but which now spans half the globe" (7 Sept.).

Although the perpetrators often attribute their action to religion as justification, these crimes are not certainly rooted in any religious texts whatsoever. In her analysis, Khan emphasizes the role of culture rather than any religion in the perpetuation of honour-related crimes around the globe, arguing that although there is no such thing

in the holy Koran, that permits or sanctions honour killings, the concept of women as commodity is deeply rooted in Eastern cultures and traditions (1999). Many influential Islamic scholars and clerics have spoken out against the practise of honour killings as “vicious phenomenon” (Qtd., Kiener 190). Not only are Muslim women killed or oppressed by their relatives in their respective Muslim countries but also Muslim immigrant communities in the West maintain their traditions and cultural practices along with them. “Daughters and sisters in Sweden, Norway, Germany, or the UK have been murdered. In Sweden the Turkish-Kurd community is notorious for committing honour related violence” (Khan, *Beyond Honour* 21). Shafak entirely agrees: “it is happening here, too, in the heart of Britain. According to the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organization (IKWRO), more than 2,800 honour-related cases were reported in the UK in 2010. Evidence from police forces reporting suggests an increase of 47% since 2009” (2012). One primary reason why this pervasive problem is seen by the West exclusively as a Muslim phenomenon can be sought in the fact that honour-related murders and violence against young Muslim girls have been more prevalent among the immigrants of Islamic, Kurdish-Turkish, Arab, and Pakistani or North African origin than any other societies living in those countries. Those immigrant families in the West often bring with them amid their language the traditions of their home communities. Rana Husseini comments that whilst punishment of women for illicit sexual activities in Europe drastically began to diminish in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, it is rocketing at a disturbing rate in the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities, in particular (201).

Violence on the basis of honour often involves murder, rape, severe attacks, stoning, forced suicide, even mutilation and dismemberment of the young bodies. The victims are mostly young women, subjected to the violence of many kinds by male relatives even by those they love the most for choosing a marriage partner without the consent of parents, for seeking a divorce or for being raped and even on groundless suspicion that they are having a relationship outside marriage. The evidence or proof of the suspicion is of no consequence; mere allegation of having entered an illicit sexual relationship is enough to ruin a man’s honour within his own community, as a result of which the killing or beating of a woman is justified. In many cases, tribal families would rather kill their daughter to “safeguard their honour” than suffer from stigma of their relationship with unsuitable partners. Isolated cases documented by Amnesty International show that a “husband murdered his wife based on a dream that she had betrayed him. In Turkey, a young woman’s throat was slit in the town square because a love ballad had been dedicated to her over the radio” (Mayell). The victims are hardly given any chance to defend themselves or to give their versions of the allegation. The right to life of a woman is conditional upon their obeying patriarchal

social norms and traditions.

Shakespearean Approaches to Honour Crimes and Their Contemporary Resonance

There is a striking parallel, direct or indirect, deliberate or coincidental, between such contemporary stories of honour-related crimes, fates of modern young people and their counterparts as portrayed in Shakespearean dramatic works such as *Titus Andronicus*, *Othello*, *Much Ado About Nothing* and *Romeo and Juliet*, in particular.⁴ In these texts, Shakespeare exposes honour-bound societies similar, in many respects, to those encountered today among some tribal and feudal cultures. A substantial part of *Othello*, for instance, revolves around the scenario of the beating, abusing and killing of an innocent young woman by her husband simply on the suspicion — without any substantiated evidence — that she has entered into an illegitimate relationship with another man. Othello explicitly makes it clear that the murder of his wife is an honour killing when he portrays himself as an “honourable murderer”(Wells 52). Written after Henry VIII publicly made a spectacle of killing his wife for allegedly committing adultery, *Othello* also “carried the messages of condemnation for adulterous behaviour” (Goldstein29). Similarly, in *Much Ado about Nothing*, Shakespeare unequivocally touches on honour crime where father Leonato desperately wishes his daughter Hero dead on the erroneous suspicion that she talked with a vile man at her window and therefore she has brought shame and dishonour on the family name.

If Othello is the “most barbarous of all Shakespeare’s misogynists, Leonato comes a close second” (Wells 51), who rashly tries to renounce and obliterate his daughter entirely upon Claudio’s accusations that she is unfaithful and unchaste. Leonato’s immediate reaction is either to commit suicide in despair with a dagger or to kill Hero instantly, believing, like most of the contemporary fathers of honour victims, that it will be better for him to get rid of his daughter than to live in shame permanently. It is well understood that in Shakespeare’s time, chastity and virginity of an upper class woman like Hero at the time of her marriage carried a great significance for her social standing as well as for the reputation of her entire family. Premarital relationships or unchaste behaviours could easily provoke a father into rejecting or even killing his daughter:

Do not live Hero, do not open thine eyes.
For did I think thou wouldst not quickly die,
Thought I thy spirits were stronger than thy shames,⁵ (IV.i. 124-126)

Driven by paranoia and suspicion, Claudio and Leonato continue public shaming of

Hero at the wedding ceremony, which is too horrendous to ignore. Public humiliation and defamation is deliberately used as a form of social punishment, closely connected to loss of honour and loss of reputation. This intimidation in public in a very strong and abusive language can inflict more pain to Hero's honour than would a promiscuous behaviour which, we believe, she never commits; "She is but the sign and semblance of her honour," "foul tainted flesh," "the rotten orange," simply a corpse that can no longer be preserved. With her honour being publicly savaged by these damning accusations, Hero is symbolically dead, never to recover her name and fame again. Claudio and Leonato's quick acceptance of the rumours about Hero's unfaithfulness without investigating the matter more profoundly demonstrates once again how ready men are to believe that their daughters, loved ones, are betraying them and thus tarnishing their honour and family reputation. Today there are quite similar examples of public shaming of women by their relatives, if methods are somewhat different. Yet, unlike the contemporary examples of honour victims, who in most cases have no right to defend themselves, let alone to clear their names, Hero is able to reject the accusations, and is given a chance to restore her honour and to declare that she "talk'd with no man," still a virgin and faithful to Claudio. Different from many of today's examples, the father orders Claudio to clear his daughter's honour by explaining Hero's innocence to entire community. Hero somewhat regains her lost honour eventually, if Leonato and Claudio's accusations in public have tarnished her name permanently.

The view of women as an object or property with very little individual rights of their own was deeply rooted in the Elizabethan society. Women often remained at the lowest bottom of the social ladder and were considered inferior to men (McDonald 252). Whatever freedom women had was granted and taken away by their husbands. All contemporary notions about the idea of marriage gave man this authority: "He was the prince with power — and his wife was his loyal, loving subject" (Papp 73). Yet, this is not entirely the case with Shakespeare's female characters, since they are on occasions portrayed in a dignified manner, cleverer and more cunning than men, holding an elevated status at the centre of the household, taking care of the provision of food and home-medication as well. Beatrice in *Much Ado About Nothing*, for instance, ignores the patriarchal norms and the popular notion of arranged marriage, refusing to marry simply because she has not yet discovered the suitable partner. Speaking out against male domination and vigorously rejecting the low status of women in the Renaissance, Beatrice asserts: "I cannot be a man with wishing, therefore I will die a woman with grieving" (IV.i. 326-327).

At the same time, it is quite possible to encounter in Shakespeare's texts some references to the subordination of women who after marriage lose everything they

have, their property, their clothes and their jewellery; their husband can sell them, throw them away, give them away or use them as they please. In *The Merchant of Venice*, Portia repeatedly makes the point when she says to her husband Bassanio:

One half of me is yours, the other half yours-
 Mine own I would say, but if mine then yours,
 And so all yours. (III.ii.16-18)

Women are also considered to be a commodity that can be bought and sold or even exchanged. In that case, it is not always the women themselves but predominantly their owners, their fathers or husbands in particular, who have almost every right to decide their fate. Similarly with Portia, Shakespeare puts Kate in *The Taming of the Shrew* into the context of a world in which she has hardly any basic control over what happens to her body and her soul, as if she has been thrown into her husband's power. Shaming Kate into a full submission and obedience, Petruchio, in fact, describes the status of his wife with such directness:

She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house,
 My household stuff, my field, my barn,
 My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything, (III.iii. 102-104)

The conception that women were no different from “commodity” to be possessed or acquired by men somewhat reflects problematic relationship between power and sex in basically patriarchal Elizabethan society “in which female ‘liberty’ was seen as a threat to the whole social order” (Hattaway 106). It would be an oversimplification of Shakespeare's female characters, however, to define them as entirely powerless in their dramatic worlds. In complete contrast to Kate, her sister Bianca, for instance, does obtain what and whom she wants; she does exert control and wield power in marriage. Yet, we are well aware of the fact that what the Elizabethan patriarchy expected and what actually happened in daily life were much different. Unmarried women were supposed to be obedient to their masters and remain virginal until marriage. Strangely enough, works of historians show that an estimate of 20% of the Elizabethan weddings may have taken place while the bride was already pregnant, whilst “the fiction was maintained that the wedding night was the time for defloration” (Cressy 374). Given this double standard in Elizabethan life, it is very possible to read Petruchio's sexist speech ironically.

Since every Elizabethan woman was expected to behave in accordance with the patriarchal value systems, supposed to remain modest, pure, silent, and fully

compliant, Kate's eloquent, talkative, confrontational behaviour in *The Taming of the Shrew* is perceived as immoral or immodest that is deemed to have broken the so-called honour code of the family. Consequently, Kate is subjected to violent treatment, brain washing techniques, which can indeed be interpreted as a form of wife beating or torturing today. The whole process of the "taming" Kate is a kind of torture, a terrible third degree which involves cruelty, physical violence, and depersonalisation even prevention of her from sleeping all night long. Hortensio threatens Kate with a ride in a cart, which can also be taken as a form of punishment for her talkativeness and for her disobedience. Hortensio's attempt to prevent Kate from sleeping was a practice commonly used by the witch-finders of sixteenth century England to obtain a necessary confession from the accused woman. Irrational prejudices against women in that particular period only served to suppress them, giving way to the "witch-hunt of the sixteenth century in which hundreds of defenceless old people were burned to death for the crimes they did not commit" (Papp 43). Kate's father Baptista associates his daughter with witches and ultimately with the devil: "For shame thou hilding of a devilish spirit" (II.i. 26). Baptista's vigorous condemnation of his daughter clearly suggests that Kate in her too loud voice has already transgressed boundaries, duties, and obligations of a daughter according to the Elizabethan patriarchal norms. For a woman in Elizabethan England, to disobey hierarchical order and honour codes of the family was an unforgivable offence against the prestige of the family. The family as a whole was considered to be a monarchy in miniature, with a hierarchical system of its own. Within this hierarchy, father was seen as the "magistrate" with an absolute control of social life and responsibility (Shepherd 160). In the Elizabethan world, virtue was associated with silence, whilst vice was identified with articulateness (Jardine 47).

What Does True Love Have to Do with Honour?

Absolute obedience of Elizabethan daughters to their family, their fathers, in particular, is one of the themes Shakespeare addresses again and again in his work. In *Romeo and Juliet*, a young woman ignores her duties and obligations towards her parents and decides to marry the son of the arch enemy of her family. Acting against the order of her family, Juliet tarnishes the prestige and image of her family and violates the norms of family honour all at once. Through the figure of Juliet, Shakespeare touches on one significant fact of the Elizabethan life that for a girl choosing a marriage partner or expressing a desire to do so was unforgivable. Juliet's unilateral decision means that she has defiled her family's honour and therefore in the eyes of the father, she deserves a severe punishment even death because of acting not according to her parents' will but her own desires:

Hang thee young baggage, disobedient wretch!
 I tell thee what: get thee to church o' Thursday,
 Or never after look me in the face.
 Speak not, reply not, do not answer me. (III.v. 160-163)

It may be useful at this point to emphasize that in the Elizabethan times it was rather fashionable for aristocratic parents like the Capulet family to arrange and force marriage against their daughters' will for obvious reasons. Such arranged marriages in Shakespeare's plays particularly involve high class, noble family members, for whom there are sizable assets and estates to protect or to possess, and political and economic alliances to consider. This was hardly an issue for an average, lower class Elizabethan family. Thus, Juliet's mother deliberately tries to impose a loveless marriage upon her daughter with "the noble gentleman, the County Paris," despite the fact that Juliet utterly rejects and disapproves of that match, thus risking the provocation of her family. Juliet's case leaves the impression that especially the daughters of higher-class family in Shakespeare's time were not entirely in the control of their marital fate mostly due to some awareness of class differences in marriage practices. If parents presented a daughter with a match that met their criteria, she would either accept the offer without any question, or she would resist the match, ultimately evoking resentment and anger of her family. Juliet's father cannot concede that his daughter refuses his offer of Paris and declares instead that the person she will marry is Romeo whom her family hates:

I will not marry yet; and when I do, I swear
 It shall be Romeo, whom I know you hate,
 Rather than Paris. (III.v. 119-121)

Juliet's defiant behaviour probably seemed shocking to most of the Elizabethan audience because her bold assertion of her will violates a sacred principle of Elizabethan life; daughters were expected to obey the hierarchical order and the wishes of their parents. As Richard Levin recognised, "the duty of daughters to obey their parents, especially in the choice of a husband, was explicitly affirmed at this time in many of the courtesy books and moral and religious treatises" (17). Juliet's act of disobedience causes not only the destruction of the family honour but also indirectly the destruction of her own life as well, and this dilemma occasioned by a so-called act of disobedience today presents us with the same problem as Juliet's; the problem of marriage without parental consent, which is still judged by some patriarchal cultures

and tribal traditions as unacceptable, immoral, wrongful, and therefore, a punishable offence. Today honour-centred societies experience the similar tragic consequences of the loss of innocent young lives, mostly caused by those men who are forcing their daughters into a loveless marriage and who are thinking only of their honour. Likewise, in *Romeo and Juliet* the young couple provides an ironic counterpoint to the violent behaviour of self-destructive, honour-bound contemporary communities. These two lovers can be seen as the victims of the intolerance and conservatism inherent in feudal systems that put their honour above everything. Foakes most perceptively describes the case of this young couple as the “victims of violence that is generated by their society” (80). There is no doubt that, by putting the scenario of the play in Verona, geographically away from early modern England, and by transforming these kinds of wrong social behaviours into fiction, Shakespeare seems to use the opportunity to awaken the social awareness of his patriarchal audience to these unacceptable social norms and relationships. Today, in so many patriarchal systems, where women’s rights are deliberately ignored, there are many examples of love affairs or relationships as such that are prematurely terminated by the family members who consider their daughter’s choice of marriage partner as a shameful act of defiance damaging family’s reputation. The figures of the young couple as such portrayed in *Romeo and Juliet* can still be encountered in our modern world, more frequently in societies where a marriage, an illicit love affair or a relationship of a young woman to a man, who is culturally, linguistically, religiously and ethnically different from her own, is less tolerated.

Killing of a Daughter on the Basis of Family Honour

Shakespeare raises the issue of honour killing in one of his gruesome plays, *Titus Andronicus*, where “patriarchal consumption of the woman’s victimised body is also made explicit” (Hiscock 227). Titus, a Roman general, treats his only daughter Lavinia viciously and commits a premeditated murder of the young girl after she was raped and her chastity spoiled by his arch enemies.⁶ Titus does not even hesitate to kill his son, Mutius who asks for forgiveness for his fleeing sister. As in the Elizabethan period, women had very few rights in ancient Rome. A daughter represented the “honour” of her father prior to her marriage. According to Roman law, a father had the authority to eliminate his unmarried daughter for any lack of sexual discretion. Female adultery was a serious crime under Roman law, which required the prosecution of the family who turned a blind eye to it. Neglecting the consideration and love every father should have and acting heartlessly against the wishes and desires of a young girl, silencing her and subjecting her to patriarchal oppression, Titus, like Juliet’s father, has arranged to marry Lavinia to the Emperor Saturninus. Titus simply tries to turn

his daughter into a senseless creature for the sake of preserving his social standing and reputation. Instead of marrying the man of her father's choice, Lavinia, ignoring her daughterly obligations, elopes with Bassianus, with whom she is in love. With this play, Shakespeare once again presents the audience with a typical example of a practice of a patriarchal father trying to marry his daughter to a noble man, which was by no means unfamiliar to a large section of the upper class Elizabethan society where most of the marriages were arranged for obvious reasons.

Peculiar to all honour-related crimes today, the acts of violence in *Titus Andronicus* include rape, killing, mutilation and dismemberment. A rape victim herself, Lavinia appears to be one of the most incapacitated heroines delineated by Shakespeare. The rape of Lavinia is undoubtedly the central and most horrific crime in the play, which leads to her killing for reasons of honour and family reputation. Encouraged by their mother Tamora and incited by Aaron,⁷ Chiron and Demetrius brutally rape Lavinia in the forest during a hunt, after which they cut off her hands and tongue so that she cannot give their crime away. In the process, the Goth princes even make fun of Lavinia, squabbling over who loves her more, despite the fact that they are merely guided by lust and desire of rape, hoping to "pluck a dainty doe to ground" (II.ii. 26). The Goths continue to torment Lavinia, verbally insulting her, satisfying their animal desires on her, inflicting her more pain and finally leaving her alone in the wilderness instead of killing her instantly. Trying to flee in shame, Lavinia is brought to her father by her uncle Marcus. As stage direction says, Lavinia's hands are "cut off, and her tongue cut out," and she is totally "ravished." Upon discovering that his daughter has been abused and raped in the forest, and thus robbed of her most precious chastity by the arch enemy Goths, Titus plunges into a deep sorrow. Titus thinks that his honour has been contaminated because her daughter's virginity has been taken not by her husband but by other men she is not related to. Loss of virginity of a daughter is an absolute blot on Titus's honour, a stain that cannot be wiped out until the death of the young girl. Believing that honour is the only thing a man has, Titus does not hesitate to take action in order to safeguard his status and cleanse his daughter's shame since she was "enforced, stained and deflowered" (V.iii. 38). Horrified by this brutal act, Titus immediately calls his close ally Saturninus and asks if Virginius, an exemplary father and symbol of Roman virtue, should have slaughtered his daughter because she had been raped and thus brought dishonour to her father. Totally unaware of the absolutely similar situation that Titus is currently confronted with, Saturninus unhesitatingly suggests by a sheer coincidence that Titus should instantly remove the perceived stain on the family's reputation by slaying his daughter with his own right hand: "Because the girl should not survive her shame, / And by her presence still renew his sorrows" (V.iii. 40-41).

Conforming to one of the cultural practices of the Roman times, Saturninus “subscribes to the logic of honour killing” (Willis 50). It is probably this coincidental act of provocation by Saturninus that has eventually led Titus to resort to summary execution of his daughter. Saturninus may be referring to an important fact of life in Roman times that a “girl whose chastity was stained should by no means survive her shame.” Saturninus’s role in the whole process should be dealt with in a different context, since he was utterly unaware of the current situation while pronouncing death sentence to a girl who had been raped. However, his sharp, direct, inciting words and his provocative behaviours call to mind his contemporary accomplices and perpetrators of honour killing; today head of the clan or head of the family council is always consulted as to what sort of punitive action should be imposed on those who have damaged the family honour. It seems Lavinia’s fate is permanently sealed, since her father is counselled by Saturninus and thus convinced that a victim of rape deserves to die. As Titus kills Lavinia, he cries:

For me, most wretched, to perform the like.
Die, die Lavinia, and thy shame with thee,
And with thy shame thy father’s sorrow die. (V.iii. 42-44)

Defending his lost honour with violence, “the patriarchal father most obviously reasserts himself: in killing Lavinia, he submits to classical precedent, removes the ‘stain’ from family honour” (Willis 49). Indeed, Titus’s shame and honour take priority over his daughter’s life. Family honour may be somewhat restored; however it is apparent that Titus has not totally ended his agony by killing Lavinia.

Titus’s choice of defending his family’s prestige with violence and cleansing his lost honour by taking the life of the rape victim is a grim reminder of what we are witnessing currently in some honour killings, which are motivated by almost comparable reasons. Like Lavinia’s father, families of rape victims ignore the suffering of their daughters as if rape were to be understood solely as a stain on patriarchal family honour. Women are punished today even when they are the victims of rape, not only by strangers but also by their own fathers and brothers even uncles. A fifteen year old girl in the Turkish city of Batman was brutally killed and thrown into a river by her closest relatives, and her body later found by fishermen in December 2012, when her family realised that the girl was four months pregnant as a result of a rape reportedly conducted by her cousins. The brutal rape and murder of 20 year old Banaz Mahmut by her uncle and father in 2006 because of her illicit sexual relationship with a man, and the murder and the mutilation of Rukhsana Naz, strangled by her family because she wanted a divorce in 1999 in the United Kingdom

(Birch) are other typical contemporary examples that show suggestive parallels to the stories presented in *Titus Andronicus*. As one critic comments: “nothing comes closer to *Titus Andronicus* than the insistent, terrible stories of gang rape by United States personnel in Abu Ghraib. Most of the women in the prison were raped — some of them left prison pregnant. Families killed some of these women — because of the shame” (Fisk, 10 Sept.). Also in her 1999 feature adaptation of the play, Julie Taymor constantly “linked the ‘honor killing’ of Lavinia to the widely reported Bosnian practice of killing women who, during the war, had been raped by Serbs in a systematic campaign rape-as-ethnic cleansing” (Aebischer 123). These victims of sexual violence in Bosnia were abandoned by the families because of a huge stigma attached to rape in their patriarchal culture where communal pride was inseparably linked to their virginity and their loyalty as married women. With Titus, who shows his cold heartedness to his own family members for the sake of his honour and who actually looks for his lost honour in the drops of his innocent daughter’s blood, Shakespeare attempts to mock the ancient Roman virtue and concept of honour, and the wrong, unacceptable patriarchal assumptions by any standards. Referring to the Roman concept of honour, Shakespeare also attempts to draw attention to women’s plight, evoking Roman decadence and brutality and subverting social norms and behaviours of his time.

“For Naught I Did in Hate, but All in Honour.”

Of all Shakespeare’s plays, *Othello* is probably the most relevant text in the discussion of the Renaissance concept of honour in relation to women, given the fact that the whole text revolves around honesty, honour, sexual chastity, and faithfulness. However, one point should be made clear that Shakespeare portrays Othello not as an Englishman but as a Moor, an outsider, non-European, the “Other” in Christian Venice, who consistently starts out in the play as nobler than anyone, yet ends up looking more barbaric than anyone else except Iago. In Elizabethan drama, tyrannous and barbaric acts of violence are typically “associated with outsiders, Muslims, Jews, Turks, Moors, savages, representatives of the ‘Other’, of countries or societies outside the bounds of Christendom” (Foakes 72). Othello’s suspicion of Desdemona’s infidelity and jealousy overcomes him. “Once Othello gives way to his jealous will and tyrannous hate the audience sees him transformed into a version of Islamic tyrant” (Vitkus 99).

As is the case with Titus, Othello is seeking the fulfilment of his obsession with honour in the blood of his wife, slaughtering her because of the suspicion about her cheating on him with Cassio, formerly his right hand man. The truth of his suspicion in this context does not really matter for Othello; mere rumours or an allegation of

infidelity is enough to bring dishonour on Othello's fame as a "valiant" commander of the Christians against the "Turkish infidels." Othello decides that the only way of redeeming his honour and clearing his wife's illicit relationship with Cassio is to kill her. In a way, Desdemona is punished brutally for allegedly committing a sin, which was principally regarded in the Elizabethan period as unfaithfulness and betrayal. Since Othello's attacks centre on the issue of sexual obedience to a single man, fidelity, chastity and honesty, it can clearly be understood that Othello has put his honour above everything even above his current position as the defender of Cyprus from a possible Turkish occupation. For him, life without his honour is not even worth living. As one critic interprets, this murder has nothing to do with jealousy and love. Rather, Othello emerges as a man who regards himself as the chastising judge of Desdemona's shame, and as "the physician of his honour; he performs this deed, according to his last testimony, not from hatred, but from honour" (Gervinus 543). Thus, the idea of "honour" emerges in the play as the most dominant weapon Othello uses against his wife.

With Desdemona as "an unfortunate victim of Othello's tragic misconception" (Snow 396), Shakespeare confronts us with the predicament of a woman caught within wrong norms of a patriarchal society. In the male order of things, Shakespeare pertinently exposes social indifference to violence against women through Cassio who, for instance, expresses very little concern over Desdemona's death. Instead, he responds with reverence to Othello's deeds as "honourable": "For he was great of heart" (V.ii. 361). Cassio's words might be interpreted as a clear indication of how societal attitudes condone violence against women and implicitly endorse men killing women who are ultimately regarded as their possession. Even today, as it was yesterday, a considerable number of young women in honour-bound societies suspected of having a relationship of some kind with a man are still being subjected to all sorts of intimidation, physical abuse, torture and even death. Like his modern prototypes of honour killers, who often decide the fate of a woman when she is accused of dishonour, Othello also decides the fate of his wife for very obvious reasons, creating an apprehension, scepticism and fantasy of his wife, and then develops irrational, baseless thoughts such as interpreting his handkerchief in Cassio's hands as absolute proof of her infidelity and ingratitude. Othello develops further his suspicion that Desdemona cannot be trusted at all, claiming that she must be killed or otherwise she will betray more men around her. In the moments before and after killing her, Othello publicly shames Desdemona by referring to her as a cunning "whore" of Venice. The bitter irony is, however, that Desdemona and Othello's marriage may not have been fully consummated; it is most likely that Desdemona's virginity still remains intact. It can readily be seen that in Othello's patriarchal culture,

communal pride is inevitably linked to the virginity of a woman.

Given that Turkish-Venetian war is looming, and the Turkish invasion of the Venetian controlled island of Cyprus is impending, defending the honour of the Venetian state and eliminating the Turkish threat for good appears less a priority for Othello as a commander than his domestic honour, his virtue, and his social standing. Othello openly exaggerates Desdemona's "infidelity" out of all proportion to human possibility and compares her sexual encounters with men with the breeding of summer flies, which demonstrates the importance to him of his wife's virginity. More to the point, Othello has a pain upon his forehead, implying that an invisible horn is growing out of his head — a traditional symbol of cuckoldry. This allusion seems to suggest that he desperately wants to confront his wife with his deep suspicions of unfaithfulness implanted in his mind by Iago. Alone with Desdemona, Othello declares that he could have borne any affliction other than the pollution of the fountain from which his tree of life is to grow.

Similarly, in our modern world, one of the most common excuses for honour killing is suspicion of an intimate relationship between a woman and a man, whether alleged adultery, sex, outside of marriage or a suspicion of simply becoming close companionships. One report documents that in tribal communities a woman can dishonour her family by standing too close to a man she is not related to ("Killing of Women on the Basis of Family Honour"). No doubt, Desdemona is killed by the same token. Today, killing to save family honour, to wipe out the disgrace is seen as a social disciplinary duty. Like Othello, honour-bound families attach their moral reputation to the female members of their family, to their women's bodies. Thus, "honour" and its natural outcome "shame" are mere instruments referred to by men to control women's sexuality. Othello's baseless delusions and suspicions of his wife end in murder, his accusations of Desdemona, his fear of being cheated by another man, inducing fear of losing his honour in public, and being labelled as a cuckold or as the man whose wife has committed adultery has probably been one of the biggest common apprehensions of men throughout history. In this context, it can be argued that the fear of being cheated by a woman is timeless and ageless. As one critic aptly remarks, "the innumerable jokes about cuckolds in Renaissance dramatic texts, combined with sermonising against adultery, suggest that marital infidelity was a familiar and troublesome social problem" (McDonald 268).

What is remarkable about Shakespeare's treatment of tragic young female characters is that his full sympathies are aligned with them. The reality in Elizabethan society, as opposed to the reality portrayed on the Shakespearean stage, was that the clash between parents' wishes and wishes of the daughters was generally decided in favour of the parents. In spite of social pressures, Shakespeare gives us many forceful

fluent female characters. Through the figures of Desdemona, Juliet and Lavinia, in particular, he explores a daughter's right to choose her husband, exposing a confident assertion of the need for fathers to acknowledge and respect a daughter's right to choose. Yet, these young women ironically share more or less the same destiny as they fall victim to the laws of arbitrary and unjust moral, social customs, and transgress the limits of social conventions and arbitrarily changing rules of feudalism and tribalism. As regards honour-related violence and oppression, Shakespeare very strongly emphasizes that it is an absolutely wrong cultural tradition, and it is indeed a brutal act of savagery. We should remember that the kind of violence dramatized in *Othello* was by no means acceptable to the Elizabethans, nor would it be for the overwhelming majority in many societies. For instance, towards the play's end, when Othello comes to realize the innocence of his wife, he feels remorse for sure, and admits that "the murder was a misplaced act of honour" (Wells 51). Admitting the atrocity he has committed, Othello also feels that he is too wicked to be allowed the sight of his dead wife, thus demonstrating "a typical male perception of women, alternately worshipping her as an angel and damning her as a whore" (Hadfield 164). However, unlike Othello, who feels a deep regret after all, quite many of the contemporary perpetrators of honour killing hardly feel shameful for what they did. Majority claim that they did commit honour crime to safeguard tribal honour and to wash with a young woman's blood the family honour; honour is the only thing a man should maintain at all costs.

These instances of violence examined in the plays leave the notion that brutal killings of Desdemona and Lavinia in the name of a man's honour do not by any means heal the anger of Othello and Titus. Likewise, Juliet's death, which resulted ultimately from her parents' obsession with family prestige, cannot spare the honour of the Capulet family. Tragic loss of lives does not clear these women of their alleged sins, either. It may well be that between these two extreme situations, the utter rejection of these wrong cultural, tribal traditions, on the one hand, and the endorsement of the maintenance of absolute authority of the Elizabethan parents over their daughters and sons in the matter of marriage, on the other hand, Shakespeare makes his point and provides a practical lesson to his audience by indicating that "like should marry like."

Honour Crimes: Unchanging Facet of Barbarism Today and Yesterday

The fictional events portrayed in these particular plays, which are taking place in different settings and different eras somewhat reflect the common life experiences of humanity both in the past and in the present. Perhaps it would not be too much to suggest that honour-related violence, whether in Shakespeare's time or today, has

always been connected with sex, virginity, chastity, infidelity, and filial disobedience. These crimes, which conspicuously held particular weight in the Elizabethan culture, still continues to be part of our life even in the twenty first century, among the members of the feudal, tribal and patriarchal societies as one of the gruesome realities of life. Yesterday saw witch-hunting for women who were perceived as deceiving, being dishonest, dangerous creatures, and today sees honour killing, with scapegoats readily available, easy targets, believed to deceive men and destroy men's honour. Honour killing is one of the most brutal examples of how culture, tradition and religion have been misused or abused to perpetuate violence against women. Strangely enough, neither the Renaissance as an age of social changes and new discoveries nor post-modern technological advances and the civilization of the twenty first century, nor legislative reforms and law-centred policies has been able to succeed in obliterating this centuries old vile tradition. It seems that killing and defamation of young women, which is still strongly embedded in the socio-cultural religious fabric of contemporary communities, will continue to be one of the unresolved issues of modern civilisation as long as man maintains his desire to look for his lost honour, his lost reputation, his masculinity in the blood of young women. Hence, patriarchal mind-sets must effectively be confronted and this serious social problem vigorously challenged.

Notes

1. Despite the fact that honour crimes often come to be associated with eastern Turkey, surveys show that honour-related murders are not confined to this particular region only, but are committed in almost every region of the country ("Kadının Gündemi").
2. English translation mine.
3. In countries where Islam is practiced this crime is called "honour killing." Yet dowry deaths and so-called crimes of passion have similar dynamic and motives in that women are indiscriminately killed by male family members, even male relatives. These types of crimes are also widespread, for instance, in Latin American countries and the Indian sub-continent.
4. Although the plays to be discussed in relation to honour killing are all set in foreign lands, Italy or ancient Rome, we should assume that these geographical locations were equivalent in the minds of the Elizabethan audience to a considerable degree. Thus, the actions of the plays should not be viewed solely as Italianate or foreign to Shakespeare's audience.
5. All references to Shakespeare are from Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (eds), *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
6. During the Roman period issue of honour was also of key concern. Even philosophers and thinkers like Cicero, Seneca, Horace, Tacitus and Juvenal considered lack of feminine chastity as the prime sin, and believed that sexual transgression of a woman brought shame to the entire family, and

suggested, therefore, that women be restricted in the house in order to be kept chaste (Rana).

7. Aaron is a Moorish character, an outsider and a very cruel person who commits crime after crime, “a black fly” whose soul is inherently black.

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Upstart Crow vs. University Wit: Shakespeare “Beautified”

Sophie Chiari

Aix-Marseille Université, LERMA

29, Avenue Robert Schuman, 13621 Aix-en-Provence, France.

Email: chiarisophie@hotmail.com

Abstract Since Greene and Shakespeare crossed paths on several occasions, this paper will argue that Greene’s influence does matter if we are interested in Shakespeare’s “anxiety of influence.” Several clues in his plays suggest that Shakespeare felt the need to reassert his authorial self as a response to Greene’s attack on the originality of his work. For instance, he gave up collaborative writing for several years and made a sarcastic allusion to the death of his rival in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. In *Hamlet*, Polonius’s allusion to the “vile phrase” should be read as an ironic reminder of Greene’s quip. It is not until he wrote *The Winter’s Tale*, a dramatization of Greene’s *Pandosto*, that Shakespeare was able to come to terms with his “anxiety of influence.” With Autolycus, he paid a last vibrant and humorous tribute to Greene’s popular ballads and romances.

Key words Shakespeare; University Wits; Greene; anxiety of influence

Shakespeare’s play texts can be regarded as multi-dimensional spaces in which a variety of styles both blend and clash. *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* is a good example, since in the last act, Theseus, the Duke of Athens who is about to marry Hippolyta, has to select an entertainment for his wedding ceremony. Among various possibilities, he is proposed “[t]he thrice three Muses, mourning for the death / Of learning, late deceas’d in beggary” (5.1.59),¹ where a reference to Spenser’s “Teares of the Muses” (1591) is generally pointed out by editors and critics. However, the miserable death of Robert Greene, University Wit and “Prince of beggars” (Harvey 11) deceased in dire poverty, was probably also in Shakespeare’s mind when he wrote those lines. Indeed, in 1592, Greene’s dissolute life and tragic end was the talk of the town, and his miserable last years became almost as famous as his admired learning.²

Actually, Shakespeare’s allusion to Greene is more than an ironical tribute paid to a former rival. It points to the complex relationship between those two contemporaries, whose literary links remained ambiguous long after Greene’s death.

Since Greene and Shakespeare crossed paths on several occasions, I will argue that Greene’s influence is not easily dispelled when one is interested in the question of Shakespeare’s “anxiety of influence.”

Greene Before *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit*

A pamphleteer and playwright, Robert Greene was one of the first professional writers in early modern England. Born in Norwich³ and proudly defining himself as *academiae utriusquemagister in artibus* (i.e. master of arts at Cambridge and Oxford),⁴ penning stories for money rather than status, the prolific writer deliberately stood for the new world of commercial print, and never stopped claiming recognition “in the act of denying it to others” (Melnikoff and Gieskes 19).⁵ By contrast, Shakespeare was an all-round man of the theatre, and if he pragmatically paid attention to the print culture which had recently emerged, he continued to value performance and social prestige above professional writing skills. His strategy succeeded, and after 1598, publishers quickly understood that his name actually helped them sell great numbers of playbooks (Kastan 32-34). As a polygraph, Greene always wanted to earn money, but as a profligate author, he utterly failed, even though he tried to make amends for his own folly in his late-career “repentance pamphlets.” The last pages he wrote coincided with his bright young rival’s rising to fame. Ironically, if posthumous celebrity preserved Greene from oblivion, it is mainly because he — or someone who masqueraded as such — was the author of *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit*, a pamphlet written in 1592 and in which “Shakescene” / Shakespeare was harshly criticised. Now, if he was the one who dashed it off, he had apparently been preparing his onslaught for quite a few months, while Shakespeare was making his *débuts* on the London stage. We may thus wonder how Greene’s resentment grew in the late 1580s and consider the reasons that led to the eventual publication of *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit*.

For this, we need to go back to 1588. In a French sonnet dedicated to Greene and included in *Perimedes the Blacksmith*, published that year, a John Eliot⁶ advised his friend to ignore the rage of crows and “endure their malignant fury.”⁷ This seems to echo the close ties which were then established between envy, slander, gossip and rumour and reveal that, in the small world of London’s professional writers, Greene already had serious misgivings about the sonnet’s “dogs, crows and kittens” which stood for the writer’s rival pamphleteers and playwrights.

In *Menaphon*, the target is more clearly defined. Greene now launched his attacks against a “country-Author” who “can serve to make a pretie speech” but whose style is “stufft with prettie Similes and far-fetched metaphors” (Greene 1589: 61). The phrase “country-Author” could well be aimed at Shakespeare, the Stratford man,

whose early plays were already quite successful on the London stage.⁸

The year after that, Greene published *The Royal Exchange. Contayning Sundry Aphorismes of Phylosophie* (1590), a rather faithful translation of Orazio Rinaldi's *Dottrina Delle Virtu* (1585)⁹ but in which he inserted his own aphorisms. One of them is particularly striking: "Foure sorts of men must not be shamefast: 1. Players. 2. Cosoners (cheats). 3. Flatterers. 4. And beggars." The Elizabethan author gave no names, but his disenchantment with players, Shakespeare included, had become quite obvious at that time (Speroni 1972: 141). In *Francesco's Fortunes* (1590) published the same year, he mocked the renowned Roman actor Roscius¹⁰: "Why Roscius, art thou proud with Esops Crow, being pranct with the glorie of others feathers?" (quoted in Melnikoff 44). Interestingly enough, in Richard Hunt's copy¹¹ of the 1590 edition of William Camden's *Britannia*, we find the following marginal annotation: "*et Gulielmo Shakespear Roscio planè nostro*" ("and to William Shakespeare, manifestly our Roscius"). Clearly, Richard Hunt associated Stratford's fame with a now well-known actor, namely William Shakespeare, and he was probably not the only one to do so.¹²

Roscius the usurper soon gave way to Batillus the plagiarist, for in the epistle to his *Farewell to Folly* (1591), Greene poked fun at the "scabd jades" who "write or publish anie thing [...] distild out of ballets or borrowed of Theologicall poets, which for their calling and gravitie, being loth to have anie prophane pamphlets passe under their hand, get some other Batillus to set his name to their verses."¹³ Through allusions such as these, Greene may have shown his contempt for the young Shakespeare, if indeed the latter was already active in the London theatrical world of the late 1580s. Generally speaking, Greene regarded himself as a poet, and as such, he could overtly despise those who were not, according to his own criteria. No wonder thus if in *A Quip for an Upstart Courtier* (1592), he still argued for the superiority of the "poet" (*i.e.* himself) over the "plaier" (*i.e.* Shakespeare).

One last decisive element may have triggered his anger and led him to put the blame on the Stratford man. According to Hanspeter Born,

[I]n April/May 1592 Greene (with or without the help of Nashe) wrote *A Knack to Know a Knave*, a play that was intended to cash in on the success of his cony-catching pamphlets. [...] When Strange's Men received Greene's script they were dissatisfied with [his] subplot [...]. Shakespeare, whether on his own initiative or asked by his fellows, 'mended' the play. (Born 152)

Indeed, if *A Knack to Know a Knave*, performed on 10 June 1592 at the Rose, remains an anonymous comedy, it is nonetheless heavily influenced by Greene's prose fiction,

and it also presents all the characteristics of collaborative authorship, as a number of interpolated passages are strongly reminiscent of Shakespeare's style. Therefore, if Born is right, Greene must have deeply resented Shakespeare's rewritings, which may explain why his attack proved so virulent against the young playwright.

The Crucial Charges of Greene's Groatworth of Wit

Greene's Groatworth of Wit is a composite text belonging to the minor genre of the deathbed pamphlet, and recounting the story of Gorinus, a usurer, and of his two sons, Roberto and Luciano. The book was printed by Henry Chettle and entered in the Stationer's Register on September 22, 1592. The problem with this book is that Greene, who had fallen very ill during the summer, died on 3 September,¹⁴ and as a consequence, rumours of forgery arose immediately after the publication of the pamphlet.¹⁵ Actually, even though its authorship remains uncertain,¹⁶ Greene probably had something to do with the text,¹⁷ but what matters at this point, whether or not Greene was its author, is that such a notorious piece of writing fashioned the image of an embittered author who was envious of the success of his younger contemporaries.¹⁸

Yes, trust them not: for there is an upstart crow, beautified with our feathers, that with his *tiger's heart wrapt in a player's hide*, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank-verse as the best of you: and being an absolute *Johannes factotum*, is in his own conceit the only Shakescene in a country. Oh, that I might entreat your rare wits to be employed in more profitable courses, and let those apes imitate your past excellence, and never more acquaint them with your admired inventions! (Chettle and Greene 84)

The passage echoes the image of a crow decked with stolen colours which Horace used to satirize plagiarizing poets.¹⁹ On the face of it, the author of the pamphlet thus blames Shakespeare for his proud self-confidence and his plagiarizing habits as he hints at Margaret's attack on Gloucester in *2 Henry VI* (1591)²⁰ while simultaneously parodying a line from *3 Henry VI* (1591).²¹

The pamphlet ends on Aesop's fable of the grasshopper and the ant, "the first version in print in English verse, the first to mix prose and verse, and the longest and most elaborate treatment of the fable up to this time."²² "Greene" identified himself with the grasshopper, and Shakespeare with the ant, i.e. the "waspish little worme" who stubbornly refuses to support his "foodlesse, helplesse, and strenghtlesse" friend (Chettle and Greene 88). As a consequence, the end of the fable emphasizes the parallel between the grasshopper's miserable end and Greene's existence:

With this the Grasshopper yielding to the wethers extremities, died comfortless without remedy. Like him my selfe: like me, shall all that trust to friends or times inconstancie. (Chettle and Greene 89)

Now, if there is no proof that Greene, who enjoyed posing as a victim, ever asked Shakespeare to help him solve his financial difficulties, there is conclusive evidence that the former probably had good reasons to be jealous of Shakespeare's fresh success. Greene's plays were indeed far from successful: a play such as *Orlando Furioso*, performed by Lord Strange's Men at the Rose in February 1591-92, appears only once in the earliest performances listed by Henslowe in his diary (Maguin 224).

So, rather than plagiarism, "Greene"'s main criticism of was probably about something else, since imitation was the basic practice of the time.²³ In all likelihood, his grievances were first and foremost levelled against an actor who thought he could write verse good enough to be performed alongside those of Marlowe, Nashe, Peele ... and Greene.

We know that the first edition *Greene's Groatsworth of Wit* was limited to a maximum of 500 copies (Miller 155). A reprint was issued by Richard Olive in 1596, and more than twenty years later, a new version was published by Henry Bell in 1617 before several reprints in 1621, 1629, and 1638. This testifies to the success of the book, and it partly explains why Shakespeare, who must have anticipated on this, took such offense at the pamphlet attributed to Greene. The fact that in *Kind-Heart's Dream* (1592-93), Chettle felt the need to rehabilitate the playwright by insisting on his "uprightness of dealing which argues his honesty, and his facetious grace in writing, that approves his art" (quoted in Dutton 85) also reveals that Shakespeare had felt the injustice done to him and had voiced his feelings. As a result, oblique answers to Greene's slurs will later be found in his plays and poems. There are indeed a number of clues suggesting that not only the playwright did react, but also that he used this opportunity to redefine his auctorial self in the light of Greene's attack.

Shakespeare's First Reactions: In Search of Respectability

Very early on Shakespeare sought to promote himself as a respectable figure, even though or because he was not one of the so-called "University Wits." On October 20, 1596, by permission of the Garter King of Arms, "John Shakespeare, Gentlemen, and [...] his children, issue & posterity" were entitled to display a gold coat of arms which proved to be a visual pun on the family name "Shake-speare," hence described by Samuel Schoenbaum as an example of "classic simplicity" at a time when "heraldry tended toward fussiness and over-elaboration" (229). Its motto was a rather defensive phrase, "Non sanz droict" ("Not without right").

Crests were highly significant parts of a coat of arms, for they generally symbolized the name or the mood of the family’s arms. Now, in the case of the Shakespeare family, it has a spear in the middle, with a falcon shaking its wings on top. The falcon probably comes from the arms of Shakespeare’s patron, the Earl of Southampton.²⁴ However, one should also note with Katherine Duncan-Jones that “[u]nlike the crow, a bird with extremely disagreeable connotations, freely killed by farmers, the falcon was explicitly associated with chivalry and with aristocratic recreation” (106). This does not mean that Shakespeare chose a falcon just as a response to the “upstart crow” attack. But he may have had this in mind when, as a confident and impertinent young man, he decided to adopt an “arrogant falcon [...] which, with its silver tip, looks as much like a pen as a weapon” (Holland 29).

The playwright was thus concerned with his public prestige. As his brand name gradually increased its drawing power, Shakespeare was keen to outstage his jealous contemporaries. In this regard, one particular anecdote is significant (Nelson 74). Around 1599, the then government servant and future Master of the Revels George Buc went to Cuthbert Burby’s shop, near the Royal Exchange, in order to buy dramatic works such as *Alphonsus King of Aragon, Edward I, Sir Clymon and Clamydes*, and *A pleasant conceyted Comedie of George-a-Greene, the Pinner of Wakefield*. He asked for Shakespeare’s advice about the last play, a historical romance whose authorship he was unable to guess. Buc recorded that, according to Shakespeare, the author of *George-a-Greene* was a minister who had played the pinner. However, Buc also recorded below this that “Ed. Iuby saith that this play was made by Ro. Gree[ne].” Edward Juby, one of Greene’s contemporaries, was a leading actor at the Rose by 1594, and at the Fortune after 1600. As an experienced player, he did remember who had written *George-a-Greene*. Therefore, if Sir George Buc’s annotations reflect what he was told, one can wonder why Shakespeare did not mention Greene at all. Did his memory fail him? Such an explanation is not convincing. Of course, he may have omitted Greene because his rival was not the author of the play, contrary to what Juby had asserted. Yet, *George-a-Greene* shares striking stylistic similarities with Greene’s works and it is now traditionally attributed to him.²⁵ In that case, Shakespeare’s refusal to name his rival must be understood as a form of silent fury at Greene’s assault against him in his death-bed pamphlet.

Shakespeare’s “Coded” Reaction to Greene’s Barbs: Clues in Early Works

At a time when playwrights usually collaborated, Shakespeare appears to have been a relative exception, for he seems to have completely given up collaborative writing between 1592 and 1603. *1 Henry VI* was performed on 8 August 1592 and the play was an immediate success. Critics like Gary Taylor think that Shakespeare actually

wrote *I Henry VI* in collaboration with Thomas Nashe and a second author who may have been Peele, Marlowe, or Greene. The diatribe attributed to Greene was then issued in September 1592.²⁶ Thus, to Shakespeare's dismay, barely one month after the first performance of *I Henry VI*, an envious playwright was publicly warning authors against writing with him. If, as suggested by the pamphlet, the young playwright had indeed claimed excessive credit for the popularity of a collaborative play, things would change very quickly, and it was not until *Sir Thomas More* (possibly revised in 1603-1604), followed by *Timon of Athens* (c. 1607), or *Pericles* (c. 1606-1608), that Shakespeare wrote again in collaboration.²⁷

Everything tends to show, therefore, that Greene's barbs destabilized the budding author. His doubts are conveyed in *The Comedy of Errors*, whose first recorded performance took place at Gray's Inn on December 28th, 1594.²⁸ After the closing down of the theatres from June 1592 to May 1594, this early comedy was one of the first opportunities which Shakespeare had to answer Greene's charge (Godman 58). Now, if we examine the "lockout scene" (3.1) in detail, we notice that it almost immediately follows a passage where Shakespeare alludes to his own self by referring to his baldness.²⁹ Maureen Godman argues that, in the "lockout scene," Antipholus of Ephesus stands for the playwright, who tries to prove that he can "bombast out a blank verse" as the best of his fellow writers. In her view, "[t]he banter between Antipholus and Dromio [...] has as its dominant image the 'crow', Shakespeare's invention and a likely reference to Greene's attack" (59). As Antipholus of Ephesus, who stands outside the door of his own house, says that he wants a "crow" (3.1.81), his servant asks: "A crow without feather? Master, mean you so?" The servant then tells Dromio of Syracuse, who has remained inside the Phoenix:

For a fish without a fin, there's a fowl without a feather.
If a crow help us in, sirrah, we'll pluck a crow together. (3.1.81-83)

Antipholus soon reformulates his order: "Go, get thee gone. Fetch me an iron crow" (3.1.85). Obviously, in calling for an "iron crow" onstage, Shakespeare/Antipholus could "visually and verbally declare that he isn't an upstart crow, but pretty handy in handling an iron one if provoked; with that iron he'll 'pluck a crow' [...] with his adversary" (Godman 60). When Antipholus finally declares that "this jest shall cost [him] some expense" (3.1.124), it seems that, having just denounced the unfairness of Greene's attack through the character of Antipholus, Shakespeare now insists on the fact that the whole scene must be seen as a private joke at the expense of his former rival.

Another enigma related to Greene may be found in another early play, namely 2

Henry VI (c. 1591). In the 1594 Quarto, Suffolk likens the Lieutenant to “Abradas,” while in the 1623 version, Suffolk likens the same Lieutenant to “Bargulus.” The line found in the Quarto is actually taken either from Greene’s *Penelope’s Web* (1587) or from *Menaphon* (1589), for “Abradas” does not appear elsewhere in Elizabethan literature.³⁰ In the Folio, Abradas is replaced by another exotic character, “Bargulus the strong Illyrian pirate” (4.1.108), lifted from Cicero’s *De Officiis* (II.xi), a book frequently used in Elizabethan schools, and which mentions a bandit actually named Bardulis.³¹ Abradas and Bargulus being hardly interchangeable (Puljean Juric 233-36), there is at least one plausible hypothesis: if Shakespeare did feel offended by Greene’s attack, then he could have decided to remove his initial borrowing from Greene. Does this mean that his “struggle with poetic influence” was not yet “fully resolved” (Bloom xlv) ? This is precisely my point in this essay, and this is also the case in *Venus and Adonis* (published on April 18, 1593), a poem in which Shakespeare, according to M.C. Bradbrook, made “a claim to social dignity of his author,” thereby trying to erase the low-class image which Robert Greene had branded him with (70).³² Indeed, what better counter-attack against his accuser than the writing of an erotic mythological poem primarily intended for the classically educated gentlemen of the Universities and Inns of Court? As a University Wit, Greene had been incapable of it. On top of that, with *Venus and Adonis*, Shakespeare also targeted part of Greene’s favourite readership, i.e. women.³³ Moreover, he probably knew that in two poems attached to *Perimedes the Blacksmith* (1588), Greene had already presented an Adonis eager to accept Venus’ attentions. In the first, Adonis was considered as a “wanton” boy, while in the second, a counsellor warned a young man against Adonis’ behaviour: “A lecher’s fault was not excused by youth.” Shakespeare must have enjoyed taking precisely the opposite view. Far from desiring to be beautified with Greene’s feathers, he rather chose to beautify Greene’s feathers by taking up the same poetic topics in order to develop them in unexpected directions. From then on, rather than seek to eliminate the traces of his deceased rival, the playwright tried his best to appropriate the haunting figure of England’s first professional writer.

As a consequence, the genial comic figure of Falstaff (appearing in *1Henry IV*, *2Henry IV*, and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*), was partly inspired by Greene’s own physique and exuberant personality. Shakespeare certainly did not aim at drawing a straightforward portrait of his dead rival but, as pointed out by Stephen Greenblatt, “the deeper we plunge into the tavern world of Falstaff — gross, drunken, irresponsible, self-dramatizing, and astonishingly witty Falstaff — the closer we come to the world of Greene: his wife, Doll; his mistress, Em; her thuggish brother, Cutting Ball; and the whole crew” (216).³⁴ In other words, a certain kind of intimacy was growing out of the literary war between the writer and the playwright.

Puns on Greene in Later Works

Almost ten years after the publication of *Greene's Groatsworth of Wit*, "Shakespeare continued to ruminate on Greene's insult," a fact which hardly surprises critics such as Joseph Loewenstein, if only because "in a single very efficient sentence, Greene had managed to impugn his profession as an actor, his ambition, his loyalty, his sincerity, and his taste [...]" (86). It should thus come as no surprise that in *Hamlet*, the playwright made Polonius parody Greene in the scene where he reads aloud Hamlet's letter to his daughter: "*To the celestial and my soul's idol, the most beautified Ophelia* — That's an ill phrase, a vile phrase, 'beautified' is a vile phrase. But you shall hear thus — *in her excellent white bosom, these, etc.*" (2.2.108-11).³⁵ Polonius's comic commentary can be regarded as still another proof, if need be, that Greene's irreverent phrase had the lasting power to hurt Shakespeare, who aimed at exorcising his rival's sting by ridiculing the very words used in *Greene's Groatsworth of Wit*.

The possible pun on "beautified" just mentioned above is paralleled, on a much larger scale, by more obvious puns on the name of Greene. The latter had himself frequently used this device. At the end of Greene's two-part romance, *Greene's Never too Late; or, a Powder of Experience* (1590), for instance, the repentant Palmer, a pilgrim who is also one of the narrators of Greene's story (and, as such, standing for Greene himself), puns on the word "greene" just before departing from the novel. He is heard alluding to his "greener years," when his "greedie thoughts / gan yield their homage to ambitious will." If, with the benefit of hindsight, such lines devoted to "ambitious will" take on an ironical flavour, the only thing to be deduced here is that Greene took an obvious pleasure in punning on his own name. This is confirmed by Palmer's last words in *Greene's Never too Late*: "Gray is the green, the flowers their beauties hides: / When as I see that I to death was borne" (quoted in Skura 209). Such wordplays on "green" abound in Shakespeare's *Sonnets* — also rich in puns on the poet's own name, Will, in the so-called "Will" Sonnets — and it is certainly wrong to deduce that each time Shakespeare mentions this particular term, he nods to his rival. This idea, however, offers some interesting clues to interpret the 110-112 sequence.³⁶ Sonnet 112 indeed includes a reference to the insult that "Greene" paid to Shakespeare in 1592. Here, the poet subject to public disgrace seems to ask why he should care about Greene's insult as long as poetry brings him solace:

Your love and pity doth the impression fill,
Which vulgar scandal stamp'd upon my brow;
For what care I who calls me well or ill,
So you o'er-green my bad, my good allow? (1-4)

The eye-catching “o’er-green,” coined by the poet, is one of these “verbal trompe-l’œil” (Schoenfeldt 62) in Shakespeare’s verse to be read as a pun on the name of Shakespeare’s rival, all the more so as it sounds close to “Robert (o’er) Greene.” As to the complaint about the “vulgar scandal,” it possibly alludes to the publication of *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit*.³⁷

Name games on the word “green” are certainly not restricted to the *Sonnets*. If the notion that jealousy is “green-eyed” is probably older than Shakespeare, the playwright is our earliest authority in print, and it is in *The Merchant of Venice* that fair Portia refers to “green-eyed jealousy” (3.2.110). This expression was all the more surprising, at the time, as yellow was the colour Shakespeare usually associated with jealousy. A few years later, in *Othello*, Shakespeare had Iago coin the more intense phrase “green-ey’d monster”:

O, beware, my lord, of jealousy;
It is the green-ey’d monster, which doth mock
The meat it feeds on. That cuckold lives in bliss,
Who, certain of his fate, loves not his wronger:
But O, what damnèd minutes tells he o’er
Who dotes, yet doubts, suspects, yet strongly loves!
(3.3.165-170)

Not unsurprisingly, Shakespeare still used the word “green” in association with the theme of jealousy in *The Winter’s Tale*, a play derived from Greene’s *Pandosto*. In act 3 scene 2, Paulina tells Leontes:

[...] Thy tyranny,
Together working with thy jealousies —
Fancies too weak for boys, too green and idle
For girls of nine — O think what they have done,
And then run mad indeed, stark mad [...]
(3.2.178-181)

In this context, “green” primarily relates to immaturity,³⁸ and the main meaning of Paulina’s reprimand is easy to grasp. On second thoughts however, since Shakespeare openly borrowed from Greene, one can wonder if, when the playwright wrote such a line, he did not have his old rival in mind, all the more so as “green” is used here concomitantly with another derogatory adjective, “idle” (i.e. “silly”).³⁹ By turning

Greene's jealousy into remedial language games which provided a safety valve for his own anger, Shakespeare converted his rival into a *pharmakon*, thus making the poison a remedy of sorts.

Conclusion: What Use Was Greene to Shakespeare?

Robert Greene's influence on Shakespeare certainly reaches a peak in *The Winter's Tale*, sometimes (wrongly) regarded as the playwright's belated revenge upon his dead rival who had been haunting him for twenty years. In this late tragicomedy, Shakespeare not only remembered Greene's *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* — Perdita bears a striking resemblance to Margaret of Fressingfield, a rustic lass wooed by Prince Edward — but also Greene's Mamillia. If the title of Greene's earliest prose fiction is echoed in the name of the unfortunate young prince Mamillius, the so-called "repentance tracts" published after Greene's death are alluded to in the unexpected repentance of King Leontes. The playwright also drew extensively from *The Second Part of Conny-Catching* (1592) in the sheep-shearing scenes and in the character of Autolycus, as well as from Pandosto. *The Triumph of Time* (1588), a sad tale of jealousy.⁴⁰ From the latter, he lifted several plot elements to reorganize them completely and give the tale a happy ending, thereby adapting Greene's "rhetoric of wonder" from the page to the stage (Kinney 203).

Many commentators have paid a particular attention to Autolycus, the dishonest peddler and ballad-maker created by Shakespeare, and they have tentatively portrayed him as Greene's alter ego. I would rather argue that Shakespeare may have represented Greene through the riddles of Hermione's statue as she is coming back to life. Like Pygmalion, the playwright transforms a petrified creature into "verie flesh" (Golding's *Metamorphoses*, X.274). Sixteen years separate Hermione's "death" from her resurrection in *The Winter's Tale*. Incidentally, sixteen years also represents the time gap between the 1595 edition of *Pandosto* (i.e the one possibly used by Shakespeare) and the first performance of *The Winter's Tale*. My point, therefore, is that this romance play should not simply be read as a retort to *Greene's Groatworth of Wit*, but as a form of literary epitaph allowing the Elizabethan pamphleteer to be revived on stage. To put it differently, *The Winter's Tale* may be regarded as Shakespeare's indirect acknowledgment that he needed rivals in order to create his own works, at a time when poets, writers and playwrights all resorted to what we may nowadays be branded as "plagiarism."

So, in the course of his dramatic career, Shakespeare's attitude towards his predecessor changed. Over the years, the influence of his dead rival proved more stimulating than paralyzing and, by the 1610s, his initial defensiveness turned into an open-mindedness which allowed him to pay tribute to a writer whose slurs he had

long sought to avenge. In other words, the playwright’s relation to Greene gradually became what could be called a posthumous intellectual collaboration. Alongside with Marlowe’s, Greene’s influence, at last, turned out to be a positive one.

Of course, as Greene embodied the new professional writing, Shakespeare, who was strongly interested in the business practices of his time, pursued what could now be defined as a cautious publication policy. However, after the “upstart crow” attack and with his integrity at stake, the playwright gave up collaborative writing for several years, worked at a much slower pace than his prolific Elizabethan counterpart, and gradually came to criticize and poke fun at Greene’s bohemian style — hard-drinking, angry, and much too overtly satirical to be able to challenge established norms in an efficient way. Besides, as opposed to his elder, Shakespeare seems to have deliberately avoided extensive autobiographical allusions in his own plays and poems, and when he sought publicity, he turned to others instead of relying on his own pen. In 1590 for instance, Greene had proudly claimed himself a “second Ovid” in *Greenes Mourning Garments* (1590: sig. A4, 9:121). Also hugely influenced by the Latin poet, Shakespeare never needed to claim anything regarding the author of the *Metamorphoses*. Indeed, eight years after Greene’s boasting self-conscious comment, Francis Mere published his *Palladis Tamia: Wit’s Treasury* (1598), in which he famously wrote that “the witty soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakespeare.”⁴¹

From then on, the playwright cultivated his reputation not only by imitating, but by rewriting Ovid, thereby further differentiating himself from his proud rival. Above all, while Greene had always used texts written by others to forge his own improbable stories characterized by what Arthur Kinney has called an “affective and powerful poetics” (181) but then not going much further, Shakespeare perfectly digested well-known literary and historical material in order to produce innovative responses which solicited sense, sensibility and fancy altogether. He managed to do all that, I will conclude, because he had taken the time to think on Greene’s unfortunate example and thus learnt a great deal from his strengths and weaknesses. As a consequence, Shakespeare even managed to beautify his best enemy.

Notes

1. Unless specified otherwise, all references regarding William Shakespeare will be taken from *The Complete Works*. Eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
2. See the second letter written by Gabriel Harvey in *Four Letters and Certain Sonnets*: “[...] but who in London hath not heard of his dissolute, and licentious liuing; his fonde disguisunge of a Master of Arte with ruffianly haire, vnseemely apparel, and more vnseemelye Company: his vaine glorious and Thrasonically braunge: his piperly Extemporizing, and Tarletonizing, his

apishe counterfeiting of euery ridiculous, and absurd toy: his fine coosening of Iuglers, and finer iugling with cooseners: hys villainous cogging, and foisting; his monstrous swearing, and horrible forswearing; his impious profaning of sacred Textes: his other scandalous, and blasphemous rauinge; his riotous, and outrageous surfeiting: his continuall shifting of lodgings: his plausible mustering, and banquetring of roysterly acquaintance at his first comminge; his beggarly departing in euery hostisses debt [...]" (9-10).

3. If we are to believe what he writes in his title pages.

4. See Kinney 86.

5. Greene's complete works can be found in *The Life and Complete Works in Prose and Verse of Robert Greene* in 15 vols, edited by Alexander B. Grosart (see bibliography).

6. A native of Warwickshire, like Shakespeare (Pruvost 272), Eliot was about to publish his famous *Ortho-epia Gallica* (1593) in which Shakespeare probably learnt part of his French. At the time of the sonnet, Eliot was only beginning his literary career, but he already paid tribute to Greene, obviously hoping that the book would sell and that his verse would awake the interest of his readers.

7. "Courage, donc je-dis, mon amy GREENE, courage, / Mesprise des chiens, corbeaux & chathuans la rage : / Et (glorieux) endure leur malignante furie, / Zoyle arriere, arriere Momus chien enragé, / Furieux mastin hurlant au croissant argenté, / A GREENE jamais nuyre sauroit ta calomnie" (quoted from the Internet site <<http://www.oxford-shakespeare.com/Greene/Perimedes.pdf>> [Accessed 23 October 2013]). Eliot's lines can be translated as follows: "Courage then, I say, my friend GREENE, courage, / Scorn the rage of dogs, crows and kittens, / And, glorious, endure their malignant fury. / Black Zoilus, black Momus, furious dog, / Furious mastiff howling at the silvery crescent, / Your calumny never knew how to harm GREENE."

8. It should therefore come as no surprise that, in his preface to Greene's *Menaphon* ("To the Gentlemen Students of both Universities"), Thomas Nashe complains about the ambitions of uneducated dramatists, the better to praise the scholarly elaboration of Greene's novels: "Indeed, it may be the engrafted overflow of some kilcow conceit, that overcloieth their imagination with a more than drunken resolution, beeing not extemporall in the invention of anie other meanes to vent their manhood, commits the digestion of their cholerick incumbrances, to the spacious volubilitie of a drumming decasillabon" (Nashe 1589: f). Here, Nashe probably alludes to Thomas Kyd as, in the same preface, he refers to Kyd's authorship of a lost version of *Hamlet*.

9. Rinaldi was a Venetian ambassador in London. See Speroni 1968: 97-175.

10. Possibly Edward Alleyn or William Shakespeare. In his *De Oratore* (55 BC), Cicero had pronounced Roscius "the only actor amongst men fitted for the stage, and the only man amongst actors who ought not to be seen there" (I.V.18). In one of Shakespeare's earliest plays, Roscius is mentioned by King Henry VI *a propos* Richard of Gloucester (3 *Henry VI*, 5.6.10): "What scene of death hath Roscius now to act?"

11. The son of a cleric, Richard Hunt was the vicar of Bishop's Inchington, near Stratford-Upon-Avon.

12. Hunt also linked Stratford’s fame with John of Stratford, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Hugh Clopton, a London magistrate. Both were quoted by Camden. For further details on the annotation linking Shakespeare to Roscius, see Nelson and Altrocchi 460-69. Hunt was born in 1596 and died in February 1661, which means that he could hardly remember Shakespeare acting on a London stage. He may simply have heard of Shakespeare’s theatrical fame. However, Hunt may also have read pamphlets connecting Shakespeare to Roscius.

13. Cf. Greene’s former allusion to Batillus in the dedication of *The Myrroure of Modestie* (1584).

14. Incidentally, the author of *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit* was inspired by a series of pamphlets printed immediately after the death of Richard Tarlton, which had been named as one of the Queen’s Men in 1583. Tarlton died exactly four years before Greene. *Tarltons Farewell* was issued in September 1588, *Tarltons Recantations* and *Tarltons Repentance or his Farewell to his Frendes in his Sicknesse a Little Before his Deathe* in 1589, and *Tarlton’s News Out of Purgatory* in 1590 (Chettle and Greene 14).

15. Both Henry Chettle and Thomas Nashe felt obliged to deny that they had a hand in its writing. Thomas Nashe repudiated Greene’s tract as a “scald trivial lying pamphlet” in the epistle to the second edition of *Pierce Penniless* (1592) (quoted in Schoone-Jongen 21).

16. Chettle, a non-university-educated dramatist who had been apprenticed to a printer at the age of thirteen, may have felt excited by the perspective of criticizing his fellow playwright under the designation of a University Wit. As to the bitterness of his attack, it can be explained by the fact that he had turned from publishing and editing to writing plays some time between 1592 and 1597, and that he was then in financial difficulty (Sanders 394). As noted by Emma Smith in her entry devoted to Henry Chettle in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, “[i]t is not known when Chettle began to write for the stage, but Francis Meres lists him as ‘one of the best for comedy amongst us’ in his *Palladis Tamia* of 1598. Between 1598 and 1603, the diary connects him with some forty-nine plays. Thirty-six of these seem to have been in collaboration.”

17. The pamphlet is loaded with reminiscences of Greene’s writing (but reminiscences can always be regarded as part of a conscious imitation process). In Greene’s *James the Fourth* for instance, as Ateukin the flatterer realizes that his plans to gratify the King have just failed, he exclaims: “What, was I born to be the scorn of kin? / To gather feathers like to a hopper crow / And lose them in the height of all my pomp? / Accursèd man, now is my credit lost!” (5.2.9-12). Ateukin being the very embodiment of the hypocrite, he can surely be described as an actor excessively trusted by the King. Such allusions to the feathers and the crow could constitute a draft version of Greene’s later accusations in *Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit*.

18. Shakespeare, at the time, was already well advanced in his ambitious project of the first tetralogy (Erne 27).

19. More precisely, one can trace Greene’s source to Horace’s third *Epistle*, where the poet warns his friend Celsus “not to pilfer from other writers any longer, lest those he has robbed should return one day to claim their feathers, when like the crow (*cornicula*) stripped of its stolen splendour (*furtivus*

nudata coloribus), he would become a laughing-stock.”

20. “His feathers are but borrowed, / For he’s disposed as the hateful raven” (3.1.75-76).

21. “O Tiger’s heart wrapped in a woman’s hide” (1.4.137). This may suggest that Shakespeare was also a usurer and thus that he “could have followed his father in the money-lending business” (Honigmann 1988: 42). Now, if one is to believe Lodge’s and Greene’s *A Looking-Glass for London and England*, a usurer was then regarded as a man utterly devoid of conscience. As Alcon (one of the usurer’s victims) puts it: “[...] he hath as much conscience about the forfeit of an obligation, as my blind mare, God bless her, hath over a manger of oats” (1.3).

22. See D. Allen Carroll’s Appendix H in Chettle and Greene 147.

23. Moreover, in *Shakespeare and the Poets’ War*, James P. Bednarz insists on the fact that “[d]uring the Elizabethan period, poet-scholars [...] often complained of being exploited by [...] poet-players.” “Playwrights,” Bednarz writes, “voiced outrage at the economic injustice of a theatrical system that rewarded famous players far more than prominent poets” (230).

24. Southampton’s coat of arms was characterized by four silver falcons.

25. Greene probably wrote *George-a-Greene* in the late 1580s or early 1590s. It has been suggested that Shakespeare had no good reason to lie and did his best to answer Buc’s query, for he must have been aware that this learned gentleman was the next in line for Edmund Tilney’s position as Master of the Revels (Shapiro 13). Buc was indeed appointed to the Mastership of Revels by King James in 1603, which means that Shakespeare’s later plays all passed through his hands. Yet, it seems hardly believable that a minister should have been allowed to exhibit himself as an actor on public stages.

26. Yet, Michael Hattaway does not believe that “stylistic analysis is sufficient to prove or disprove authorship” in the case of *1 Henry VI*. See Hattaway’s Introduction to *1 Henry VI* for the New Cambridge Shakespeare, 42-43.

27. According to Taylor, “Greene’s attack [...] probably had the effect of making collaboration an exception in the Shakespeare canon” (Taylor 186).

28. I assume, here, that *The Comedy of Errors* was composed after 1592. Yet, whether the comedy was written after the publication of *Greene’s Groatworth of Wit* remains unclear. T. S. Dorsch, editor of the *New Cambridge Comedy of Errors*, thinks for instance that the play was probably composed between April 1591 and June 1592. But Shakespeare was then likely to revise his play, and insert his response to Greene’s insult whenever he wanted to.

29. The playwright wittingly praises the “bald followers” of hairless Time (2.2.108-109).

30. In *Penelope’s Web*, Greene writes: “I remember, Ismena, that Epicurus measured every man’s diet by his own principles, and Abradas, the great Macedonian pirate, thought everyone had a letter of mart that bare sails in the ocean [...]”. The same idea is hammered home in *Menaphon*: “I remember, sir, that Epicurus measured every man’s diet by his own principles; Abradas, the great Macedonian pirate, thought everyone had a letter of mart that bare sails in the ocean [...]”.

31. In the 1999 Arden edition, a note explains that “Bargulus” was the spelling Shakespeare probably found either in Nicholas Grimald’s or Robert Whytington’s translation of the *Offices*.

32. As M.C. Bradbrook put it, Shakespeare managed “to make a second reputation for himself,” because “[t]o appear in print was to make a dignified bid for Fame.” He would thus at once have “achieved recognition and respectful notice, even among those who despised, or affected to despise, the work of the common stages” (62).

33. Women readers seem to have particularly enjoyed Shakespeare’s poem “more than any other Shakespearean work before the 1640s” (Roberts 262). In 1611 for instance, Sir John Davies of Hereford still lamented in *The Scourge of Folly* that Shakespeare’s *Venus and Adonis* was read by “the coyest Dames” for their “Closset-games.”

34. See Giorgio Melchiori’s comment in his Cambridge edition of *The Second Part of King Henry IV*: “By this logic, Falstaff is fashioned from the ‘wasted life’ of a character like Robert Greene. To spurn the fat knight is to accept the necessity and benefits of prudent speculation and graft; yet it is also to acknowledge the influence of minds that shone brilliantly but briefly” (Shakespeare, *The Second Part of King Henry IV*. Ed. Melchiori, 2007: 62).

35. However, Hamlet’s use of “beautified” is not necessarily connected to Greene only, because Shakespeare himself uses the word “beautified” in plays such as *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *King Edward III. Second*, because this very word, having been recently favoured by Sir Philip Sidney in his *Arcadia* (1590), had become fashionable.

36. In *Soul of the Age*, Jonathan Bate partly dates the *Sonnets* from the years associated with Southampton’s patronage by reading the sequence 110-112 (related to the trade of acting) as a riposte to Greene’s attack (19).

37. In a 1994 article written for the *TLS*, Barbara Everett paid attention to sonnet 112, which she clearly interpreted as an underlying allusion to Robert Greene’s attack: “A generous man’s complex feeling for a dying enemy who is both rival and fellow poet may have fused with all that the difficult sonnet is saying about sympathy and empathy, about wounded and wounding lovers, about the ‘profound Abisme’ at the centre of love” (13). Incidentally, Shakespeare may also have expressed his literary humiliation in sonnet 29, where the poet, wishing he had more friends, complains that he is “in disgrace with Fortune and men’s eyes” (l. 1).

38. See the fable of the ant and the grasshopper in Chettle and Greene 89: “My wretched end may warn Greene springing youth / To use delights, as toys that will deceive, / And scorne the world before the world them leave.”

39. The same sort of joking tone may be detected in *The Tempest*, where an enthusiastic Gonzalo exclaims: “How lush and lusty the grass looks! How green!” (2.1.55). However, the landscape is not verdant for everyone, and Sebastian’s riposte is particularly sarcastic: “With an eye of green in’t.” Listening to Sebastian’s words, the audience certainly overheard an echo of Shakespeare’s “green-eyed jealousy” and “green-eyed monster.” Jealousy is, after all, a feeling shared by many of Shakespeare’s villains. Now, would it be possible that Shakespeare felt particularly inspired when he used the word “green” because he could not help thinking of his old rival who, (literally) green with envy, had criticized his skills?

40. The editio princeps of *Pandosto. The Triumph of Time*, unfortunately lost, probably dates back to 1585. A listing for “Triumphe of Time” as “an unrecorded first edition of Pandosto” has been identified in a 1585 stationers’ shop inventory (Rodger 264). However, a unique copy of the 1588 edition is the earliest extant one. *Pandosto* was then reissued in 1592, 1595, 1607, and was to run through several reprints in the course of the 17th century. Besides, it may be worth noticing here that in *Pandosto*’s dedicatory epistle, Robert Greene wrote that “[t]hey which fear the biting of vipers do carie in their hands the Plumes of a Phoenix.” With the benefit of hindsight, an expression such as “the Plumes of a Phoenix” takes on an ironical twist. How could the writer have anticipated the fact that a play entitled *The Winter’s Tale* would indeed be a Phoenix reborn from its ashes?

41. The full text is accessible online <<http://www.elizabethanauthors.com/palladis.htm>> (Date accessed: 27 October 2013).

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责任编辑：尚必武

发现“另一个传统”：玛乔瑞·帕洛夫的《诗学新解》及其他

罗良功

内容提要：玛乔瑞·帕洛夫的《诗学新解》（2013）提供了一个洞悉其诗歌批评理论的动态视角，其中涉及的帕洛夫与布鲁姆之间的诗学对话揭示了帕洛夫学术思想的微妙变化。两者论争的三个焦点，即审美批评、语言本体、现实关怀，构成了帕洛夫辨微阅读的核心，使她在批判地吸收新批评和文化批评的基础上形成独特的诗歌批评理论。借此帕洛夫不仅梳理了诗歌传统，而且还发现了一个与新批评所推崇的象征性诗歌传统并存的暗示性诗歌传统。

关键词：玛乔瑞·帕洛夫 辨微阅读 诗歌传统 新批评 文化批评

作者简介：罗良功，华中师范大学外国语学院教授，主要研究英语诗歌和现当代英美文学。

Title Discover “the Other Tradition”: On Marjorie Perloff’s *Poetics in a New Key* and Others

Abstract Marjorie Perloff’s newly released *Poetics in a New Key* (2013) offers a dynamic perspective to her theory on poetic criticism. The book demonstrates some academic dialogue between Perloff and Harold Bloom over years, which reveals the subtle change in Perloff’s critical ideas. The focuses of the dialogue — aesthetic criticism, language as subject, and concern with reality — constitute the core value of Perloff’s “differential reading,” which witnesses her critical absorption of both New Criticism and Cultural Criticism and leads her to a discovery of “the other tradition” — the tradition of suggestive poetry neglected and rejected by New Criticism which devoted itself to the tradition of “symbolistic poetry.”

Key words Marjorie Perloff; differential reading; poetics tradition; New Criticism; Cultural Criticism

Author Luo Lianggong is Professor of English at Central China Normal University (Wuhan 430079, China). His research is mainly focused on English poetry and modern and contemporary American and British literature. Email: luogon2@yahoo.com

玛乔瑞·帕洛夫教授的新著《诗学新解》（2013）注定是一部个性鲜明、别有风趣的学术著作。与帕洛夫教授此前出版的十余部专著或专门主题的文集不同，这部由菲律宾德拉萨大学出版社出版的《诗学新解》，由帕洛夫教授十

余年来散刊于世界各地报刊的 15 篇学术访谈和 2 篇文学随笔集结而成，因而这部学术著作没有她在其他著作的严肃庄重，却充满灵动生气。她在序中说到这些访谈大多是即兴发挥，她本人也多已淡忘，但每一篇妙趣横生、旁征博引的文字，无不透着帕洛夫教授作为诗歌批评家和理论家的率真、严谨和执着，其中的每一处思辨、每一个观点，都具有清晰的指向性，与她一贯探讨的诗学问题相互映照、相互阐发。在这一意义上，这部著作虽然并非旨在呈现一个完整的知识结构或思想体系，但为研究帕洛夫教授的诗歌批评理论提供了动态的、多维的视角，为阅读帕洛夫教授的其他专著和专门主题的文集提供了补充。

一个突出的例子就是《诗学新解》反映了帕洛夫与哈罗德·布鲁姆对话的进程。该书收录的一篇帕洛夫在 2008 年进行的谈话——“（解）建构另一种传统”——显示出帕洛夫对布鲁姆诗歌批评的态度转变，由此折射出她学术思想的变化与发展。帕洛夫教授一贯坚持审美批评、反对文化批评的诗学立场，这也是她与认同布鲁姆诗歌批评思想的一个共核。在女性主义、多元文化主义、文化唯物主义、新历史主义、非洲中心论等各种文化批评理论大行其道之际，布鲁姆力拒文学批评的意识形态化，强调知识与审美标准不可或缺，高扬其“审美自律性”的批评主张。1998 年，帕洛夫教授在《波士顿评论》（1998 年夏季刊）发表了关于布鲁姆编辑的《优中之优：1988-1997 年美国诗选》（*Best of the Best American Poetry, 1988-1997*, 1998）的书评，对布鲁姆反对文化批评、坚守美学立场的诗学原则给予肯定，但随后对布鲁姆提出了尖锐批评，认为他过于强调主题阅读而忽视诗歌的语言本体、强调西方传统的“正典”地位而忽视了当下的创作实践，表达出对布鲁姆的研究路径、方法和基础的强烈不满。但是，在十年之后的访谈中，帕洛夫教授则对布鲁姆及其主题阅读给予了更多的肯定：“我的确比以前更喜欢布鲁姆的诗歌批评了，因为他毕竟关注的是文学性，而我们当前太多的学术批评基本上是凸显少数族裔、妇女、不同的民族等”（“(Un) Framing the Other Tradition” 116）。帕洛夫对布鲁姆给予更大的肯定，不仅是因为布鲁姆自身更加强调审美批评，而且也反映了她从学术史和学理上对布鲁姆“审美自律”主张的部分认同。布鲁姆诗歌批评的核心是主题阅读。他借此抛弃了新批评主张的“封闭式语言阅读”范式，将文学批评从文本之内重新引向文本之外，将文本和作家放置于一个更大的文学传统语境之中进行研究。帕洛夫尽管在 1998 年的书评中指责布鲁姆的主题批评没有关注诗歌形式等艺术要素，甚至在一定程度上对于“审美（形式主义）批评向他自己反对的文化批评转变”也负有部分责任（“Visionary Company,” Web），但是在 2008 年的访谈中，她以阿什伯利为例肯定了布鲁姆的主题阅读：“将阿什伯利置于整个诗歌版图中加以研究的正是布鲁姆，这一点就不错”（“(Un) Framing the Other Tradition” 116）。由此不难看出，帕洛夫在 20 世纪后期和 21 世纪之初文化批评浪潮汹涌之时，对布鲁姆主题阅读表现出更积极的态度，反映了她更加坚定的审美批评立场。

然而，在《诗学新解》和其他著述中，帕洛夫从来都没有全盘肯定布鲁姆

的主题阅读范式。她认为“主题阅读是不错的，只是[……]有局限”（“(Un) Framing the Other Tradition” 116）。对于帕洛夫来说，布鲁姆主题阅读的局限在于他的批评理论在语言本体和现实关怀两个方面缺失。帕洛夫认为诗歌语言的物质性是审美批评的必由之路，而“处于布鲁姆诗歌批评核心的修辞心理学往往将我们带回到外在于诗歌语言物质性之外的主题”（“Visionary Company,” Web）。例如，他视阿什伯利的诗歌技巧为无关紧要之物，即便是对于他所钟爱的现代主义诗人史蒂文斯，他也拒绝关注其诗歌中的声音、节奏、句法，这“也使得他甚至没能铺平通向审美批评的道路”（“Visionary Company,” Web）。在这一点上，帕洛夫对布鲁姆的批评从来未曾撤销，而且以自己的诗歌批评实践与他对抗。

帕洛夫认为布鲁姆的诗歌批评缺乏现实关怀，主要因为布鲁姆忽视现当代诗歌、缺乏对诗歌与现实关系的关注。帕洛夫指责布鲁姆以浪漫主义作为唯一范式的理论前提，认为布鲁姆“以浪漫主义为唯一范式，使他无法参透一些当前创作的一些令人激动的诗歌”，他编辑的《1988-1997年美国诗选》将众多非常具有价值的当代诗歌特别是先锋诗歌被排斥在外（“Visionary Company,” Web）。在帕洛夫看来，布鲁姆试图以浪漫主义传统来建构当下的诗歌体系，明显忽视和压制了当下最具有活力和时代精神的诗歌作品，缺少现实关怀；而先锋诗歌——她有时称之为“形式激进的诗歌”——在现当代诗歌中占有重要地位，是诗歌批评不可回避的内容。同时，布鲁姆诗歌批评的核心在于修辞心理学而非语言和语言的物质性，其批评实践的重点是在诗歌版图中而非文化批评所主张的社会历史语境中探讨诗歌，因而忽视了对现实社会的回应和关注。这正是帕洛夫认为布鲁姆的主题阅读的不足所在。

帕洛夫对布鲁姆忽视语言主体和现实关怀的持久批评恰恰反映了她本人对这两点的长期重视。这两点与她与布鲁姆共同奉行的审美批评一起，构成了帕洛夫诗歌批评的三个基本点，反映了她的诗歌批评理论与实践的独特路径。布鲁姆将盛行于20世纪中期的新批评派注重修辞与主题引出了文本之外，帕洛夫则在吸收新批评派强调文本研究的同时，将作品文本引向社会文化文本，将新批评的文本细读与文化批评结合，形成自己的诗歌批评方法，即“辨微阅读”（differential reading）。辨微阅读批判性地吸收了新批评和文化研究的优点，对20世纪以来美国影响最大的两种文学批评路径进行了纠正，具有文学研究领域具有里程碑意义。辨微阅读作为诗歌批评方法很早就在帕洛夫学术研究中得到运用，而在由她的15篇写于80年代的论文集结而成的《诗歌的破格特权》（1990）一书中得以完善，在2004年出版的专著《辨微：诗歌、诗学、教学》中给予了深入系统的理论阐述，《诗学新解》一书则通过访谈形式提供了更丰富的动态阐释。

帕洛夫认为，语言是诗歌的核心，也是诗歌与散文的区别所在，诗歌语言的物质性是审美批评的必由之路。她从叶芝、斯泰因、庞德的诗学观中找到了佐证。这三位成就巨大的诗人有着一个共同点，即叶芝所说的，“我们的语

汇一定要显得不可回避”，这的确是诗歌的关键所在（“Futurism and Schism” (2009) 140），因而诗歌批评必须面对语言，尤其是语言的物质性。因而，帕洛夫的辨微阅读拒绝从张力、象征、主题等固有的概念出发，直接面对语言所构建的绚丽文本。在这一点上，她与新批评和布鲁姆有着巨大差别。她承认诗歌“的确有所谓的‘技巧’——押韵、重复、首语重复、谐音、拟声、隐喻、转喻、双关、明喻，但是仅凭技巧难以成诗，认识到这一点的‘诗人’太少”；而“诗歌的内容和历来的形态”就在于“每一个表述都不只朝着一个方向”（“Alter(ed) Ground” 88），即她高度认可的伯恩斯坦诗歌语言所表现出的“两重性、三重性、四重性”，这正是诗意所在。因而，帕洛夫的辨微阅读强调语言在诗歌文本构建和诗歌意义建构中的中心地位，努力从语言的破格、语言的物质性呈现模式等方面去把握文本的文学性，探索语言产生的微妙的诗意。事实上，帕洛夫对于诗歌语言物质性的关注和强调贯穿了她的整个学术生涯，她早期有关弗兰卡·奥哈拉、罗伯特·洛威尔、约翰·阿什伯利等诗人的专题研究都强调对诗歌的语言包括声音和视觉等物质形态的诗学探讨，并逐渐引入和借鉴维特根斯坦的语言哲学和解构主义语言理论，强调对日常语言对常规语法和语言限制的突破所产生的诗性特征和诗性美的，注重语言的声音、视觉等物质性元素及其与物质世界的互文关系来发掘诗歌意义。例如，伯恩斯坦在2009年与帕洛夫谈话时说，帕洛夫在编辑《诗歌的声音 / 声音的诗歌》一书延续了她对于声音结构的重视，认为她“在整个生涯中从格律环境到后格律或非格律环境不断探索节奏和声音”（“Futurism and Schism” 139）。这从一个方面反映了《诗学新解》中大多数访谈所揭示的一个事实：帕洛夫的诗歌批评始终重视诗歌的语言问题。

帕洛夫的辨微阅读强调诗歌批评的现实关注和当下价值，认为诗歌文本与诗歌之外的社会文化文本之间有着天然联系，而诗歌批评的现实关怀也应该通过面对语言来实现。她在《诗歌的破格特权》（1990）中指出，诗歌的破格特权与诗歌的历史和时代是分不开的，诗歌创新的基础是语言的拓展，其必然的发源地是活跃的城市和技术文化；在《未来主义：先锋艺术及其断裂的语言》（1986）中她系统讨论了先锋诗歌与语言之间的关系，先锋美学、极端政治、流行文化在语言上的交汇所形成的短暂而和谐的共融与渗透。她在与伯恩斯坦谈到在比利·柯林斯和戴娜·乔亚所代表的时代诗人该如何对待复杂的文化指涉的问题时，认为伯恩斯坦的诗歌就是“一种优秀的新的现实主义”，并称她为我们所在文化的“重要的编年史家”（“Futurism and Schism” 82），实际上肯定了伯恩斯坦在诗歌中以其高度的语言实验回应社会文化所反映出来的时代精神。帕洛夫这一批评立场的理论基础来源于维特根斯坦的语言哲学和解构主义语言观，也被她所认可语言诗等先锋诗歌流派通过强调语言的能指功能来进行的诗歌实践所证明。在她看来，诗意在于诗歌语言的多重指向性，而后者正是语言的能指功能得以唤醒的结果，因而诗歌不是用语言来复现世界或者象征世界，而是以不确定指向的、充满歧义和多种可能性的语言来建构世界。即便诗人运用生活素材，一旦以语言形式进入诗歌便获得一种“此在性”（thisness），

其意义即变得开放。在这一意义上，诗歌文本是暗示性的而非再现性或象征性的。帕洛夫没有像新批评派那样将诗歌文本视为是自足的、封闭的、被现实规定的，而是视之为丰富的、开放的、不为现实左右的。因而，诗人不需要像艾略特那样使用注释，诗歌的阅读也不应局限于生活实际或读者的知识储备，因为这样会使得现实干扰诗歌的独立性，而且“读者不需要了解所有的指涉典故，[……]意义即可能较充分地显露出来。……这也是诗歌具有无穷的重读性的原因”（“Alter(ed) Ground” 88）；诗歌阅读应该实现个人化的、现实的生活向艺术世界的转变，以此反观现实生活。换言之，帕洛夫的辨微阅读是与诗歌的互动，是伯恩斯坦所说的“跳舞，两者跳着探戈”（“Alter(ed) Ground” 90），而不是两者的竞争，不是像新批评派那样对文本的操控，也不主张文化批评所奉行的意识形态介入。从根本上说，帕洛夫的辨微阅读反对意识形态主导或观念介入的诗歌批评，是希望将诗歌阅读引向语言本身及其与现实的对话，以此捍卫诗歌批评的审美性。

帕洛夫的辨微阅读是通过对新批评、文化批评等 20 世纪主流诗歌批评范式进行回应和反拨而形成的，但其目的并不在于对这些批评范式进行批判或评价，而是在于回到诗歌批评的本体、探寻诗歌这一特殊的艺术形式与人类生存状态的对话关系，在她的诗歌批评中促成了她发现了新的诗歌传统，即“另一种传统”（the other tradition）。这一表述本是阿什伯利在文章中的一个半戏谑性的表述，本身意义模糊、不确定，但是帕洛夫借用过来之后，就赋予它明确的内涵：它指的是与艾略特所关注的象征主义诗歌传统相对的“另一种传统”，“在这个传统中，语言立刻显得更强调字面意义、更神秘，无法被翻译或阐释”（“(Un) Framing the other Tradition” 111）；这一传统形成的诗歌强调语言的暗示和语言的突破，与新批评派所推崇的“再现性的、以易懂的方式表达情感的”那类“正确”诗相对应。帕洛夫从语言的审美性出发，对于从兰波、斯泰因、庞德、威廉姆斯、到大卫·安廷、约翰·凯奇等被新批评派排斥的诗人分别进行了研究，同时对虽已被新批评派关注但研究仍有大量偏颇和遗漏的诗人如叶芝和阿什伯利进行了考察，梳理出一个与“象征性诗歌”并行的传统，即“暗示性诗歌”传统。她的许多论著还通过论述大众传媒与诗歌语言和形式的关系，揭示了先锋诗歌的成长轨迹，确立了先锋诗歌在现当代诗坛的地位以及在人类文明史上的地位。帕洛夫对于“另一种传统”的梳理具有重要意义，不仅补充和纠正了主流批评话语由于认知缺陷和理论缺陷导致的重大遗漏和偏颇，确立了直抵审美本质、敏锐呼应时代的诗歌批评范式和标准，而且促进了人类对于艺术与生存关系的关注，彰显了强烈的人文情怀。她在专著《激进的策略：传媒时代的诗歌创作》（1991）中，现代传媒的兴起和社会的商业化是促进现当代先锋诗歌发展和流变的关键因素，揭示了诗歌与人类文明进程的互动关系，展现了她的诗歌批评对人类知识进步的人文关怀。由此，不难理解她对先锋诗歌推动人类知识发展的信心：“我坚信，一切将要发生的知识更新，都将来自于激进的诗歌/艺术社区”（“The Intellectual in the 21st Century” 225）。

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帕洛夫的梯子

——玛乔瑞·帕洛夫和她的诗学谱系研究

王 卓

内容提要：诗学谱系研究贯穿于帕洛夫诗歌和诗学研究的始终，并与她的“诗学时差”、“诗学互文”理念以及“细微阅读”方式完美结合，成为帕洛夫架起的通往诗学研究绝顶的“梯子”。与哈罗德·布鲁姆在“西方正典”框架之下建构的诗学谱系不同，帕洛夫在开放的诗学框架之下，建构了多元的英美诗歌谱系，并因此形成了一部见解独到的“个人的诗歌经典”。

关键词：玛乔瑞·帕洛夫 诗学 谱系

作者简介：王卓，济南大学外国语学院教授，主要从事现当代美国文学研究。本文为作者主持的国家社科基金一般项目“意象派、客体派、黑山派诗学谱系研究”（12BWW040）的阶段性研究成果。本文同时得到国家留学基金项目支持。

Title Perloff's Ladder: Perloff and Her Poetic Genealogy Study

Abstract Present throughout Marjorie Perloff's poetry and poetics study, poetic genealogy study, combining harmoniously with her concepts of poetic lag, poetic contextuality, and differential reading, becomes a ladder which leads to a summit of poetic study. Different from Harold Bloom's poetic genealogy study in a framework of western cannon, Perloff constructs a multi-poetic genealogy of British and American poetry and poetics in an open poetic framework, and thus forming a unique "personal poetry cannon."

Key words Marjorie Perloff; poetics; genealogy

Author Wang Zhuo is Professor of English at the University of Jinan(Ji'nan 250022, China), Her major research area is modern and contemporary American Literature. This Article is under the project of A Genealogical Study of Imagism, Objectivist Poetics and Black Mountain Poetics(12BWW040).Email: wangzhuo69@hotmail.com

从 20 世纪 70 年代开始，玛乔瑞·帕洛夫的名字就与英美现当代诗歌的发展如影随形。她的诗歌和诗学研究如同一部包罗万象的英美现当代诗歌的百科全书。正如聂珍钊教授所所指出的那样：“帕洛夫的著作加在一起，就是一部现当代美国诗歌批评史”（109）。那么，帕洛夫是如何做到以一个人的学术生涯书写一部现当代美国诗歌批评史的呢？奥秘在于她独特的诗学研究方法和思维方式：对英美诗歌的谱系研究。诗学谱系研究贯穿于帕洛夫诗歌和诗学研究的始终，并与她的“诗学时差”、“诗学互文”理念以及“细微阅读”方法完

美结合，成为她诗歌和诗学研究中唯一恒定的元素。打个形象的比喻，诗学谱系研究就像帕洛夫架起的一架通往诗学研究绝顶的“梯子”。

一、帕洛夫的梯子：帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究

梯子是帕洛夫本人一直情有独钟的意象。她在阅读了语言哲学家维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》（*Tractatus*）之后，便对维特根斯坦所强调的那架攀上后就抛弃的“梯子”深有感触。她不但尝试以维特根斯坦的语言哲学观为基础，观照英美现代派诗学和先锋派诗歌，更把自己出版于1996年的学术著作命名为《维特根斯坦的梯子：诗歌语言和日常语言的奇特》（*Wittgenstein's Ladder: Poetic Language and The Strangeness of the Ordinary*）。有学者指出，“梯子意象是正确理解维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》的关键”（Reid 97）。那么，可以毫不夸张地说，这一意象也是正确理解帕洛夫的关键。帕洛夫之所以以“维特根斯坦的梯子”来命名她的这部重要作品，是看中了这一隐喻包含的扬弃的思维特点。这自然是最符合维特根斯坦本意的阐释。然而，人们其实一直忽视了帕洛夫在运用这一隐喻时，却突破了维特根斯坦所设定的梯子的意义，赋予了这一文化意象新的含义。那就是梯子所蕴含的继承关系和谱系关系。纵观帕洛夫的诗学和诗歌研究，我们不难发现，她的研究事实上勾勒出了英美现代派和后现代诗学发展变化的清晰的轨迹，而这一轨迹上盘根错节的各个节点勾连起来的就 是诗学之间的谱系关系。即便是以个体诗人以对象的研究，帕洛夫也总是尝试把他们有效地纳入完整的英美诗学的谱系之中。她对庞德、艾略特、斯泰因、奥哈拉等人的研究莫不如是。正如聂珍钊教授所言：“她的诗学批评兴趣存在于对隐藏在系列诗人身后影响的发掘，并在诸多作家之间建构起具有相关性和连续性的谱系关系”（聂珍钊、张鑫、鲍秀文等 2）。从这一意义上来说，帕洛夫的梯子不仅仅是后辈诗人怀揣一颗好奇之心攀爬之后就可以抛弃的东西，而是攀爬之后获得的更高的平台和巨人的肩膀。

对于自己的诗学谱系研究，帕洛夫本人是有着清醒的认识的。她一再强调自己更像诗歌的历史学家，而不是评论家，原因就在于她的诗学研究带有鲜明的历史维度。在一次访谈中，当被问及她把自己定位为诗歌的历史学家，是否意味着她的主要兴趣是当代诗学的谱系关系时，帕洛夫回答道：“是的，我想要试试看已经发生了什么，又为何会如此发生”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 42）。这个回答不仅道出了帕洛夫诗学对谱系研究产生兴趣的动因：揭示出诗歌和诗学发展变化的内在规律，为评价和遴选伟大的诗人和诗歌做出学理依据，还揭示出帕洛夫诗学谱系研究的出发点，那就是“基础性的诗学变化”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* p.5），也就是以语言和形式为代表的具有相对稳定性的诗歌元素。在这一点上帕洛夫深受维特根斯坦的影响。而帕洛夫之所以更为关注以语言为代表的诗歌元素，和她对诗歌的定义和评价标准有密切关系。在与诗评大家罗伯特·冯·哈尔伯格（Robert von Hallberg）关于诗歌评价标准的对话中，帕洛夫说：“在某种意义上，我对诗歌的定义相当传统、古典。我认为诗歌与

日常的或者通常的文本（就比如这一表述）之所以不同，在于它是通过凸显语言的复杂性、密集性，特别是关联性而成为艺术形式的”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 181-82）。这一定义表明，帕洛夫执着地认为诗歌是语言的艺术，包含着“承载着含义的语言”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 198）。这个评价标准使得帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究成为可能，也成为必然，因为相对于思想内容，政治观念，文化特征等因素，语言是最为稳定的元素。这样的诗学研究立场使得帕洛夫更倾向于形式主义，而与带有鲜明意识形态的文学批评保持了审慎的距离。不过，帕洛夫的形式主义与众不同，带有一种独特的“历史色彩和评价特点”（*Bayot xi-xii*）。可以说，帕洛夫的形式主义是带有历史维度的形式主义。而之所以如此，和她一直致力于探索英语诗学谱系关系的努力是不可分的。

二、诗学时差、诗学互文和诗学谱系研究

帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究既是历时的，也是共时的。帕洛夫历时的诗学谱系研究赋予了她发现“诗学时差”（poetic lag）的独特视角（Perloff, *21st-Century Modernism* 10）。帕洛夫非常认同庞德的宣言：“诗歌一定有其自己的时间性”。换言之，诗歌是一种不能脱离其时间和地点的存在范式的实践。这也是戴维德·乔纳森·贝奥特（David Jonathan Y. Bayot）在《诗学新解》“前言”中把帕洛夫的诗学定义为“副词诗学”（adverbial poetics）的原因（xxv）。帕洛夫仿佛是站在时间之梯之间的人，一边回望已经走过的阶梯，一边展望通往未来之路。例如，在《未来主义：先锋派艺术及断裂语言》（*The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture*）中，帕洛夫以未来主义为基点，通过回溯各种诗学变异现象，选取了过去、当下和未来三个时间观测点：向前追溯了未来主义的渊源，立足当下对未来主义的各种实验进行了广泛研究，并向后对未来主义的诸多文化遗产进行了思考。真可谓“一箭三雕”。可以说，帕洛夫的历时诗学研究既关注了“运动”（movement），也观照了“时刻”（moment）（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 58），并在二者的不断变化之中，寻找诗学发展变化独特的内在规律性。这种历时性的诗学谱系研究对于理解和定义诗学传统性和先锋性之间的辩证关系具有重要意义。比如，帕洛夫对自由体诗的历时观察就很有说服力：自由体诗从先锋性到世俗性的变化过程就是一种“文学变化的辩证法”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 17）。这个显而易见的例子当然并非帕洛夫诗学谱系历时性研究的主要目的。然而当她把这一思维运用到现代派诗学和后现代诗学的关系的研究时，这一思维的张力马上显现出来。在《21世纪的现代主义》一书中，帕洛夫提出，“现代/后现代之间的差别”只是表面现象：所谓后现代派诗歌其实根源于现代派，是“现代派的第二次浪潮”；而如今的实验和先锋诗学则是“胚胎阶段”的早期现代主义的结果（Perloff, *21st-Century Modernism* 5）。她通过对艾略特、斯泰因、杜尚和赫列勃尼科夫四位现代派代表作家的研究发现，当代最“激进的”诗歌事实上都带有现代主义传统。现代主义的力量如此巨大，以至于我们现在才开始真正吸收这个伟大的先锋运动，

于是造成了“诗学时差”。对于这一点，帕洛夫在《诗学新解》中又再次提及。在与杰弗瑞·塞德（Jeffrey Side）的访谈中，她强调说如今的令人兴奋的诗歌一定要从现代主义革新角度来理解，这一革命比奥尔森在“投射诗”和金斯堡在“嚎叫”中的诗歌实验要戏剧化的多（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 101）。历时诗学谱系研究赋予了帕洛夫一双慧眼，观测到了其他人从未发现的诗学发展变化的独特规律性。可以说，帕洛夫正是以历时的诗学谱系研究建构起了“现代派和后现代派之间的深层联系和亲缘关系”（Barry 833）。

帕洛夫的共时诗学谱系研究本质上说是诗学的互文性研究。帕洛夫认为，诗学不仅有其历史性，还有“互文性”（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* XXV）。基于此，帕洛夫诗人和诗学研究的一个基本模式就是以互文共建为基础的比较研究。比如帕洛夫的著名文论：“庞德 / 斯蒂文斯：谁的时代？”（Pound/Stevens: Whose Era?）就是对庞德和斯蒂文斯诗歌和诗学的互文性研究。这一共时的诗学谱系研究意义非同小可。比如帕洛夫对庞德时代还是斯蒂文斯时代的思考回答的是一个更深层次的问题：“现代主义的含义”（Perloff, *The Dance of the Intellect* 2）。对互文性的不断发掘让帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究取得了诸多令人惊喜的发现。比如后现代诗人热衷的“陌生化”（defamiliarization）一路追溯到华兹华斯的《抒情歌谣集序言》（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 16-17）；语言派代表诗人伯恩斯坦提出的在创作诗歌时，每一个词都有独特作用，而改变一个词就会改变整首诗歌的观念与艾略特在论文《传统和个人天才》（“Tradition and the Individual Talent”）中的相关阐释如出一则等（Perloff, *21st-Century Modernism* 63）。2010年，帕洛夫更是以引用、转录、复制等带有互文性的诗歌创作策略为研究视点，提出了“非原创天才”（Unoriginal Genius）的理念（Perloff, *Unoriginal Genius*），为英美现代派和后现代诗歌编织出一张互文建构的诗学谱系之网。

三、“细微阅读”与诗学谱系研究

帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究既是宏观的，也是微观的，或者更确切地说，是宏观历史思维和“细微阅读”方式的有机结合。所谓“细微阅读”就是既阅读文本，又阅读语境（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 26），是“活动于细节和更大的文化与历史的决定要素之间”的阅读行为（Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* xvii），因此本身就是把文本阅读和文化阅读相结合的开放式阅读。“细微阅读”对于拯救人文学科的危机、对重新评价现代派经典作品、对诠释当代的先锋实验诗歌均具有重要意义。事实上，从诗学谱系研究的角度来审视“细微阅读”，其意义就更不可小觑。这种阅读方式对于发掘、定位和修正诗学谱系来说是最合适不过的了。正是通过“细微阅读”，帕洛夫为语言派诗歌寻找到了厚重的诗学之源，为这个曾经饱受争议的诗歌流派被评论界和读者的接受奠定了坚实的基础。为语言诗寻找诗学谱系的努力开始于20世纪末，在21世纪逐渐酝酿成熟。在出版于2002年的《21世纪的现代主义》开篇，帕洛夫就以清晰的思维，简

介的语言,为语言诗派画出了一幅家族谱系树形图。从两位“斯泰因”(Gertrude, Wittgenstein),到法国诗人纪尧姆·阿波利奈尔(Guillaume Apollinaire)和美国现代派诗人威廉斯,再到客体派诗人和纽约派诗人,爱尔兰戏剧家、诗人塞缪尔·贝克特(Samuel Beckett),法兰克福学派,直至法国后结构主义理论(Perloff, *21st-Century Modernism* 211)。在《诗歌、诗学和教学辨微》中,帕洛夫在对伯恩斯坦、苏珊豪、西里曼(Ron Siliman)等语言派诗人的诗歌和诗学理念进行了细致入微的解读之后,总结出了语言派诗歌的四个特点,并在后结构主义的观照下,考察了语言诗派在语言的能指和所指的关系、诗歌和作者的关系、诗歌和现实的关系等方面的先锋性和艺术魅力。而她在论及艾略特的先锋性时,也在先锋的艾略特身上看到了伯恩斯坦的影子:伯恩斯坦关于语言诗歌“反对吸收”的理念与早期的艾略特的诗歌创作之间谱系传承关系远比与奥哈拉或者金斯堡密切和直接。在《诗学新解》中,帕洛夫对此又有更为详尽的阐释:伯恩斯坦的“反对吸收”与艾略特在“玄学派诗人”中提出的,多恩和他的小圈子“拥有一种能够吞没任何一种经验的敏感机制”的说法一脉相承(Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 13)。至此,帕洛夫为语言诗派寻找到了一个庞大、丰富的学理之源,成功地为语言诗派挖掘出了盘根错节、深置沃土的谱系之根。

值得注意的是,尽管同为诗学谱系研究,帕洛夫和哈罗德·布鲁姆之间有着诸多不同。很多差别是外在的,显而易见的。比如布鲁姆在《影响的焦虑》的前言中开篇就表明他试图“通过描述诗学影响提供一种诗歌理论”(Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence* 5),说到底还是以理论建构为目的;而帕洛夫则从来未曾试图以任何方式建构诗歌理论;布鲁姆的诗学影响谱系是以后辈诗人对前辈诗人的“误读”为基础的,而帕洛夫显然对这一理念没有兴趣。然而两位诗评大家之间最本质的区别却是潜在的,深层次的。具体表现为以下两个方面:其一、诗学谱系框架设定不同:布鲁姆的诗学谱系的建构是在他的“西方正典”的封闭框架之内的。而帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究的框架是动态的,开放的,只具有相对稳定性。布鲁姆的诗学谱系设定了一个绝对中心,即西方文学中心——莎士比亚;又设定了一个相对中心,即美国诗歌中心——惠特曼。而帕洛夫的诗学谱系则是彻底“去中心”的。对帕洛夫来说,经典是一个不断扩大的版图和不断新陈代谢的有机生命体。而这正是布鲁姆与帕洛夫那次著名的学术冲突的真实原因(Perloff, *Poetics in A New Key* 53-54)。其二、诗学谱系建构方式不同。布鲁姆的诗学谱系建构是一场后辈诗人和前辈诗人的心理战,而战争的焦点是诗歌的主题主旨。这也就意味着布鲁姆既拒绝文化批评,也绝不会在语言分析上恋战。而这两点却恰恰是帕洛夫的“细微阅读”关注的焦点。截然不同的诗学谱系建构方式产生的结果也自然不同。帕洛夫积极推介的语言诗也许永远进入不了布鲁姆的“西方正典”。而在布鲁姆的“西方正典”中失去了阵地的庞德则在帕洛夫的“个人经典”中找到了恰切的位置。

从以上的论述不难看出,帕洛夫的诗学谱系研究的确是她搭建的一条通往诗歌和诗学研究顶峰的天梯。维特根斯坦曾在《逻辑哲学论》命题7之前告诫

读者：“在爬上梯子之后就把它抛弃”（Wittgenstein 89）。那么，帕洛夫对待自己的这条天梯又是何种态度呢？帕洛夫以自己的行动告诉我们，她的梯子在被她本人不断地“抛弃”。这就是她不断自我否定的精神。纵观她的诗学研究之路，我们发现她经历了一次又一次的自我反思、自我修正，甚至是自我否定。比如，对现代主义和后现代主义诗学的关系问题的论证就经历了这样一个过程。即便是对同一位诗人，这种不断修正的精神也贯穿始终，比如在艾略特的研究中就充分体现出来。在《诗学新解》中，这种自我纠正的例子更是比比皆是。帕洛夫不断抛弃自己架起的梯子的做法彰显了一位严谨的学者尊重客观规律，不断自我突破，与时俱进的学术精神和学术境界。这是她自我前进的动力，也是她能够不断推进英语诗歌和诗学前进的动力。

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Call for Papers

The 4th International Symposium on Ethical Literary Criticism Dec. 19-22, 2014. Shanghai, China

In order to promote international academic exchange in the field of literary criticism, The International Association for Ethical Literary Criticism (IAELC) will collaborate with the School of Foreign Languages of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the A&HCI scholarly journal *Foreign Literature Studies* at the School of Humanities of Central China Normal University (Wuhan, China) in hosting “The 4th International Symposium on Ethical Literary Criticism” from Dec.19 to Dec. 22, 2014 at Shanghai, China. Scholars and literary critics all over the world are welcome.

Topics of the conference include (but are not limited to):

1. Theoretical Explorations of Ethical Literary Criticism;
2. Ethical Literary Critical Perspective on English Literature;
3. Ethical Literary Critical Perspective on American Literature;
4. Ethical Literary Critical Perspective on Japanese Literature;
5. Ethical Literary Critical Perspective on Chinese Literature;
6. Ethical Literary Critical Perspective on Literature of other Nations;
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The abstract of [or *and*] your conference paper together with your Feedback Slip is expected to be submitted via email by Oct.1, 2014 to the conference organizing committee at elc2014@163.com. The official invitation will be sent by mail or e-mail within one week upon reception of the above-mentioned document[s].

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Call for Papers

“Fiction and Ethics in the Twenty-first Century”

***CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 17.5 (December 2015)**

Deadline for Submission: 31 March 2015

Fourteen years into the twenty-first century, we are at a point when reflection on what has been achieved by novelists in the new century is possible and indeed offers a unique critical opportunity to look at what is happening now in fiction. The first decade of the 2000s has been saliently marked for its fictional creativity and diversity. Twenty-first century fictional writing is particularly noted for its peculiarly rich features, which entail the implications of entering into a new century and the potent symbolic evocations arising from the millennial and post-millennial discourses. Responding to such a complexity of ethical environment involving the natural catastrophe, 9/11 attack and its consequential war on terror, peak oil, and the financial collapse and its aftermath, contemporary novelists have not only transformed mechanics of narrative but also captured and recounted events in an ethical light. In seeking to capture the novelistic responses to our twenty-first century contemporaneity, a number of critics have embarked upon this scholarly endeavor, which is evidenced in most recent scholarly works such as Peter Boxall's *Twenty-First Century Fiction: A Critical Introduction* (2013) and Siân Adiseshiah and Rupert Hildyard's edited collection *Twenty-First Century Fiction: What Happens Now* (2013).

Unlike those existing critical works on twenty-first century fiction, “Fiction and Ethics in the Twenty-first Century” a special Issue of *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 17.5 (December 2015): <<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb>> guest-edited by Zhenzhao Nie (Central China Normal University) and Biwu Shang (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) aims at assessing and reflecting the fictions produced in this century from an ethical perspective. It tries to reconstruct the ethical principles in the storyworld built up by novels in the twenty-first century, to analyze the ethical identities of the characters and the ethical choices they make when encountering an ethical dilemma. In short, all contributors try to unpack the ethical elements of contemporary literary fiction, to pin down the ethical pursuit of the authors, and to display the ethical enlightenments of the works produced in this changing environment. Practically, this special issue will identify a diverse and wide range of novelists in the world. For reference, it might be wise to sketch out a few names

here: in North America, Don DeLillo, Cormac McCarthy, Margret Atwood, Alice Munro, Philip Roth, Toni Morrison, Anne Tyler, Jonathan Franzen, Jonathan Safran Foer, Claire Messud, Dave Eggers, and Amy Waldman; in UK and Ireland, Julian Barnes, Martin Amis, Ian McEwan, Kazuo Ishiguro, Salman Rushdie, J. G. Ballard, Rose Tremain, John Banville, James Kelman, Zadie Smith, Monica Alie, Ali Smith, David Mitchell, Tom McCarthy; in other European countries, W. G. Sebald, Elfriede Jelinek, Orhan Pamuck, Ismail Kadare; in Asia, Aravind Adiga, Moshin Hamid, Amitav Gohsh, Bi Feiyu, Mo Yan, Jia Pingwa, Wang Anyi; in Africa, J. M. Coetzee, Chimamand Ngozi Adichie, Zakes Mda. In attending closely to some of the best novels written by those authors in the new century, this special issue will make its utmost efforts not only to listen to the way that these novels respond to and project their contemporaneity, but also to probe into the ethical issues posed by them, to reap ethical experience from them, and ultimately to make us live as an ethical being.

Please submit papers in 6000-7000 words by 31 March 2015 to Zhenzhao Nie at <niezhenzhao@163.com> and Biwu Shang at <biwushang@gmail.com>. For the style of the journal consult <<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweblibrary/clcwebstyleguide>>. Articles published in the journal are double-blind peer reviewed and indexed in the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, the Thomson Reuters ISI Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Scopus, etc.



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